Tom Daamen

Strategy as Force

Towards Effective Strategies for Urban Development Projects:
The Case of Rotterdam CityPorts

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door Tomas Albertus DAAMEN

bouwkundig ingenieur
geboren te Amsterdam.

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Preface

This book is the result of a learning process. This learning process started to become tangible almost seven years ago, when I finished my master thesis. My interests in the who, how, and why behind urban development projects had been triggered, and I felt that I had only caught a glimpse of all the possible answers available to these questions. When I published the book *De kost gaat voor de baat uit* in the spring of 2005, it was this curiosity that brought me to accept the challenge to start a PhD research project. Now, five years later, I am happy to report that this curiosity is still far from satisfied.

The investigation leading up to this thesis is home to the department Real Estate & Housing, which is part of the Faculty of Architecture at Delft University of Technology. Here, it was my supervisor, Gerard Wigmans, who asked me to become a junior researcher after finishing my master thesis in July 2003. He also asked me to assist in organizing a new post-initial master course for professionals in *gebiedsontwikkeling*, a new area of expertise piercing through all established disciplines concerned with the (re)production of urban space. It was in the context of this new master course named Master City Developer (MCD) that I first heard of the project *Stadshavens* (CityPorts) Rotterdam. Founding father and first MCD director Jan van 't Verlaat, a currently retired strategist at Rotterdam's municipal development corporation OBR, suggested an investigation into the project. He felt that the CityPorts assignment had unprecedented characteristics, and wondered what knowledge could help those involved to approach this assignment effectively. Soon, I was asked to write a PhD research proposal incorporating this extraordinary case. This proposal was finally approved in September 2005.

Although this thesis is formally the end product of my efforts to fulfill my original research proposal, I stress that I do not see it as such. In the last five years, my understanding of the strategies behind urban development projects has changed completely, and that understanding has also changed me. Much of this is due to the inspiring and insightful academic work I have been able to study and subsequently build upon in this thesis – a legacy I will be honoring by using the plural 'we' throughout most of the book. Still, my changed understanding of the strategies behind urban development projects is also the product of my own observations and reflections. As an engineer, I had much to learn about the intimate ways people relate to the built environment in which they live and work, and about how deeply their techniques are influenced by the context in which they aim to realize their goals. So while I am completing the research I have set out to do, this thesis can also be seen as an instrument: a result that can be used to improve urban development practice and research and make them more effective.

The years that I have conducted my PhD research overlap with an important period in my life. During that period, I have been able to travel the world several times – experiences that have changed me both as an academic and as a human being. I have also been able to meet and talk with several extraordinary academics and practitioners, who have convinced me that I made the right decision when I applied for a PhD position. But most of all, being a PhD student allowed me to explore my interests and my talents, and learn

a lot about myself and my relationship to others. In that last regard, I would like to thank all my RE&H colleagues who helped me to conduct my research in so much freedom and comfort. Thanks especially to my fellow PhDs, to the always cheerful Juriaan van Meel, to the exceptional Ada van Gulik, to my roomy Yawei Chen, to the cynical (but fair) Menno Huys at TBM, to my dear friend and daily supervisor Gerard Wigmans, and to the phenomenon who convinced me to come to Delft in the first place: professor Hans de Jonge.

Here, I would also like to thank all my interviewees, both in Hamburg and in Rotterdam, whose experiences filled my research with meaning and direction. During my rounds in Rotterdam, conversations with Wil van der Hoek, Jeroen van Meel, Remco Neumann, Wio Schaap, Henk de Bruijn, Hans Beekman, Valéry Hunnik and Marco den Heijer have been particularly insightful. A special thank you goes out to Jan van 't Verlaat and Ria van Oosterhout, who have opened some doors for me on several important occasions. And lastly, I would like to thank all others within the Rotterdam municipality and port authority who have encouraged me in my research during the years, as well as my colleagues at Erasmus University. You are working on a truly remarkable port city.

My heart goes out to all of my closest friends, without whom I would not have had the courage and energy to finish this book. I know that some of you specifically told me not to put your contribution in writing, but I will go ahead and do it anyway. From Amsterdam, it are my druže Jorn, Bart & Heleen, Faf & Klazien, Roog, Tiny & Jasper, Lenny, Karlien, Coen & Lonneke, Wiebe, Thomas & Coleta, Carolien, and the boys and girls of US H5 who I should mention here. From Almere: Nick & Sahs, my goddaughter Zeliha, Jasper & Tessa, and Bas & Mandy. From Delft: Phil! From Rotterdam: Marcel & Hester. From The Hague: Walter & Astrid, and Bert Jan & Sara. From Alphen: Joost & Sharon. From Singapore: Joep & Ingrid. From Århus: The Great Dane. From Vojvodina: Dejan & Sanja. And from somewhere on planet Earth: Pim & Kate. Like it or not, you are all an inspiration to me.

In conclusion, I would like to thank Annemieke Krikke, Corien Smit, Mariska Roos, and the publisher for working so hard to get this book ready in time. My special gratitude goes out to my friend Menno van der Veen, for discussing several chapters of this thesis with me, and for reminding me not to take things too seriously. My warmest appreciation to Pieter & Fiona, Sophie & Gerben, Suus & Tim, Kees & Agnes, and Oma & Bonpa, who have made me feel part of the family from the very first time I met them. Their support has been very important to me. This, in turn, brings me to my Sarah, who has helped me through my most desperate moments. During the years of my research, she has by far been my most valuable finding, and I am looking forward to our life together. Finally, I deeply thank my parents for their unfailing love and support. This book I dedicate to you.

Tom Daamen
Amsterdam/Delft
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Studying Urban Development Project Strategies

1.1 The Problem: Ineffective Strategies

Since the turn of the millennium, Dutch urban development practice is characterized by a growing sense of ineffectiveness in realizing its ambitions. This sense of ineffectiveness is often assigned to a growing body of regulations, a rising number of well-organized special interest groups, and an increasing amount of ambiguous and time-consuming planning procedures. Solutions tend to be sought in the adjustment of existing laws and legal directives, and the formalization of new procedures and legal arrangements through which those involved may be able to work together. More recently, it has been put forward that many problems experienced in Dutch urban development practice are also the product of more social, interpersonal factors. Arguments about a recurring lack of leadership, expertise, commitment, trust, and perseverance have entered the debate, indicating these as crucial factors in bringing urban development projects towards realization. Indeed, there seems to be a growing awareness that realizing an urban development project does not merely involve different legal structures and instruments. It is increasingly acknowledged that effective strategies behind urban development projects also involve relationships and perspectives that allow people to work together enduringly towards shared outcomes. In an essentially dynamic and complex environment, it is important to understand how such strategies come about.

This thesis aims to provide a useful understanding of the real strategies behind contemporary urban development projects. Based upon an institutionalist theoretical framework and an in-depth study of one critical case, it proposes a power interpretation of the things people actually do in order to realize an urban development project. This interpretation is built around a fourfold definition of strategy – planning, venturing, learning, and visioning – and connects it to eight distinct resources that actors involved need to mobilize in order to realize an urban development project: property, finance, information, expertise, legitimacy, commitment, instruments, and time/result. It will be argued that this opens up a broader, more complete view of the strategies behind urban development projects, and that it offers the opportunity to uncover and specify what makes these strategies both legitimate and effective. In doing so, this thesis proposes a descriptive 'strategy-as-force' model by which contemporary urban development project strategies can be comprehensively evaluated and reflected upon. As such, the model is meant as a useful scientific tool in a common quest for a better urban development practice.

In this introducing chapter, we will give an outline of the approach towards the strategies behind urban development projects adopted in this thesis. This will enable us to define the objective of the research, and present its main questions. After a short introduction of the central case in this thesis – the case of Rotterdam CityPorts – the chapter concludes with an overview of the way we will present our results. However, we begin by providing a small excerpt taken from our case, followed by an explanation of the motive for the research.

In December 2006, several Dutch national newspapers recorded the decision to close down and dismantle the *Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens Rotterdam* – a semi-autonomous development agency. The two shareholders of the agency, the municipality and the port authority of Rotterdam, officially announced that they would take the future development of the CityPorts area back into their own hands. One newspaper added that the city and port authorities of Rotterdam had come to this decision, because they found it more logical to redevelop the CityPorts area themselves rather than to have a separate development agency do the job.[1] In fact, the decision concluded a process of negotiation that had lasted for almost a year. After less than three years of implementation efforts, the OMSR was set to be replaced by a new project organization that would be largely embedded in existing municipal and port authority departments. An OMSR executive explained:[2]

'Look, the content, the agency, they were based on an agreement between city and port. The base of that agreement was really nothing more, or less, than a division of power in this area. That's what it eventually was about: that people didn't want to share that power anymore. People were no longer willing to share eventual losses and revenues, to bear those risks together.'

1.2 The Motive: Changing Practices

The problems that cause the growing sense of ineffectiveness in Dutch urban development practice described above are not unheard of in other European countries (e.g. Healey, 2007). Still, it has been argued that the Netherlands has a distinct place among European planning practices due to a pragmatist planning 'culture' – a culture that is characterized by a growing tension between high ambitions and scarce resources, and a strong bias towards consensus (Faludi & Van der Valk, 1994; Needham, 2007). This makes the Netherlands a potentially interesting venue for studying how institutional changes identified throughout Europe take concrete shape on the level of projects. However, when it comes to the realization of these projects, Dutch practice has been losing its confidence and the capacities to solve its problems. While there is traditionally no shortage of compelling spatial plans, it has become harder to make those plans come to life.

Changing Institutions
The problems in the Netherlands make us aware of the fact that, while there are clearly similarities in the changes taking place in European spatial planning institutions, ways of coping with those changes tend to differ between practices. During the 1980s and 1990s, the private sector entered the realms of spatial planning throughout the continent. Hence, all countries witness a diminishing role of national governments and a rearrangement of formal planning powers across a diversity of (semi-)public bodies (Salet *et al.*, 2003). This has fostered an increasing amount of new public-public and public-private relationships, particularly in efforts to implement spatial policies, plans and projects. For many practices, it requires cutting across the formal structures of existing disciplines, sectors and jurisdictions, aiming to create collaborative relations and 'networks' that meet the

interdisciplinary challenges that spatial interventions are often supposed to meet.

In the last few decades, collaborative experiences between public and private spheres have started to change spatial planning systems throughout Europe (Healey *et al.*, 1997). Governments have found themselves not above but between the other actors concerned, signifying a definite shift in their power to enforce and regulate particular land uses and planning activities. Spatial policies, plans, and projects are thus the result of a negotiation process in which governments are no longer obviously 'in the lead'. Private actors, community groups and other public bodies have all become participants in an on-going quest for improving the way land is being used and developed. However, concerns about the effectiveness of such 'governance' efforts are still at the heart of many European practices (Healey, 2007). In the Netherlands, this seems doubly so. Here, the changing relationships between actors involved in spatial planning processes have often been expressed in terms of power, and the problems these cause explained in terms of paradoxes and dilemmas (De Bruijn *et al.*, 2002; De Bruijn *et al.*, 2004). In the last few years, debates have been converging around a new way of working with which these paradoxes and dilemmas are meant to be overcome. In both research and practice, this way of working is referred to as *gebiedsontwikkeling* or (urban) area development.

(Urban) Area Development

The 'Dutch' answer to the changing roles and relationships in its spatial planning practice is called *gebiedsontwikkeling*. Translated most literally as 'area development', *gebiedsontwikkeling* most neutrally refers to spatial projects of various geographical sizes, both in and outside existing urban territories. The rationale behind it was originally one of 'scoping', which was set to geographically enlarge a project's scope in such a way that public land development costs could be compensated by land transaction revenues paid by private parties. Since the turn of the century, the emergence of the term has however become increasingly associated with the broader neo-liberal shift in European planning systems described above. In the Netherlands, this shift meant that the hierarchical designation of land uses by government bodies made way for an entrepreneurial, developmental approach in spatial planning called *ontwikkelingsplanologie* (Needham, 2003). *Gebiedsontwikkeling* soon became known as the practical 'translation' or 'instrument' of this approach, reflecting a joint public-private effort to link spatial policies more closely to project implementation. Today, it can in fact only be qualified as a highly ambiguous term. The most popular view is perhaps that *gebiedsontwikkeling* 'stands for a way of working, in which government bodies, private parties, and other actors involved reach an integration of planning activities and spatial investments, eventually resulting in the implementation of spatial projects'.[3] But although this definition reflects some clear collaborative ambitions, questions around how this integration of activities and spatial investments actually takes place are often left unanswered. This suggests that Dutch *gebiedsontwikkeling*, as it is practiced today, is often more a promise than a reality. Its practice, it seems, is still in the making (Rooy, 2009).

Urban Development Project Strategies

The motive and background of this thesis is found in the enduring discrepancy between the institutional changes apparent across European spatial planning systems, and the

practice of Dutch *gebiedsontwikkeling*. Here, we follow scholars who hold that Dutch spatial planning institutions need changing if this practice is to discover the capacity to realize its ambitions effectively (e.g. Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000; Teisman, 2005). This quest requires insight in the relationship between institutional structures and the actual decisions and actions of actors on the level of potential *gebiedsontwikkeling* projects – projects we will refer to as 'urban development projects'. In this thesis, practices are understood as a dynamic in-between, i.e. an ongoing dialectic between structures and projects that is changing these practices constantly. By investigating to what extent the actual decisions and actions of those who intend to realize a contemporary urban development project are influenced by the 'rules of the game' – i.e. by studying their strategies – we will be able to shed more light on the difficulties involved in escaping them. This way, we may be able to increase the reflexive capacity of its practitioners, and contribute to the emergence of a more effective governance practice.

1.3 The Approach: Waterfronts, Strategies, and the Issue of Power

The quotation at the beginning of this introducing chapter is one of several instances in which we have come across the issue of power in our study of the Rotterdam CityPorts case. The issue is controversial.[4] It is controversial, because while everybody knows what power is, experts tend to chronically disagree about its nature and existence. But this does not make the issue less important. In fact, it has often been argued that power is of fundamental importance to understanding contemporary urban development project strategies. In this section, we will introduce why this is so. However, before we arrived at this assertion ourselves, we had already taken several steps in our approach to our object of interest. In this section, we will retrace some of those steps, and outline the interpretation of urban development project strategies we have adopted in this thesis.

The Waterfront Model
Like many investigations, the research presented in this thesis started with a fascination. This fascination was oriented towards a phenomenon that seemed to travel to port cities around the world: the waterfront model. We were fascinated with this model, because it seemed to be applicable anywhere and often resulted in 'successful' projects with impressive buildings and a high quality public space. Because our case in Rotterdam is also situated on the waterfront of a major port city, we explored some of the knowledge available on this model. This is how we started our research project.

The 'renaissance of the urban waterfront' is a well-documented phenomenon. A good example is a book by Breen & Rigby (1996), who conclude that waterfront development projects can be regarded as a 'worldwide urban success story'. Many of the projects the authors visited were able to turn old and rundown waterfront areas, once used but now abandoned by port and port related industries, into attractive urban locations. Nevertheless, there is also a 'dark side' to the urban waterfront phenomenon, as projects failed to contribute to solving the wider problems port cities are coping with. One of the most sophisticated explanations for this two-sidedness is provided by Harvey (1990), who presents the urban waterfront as a prime example of a more general shift in western society. Focus-

ing on the United States, Harvey shows how traditional spaces of trade and production have since the 1950s slowly been turned into a commodity, particularly for middle and high income groups. The waterfront qualities of these spaces ensured their attractiveness in terms of cultural heritage, symbolic architecture, and high quality urban design (*ibid.*: 92). After the economic and architectural success of the first waterfront development projects in places like Baltimore's Inner Harbor (see Figure 1.1), the waterfront model became subject to capitalist logic. It was repeated many times in places throughout the western world, and later on urban waterfront locations all over the globe. However, it was

also becoming increasingly clear that the focus on the most tangible features of an urban waterfront tends to mask the less successful social and cultural sides of these projects (Harvey 1990; Bruttomesso, 1993). Hence, we learned that the immaterial dimensions of waterfront development projects are likely to stay underexposed. Particularly in western port cities, where the process of de-industrialization has had the most dramatic of social impacts, a project's success cannot be judged only on the basis of its material results alone. It became clear that the outcome of these projects is more accurately assessed on multiple scales and dimensions.

The insights obtained from the available literature on the waterfront phenomenon had thus made us more critical towards their seemingly successful results, and led us to focus more on the common problems waterfront development projects in port cities are supposed to solve. Initially,

Figure 1.1 Initiated in 1963, Baltimore's Inner Harbor is widely considered the world's first waterfront development project (e.g. Breen & Rigby, 1996).

we were puzzled. The fact that these projects take ten to over thirty years to complete make it hard to think about them in problem-solving terms alone. Thus, we also started to think about waterfront development projects in terms of process. This led us to waterfront literature that defines them as such, indicating political and financial mechanisms as fundamental not only to processes behind the realization of waterfront development projects, but to 'all frameworks of urban development' (Malone, 1996: 2). According to Marshall (2001: 7), this is exactly what makes urban waterfronts interesting, because their high visibility makes them 'magnified intersections of a number of urban forces' that drive up political and economic stakes. This is where a set of more compelling and less presumptuous reasons for adopting a focus on a waterfront development project were presenting themselves.

Strategy as (Inter)Action

Combining the results of earlier waterfront research with preliminary observations in practice convinced us that our objective of comparing the strategies behind waterfront development projects could only be reached by adding a projects-as-process type of thinking to our research. Next to seeing our case as a 'most likely' example of the implementation of a 'successful' model, we could now also perceive it as potentially 'critical' processes in which the forces played out in any urban development project are especially amplified (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2004). This persuaded us to review some of the available knowledge on waterfront development projects in-depth, the results of which have found their place in chapter three of this thesis. Moreover, our new insights made us aware that understanding the strategies behind waterfront development projects demanded a pragmatic, 'both/and' attitude towards the reality of our case. No doubt, the strategies we wanted to study are primarily oriented towards production, affecting the development of infrastructure and real estate necessary to improve otherwise deteriorating waterfront areas. But strategies are also processes: enduring streams of social (inter)action involving the day-to-day tasks necessary to bring the future image of a waterfront area closer to realization.

The twofold view on strategies for waterfront development projects initially did not seem to be common in the field of spatial planning. However, this did not mean that there was a shortage in the use of the term in this field. After a planning research emphasis on comprehensive urban planning in the 1960s and 1970s, and on land use regulation and urban projects in the 1980s, an interest for 'strategic spatial plans' for cities and urban regions emerged in the 1990s (Healey *et al.*, 1997; Healey, 2004). In practice, the term strategic often refers to the reshaping or repositioning of what an urban region or city has to offer as opposed to others, expressed in words and images inside distinctive documents and plans (see Figure 1.2 for a recent Dutch example). However, since the turn of the millennium, the interest taken in these documents and plans shifted towards the way they are produced and how the future of the city within these documents and plans is 'imagined' (Vigar *et al.*, 2004). This interest was triggered by the fact that the experiential dimensions of cities have become complemented by cities envisioned as 'nodes' in a globalizing 'network' of social and economic relations, fuelled by developments in technology and informational infrastructures (e.g. Castells, 2000a; Sassen, 2001). The competitive forces to which cities have to cater are thus increasingly boundless and elusive, while at the same time, problems due to the growing diversity and fragmentation in urban locales demands unfailing attention (Healey, 1997/2006). The urban complexity caused by this global-local tension puts significant pressure on the practices of strategic spatial planning for cities and urban regions, as the process that has to synthesize a multitude of conflicting considerations (Verma & Shin, 2004; Amin, 2004; Albrechts & Mandelbaum, 2005).

Finally, it is in the work of Healey (1997/2006; 2007) that we found the term 'strategy' to reflect the twofold understanding for which we were exploring the literature. Healey (2007) recognizes spatial strategies essentially as an interactive process. This means that they are understood to be produced by knowledgeable 'actors', who engage into a 'restless search' for a powerful future image of a region, city or place. As these actors 'act' and involve a multitude of other actors in the process, the strategy they are aiming to produce is in fact already being shaped through their interaction with others. Once they find the

words and images that capture or 'frame' all considerations to the best of their knowledge, they are put down into a document or spatial plan. Then, as this strategic frame is publicly communicated, it accordingly starts to influence the way people imagine the future of the city around them. As such, those who produce the document or plan 'interact' with them, no doubt triggering various responses that may or may not contribute to the realization of what is intended. Hence, a 'strategy' is both a product and a process, understood as complex human interaction. Here, the product is primarily a strategic frame communicated through language or images by speech, plans and other media. But the process is ongoing, as it is first aimed at finding the

Figure 1.2 Image taken from a national spatial strategy for the western, most densely urbanized part of the Netherlands: *Randstad 2040* (VROM, 2009).

frame and then focused on retaining its key considerations – and thus offering a degree of certainty – through time (*ibid.:* 185). In practice, it is such key considerations that allow for collective action to occur.

Healey's (2007) interpretation of spatial strategies outlined here offers a useful but abstract understanding for the strategies behind waterfront development projects. In fact, the very term 'spatial' points out that this view on strategies is relevant for those of any level or scope. Later on in this thesis, we will show how our project of interest is indeed identified in strategic documents and plans on municipal, regional, provincial, and even national levels of government. However, on the level of the project, the 'product' of strategy is far more dramatic due to the concrete material interventions it implies. Especially urban waterfronts are, not least due to the legacy of their 'success', often if not always at the very center of attention. As pointed out by Marshall (2001), this makes the meanings and emotions people attach to them strong and diverse, and the interests involved in developing them particularly high. Finding a strategic frame for the multitude of considerations involved in waterfront development projects thus turns out especially problematic. It raises questions about the content of these strategies, such as how specific or abstract their 'frames' should be if any persistence through time is to be offered. Naturally, such questions can only be answered by studying these strategies empirically. For the theoretical ideas that will help us to find these answers, we turn to the work of Mintzberg (1989; 1994; 2007; Mintzberg *et al.* 1998).

Forms of Strategy

Mintzberg's work on strategy is also known outside the field of strategic management. In her interpretation of spatial strategies, for example, Healey (2007: 184) uses one of Mintzberg's most widely reproduced illustrations of the strategy process (see also Figure 1.3). It depicts how the trajectory of an intended strategy is often changed during the strategy process due to essentially unpredictable forces. These forces can emerge from anywhere, invoking an emergent strategy process that gets mixed up with the activities that were deliberately executed on the basis of earlier intentions. While some parts of those intentions will thus turn out unrealized, others will be able to persist through time and complement other, unintended outcomes (or those intended but unexpressed). As such, Mintzberg's concepts of strategy show that a real world strategy is usually found somewhere in between those completely deliberate and fully emergent, and that a real world strategy produces both intended and unintended outcomes. This means that realized strategies can only be fully recognized in retrospect, as a 'pattern' understood as consistency in behavior over time (e.g. Mintzberg, 1998: 9).

Figure 1.3 Deliberate and emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 1998: 12).

Although it is quite easy to see a strategy process as a 'pattern', most people think about it as a 'plan', that is, a particular course of action into the future. Mintzberg (2007: 5) concludes that this is because people are 'mesmerized by the myth of control', which is propagated by our conventional knowledge about scientific management[5] yet falsified by our common sense about reality. Indeed, where planned strategies imply full control and surprise-free implementation, process strategies leave room for learning due to an essentially boundless and unpredictable environment. This also means that if strategy is to be partly emergent, aspects of content will need to be left to others. On this point, Mintzberg *et al.* (1998) offer two more views of strategy, but this time defined by their content. One sees strategy as a 'position', namely the locating of particular products in particular markets. The other sees strategy as a 'perspective', i.e. as a fundamental way of doing things, because of a culture or by habit. According to Mintzberg *et al.* (1998), changing position within perspective may be easy, but changing perspective while trying to maintain position is not. Again, both of these views of strategy can be recognized in relation to spatial strategies. They specify those views of spatial strategy content offered by Healey (2007:

237) – spatial strategies as a position, as a perspective, or both? – and are useful for building a research framework. We will present this framework in the next section, and elaborate on its concepts in the next chapter.

There are a couple of reasons why the forms of strategy offered by Mintzberg seem to be useful for our study of strategies for urban development projects. The first is that urban development projects are surrounded by the intention to intervene in the existing development trajectory of an existing urban area. This is fundamental, because it is hard to think about decisions and actions that reflect no consistent intent or desire (Mintzberg, 2007). The second reason is that Mintzberg's concepts, like those of Healey (2007), allow for the interpretation of strategy as a collective effort emerging between a plurality of actors which will more likely follow the model of a political 'arena' rather than that of a single, rule-adhering actor.[6] This is because, in reality, rules are often if not always contested, even if the actors involved are part of one and the same organization. Moreover, thinking of strategy as an ongoing process that is both deliberate and emergent reflects the obvious reality of change. It does not assume a complete realization of perfectly defined intentions, nor does it suppose the complete predictability of, or full control over, all the activities and events that influence the strategy process. Rather, it assumes change, and thinks of strategy formation as a way of coping with that change in light of common intentions. In our research, these intentions are to realize a particular urban development project.

Strategy as Force

The assumptions about strategy that Mintzberg (2007) and Healey (2007) depart from in their scientific work – such as those of predetermination and control – are not devoid of any controversy. Both scholars acknowledge that in the respective fields of strategic management and strategic spatial planning, thinking about strategy in terms of change is still uncommon. Explanations for this lie in assumptions about the way decisions and actions – and thus the knowledge on which these are based – are produced, and can thus be given only by probing into the realms of philosophy and human psychology.[7] However, we will not look for explanations like that right here. We will address them in the beginning of the next chapter, when we appropriately position our study among the fields of research we draw upon. In this chapter, we will go back to our excerpt from the case of Rotterdam CityPorts, and introduce the issue that seems to surround all strategies that we have come across so far: the issue of power.

In relation to our case, we have already learned that political and financial 'forces' are seen as fundamental to the realization of urban development projects, particularly to those on contemporary urban waterfronts (e.g. Malone, 1996; Marshall, 2001). This means that, in research as well as in practice, the strategies behind these projects are interpreted and often expressed as being highly determined by these forces. The quotation at the beginning of this chapter tends to confirm this view, as the executive involved in our case talks about power in terms of financial losses, revenues, and risks. Politics come into view as the interviewee refers to a 'division of power' in the project area.

Our excerpt of the Rotterdam CityPorts case shows how the practitioner involved expresses the decisions and actions discussed in terms of power. The content of the power relations referred to – whether defined as political, financial, or otherwise – reveals something about the goals of the actors involved in our case, such as reaching a policy objective

or making a return on investment. It also says something about the capabilities of these actors, such as the ability to change a policy program or to withdraw from an investment deal. Through interaction, these actors can thus be understood to shape the strategy of the urban development project in which they are involved. Their 'orientations' guide their decisions and actions, and their 'capabilities' determine the potential of their influence (Scharpf, 1997; 2000).

Besides a reference to power, the passage taken from our case also suggests that the decision recorded in it involves conflict – both between municipal and port authorities, and between them and the agency they decided to close down and dismantle. Though it may turn out right to do so, we cannot immediately judge such conflicts negatively. As we already stated, we follow those who take a collective point of view on (spatial) strategies and allow for a contested, pluralistic model of interaction. In our study, the focus is thus on the decisions and actions of all the actors that intend to realize the project. As long as these activities reflect such intentions, we will thus be able to speak of an urban development project strategy. The excerpt provided above clearly refers to such intentions: city and port authorities have merely decided to take matters 'back into their own hands'. Still, the question of judgment remains unanswered. How can we judge the decisions and actions that shape our case? To answer this question, we turn to the work of Flyvbjerg (1998ab; 2001a; 2002).

Flyvbjerg (1998b) builds up his relationship between 'rationality and power' with a power-as-strategy view. In his study of the process of politics and planning behind an urban development project in Aalborg, Denmark, the dynamics of conflict and struggle are at the center of the analysis. He asserts that it is in these dynamics that the 'real rationality' behind the decisions and actions in his case are found. Flyvbjerg's view on power and conflict is both positive and negative, as both are seen as an integral part of modern society. Social conflicts are a vital characteristic of democratic society, and thus also of the political, administrative, and spatial planning practices therein. Hence, according to Flyvbjerg, it is rather the suppression of conflict in these practices that should be judged negatively, because it is the very option to engage in lawful conflict that is essential for the freedom and democracy we so value. We follow this argument in this thesis. For the judgment of our case, this means that it is not the presence of conflict, but rather the resolution of conflict that will be of special interest to us. It is to find out how things were decided, by whom, and by what mechanism of power. It is here that we expect to find a tension between the effectiveness and legitimacy of our urban development project strategy (Scharpf, 1997), and thus a chance to expose the real rationality behind our case (Flyvbjerg, 1998b).

1.4 The Objective: Towards Effective Strategies

The objective of the research presented in this thesis is to provide a useful understanding of the strategies behind urban development project strategy. By 'useful' we mean that it should be able to provide a comprehensive and more complete view of the decisions and actions that constitute these strategies, and that this view should provide a basis for actors involved to reflect on them and make them more effective.

The theoretical work we draw upon in this thesis can be classified as a sociological account of 'institutionalism', which means that we will be investigating the relationship between the intentional action of individuals and the structural forces that influence their conduct. In doing so, we follow scholars like Scharpf (1997), Flyvbjerg (1998a) and Healey (2007), who hold that such relationships can only be studied in the concrete. In this regard, the situational characteristics of our case do provide us with the opportunity to explore the structural forces that are likely to play a role in the Rotterdam CityPorts project beforehand, and evaluate to what extent this is actually the case. By exploring the available knowledge on port evolutions, port-city relations, and waterfront development projects, we will thus be looking to answer our first main research question, namely: What can we expect? This will provide us with a view on the actor orientations, i.e. the biases actors involved in our case are expected to have. Then, we will be able to unfold the actual interaction that the urban development project strategy found in Rotterdam consists of, and answer the second of our research questions: What is actually done? Finally, we will evaluate to what extent the actor orientations found earlier are also reflected in the intentional action found in our case study. This will allow us to classify some of the substantive elements shaping the 'urban development force' built up behind our case. In doing so, we will be answering the ultimate institutionalist question[8]: Does strategy follow structure?

Figure 1.4 Full conceptual framework.

Figure 1.4 shows our three main research questions in relation to the three concepts central in this thesis. The relationships between them are depicted as reciprocal, which reflects a mutually influencing view of the relationships between them. The curved arrow in the center represents the ongoing and dynamic nature of the reality to which these concepts refer. In the next chapter, we will develop the conceptual framework depicted here into an interpretive scheme, which will also lead us to specify our main research questions.

1.5 The Case: Rotterdam CityPorts

'In the next decennia, the Rotterdam CityPorts area is going to change significantly. The port will remain present in all its dynamics, but the city will increasingly interweave with its fabric. The ships, the cranes, the continuing industry and the fabulous views will become the background of a very special living and working environment. City and port are entering a new alliance.'

— *Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens Rotterdam*

The port city of Rotterdam is located in the constitutional monarchy of the Netherlands, and is best known for its large maritime port (Figure 1.5). Originating from medieval settlements on the fenland rivers of the Rotte and the Schie, Rotterdam has evolved to beset the shores of the wide New Meuse River in the middle of the Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt delta in North-Western Europe. Rotterdam counts just under 600 thousand inhabitants within its municipal limits and about 1.2 million people within the conurbation known as the *Stadsregio* Rotterdam, making it the second-largest city after the Dutch capital Amsterdam. Like many port cities, Rotterdam's population is signified by a higher level of unemploy-

Figure 1.5 Location of the Netherlands in Europe (left, dark green), and of Rotterdam in the Netherlands.

ment as opposed to other cities in the country, a relatively large amount of low income-families, and a very diverse ethnic profile. After the annihilation of its downtown by the end of the Second World War, Rotterdam rebuilt its urban core according to modernist principles. Its urban fabric is characterized by a north-south division, as the New Meuse River splits the city in half. This separates Rotterdam's downtown and northern, more luxurious districts from its southern, mostly working-class neighborhoods. An attempt to balance this historical separation has resulted in the implementation of the well-known *Kop van Zuid* project in the late 1980s, featuring the famous Erasmus Bridge (see Figure 1.6).

While this waterfront development project is still underway, Rotterdam's urban development aspirations have since moved farther downstream towards the North Sea.

Defined as *Stadshavens* or City-Ports, the last port areas within Rotterdam's outer highway rim have become the focus of a new waterfront development project for the next twenty to forty years. Initially, the CityPorts area consisted of four distinguishable havens or harbors: the *Merwehaven* and *Vierhavens* on the northern riverbank, and the large *Waal-haven* and *Eemhaven* south of the river. Later, the *Rijnhaven* and *Maashaven*, caught between the *Kop van Zuid* project and the CityPorts area, were added to the project. Together, the *havens* of Rotterdam CityPorts encompass

Figure 1.6 Birds-eye view of Rotterdam's *Kop van Zuid* as seen from the north-west towards the south-east, with the Erasmus Bridge in the center of the picture (ULI, 2004).

1,600 hectares of land and water. The area contains more than 850 companies, providing work for around 20,000 people. Here, about forty percent of the total amount of container transhipment in the port of Rotterdam is handled – a branch of transhipment that is expected to show significant growth in the future (OMSR, 2005).

This thesis is built around an in-depth investigation of the strategy behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project. The quotation above characterizes the content of the strategy as it was formulated in 2005 by the development company that was initially founded to affect the project's realization. Needless to say, not everything went quite according to plan. Our narrative of the Rotterdam CityPorts case will elaborate on how the strategy of this waterfront development project was formally initiated in November 2002, and how it has evolved up to May 2008. Our story is elaborate, no doubt defying readers who are looking for an orderly overview of what has happened. However, following Stake (1995) and Flyvbjerg (2001a; 2004), we hold that many useful insights are usually lost due to the reduction of cases according to

Figure 1.7 The CityPorts Area (Summer 2006).

theoretical frameworks and formulae. Of course, we have adopted a specific interest and focus in this thesis, and we will accordingly confront our narrative with a framework of our own. Nevertheless, presenting our research results as a story provides the reader with a more in-depth experience of the Rotterdam CityPorts case. This will make the argument for our strategy-as-force interpretations of the decisions and actions that constitute our case more thorough and complete, and will make our conclusions transparent and open for debate. An elaboration of our research methodology will be given at the end of the next chapter.

1.6 A Structure for this Thesis

In this introducing chapter, we have provided an outline of the research presented in this thesis. In doing so, we have tried to make it clear that the research has not followed a formal, hypothetico-deductive model of scientific inquiry. Instead, we explained the way we have come to associate and compare observations made in practice to theoretical propositions and conceptualizations that seem to relate usefully to our object of study: an urban development project strategy. It is meant to point out that the research has essentially been a learning process, exploring and selecting tools and concepts that seem to make useful sense out of the decisions and actions found in the Rotterdam CityPorts case. While this process continues, the purpose of this thesis is to present what we have learned so far. And for that purpose, we need a structure.

Figure 1.8 provides a schematic overview of the chapters in this thesis. Chapter two is mostly dedicated to an elaboration of the research framework already depicted above in section 1.3. It will explain how an institutionalist approach to the Rotterdam CityPorts case surmounts to a framework of nine concepts and research questions through which the three main research questions presented in this chapter are made specific and operational. In addition, the chapter will begin by positioning this study opposed to others, and conclude with an account of the methodology used in answering its research questions.

Chapter three explores and discusses some of the literature available on port evolutions, port-city relations, and waterfront development projects. The result is an outline of the knowledge that is likely to play a role in the decisions and actions that constitute our case. This knowledge is drawn together in the concept of 'actor orientations' which, on the one hand, refers to shared perceptions of the challenge projects like Rotterdam CityPorts are supposed to meet, and on the other to the role-specific interests, norms and identities that tend to be involved in such projects. The results of the case study will then provide a basis for evaluating to what extent the actor orientations defined in chapter three are indeed reflected in the behavior of the actors involved in our case.

Chapters four to six provide three detailed and largely chronological accounts of the decisions, actions and events that have influenced the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project between November 2002 and May 2008. Each chapter will be argued to concern one distinct period in the urban development project strategy recognized signified by a change of focus in the strategic behavior of those involved. The chapters conclude with a strategy-as-force interpretation of the decisions, actions, and events presented, specifying the different processes of strategy formation, actor orientations, and force relationships apparent in

the period described.

In chapter seven, we return to our three main research questions and answer to what extent the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy follows structure. The evaluation results in the discussion and specification of urban development rules and resources, which in turn provide the basis for theorizing the strategy behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project. It will be argued that the strategy-as-force relationships

Figure 1.8 Schematic overview of the chapters in this thesis.

specified on the basis of this critical case produce a useful explanation of the changes that occurred in the strategic periods defined. The strategy-as-force model will then be proposed as to provide a powerful tool for evaluating and reflecting upon contemporary urban development project strategies: a tool through which the Dutch practice of *gebiedsontwikkeling* will be able to produce more effective strategies for its urban development projects.

Notes

1   NRC Handelsblad (2006), 'NV voor havens in de stad verdwijnt' [PLC for ports in the city disappears], December 15, 2006, page 13.

2   Taken from an OMSR interview conducted in April 2007.

3   See www.urbanareadevelopment.bk.tudelft.nl

4   On this point, Lukes (2005: 61) writes that 'we speak and write about power, in innumerable situations, and we usually know, or think we know, perfectly well what we mean. In daily life and in scholarly works, we discuss its location and its extent, who has more and who has less, how to gain, resist, seize, harness, secure, tame, share, spread, distribute, equalize or maximize it, how to render it more effective and how to limit or avoid its effects. And yet, among those who have reflected on the matter, there is no agreement about how to define it, how to conceive it, how to study it and, if it can be measured, how to measure it. There are endless debates about such questions, which show no sign of imminent resolution, and there is not even agreement about whether all this disagreement matters.'

5   The theory of 'scientific management' was developed by Frederick Winslow Taylor (1913), and refers to the use of the scientific method to define 'one best way' for a job to be done (Robbins & Decenzo, 2008).

6   For an elaboration on how (collective) actors are conceptualized in (strategic) management theory, see Mintzberg (1983: 8-21) or Pfeffer (1981: 31).

7   For an insightful paper about the relevance of thinking in terms of change – i.e. the metaphysics of process versus the metaphysics of substance – for contemporary planning practice, see Van Wezemael (2006).

8   These main institutionalist questions can also be found in Hall & Soskice (2004), who investigate the relationship between political economies and the actual behavior of economic actors therein.

Chapter 2 Strategy as Force: A Research Framework

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we introduced the motive, approach, and objective of the research presented in this thesis. We explained that we are interested in what actors that intend to realize an urban development project actually decide and do in practice, and that we aim to build a useful understanding of the strategy that these decisions and actions constitute. A sociological account of institutionalism has been introduced as providing the overall theoretical framework behind our study. Within that framework, we put forward that we intend to answer our main research questions by closely zooming in on one distinct situation – that of a major European port city – and case: Rotterdam CityPorts. This way, we expect to provide a close understanding of the strategy behind a critical urban development project, and produce some propositions about the power mechanism apparent in it.

In this chapter, we will elaborate on the institutionalist framework introduced in the previous chapter, and shown again in Figure 2.1. This means that in the sections that follow, we will discuss and define the concepts depicted in it, and describe the way we interpret the relationships between them. Because this discussion draws particularly on academic work from the overlapping fields of spatial planning, strategic management, and policy research, definitions are considered to be of the essence.[1] Hence, the first section of this chapter will elaborate on what we mean by an 'urban development project' in this thesis, how we position this study within the relevant scientific fields, and in what way the overlap apparent among them helps us to link the theoretical concepts and tools drawn upon. In the sections that follow, we will subsequently be able to explain the way we have chosen to approach and interpret the Rotterdam CityPorts case (sections 2.3 to 2.5). Then, we will be able to bring our research design into sharper focus in section 2.6, and specify the research questions that we will be answering accordingly. Finally, section 2.7 will provide an explanation on what we have done to answer those questions in methodological terms.

Figure 2.1 Full conceptual framework.

2.2 Positioning the Research

In the previous chapter, we introduced the case central in this thesis. We defined it as a case of 'urban development project strategy', in which the term 'strategy' refers to what people actually do in order to get an urban development project done. But while our focus may be on the decisions and actions of those involved, we first need to be clear on what we mean when we refer to Rotterdam CityPorts as an 'urban development project'. It is therefore appropriate to shortly discuss why we have chosen this phrase instead of some obvious others. This will also help us to explain the way we position this study within the fields of research we draw upon in this thesis. Finally, we will be able to identify the overlap we observe in these fields, and clarify the intellectual common ground we have found between the academic works we build upon.

Defining Urban Development Projects

In this thesis, the phrase 'urban development project' refers to a framework of concrete material interventions inside a geographically distinct urban area. This means that we take the concrete realization of material products like buildings, infrastructures, and public spaces as the fundamental feature of urban development projects. In doing so, we follow an argument made by Van der Veen (2009: 16-17), who in turn refers to a distinction made by Koolhaas (1978) between a plan and a project. Here, Koolhaas names the Rockefeller Center in New York City as a relatively compact, spatially contained and distinct investment 'project' within an overall 'plan' for the development of Manhattan. Following this example, Van der Veen defines a plan as a framework in which one or more projects take place, and acknowledges that his case studies – such as the 'Zuidas' in Amsterdam or 'Battery Park City' in New York City – thus qualify as plans rather than projects. However, he then rightly asserts that such orderly distinctions are hardly ever made in practice. Here, plans are also called 'visions', 'programs' or even 'strategies' while still referring to the overall initiative as 'the project' (see also Chapters 4-6). Van der Veen (2009) concludes that project and plan must therefore be understood as rhetorical terms: they are meaningful only within their specific context.

Following the above argument, we have chosen to employ the phrase 'urban development project'. Like Van der Veen (2009), we have done so because of its neutral connotation. In contrast, phrases like 'urban mega project' (Carmona, 2003; Chen, 2007) or 'large-scale (urban) development project' (Majoor, 2008; Moulaert *et al.*, 2005) are underlining the seemingly unprecedented size of the geographical, financial, and/or symbolic features of these phenomena. As we shall see, the Rotterdam CityPorts project also answers to (some of) these characteristics. However, we may ask ourselves to what extent the specifications used here refer to something we have not experienced before. For example, Baron Hausmann's transformation of nineteenth-century Paris (e.g. Castex *et al.*, 1997) would also seem to be worthy of the 'mega' or 'large-scale' labels employed in recent studies.

The Rotterdam CityPorts project central in this thesis could also be referred to as an example of 'integrated area development'. In Dutch spatial planning, the level of integration would then be related to the degree of functional and material changes planned for the area, which is in turn relates to the amount of interests, disciplines, and government sectors likely to be involved in the intervention (Daamen, 2005; see also Teisman & Klijn,

2002). In addition, an integrated approach in the Netherlands also implies that the technical, legal, political, economic, demographic, ecological, and socio-cultural aspects of a project all have to be consciously taken into account if qualitative results are to be realized (Bruil *et al.*, 2004; Peek, 2006). In the United Kingdom, however, the phrase 'integrated area development' has an entirely different meaning than its Dutch counterpart. Here, the integrated approach counts as a normative response to the depressing social and environmental results produced by a market-led urban planning regime in the 1980s. This approach is meant particularly for urban areas ignored by private developers and investors, such as deprived housing districts and neighborhoods. Integrated area development thus promotes social communication and interaction, and does so in order to empower groups that have previously been ignored and excluded from the planning process (e.g. Moulaert, 2000; based on Friedmann, 1992).

Another label that could be given to the Rotterdam CityPorts project is that of 'urban regeneration' (e.g. Roberts & Sykes, 2000; Couch *et al.*, 2003). Similar to the integrated approach, this label roughly refers to a recognized necessity for balanced urban development initiatives that incorporate economic, social, as well as environmental objectives. If such initiatives concentrate on abandoned ports and industrial 'brownfields' along waterways, these could also be referred to as projects of waterfront regeneration or revitalization (e.g. Hoyle & Pinder, 1992). However, phrases like 'urban waterfront development' or 'waterfront (re)development project' are also often used, which renders these and other waterfront labels increasingly meaningless. In the end, the only feature that seems to characterize the projects these labels refer to is their specific location on the water's edge. Today, such projects are certainly no longer confined to cities with a significant port industrial history (Hoyle, 2000). Indeed, it seems that for a contemporary 'waterfront development project', almost any waterfront will do (see also next chapter).

The above discussion points out that labeling the projects we refer to in this thesis can easily lead to misunderstandings. In order to avoid them, we have therefore chosen a phrase that merely indicates that the interventions focused upon take place within the city – simply: an urban development project (see Figure 2.2). We do so, because the aim of this study is not to contribute to a discussion about the way particular differences between urban development projects might be theoretically categorized and defined, but rather to provide a useful understanding of the strategies behind the realization of buildings, infrastructures, and public spaces as it takes place today. Whether or not it is appropriate to refer to Rotterdam CityPorts as a plan or specify it with one of the labels discussed is not of the essence here. What is important is that, in practice, initiatives like Rotterdam CityPorts are usually indicated as projects, and that these are primarily signified by concrete material interventions within a geographically distinct urban area.[2] The reason for selecting an urban development project located on the waterfront of a contemporary port city is that, among all frameworks of urban development, these 'waterfront development projects' have proven to be particularly critical and insightful in terms of both content and process. In section 2.7 and in chapter three, this last point will be elaborated upon.

Scientific Position and Contribution
The above emphasis on the material outcomes of an urban development project strategy is, of course, deliberate. By doing so, we aim to give this study a specific position among

the fields of research that also focus on phenomena affecting the production of urban space, and point out the scientific contribution we are trying to make.

In Europe, there are growing research efforts that aim to theoretically 'bridge the gap' between spatial policies, plans, and projects (Albrechts, 2006). With this thesis, we aim to make a contribution to those efforts. As Albrechts (2006) points out, research has revealed that the actors involved in the political decision-making, spatial plan-making and project implementation efforts tend to do so in separate 'networks' and 'arenas' (see section 2.4). The actors in these separate spheres criticize each other when decisions or plans fail to materialize, or when decision makers fall short in defending particular plans or projects on policy levels. According to Albrechts, much of this has to do with a lack of understanding for the nature of each other's work, and for 'the social, intellectual, and political capital' built during the processes other actors were not part of (*ibid.:* 1489). In practice, this has recently led to approaches in spatial planning in which actors from different spheres interact with each other more directly and intensively in order to make sure 'strategic' interventions do take place, all the while breaking up or reshaping institutional barriers and planning procedures in the process (e.g. Healey *et al.*, 1997). Today, these 'strategic projects' are at the center of attention in European spatial planning research (Albrechts, 2006; Majoor, 2008). They can be understood not only as to transform the urban areas they are situated in, but also the very practices through which they are delivered. In this thesis, we will argue that the Rotterdam CityPorts project can be considered as one of such projects.

	Discourses	Main concepts	External influences
Origin of the term	Goal-oriented action and game	Assumptions of both static and *dynamic environment*	War sciences
1950s-1960s	Structural planning	Introduces the *process*	Theories of decision- making
1970s-1980s	Competition among critics Organizational planning	Introduces *uncertainty* and *performance* of the city as a system	Enterprise and organizational planning Policy analysis
1990s-	Strategic planning Strategic behavior	Introduces *interaction*	Governance

Figure 2.2 The terms strategy and strategic in spatial planning: contextualized interpretations (Sartorio, 2005: 29).

The term 'strategy' and the adjective 'strategic' are frequently used in the spatial planning field. Sartorio (2005) explains that they have probably always been around in planning, but that the first (systematic) use of them seems to stem from the 1960s (see Figure 2.2). This went hand in hand with the introduction of process as a main concept in the field, shifting attention to the actual decision-making behind planning endeavors. In the 1970s and 1980s, planning in general – whether spatial, organizational, or governmental – was criticized to the point of redundancy as most of its rational premises were proving false in light of empirical evidence (cf. Wildavsky, 1973; Faludi, 1973). As the empiricist approach in planning research grew, attention was drawn towards the interaction and power differences between those involved in the (spatial) planning process (see section 2.4). In the 1990s, the term 'governance', understood as 'the capacity to organize collective

action toward specific goals' (e.g. Hillier, 2002: 4) came into use. Strategic planning (prescriptive) was complemented by strategic behavior (descriptive), and are both established terms in planning discourses today (Sartorio, 2005).

This thesis and the Dutch practice of *gebieds-ontwikkeling*, to which it most closely refers, finds its scientific position in the diverse field of spatial planning. Kunzmann (2002) illustrates this diversity by depicting the indefinable core of this field – here: *Raumplanung* – as the planet Saturn, around which the moons

Figure 2.3 The different specialties of (spatial) planning revolving around the missing core of the discipline (Kunzmann, 2002: 33 as redrawn in Sartorio, 2005).

of more clearly definable disciplines revolve (see Figure 2.3). Fainstein & Campbell (2003) explain that planning theory overlaps with all the social science disciplines, because many of its fundamental questions concern the role of the state in social and spatial transformation. In addition, they point out that the boundary between planners and related professions such as real estate developers, architects, and city councilors is not mutually exclusive: 'planners don't just plan, and non-planners also plan' (*ibid.:* 2). However, the eclectic nature of spatial planning does not imply that we cannot be more precise about the way the research presented in this thesis relates to other fields of research.

The study of the Rotterdam CityPorts case presented in this thesis is interaction-oriented, and the theoretical framework we approach it with is sociological in nature (Giddens, 1984). We take concepts from political science literature (Scharpf, 1997; 2000), public administration (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) and spatial planning (see section 2.4) in order to specify the strategy-as-force relationships central to the scheme. Finally, we use theoretical ideas on contemporary spatial strategy-making (Healey, 1997/2006; 2007), and link these to concepts of strategy formation that stem from organizational studies (Mintzberg, 1994; 1998; 2007). In doing so, we follow recent efforts to link strategic spatial planning discussions to strategic management literature (e.g. Friedmann, 2004). Also, we aim to make a contribution that transcends the process/content, theory/practice, actor/institutional dichotomies still apparent in (Dutch) spatial policy and planning discourses today. If not restricted to a particular 'field', the latter means that the research presented in this thesis can at least be associated with a 'pragmatist' approach to spatial planning practice and research (Healey & Hillier, 2008; see also section 2.7), and with 'phronesis'

– a research effort which aims to understand values and interests and how they relate to practice (Flyvbjerg, 2006).

In conclusion, we state that we are aware that the body of literature on strategic spatial planning and strategic management extends well beyond the sources drawn upon in this thesis. As we pointed out in the introducing chapter, the theoretical choices made here are the result of an iterative process in which different theoretical concepts have been confronted with empirical observations. The potential usefulness of concepts has been a main criterion behind this iterative process. We emphasize that in this thesis, this criterion incorporates both the academic background of this thesis – which is also one of applied science – as well as the normative implications of the social scientific insights offered by the strategic spatial planning and strategic management literature.

Instrumental and Value Rationality

Since the 1980s, it has become well argued that western social sciences are threatened to become irrelevant to the practices they study (Giddens, 1984; Flyvbjerg, 2001a). In the literature drawn upon in this thesis, it has accordingly been evidenced that many theoretical products created in the past can be regarded as poorly attuned or even dangerous to the social practices they seem to address (Healey, 1997/2006; Mintzberg, 1994). Critics argue that this is due to assumptions about the nature of reality (ontology) and truth (epistemology), and thus about the way our knowledge of the world is being produced. Such assumptions – those that promote objective reason and value-free verification – are products of the philosophies from the Enlightenment era, and are known in science under labels like 'positivism' or 'rationalism'. For almost thirty years now, scholars have become increasingly aware that these 'paradigms' are inappropriate for solving the complicated social problems of our age (Schön, 1983: 31-32). In fact, according to sociologist Anthony Giddens (1984: 205), 'our era is one which entertains radical doubts about the accomplishments of Enlightenment guided by science and by technological innovation […]'.

Although still valuable for a wide range of research objects in the natural world, it is now widely accepted that positivist thinking in the study of social interaction produces too narrow a view of them (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2001a; Hillier, 2002). The perspectives offered are inadequate for producing a theory of spatial planning that can illuminate its contemporary practices, because analyses tend to ignore the important value-laden conduct that so characterizes them (Forester, 1993: 24-25). According to positivists, solutions for social problems have to be arrived at rationally, by objective and verifiable facts and criteria. To them, decisions based on values, intuition and experience do not meet the principles of scientific knowledge, and should therefore be made objective – i.e. rationalized – or be ignored and teased out of the process. In studies of spatial, political, and organizational planning, it has been thoroughly argued that ignoring the values and experience people employ in daily practice means to disregard part of its very nature (Forester, 1993; Flyvbjerg, 1998b; Mintzberg, 1998). In fact, scholars have concluded that too much social scientific work has been concentrating on what should be done, and too little on what is actually done.[3] According to them, what is needed is a scientific mode of thought that recognizes both the value-laden nature of planning work, and the active role of scientific knowledge or 'theory' within that work (Allmendinger, 2002; Friedmann, 2003; Rydin, 2007). Considering their arguments in relation to what we have observed in

our case study, we choose to follow these scholars. It is on their work that we will build our research framework.

Instrumental rationality	Value rationality
Practical know-how	Practical common sense
Oriented towards production (goals, solutions)	Oriented towards (inter)action (deliberations, resolutions)
Analytical thinking (technique, reason)	Experiential thinking (phronesis, ethics)
Deciding before acting (analyzing)	Deciding while acting (synthesizing)

Figure 2.4 Two rationalities involved in social conduct (based on Flyvbjerg, 2001a: 55-57).

Figure 2.4 suggests two 'rationalities' at work in the production of the knowledge on which human decisions and actions are based. According to Flyvbjerg (2001a), social inquiry should focus on values in order to restore what has been lost in the western pursuit of the positivist ideal: 'the objective is to balance instrumental rationality with value rationality by increasing the capacity of individuals, organizations, and society to think and act in value rational terms (130).[4] In contrast, Healey (2007: 244) emphasizes that presenting these different rationalities as a dichotomy gives 'too dualistic a presentation' of them. Instead, she asserts that if it is accepted that knowledge is constructed in social interaction, it follows that there are potentially many ways of making sense of observations and experiences. According to her, there may thus be a variety of 'rationalities' through which situated decisions and actions are argued and legitimized. This means that the work of scientific groups, and of other 'expert communities' can thus be understood as a particular form of producing knowledge/action in addition to others (see also Latour, 1987).

In this thesis, we do not interpret the contrast between instrumental and value rationality depicted in figure 2.4 in dualistic, either/or terms. In fact, we think it is useful at this point to explain our position in the way we believe knowledge and action are produced in the world. However, this is not to say that we follow the work of Flyvbjerg (2001a) rather than that of Healey (2007). In this thesis, we hold that the work of Flyvbjerg (2001a), Healey (2007) and other pragmatists in the field of (spatial) planning (see section 2.7) reflect the same basic values – like freedom, equality, justice, and truth – and that 'choosing sides' would therefore be missing the point. To us, their work merely reflects a difference of opinion on how to protect those values – a debate we do not aim nor wish to reconcile. We will explain how we have come to this insight when we add the concept of power to our research framework in section 2.5. This will make it possible to substantiate the debate between these scholars, and take position in it.

2.3 An Institutionalist Framework

In the introducing chapter, we already presented the institutionalist framework upon which the research presented in this thesis is based. This framework forms the theoretical background of our study, and links together the nine interrelated concepts that are

depicted in figure 2.1. In the following sections, we will define these concepts and link each to a specific research question. In this section, we will first explain how the sociological account of institutionalism helps us to build a useful understanding of the Rotterdam CityPorts case central in this thesis. Then, we will clarify how we perceive the relationships between structures, practices, and concrete projects as depicted in our framework. Finally, we will address the first gap we aim to fill with the insights produced in our case study.

From Actors to Institutions

In this thesis, we follow a sociological account of institutionalism, particularly that developed by Anthony Giddens (1984).[5] In doing so, we follow the work of Healey (1997/2006; 2007), who has been proposing that Giddens' theory of structuration is a useful theoretical tool with which one can develop a closer understanding of processes of urban development (see Healey & Barrett, 1990; Gonzáles & Healey, 2005). The theory offers an approach to the dynamic relationship between 'agency and structure', i.e. between what actors do and the specific context in which they do it. This means that, for our research, it offers a way to investigate and make sense of the way actors involved in an urban development project interact, and the specific time and place in which the project is situated. This is important, because while we know a lot about the broader economic and political mechanisms that are presumed to govern situated action, little is known about the actual influence these and other forces have on those involved and vice versa. Let us explain.

In social institutionalism, it is assumed that the daily activities of individuals are 'structured' by considerations that are both instrumental and value-laden. This means that human beings find it practical to behave towards each other in a way that is both consistent and socially appropriate. This is practical, because when they interact with each other in daily life they know what to expect from each other. In theory, the structured courses of action within a community that is based on this 'practical reasoning' are referred to as being institutionalized (Hall & Taylor, 1996).

In this thesis, we follow a threefold understanding of social institutions. The first part includes formal rules like the laws which actors in a certain community have to obey to avoid a legal penalty. The second includes informal rules like 'social norms that actors will generally respect and whose violation will be sanctioned by loss of reputation, social disapproval, withdrawal of cooperation and rewards, or even ostracism' (Scharpf, 1997: 38). Finally, social institutions include symbol systems (e.g. numbers, the alphabet), cognitive scripts (ideas, guides) and moral templates (values, desires) that produce the meaning of phenomena in a particular place and time. Together, all these institutions surmount to systems or 'structures' of rules, approaching what anthropologists define as 'culture' (Giddens, 1984; Hall & Taylor, 1996). In short, these institutions constitute the written and unwritten preconditions for human interaction (Scharpf, 1997).

The term 'institution' is often associated with 'organization'. According to Scharpf (1997: 38), this is because organizations, like acting individuals, are usually understood as social entities that are capable of purposeful action. This enables scholars to theorize on the behavior of these collective actors in a given market environment, law makers to prescribe what organizations can or cannot do, or managers to talk about 'organizational performance'. According to Mintzberg (1989: 7), what distinguishes the formal organization from a random collection of people is 'the presence of some system of authority and ad-

ministration, personified by one manager or several in a hierarchy to knit the whole thing together'. In institutionalist terms, an organization thus consists of a collectivity of actors who are held together by formal and informal rules that, for example, ultimately determine who is 'in charge' (leadership) and structure how these actors behave towards each other (internal), and towards their environment (external). Following Scharpf (1997), we will refer to these collective actors as 'organizations', not as institutions.

In line with the concepts of 'actors' and 'organizations' adopted here, we stress that while it is certainly true that only individuals are able to act, we know that in reality, individual actors will often act on behalf of another person, group, or organization. In our analysis of the Rotterdam CityPorts case, we will thus use Scharpf's principle of 'methodological individualism' (1997: 52-53): distinguishing between individual actors and the larger unit – like an organization, department, or coalition – only when actions empirically deviate from what is institutionally ascribed to them on the collective level. In our case narrative this means that when we define 'the municipal urban planning department' as an 'actor', we have empirically found those acting on behalf of the department as behaving collectively towards Rotterdam CityPorts project. If certain decisions and actions are in sync with the 'orientations' of the whole municipality, we will refer to the actors that produce them as the 'municipality of Rotterdam'. We will return to the concept of actor orientations shortly.

Between Structures and Projects: Practices

In her research on the practices of strategic spatial plan-making, Healey (2007: 21) speaks of 'governance cultures' as to define the range of accepted modes of interaction, embedded cultural values, and (in)formal critiques through which decisions and actions are rendered legitimate. In this thesis, we will refer to such governance cultures simply as 'practices' (see Figure 2.5). Again, we do this, because we want to depart from using complex, ambiguous terms. We define 'practices' as a conceptual middle ground, existing somewhere between 'projects' and 'structures', that is, between the level of the concrete material intervention and the level on which certain rules are perceived to portray continuity in time and space. Following Healey (2007), practices are understood as dynamic, constantly changing and thus escaping every stable, rule-adhering description of them. As such, a particular practice is signified by all the things those involved in a situated urban development project actually do.

According to Hall & Taylor (1996: 950), institutionalism sheds light on what a 'practice' consists of and how it evolves. They refer to the example of the 'network', a practice that emerges from an interactive process of discussion taking place among actors in a variety of forums about shared problems, how to interpret them, and how to solve them. Such a practice can also be recognized in that of *gebiedsontwikkeling* – outlined in section 1.2 of the introducing chapter – which has been

Figure 2.5 Actor orientations.

emerging in the Netherlands since the turn of the millennium. This practice is particularly relevant for the Rotterdam CityPorts case study which, as we shall argue, also draws on other practices during the process of strategy formation.

Actor Orientations

As pointed out by Scharpf (1997: 38), institutionalist terms and definitions remain at an extremely high level of abstraction, because every attempt to specify or categorize them is overwhelmed by their variety in practice. For example, to account for all the legal rules that might apply to the Rotterdam CityPorts case would be a life's work, and might then still prove insignificant for understanding the actual decisions and actions investigated, because the knowledge of those that produce them is bounded. This is where the mentioned literature on (the processes behind) urban development projects that are substantively like Rotterdam CityPorts enters the research. It is through the concept of actor orientations that we have incorporated the information it offers into our framework.

As Scharpf (1997: 62) explains, an institutionalist understanding of human interaction means that it does not assume – like for instance in neo-classical economics – that actors are fully informed about the state of the world (bounded knowledge) plus all objectively available options (bounded rationality). Instead, institutionalism merely expects that in a situated practice, specific combinations of knowledge and ignorance tend to be shared among actors and that, for the same reason, they will be accessible to the researcher as well.[6] Because strategic decisions and actions will be based on perceptions derived from the knowledge shared in a situation, it becomes of empirical interest to find out to what extent perceptions depart from the knowledge available (*ibid.:* 63). Based on the substantive characteristics of our case, we have thus explored some of the literature available on port evolutions, port-city relations, and waterfront development projects in search of what we defined as 'port-city challenges': the perceived challenges that an urban development project in a contemporary port area is supposed to meet.

Actor Orientations		
Perceptions (shared)	Combinations of knowledge and ignorance shared among actors in a particular situation on the basis of which strategic action is taken.	
Preferences (role-specific)	Interests	Specific (e.g. individual or organizational) requirements for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth.
	Norms	Specific expectations, conditions or restrictions in relation to particular action, or to the purposes to be achieved thereby.
	Identities	Stable emphasis on certain aspects of interests and norms in order to simplify choices and reduce uncertainty towards others.

Figure 2.6 Definition of actor orientations: perceptions and preferences (based on Scharpf, 1997).

Next to perceptions shared, actor orientations are also based upon role-specific preferences consisting of three components: interests, norms, and identities.[7] In figure 2.6, these role-specific components are defined next to the shared perceptions just described. In chapter three, we will present a review of the literature explored in order to define the

actor orientations we are likely to encounter in our case study. Here, we stress that the orientations defined will rely almost exclusively on institutional analyses. This means that the likely interests, norms and identities we will define refer particularly to the behavior of two collective entities recognized in the literature reviewed – in our case: the port authority and the port city administration. However, that this does not mean that we will limit our case study to the two entities defined here. Our story will include all actors found in the empirical material studied. Nevertheless, special attention will be paid to actors who act on behalf of the port authority and the port city administration, because we were able to draw out their likely orientations from available literature. After the presentation of our case study, we will thus be able to evaluate to what extent the real actors in our case follow the actor orientations found in chapter three.

Port-City Arena

In daily practice, actors build relationships with each other. Such relationships are often understood as constituting 'networks' in which actors produce and strive to coordinate their decisions and actions (Teisman & Klijn, 2002; Teisman, 2005). Moreover, when actors from different networks interact with each other in relation to a specific project or policy issue, they can be perceived to do so in an 'arena' (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Inside such an arena, actors can thus be perceived as to influence each other's orientations by defending their own perceptions and preferences in relation to the urban development project at hand.[8] Because different orientations imply different perceived challenges and thus different outcomes, actors can be expected to favor certain orientations over others. What follows is best understood as an ongoing negotiation, a constant 'push and pull' between actors involved in the realization of the urban development project (see Figure 2.7).

In this thesis, we use the concept of the arena, because it indicates that those involved in an urban development project are not part of one coherent organization as defined above by Mintzberg (1989), and that the same actors may also partake in other arenas focused upon other (spatial) projects, plans or policy issues as put forth by Koppenjan & Klijn (2004). In fact, the realization of an urban development project takes the efforts of a multitude of actors who act on behalf of many different organizations (e.g. Bruil *et al.*, 2004). This is why the decision-making processes behind these projects have also come to be defined as 'inter-organizational', understood as settings with a highly disjointed nature in which actors are constantly negotiating and influencing each other (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004: 44).

Figure 2.7 Simplified depiction of an arena (after Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The arrows indicate differing actor orientations.

In our case study, the concept of the 'port-city arena' will be used as a descriptive tool, effectively drawing a picture of who the actors are that intend to affect the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project – be it on different aggregate levels. As such, the arenas drawn in each case chapter are not understood to represent a closed 'system' or limited 'network' of actors, but are merely meant to get a first grip on the constellation of

actors involved as well as their relative capacity to influence a project's realization. Inside the arena, we will thus depict the (collective) actors whose decisions and actions reflect an intention to realize the Rotterdam CityPorts project. Outside the arena will be those who are involved in the project, but show no explicit intention of advancing the project towards realization (see Chapter 4-6 and Appendix 2). In section 2.5, we will return to the concept of the arena when we account for the use of concepts from organizational strategic management studies.

2.4 Understanding Strategy: Interpreting Situated Interaction

Conceptualizing the place where those involved in an urban development project interact as an 'arena' rather than, for example, a 'coalition' or 'alliance' is meant to reflect certain insights about the contested character or 'mode of interaction' involved in these projects (after Mintzberg, 1983; Scharpf, 1997).[9] In short: arenas conceptually allow for internal as well as external conflict. This signifies an important premise followed in this thesis, namely that it has too often been assumed – by scholars and practitioners alike – that the orientations of those involved in an organized human endeavor are completely aligned.[10] In this thesis, the common intent to realize an urban development project may be accompanied with considerable disagreement about what should be developed, how much, and for whom. In this view, strategy becomes a capacity – a capacity to link actors with diverging interests and goals to the realization of one and the same urban development project.

Urban Development Project Situation
According to Scharpf (1997: 59) the capacity for strategic action depends on two things. On the one hand, it depends on the pre-existing convergence or divergence of actor orientations, as defined above. On the other, it depends on the capacity for conflict resolution between the actors involved. Both are influenced by what we define as the 'urban development project situation', i.e. a project's time and place. This concept is quite straightforward, asserting that information about the history and geography in which the urban development project is 'situated' matters in relation to what future actors imagine and propose for it. In institutionalist terms, this means that the history and geography of the project area will have a structuring influence on its development trajectory (Healey, 2007), relating strongly to what more systemic thinkers refer to as path-dependency and policy inertia (e.g. Scharpf, 2000; Klijn & Teisman, 2003). In the introducing chapter, we explained that this is exactly what makes urban development projects located on the waterfront of contemporary port cities such interesting research phenomena: their location and legacy makes them 'magnified intersections of a number of urban forces' that drive up political and economic stakes (Marshall, 2001).

Our case narrative will show how knowledge of the history and location of the Rotterdam CityPorts project has influenced the decisions and actions of the actors involved. Again, the aim is not to give a 'complete' account of all the historical and geographical characteristics that have played a role in the interaction examined – like the legal rules referred to above, such an approach would be far to exhaustive and deterministic. In real-

ity, the knowledge actors have of an urban development project situation is bounded and will be used selectively in light of their orientations. It is therefore empirically interesting to study how the decisions and actions of those involved reflect the history and geography of the Rotterdam CityPorts area. In chapters four to six, relevant information on the Rotterdam CityPorts project situation will be presented in boxes that are interweaved in the case narrative.

Urban Development Project Strategy
In the introducing chapter, we introduced four forms of strategy as defined by Mintzberg (1994; 2007; Mintzberg *et al.*, 1998): strategy as plan, as pattern, as position, and as perspective. These concepts have already been introduced by him in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Minzberg, 1987), and have since then been revised and added to only mildly in light of empirical evidence. According to Mintzberg (2007: 15), this is because processes of strategy formation are essentially personal and social, and that 'these hardly change over time. While their trappings may be affected by new techniques and fads, the underlying human processes – personal thinking, social interacting, learning from experience, etc. – do not.' Only a fifth concept, strategy as ploy – defined as a maneuver to confront a competitor or component – has recently been judged as 'not

Figure 2.8 Urban Development Project (UDP) Strategy between Situation and Interaction.

necessarily strategic, in the sense of being of overriding importance' for an organization (*ibid.:* 9).

Although there has surely been no shortage of scientific debates around Mintzberg's concepts in the field of strategic management, we do not aim to discuss them here.[11] In this thesis, we are interested in the way Mintzberg's concepts may be used to illuminate the decisions and actions of those that intend to realize an urban development project. By confronting the Rotterdam CityPorts case with Mintzberg's fourfold view on strategy, we will argue that the concepts indeed offer a useful way to analyze the decisions and actions studied.

Integrating the definitions on strategy process (plan, pattern) and strategy content (position, perspective), Mintzberg (2007) defines four basic processes of strategy formation (see Figure 2.9). The first process, strategic planning, formulates deliberate plans with tangible positions. According to Mintzberg (1994: 333), empirical research points out that organizations engage in this process not so much to create strategies but to program the strategies they already have, i.e. to elaborate and operationalize the consequences of their strategies. The strategic plans – produced by analytical thinking as characterized in figure 2.4 – thus serve two 'capacities' or roles: they are media for communication, and devices for control. In other words, strategic plans – i.e. budgets, programs, schedules, etc. – do not only communicate strategic intentions but also what others must do to realize them (*ibid.:* 352). This reflects to epic assumptions underlying strategic planning, namely that the strategic intentions elaborated and operationalized in the plans will not (need to)

change during implementation – in other words, it assumes a fully stable or predictable environment. Additionally, those who have to realize the formulated strategic intentions are under direct and full control of those who communicate the plans. According to Mintzberg (1994), such conditions rarely, if ever, hold in organizational reality.[12] For contemporary processes of strategic spatial planning – and perhaps particularly for those in European practices – this is certainly also the case. Healey (2007: 3) confirms this as she asserts that it 'is widely recognized that the development of urban areas [...] cannot be "planned" by government action in a linear way, from intention to plan, to action, to outcome as planned.' Hence, next to strategic planning, the process of strategy formation must also be understood in emergent terms, leaving things open for unforeseen influences and new opportunities. Here, strategic planning is contrasted by strategic learning, which Mintzberg (2007: 11) defines as 'emergent patterns that result in a broad perspective'. This strategy formation process relates closely to what Healey (2007: 9) calls the 'intellectual project' behind strategic spatial planning, that is, the process 'through which new understandings are generated and new concepts to frame policy interventions are created [...].' In other words, strategic learning is the process in which actors redefine their intentions and find out how to do things in order to realize them.[13] In contrast to the analytical thinking involved in strategic planning, strategic learning thus involves the experiential thinking referred to in figure 2.4. Its role or capacity is to reflect on the frame, perception or interpretation of the challenge the urban development project is supposed to meet (see Schön & Rein, 1994; Scharpf, 1997).

Synthesizing and legitimizing a newly found perspective takes place in a process that Mintzberg (2007) calls strategic visioning. We associate this with the political nature of spatial strategy-making defined by Healey (2007: 9), seeking to deliberately mobilize attention, change discourses, and alter ways of working in order to move towards the realization of intentions. As such, strategic visioning reflects ideas and decisions about where to go (content) and how to get there (process), summoning up and simplifying them in order to imagine a future-in-the-making. Hence, it is understood as an intuitive, creative process aimed at influencing and persuading others to 'see' a development trajectory, providing meaning to the decisions and ac-

Strategy Content		Strategy Process	
		Deliberate Plan	**Emergent Pattern**
	Tangible Positions	*Strategic Planning* Deliberate plans about tangible positions. plan-making programming	*Strategic Venturing* Emergent patterns manifested as tangible positions. place-making discovering
	Broad Perspective	*Strategic Visioning* Deliberate plans in the form of a broad perspective. future-making imagining/designing	*Strategic Learning* Emergent patterns that result in a broad perspective. sense-making (re)framing/interpreting

Figure 2.9 Analytical distinction between four processes of strategy formation (based on Mintzberg, 2008 with additions taken from Healey, 2007).

tions this new direction implies.

Strategic visioning is conceptually contrasted by strategic venturing, understood as emergent patterns manifested as tangible positions (Mintzberg, 2007: 11). In strategic management, this process involves a discovery of the place where the product meets the customer (Mintzberg *et al.*, 1998: 12), while in spatial planning, it relates to 'place-making': positioning the urban area in relation to other spaces and places (Healey, 2007). While part of this positioning process may be planned and deliberate, another part is understood to be emergent. This strategic venturing involves the incorporation of new developments in and around the urban area – i.e. the region, city or locale – analogous to new trends in the marketplace. As already pointed out in the introducing chapter, Mintzberg *et al.* (1998: 14) explain that changing position within perspective – i.e. frame, perception or interpretation – may be easy, but that changing perspective, even while trying to maintain position, is not.

Urban Development Project Interaction

The decisions, actions, and events – or in other words, the interaction – that constitute each strategic period of the Rotterdam CityPorts case will be confronted with the fourfold understanding of strategy presented above. Hence, the concepts provided by Mintzberg (2007) will be used to analyze the behavior of those involved in the realization of the urban development project in terms of strategic planning, venturing, visioning and learning. This will shed a useful light on the different processes of strategy formation reflected in the case, and will motivate the strategic changes apparent in each period described. Before we move on to elaborating on how these strategic changes can be explained, we will first address some of the terms we have used to indicate our main units of analysis: decisions, actions, and events.

The fabric of the urban development project strategies pursued in this thesis consists primarily of the 'decisions and actions' of those that intend to realize the concrete material interventions they involve. In this thesis, decisions are understood as commitments to action, which can be found in formalized decision-making documents or articulated in speeches, interviews, newspaper articles and the like. The importance of the distinction between decisions and actions is related to the issue of power that we will elaborate upon in the next section. According to Mintzberg (1983: 4), power can sometimes be exercised between decision and action, which implies that 'effecting the decision is sometimes not good enough – it is effecting the action that matters.' Hence, focusing on either decisions or actions could lead to misinterpretations. Focusing on both and on the relationship between them is thus likely to provide more insightful information about how things were actually done and why. We thus take it that we need to assess both decisions and actions in order to provide a useful understanding of the strategy behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project: analyzing them in terms of planning, venturing, learning, and visioning, and explaining them in terms of power.

We have already stated several times that the decisions and actions that affect (or effect) the realization of an urban development project are understood as being motivated by a common intent. However, in light of the institutionalist framework employed in this thesis, it is important to be clear by what we mean by common 'intentions', because analyzing them can prove to be quite problematic. Giddens (1984) explains this when he asserts

that the things actors do should be separated out from their intentions, because, in reality, the things actors do often turn out to have all kinds of unintended consequences. So, what was done on the basis of a common intent could thus prove to have all kinds of perverse effects far from what was intended: 'If there are complexities in this, they are to do with how it comes about that a seemingly trivial act may trigger events far removed from it in time and space, not whether or not those consequences were intended by the perpetrator of the original act. In general it is true that the further removed the consequences of an act are [...] from the original context of the act, the less likely those consequences are to be intentional. [...] In most spheres of life, and most forms of activity, the scope of control is limited to the immediate contexts of action or interaction' (*ibid.*: 11).

Terms	Definition
UDP Situation	(Information about the) history and geography of the urban development project influencing the decisions and actions of actors involved
Actors	Acting individuals, usually acting on behalf of a collectivity of actors like a group or organization
Decisions	Commitments to action
UDP Strategy	Stream of decisions and actions reflecting a consistent intent to realize an urban development project
Intentions	Goals behind decisions and actions
UDP Interaction	Stream of decisions, actions, and events influencing the realization of an urban development project
Events	External decisions and actions influencing the realization of the urban development project indirectly
Arena	Collectivity of actors with a common intent

Figure 2.10 Terms and definitions.

Two important insights follow from Giddens' distinction between what actors do and what their intentions are. First, the limited scope of control referred to here provides a clear motive for assuming that urban development project strategies include much more than just the 'strategic planning' defined above. If the realization of urban development projects is indeed a long-term effort between interdependent actors acting in a dynamic and complex environment (see Chapter 1), there should be a lot more going on than planning alone. Second, Giddens' argument makes us aware of the fact that the realization of an urban development project is essentially the outcome of a profoundly complex and unbounded stream of intended and unintended decisions and actions.[14] Hence, when we talk about intentions in this thesis, we merely refer to those decisions and actions that clearly reflect a goal to realize the urban development project focused upon.[15] This means that the port-city arenas constructed for each strategic period of the Rotterdam CityPorts case will only include actors producing such decisions and actions. In the analysis of our case, the decisions and actions that influence the realization of the CityPorts project indirectly – that is, intentionally or unintentionally influencing the decisions and actions of those involved – will be defined as 'events'. Figure 2.10 provides an overview of the terms and definitions introduced in this section.

2.5 Explaining Strategy: The Concept of Urban Development Force

In the previous section, we explained the way we will interpret the situated interaction of those involved in the Rotterdam CityPorts case. In this section, we will elaborate on how the strategic planning, venturing, learning and visioning going on in our case study may be theoretically explained. In order to do so, we need to employ a concept that may be home to the field of politics, but has been penetrating strategic management and (strategic) spatial planning studies since the 1960s: the concept of power.[16] We will do so by first explaining how power connects the terms and concepts as defined in this chapter up to this point. Then, we will elaborate on the relationship between strategy and power, defining it as a productive capacity or transformative force both shaping and shaped by the practice in which it operates. Finally, we will confront the four processes of strategy formation defined above with a typology of force relations, and explain how we aim to operationalize the concept of 'urban development force' they constitute.

Configurations of Power

In the introducing chapter, we explained that the research presented in this thesis finds its motive in the shifting relationships occurring between the private and (semi-)public spheres in countries throughout Europe (e.g. Salet *et al.*, 2003), and in the increased sense of ineffectiveness in organizing spatial planning efforts like the realization of urban development projects (e.g. Healey, 2007). On a general level, we established that the changing context of spatial planning has undeniable implications for the ability to organize projects effectively, and that it is in the relationship between them that new ways of working may be invented (e.g. Albrechts & Mandelbaum, 2005). Then, we presented Dutch *gebiedsontwikkeling* as the potential label for these new ways of working, and that solving its contemporary problems may be helped by providing a useful understanding of its daily struggle. In the literature on which our research framework is based, we have thus found theoretical tools and concepts that offer a useful understanding of the relationships between the behavior of actors in practice and the context in which they find themselves. In the literature reviewed, these relationships are consistently explained in terms of power.

The different types of strategic conduct defined by Mintzberg (2007) are founded on different 'power configurations' between an organization – defined by the degree of stability of its internal structure – and its market environment – defined by the predictability of the context in which it finds itself. Mintzberg's theory of configuration is based upon 'ideal types' of relationships between organizational structure and degrees of environmental predictability (1983; 1994; Mintzberg *et al.*, 1998). It proposes, for example, that an extremely dynamic and thus unpredictable organizational environment thus fits most naturally with, and so tries to give rise to, a politicized or divided internal structure (Mintzberg, 1983: 306). Large, machine-like organizations will thus be most effective in stable external environments, and will try to do everything they can to keep their context predictable. This, in turn, will allow them to plan ahead, making strategic planning their main activity in working towards the future. In contrast, dynamic external environments are associated with strong leadership, probably combined with small, team-like structures that allow an organization to maneuver, enabling them to react effectively to new external trends and developments. According to Mintzberg (2008), the strategic conduct of these

organizations converges particularly around visioning and learning, so trying to give rise to a continuously divided, unpredictable context. From all this theory, it logically follows that large bureaucratic organizations will find it hard to act effectively in a context that changes rapidly, and that this will destabilize its internal structure and force it to adapt. Mintzberg (1983) asserts that such misfits are likely to cause an organization to relapse into a functional hybrid that may best be typified as a political arena – a concept we have already introduced into our framework in section 2.3.[17]

The 'ideal types' defined in Mintzberg's work – such as the machine organization just described – have been criticized for the fact that no real-life organizations fit into them, claiming that the power configurations they are based on must therefore be flawed. Mintzberg *et al.* (1998: 345) defend themselves by stating that reality is always more complex than any theory can describe, and that real-life organizations are thus always an in-between, moving somewhere between different configurations of power as they decide and act their way into the future. The theory of configuration merely states that in these decisions and actions, notions of strategic planning, venturing, learning, and visioning may be recognized, and that this provides a useful explanation of the relationship between the character of an organization's internal structure and its external environment. In this thesis, we follow this theory in recognizing that the structure of any collectivity of actors with a common intent – whether an organization, coalition, alliance, group, etc. – is always in flux, and that the environment in which it deploys its activities is relentlessly dynamic. It is here that we find the fundamental reason for choosing this theory over others in our approach to the strategies behind contemporary urban development projects (see also section 2.7.[18]

Figure 2.11 The Concept of Urban Development (UD) Force

Strategy as Force

In this thesis, the concept of power does not only provide a useful understanding of what those involved in the realization of an urban development project do. It also offers a way to address the question why. In this theory of structuration, Giddens (1984: 15) asserts that theorists have defined the notion of power either as the capacity of actors to achieve desired and intended outcomes, or as a property of society, dominating all our desires, intentions, and thus our decisions and actions. Those that favor the first notion explain decisions and actions by assuming complete freedom in the relationships between (collectivities of) actors – e.g. by assuming a free market environment in neo-classical economics. Such an interpretation would make the 'resources' these actors are able to mobilize determinant for their capacity to act and to pursue their intentions. In contrast, those that favor the second notion of power give priority to the institutions or 'rules' of the practices they study, and explain the behavior of actors within those practices as dominated or controlled. To these 'structuralists', the outcome of any collective endeavor would thus adhere to the rules of 'the system'.

In contrast to these opposing theoretical ideas, we have already explained that we follow Giddens (1984) in turning away from this dualism. This means that we do not conceive of the actors in our case as units behaving like automata, dominated by the rules of society at large. Although their behavior will surely be influenced by those rules, we take it that these actors may always decide and act against them, and that their capacity to do so depends, in turn, on the resources they are able to mobilize. This implies that when an increasing amount of actors decide and act differently than rules dictate, formerly prevailing systems will eventually be changed, i.e. transformed into new structures. This is the reciprocal nature of the relationship between 'structure and agency' as put forth by Giddens (1984), or between the 'institutions and actors' as described in section 2.3.[19] In our research framework, the ongoing 'dialectic of control' between urban development resources and rules is reflected in the double-pointed arrows connecting the concepts (see Figure 2.11).[20] This dialectic between resources and rules is where we locate the dynamic concept of 'urban development force', defined as the capacity to effect (or affect) the realization of an urban development project.[21] [22]

In this thesis, we confront Mintzberg's (2007) processes of strategy formation with the concept of urban development force as they are both shaped by the same fabric, namely social interaction. Following Giddens (1984), we take it that urban development force depends on the mobilization of a definite amount of resources. In the case of Rotterdam CityPorts, these resources are mobilized when actors are attracted to our 'port-city arena', because the actors see them as a vehicle for satisfying their basic interests – defined above as 'specific requirements for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth' (after Scharpf, 1997). However, because these actors will have differing orientations, each will try to influence the other by mobilizing particular action resources, of which Giddens (1984) distinguishes two types: allocative and authoritative.[23] Authoritative resources refer to the power certain actors exercise 'over' others, i.e. the resources that these actors draw upon to be able to coordinate (i.e. to affect) what others do – like mobilizing a law enforcement agency. Allocative resources refer to the power 'to' effect the actions of others, i.e. the resources drawn upon to have others do what they might otherwise not do or choose to do differently – like mobilizing money in order to commission tasks. This means that power is both negative and positive (Flyvbjerg, 2001a), i.e. oppressive as well as generative (Healey, 2007). Moreover, it means that power cannot be possessed: it can only be exercised in relation to one another. When we write about urban development force in this thesis, we are thus writing about power relations between a collectivity of acting individuals who are able to allocatively effect and authoritatively affect the realization of an urban development project. When we write about strategy-as-force, we mean the shaping of the relationships through which urban development projects are realized.

In the western world, allocative resources speak most to the minds of people, as power here stems more concretely from control over tangible products, or over the means of material production. Giddens (1984: 258-9) acknowledges the impact of allocative resources on any coordination of a situated practice, but also explains that it has long been conventional to emphasize allocative resources despite the parallel significance of authoritative resources in that coordination. We recognize the necessity for a counterbalance with the stress Mintzberg (1994) puts on the intuitive and experiential work involved in the reality of strategic management, and with the attention paid to the political and intellec-

tual work involved in actual spatial strategy-making by Healey (2007). In our case study, we will indicate both the authoritative and allocative resources apparent in the urban development force relations shaped in the Rotterdam CityPorts case, and argue that all prove to be of equally vital importance for realizing the urban development project. Moreover, we will particularly focus on how the orientations of resourceful actors are both shaping and shaped by the processes of strategy formation as they become attracted to, or distracted from, the port-city arena. This will help us to specify the dynamic strategy-as-force relations between actors who are able to mobilize the irreplaceable, unalienable resources needed to realize the Rotterdam CityPorts project, and actors whose resources can be substituted by those of others. In other words, we will be able to operationalize the power 'mechanisms' (Flyvbjerg, 2001a) or 'rationalities' (Albrechts, 2003; 2004) at work in our case.

Figure 2.12 Proposed typology of strategy-as-force relationships and constituent resources confronted with Mintzberg's (2007) forms of strategy.

Figure 2.12 confronts the deliberate and emergent processes of strategy formation defined by Mintzberg (2007) with the allocative and authoritative dimensions of power defined by Giddens (1984). It depicts four pairs of 'urban development resources', each consisting of an inalienable category – property, expertise, legitimacy, and instruments – and a substitutable category – finance, information, commitment, and time/result.[24] We will argue that the Rotterdam CityPorts case reflects a stream of decisions and actions aimed at mobilizing these eight categories of urban development resources, and that these decisions and actions can be interpreted in terms of strategic planning, venturing, learning and visioning. The case will show how the actors involved effectively shape the force relationships that we propose are necessary to effect (and affect) the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project. In addition, we will argue how the concepts presented in this chapter help us to recognize the strategic changes apparent in the case, and explain them by specifying the elements of the resources mobilized and withdrawn in each strategic period defined.

It should be emphasized here that the urban development resources categorized in figure 2.12 are not meant as simple 'building blocks'. In our conception, the capacity to realize an urban development project grows and weakens through time, and is thus in need of the unfailing efforts of a collectivity of interdependent actors. Our case will show that even formal rules and decisions offer no guarantee for an effective strategy: what matters are the actions these rules and decisions produce, i.e. whether or not actors continue

to dedicate their scarce resources to collective outcomes. When they do so, the case will illustrate how the actors that created the internal stability of the arena – by strategic planning and venturing – will try to give rise to a stable external environment – by visioning and learning. We will argue that this provides a useful understanding of the strategy behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project. In turn, its critical characteristics will be a basis for producing some more general propositions.

Evaluating UDP Strategy

Leading scholars in the field of spatial planning have argued that an understanding of the social interaction producing spatial policies, plans, and projects cannot do without the concept of power (e.g. Friedmann, 1998). Nonetheless, Flyvbjerg (2002) finds that 'unlike political science and sociology, the field of [spatial] planning research still lacks a regular body of central monographs and articles which place power relations at their core'. Since this remark, there have been some significant efforts answering the call to 'bring power to planning research' (e.g. Hillier, 2002; Albrechts, 2003; 2004; Allen, 2004; Hoch, 2007; Healey, 2007). Although there is considerable common ground in these works, none of these efforts seem to have produced a generally accepted conceptualization of power. This, nevertheless, should be regarded quite normal. Today, it is clearly understood that any theory on the workings of a complex social phenomenon is inherently context-dependent and enmeshed with personal values (Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Allmendinger, 2002). This means that many theoretical accounts of power in the spatial planning field may co-exist, depending on the object of study, the time and place within which it was studied, and the purposes and convictions behind the study itself (see Lukes, 1974/2005). It would thus make no sense – at least at this point in the process of theory development – to try and propose a conceptualization of power that transcends all those apparent in the spatial planning literature. Inspired by the case of Rotterdam CityPorts and the literature reviewed, this thesis is merely set to synthesize and specify some of the concepts that have been found useful in explaining the things those involved in our case do when they engage in a collective effort to realize an urban development project. As such, this thesis is meant as a contribution to the empirical insights already accumulated in the concepts employed, and as a sign of agreement with the fundamental values they reflect.

Acknowledging that any account of spatial planning theory has a normative dimension to it, scholars have been very explicit in seeking out the principles on which they base their analyses and conclusions. A central discussion within the spatial planning literature is how to understand the role of power in contemporary spatial planning processes, and in what way to criticize one power structure and to propose (a way towards) another. Arguments have often been built around the work of two monumental thinkers, that of the Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas.[25] Although often interpreted as two opposing views on the working power in human society, presenting the disagreement between them as an opposition is rather unproductive if not false (Hillier, 2002). In contrast, we would rather follow those who claim that the common ground between Foucault and Habermas was to offer a way to approach and analyze the power relations at work in our society, but that they differed in their opinion about how to go about them once they are uncovered.[26] Some will hold that Habermas goes a step further than Foucault, because he also provides the tools to criticize existing power structures where Foucault refrains from making any

normative evaluations. Others will argue that Foucault's work is more profound, because any normative standpoint runs the risk of (re)producing the very power relations it aims to address. Indeed, Foucault asserted that there is nothing exterior to power, not even (or especially not) the power analyst (Foucault, 1990). So any norm, any ideal, is by definition a product of existing power relations, and can be understood only in reference to the historical development of the current, apparently undesirable situation (Rabinow, 1984; Flyvbjerg, 2001ab).

Answering the question of whether or not Foucault's and Habermas' thought worlds can or should be reconciled is beyond the scope of this thesis. The relevance for spatial planning research is that both scholars offer distinct tools for revealing and addressing the power relations reflected in social interaction. What is important is that these tools are meant to make people (whether practitioners, scholars, or both) reflect on what they are doing, make them aware of the unequal forces influencing their decisions and actions in daily practice, and find ways to actually change them (see Moulaert & Cabaret, 2006). Where the strategies behind the realization of urban development projects have an impact on the lives of others, many or few, we believe that these decisions and actions should reflect the fundamental values of the society in which they are effectuated. As our case is situated in the Netherlands, and because the scholarly work we build upon is mostly North-Western European, it should be clear that these values are rooted in a quest for freedom, and thus, in democracy – a system of control guiding us to some distant place where human kind might not need it anymore.[27] In the concrete reality of our case, this means that we will evaluate how (process) and on the basis of what substantive knowledge (content) decisions and actions of those involved in the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project are produced. This evaluation will be grounded in the 'situational ethics' (Flyvbjerg, 2001a) of our case, showing how the key actors walk the fine line between the legitimacy and effectiveness (Scharpf, 1997) of their 'urban development project strategy'.

2.6 Research Design

In this thesis, we do not aim to measure the power relations we substantiate in the case chapters. In the theories and concepts brought together in this chapter, power is consistently understood to exist only between acting individuals – it thus cannot be possessed. Hence, what we are interested in are the dynamic power relations between the actors involved in the realization of a contemporary urban development project. Based on the critical case of Rotterdam CityPorts, we will argue that interpreting the behavior of the actors involved in terms of strategy and power provides a useful understanding of what they decide and do. In this chapter we have defined the theoretical tools and concepts we employ in our strategy-as-force interpretation of the Rotterdam CityPorts case. By doing so, we operationalized the three main research questions we presented in the introducing chapter:

What can we expect? What is actually done? Does strategy follow structure?

	What can we expect?		*What is actually done?*		*Does strategy follow structure?*
Structures	Port-City Challenges *What are the perceived challenges that urban development projects in the port-city interface are supposed to meet?*	↔	Urban Development Situation *What historical and geographical characteristics influence the project's development trajectory?*	↔	Urban Development Rules *What rules structure the decisions and actions of those involved in the urban development project?*
	↕		↕		↕
Practices	Actor Orientations *What orientations are likely to shape the capacity for strategic action in the development of the port-city interface?* *Key concepts* perceptions, interests, norms, identities	↔	Urban Development Strategy *What pattern can be recognized in the processes of strategy formation behind an urban development project?* *Key concepts* planning, visioning, learning, venturing	↔	Urban Development Force *To what extent do the force relations identified shape an urban development project strategy?* *Key concepts* knowledge, material, deliberative, planning
	↕		↕		↕
Projects	Port-City Arena *Who are the actors that intend to effect (or affect) the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project?*	↔	Urban Development Interaction *What decisions, actions, and events have influenced the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project?*	↔	Urban Development Resources *What resources are mobilized by the actors that intend to effect (or affect) the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project?*

Figure 2.13 Overview of specific research questions in relation to the research framework.

In this chapter, we operationalized our main research questions in two ways. First, we introduced the concept of 'actor orientations', by which we aim to explore to what extent information available about port evolutions, port-city relations and waterfront development projects is reflected in the actual decisions and actions that shape the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy. We will do this by reviewing the literature on these topics in chapter three concluded by a definition of common perceptions of port-city challenges and two theoretically institutionalized sets of interests, norms and identities: those of a port authority and those of a port city administration. We will then be able to compare the actual decisions and actions of actors acting on behalf of these two collective entities,

and discuss to what extent their decisions and actions follow the 'structure' of the actor orientations defined.

The second way we operationalized the three institutionalist questions above is by confronting a fourfold concept of strategy-making with the concept of 'urban development force'. We then proposed a typology of four force relations constituted by eight distinct 'urban development resources', and announced that we will specify them on the basis of the concrete reality of our case. The critical case of Rotterdam CityPorts will show how the strategy-as-force relations proposed in figure 2.12 provide a useful basis for theorizing on the strategies behind contemporary urban development projects. In the concluding chapter, we will then be able to evaluate the strategy behind the Rotterdam CityPorts case, and draw out some general insights offered by this critical case for the Dutch practice of *gebiedsontwikkeling*. These will provide the basis for an ongoing scientific effort to understand and improve its workings.

Figure 2.13 depicts the specific research questions to be answered throughout this thesis. In the next and final section, we will elaborate on the methodology used to answer them.

2.7 Methodology: A Single Case Study

So far in this thesis, it has been put forth several times that the aim is to answer the research questions by conducting a single, in-depth case study. While it may still be conventional to think that this method is a first step in a theory-building process aimed to generate hypotheses, I follow those who assert that the case study is valuable at all stages of this process (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2004). Hence, this thesis is not about building a theory from the ground up, but rather about synthesizing the components of several existing theories into a more specific explanatory model. In this section, I will explain why I have personally come to conduct a single case study, what criteria I have used to select the case, and how I have sought to increase the validity of my findings. In doing so, I will be as explicit as possible about the learning process that has occurred during the study, and elaborate on the choices made in the organization, presentation, and interpretation of the case material.

Pragmatism and Phronesis
At the beginning of the research project this thesis is based on, the initial idea was to conduct a comparative case study. The plan was to study and compare the strategies behind urban development projects in three different port cities throughout Europe: Hamburg *HafenCity*, Antwerp *'t Eilandje*, and Rotterdam CityPorts. However, I soon found out that the textbook ideas about strategy I was familiar with related poorly to my observations in practice. A more extensive review of the literature made me realize that this was because my notions of strategy referred only to formal 'strategy-as-plan' definitions instead of to the broader efforts made by actors in order to make a project work. Surely, the Hamburg 'pilot' was surrounded by formal plans – not least by the masterplan designed by the Dutch architect Kees Christiaanse (see also Chapter 4). However, when asked about the project's strategy, many interviewees also started talking about the specific history and political context in which the *HafenCity* project was initiated.[28] Soon, I learned that understanding an urban development project strategy requires a great deal of information about

the details of a particular project's situation. While I was expecting a 'technique', what I got were stories of a passionate, visionary, and contingent process between port city planners and politicians. Hence, I was told about local politics and cultures, about negotiations and visions, and about intrigues and contemplations between actors who were looking to genuinely improve their port city to the best of their intentions. In effect, I was discovering the 'little things' that made an actual urban development project come to life.[29]

Convinced of the fact that what I had found in Hamburg mattered, I decided to dive deeper into the literature on strategy-making and urban planning. This exploration is described in the introducing chapter, and the encountered tools and concepts have found their place in the research framework described above. Later on, I found that the scientific approach I was following strongly reflects that of 'pragmatism' – an approach which has been developing in the field of spatial planning since the 1960s.[30] Central to the pragmatic method is a habit of questioning and exploring, of testing theoretical answers and discoveries in relation to empirical evidence (Healey & Hillier, 2008). For me, this meant taking the actual decisions, actions, and events in practice as a starting point, and exploring the literature for concepts that structured and explained my findings in a useful way. Hence, the research has in fact been an iterative process, i.e. a constant reflection between theory and practice aimed at results that are both critical and productive. The Hamburg *Hafen-City* study helped me to get a grip on the phenomenon I was actually studying.

One of the essential features of the pragmatist tradition in spatial planning research is that it acknowledges that human conduct is, and should be, value-laden. And while this applies to the decisions and actions of actors involved in an urban development project (explained in section 2.2), it certainly also applies to researchers studying them. This insight is essential, because it recognizes that the relationship between a researcher and his object of research is not value-free, and that it is important to address this relationship.[31] It acknowledges that the academic work produced is part and parcel of the society it is created in, and that it can have both intended and unintended effects therein. Clearly, this implies that scholars should take such effects into consideration, and use the normative dimension research openly and purposefully. In this chapter, I have referred to a specific group of pragmatists in the planning fields who take democracy – and the need for more of it – as a general norm by which practices are evaluated (see section 2.5). Among them, I have argued how the work of Flyvbjerg (1998; 2001a) reflects a specific 'strategy' in enforcing higher democratic quality in a particular practice by exposing its situated ethics. However, choosing his work as a point of reference also has an important methodological consequence. In his explanation of 'phronesis', Flyvbjerg (2001a: 132) argues that researchers need to come close to the phenomenon studied and anchor their work into its context: 'For contemporary studies one gets close to the phenomenon or group whom one studies during data collection, and remains close during the phases of data analysis, feedback, and publications of results'.[32] Because my research interests had grown to be similarly in-depth, I reverted to a single case study design.

Of the three cases I pre-selected, the only one of which I could approach the 'closeness' Flyvbjerg (2001a) refers to – and has reached himself in his own Aalborg case study (Flyvbjerg, 1998b) – was Rotterdam CityPorts. The reasons for this are both practical and situational. The practical part is that I was based in a university in Delft, which is located just outside the port city of Rotterdam. This made it possible to travel to the project area,

to visit meetings and seminars featuring the project, and to do all the other fieldwork necessary in a less planned and more opportunistic way. It also enabled me to consult with those involved in the project before and after I published some preliminary results.[33] The situational part of the reason was my acquaintance with the Dutch context: I was born in the Netherlands and have lived in the western, most densely urbanized part of the country all of my life. This makes me naturally attuned to Dutch habits and culture, and capable of conducting all of my fieldwork in my first language. Moreover, being a born and bred Dutchman makes me perceptive of the linguistic nuances and expressions used in inter-views and written sources, and weary of the rivalries and preconceptions that may exist between specific (groups of) actors. Even in the Flemish speaking port city of Antwerp, I did not expect that I could reach such closeness to a case.[34] Rotterdam was thus the only place where I felt that a 'deep going case experience' referred to by Flyvbjerg (2001a: 135) could be achieved.

Selecting a Critical (and Extreme) Case

Next to the above reasons, the selection of the Rotterdam CityPorts case is also closely at-tuned to the research objective. After all, my interests were focused on providing a useful understanding of the strategies behind urban development projects. Nevertheless, it has to be confessed that the Rotterdam CityPorts case has been pointed out to me by chance, and that its qualities – outside of its geographical size and waterfront location – were not that obvious to me right from the beginning.[35] But as I started to view my cases in a more interaction-oriented way, I developed selection criteria that kept leading me back to the one in Rotterdam. Moreover, the methodological work of Flyvbjerg (2004) and George & Bennet (2004) helped me to address the issue of generalization. To what extent could the research results provide insights that are relevant beyond this case alone? These scholars point out that much depends on the single case one is speaking of and how it is chosen, but that generalizing from that case may then be just as central to scientific development as other methods (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 423-425; George & Bennet: 83-84). As soon as I learned more about the situation in Rotterdam, I decided to go with a single case design.

In the introducing chapter, a reference was made to the work of Marshall (2001) and Malone (1996) in order to argue that urban waterfronts are 'magnified intersections of a number of urban forces' fundamental to 'all frameworks of urban development'. Hence, it followed that if the strategy behind an urban development project is to be examined, the port urban waterfront is a place where the concentration of forces that shape such strategies have proven to be particularly high. If the operational objective of this study is to specify the strategy-as-force relationships behind an urban development project, such a case can thus be regarded as having a 'most likely' and 'critical' quality. Following Flyvbjerg (2004: 426), this means that the case selected allows for a logical deductive gen-eralization of the sort: 'If it is valid for this case, it is valid for all (or many) cases.' Hence, because the Rotterdam CityPorts case is situated in the critical 'interface' of a major con-temporary port city, it is thus logical to assume that the strategy-as-force relationships revealed in its study are most likely to provide more general insights. This reasoning is reinforced by another situational characteristic, namely by its location in the Netherlands. As we explained in section 1.2, contemporary Dutch land use planning is characterized by the tension between the ambitions and the resources for spatial planning, and combines it

with an inviolable cultural urge to retain set ambitions and squeeze out available resources to the point – or even beyond – what is responsible or justifiable (Needham, 2007: 43). Both these critical situational features provide a logical basis for selecting Rotterdam City-Ports as a single, in-depth case of study.

Next to logic, there is of course also intuition, and perhaps even luck involved in selecting the 'right' case. During the years that I followed the strategy formation process in Rotterdam, I discovered that I was also studying a particularly unusual instance – both substantively and in terms of process. As the story in chapters four to six will show, those involved in the project repeatedly confirmed this assessment: what they experienced struck them as unprecedented, pushing them to take unprecedented action. This reinforced my choice to go with the urban development project strategy I found closest to home, and it strengthened my idea that what was going on in Rotterdam deserved a detailed description. So, as the research became progressively focused, the CityPorts case also turned out to be the 'anomaly' by which existing theories are often improved, integrated or completed (Mintzberg, 2005).[36] Indeed, its unusual features could help to get the patterns recognized in it across in a more dramatic way (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2004). All of this improved the chance of generating a set of propositions which can be defended as having a general significance – the extent to which will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

Triangulations

According to Flyvbjerg (2001a: 130), phronetic research is based on interpretation and is open for testing in relation to other interpretations and other research. This also applies to the research leading up to this thesis. In fact, during the course of the investigation, different theoretical paths have led to various interpretations of the case material (Daamen, 2006b; Daamen & Van Gils, 2006). Among these are most notably those based on the theories of 'complexity' (Axelrod & Cohen, 1999; Innes & Booher, 1999; Stacey, 2003; Teisman, 2005; Klijn, 2006; Uprichard & Byrne, 2006; and more recently Teisman *et al.*, 2009) and of 'transitions' (Rotmans, 1994; Rotmans, 2003; Rotmans & Loorbach, 2001; Kemp & Loorbach, 2003). Although the concepts employed by these theories did offer some insightful interpretations of the formal decision-making processes shaping the Rotterdam CityPorts project, they did not seem to shed much light on actions that continued without any formal decision-making, nor on decisions that remained devoid of any actions. Because the case material pointed out that these decisions and actions were no less relevant than others for understanding the strategy studied, I decided to explore the literature for more inclusive interpretive schemes.

Interpretive research implies that the phenomenon studied is provided with a meaning that might compete with others. Such is the scientific process as understood in this thesis: a particular interpretation of a phenomenon is 'valid' for as long as it is not replaced by another interpretation that is regarded even more valid in light of the evidence presented. As put forward by Stake (1995: 107-112), this means that academic research comes with the ethical obligation to 'get it right', that is, to engage in a deliberative effort to find the validity of data observed. It is considered in the interest of the researcher to minimize misrepresentation and misunderstanding, and to put considerable effort into confirming contested descriptions and key interpretations. The way I have strived to achieve this for the Rotterdam CityPorts case is as follows.

During the case study, different types of 'triangulation' have been applied in order to gain the needed confirmations. The most obvious one is what Denzin (1984) defines as methodological triangulation. Direct observations in Rotterdam were combined with a review of empirical documents like policy briefs, spatial plans, as well as with books and (newspaper) articles about or related to the CityPorts project. In addition, the internet was used to compare facts and figures through multiple electronic sources, and through public records of government decision-making. When crucial documents could not be found through databases accessible through the internet, hard copies were obtained from libraries, project archives, and the municipal clerk's office.

A large amount of informal conversations with actors involved were complemented by a total of twenty-five open interviews performed between January 2006 and November 2008. These recorded interviews may be labeled as semi-structured, as I prepared each conversation with a list of five to ten specific questions – about critical facts that needed confirmation – combined with a few more general topics – aimed at other facts and exploring alternative views and explanations. Sometimes I used so-called 'probes', suggesting a few contrasting interpretations of a given fact. Interviews were transcribed and coded along with the documents described above. This was largely done by hand when reading copies and print-outs. Some of the interviews and data collection were performed in collaboration with another PhD student. This frequently allowed for what can be called 'investigator triangulation', i.e. discussing observations and interpretations with fellow researchers and providing each other with additional data.

When the rough drafts of the case chapters were finished, each chapter was sent to an actor who had been closely involved in the strategic period to which the chapter refers – so-called 'member checking' (Stake, 1995). The actors were also chosen with regards to their demonstrated ability to critically reflect on their own experiences. Two of the three actors responded at length, providing the opportunity to add some more accurate data to the case and improve interpretations. One actor commented only on a few personal quotations taken up in the case narrative.

Each of the case chapters is structured in three basic parts. First, it provides an introduction to the pattern identified in the strategic period described. This is followed by a detailed and largely chronological description of the actual decisions and actions that constitute the case. Finally, the description is confronted with the research framework, effectively specifying the variables defined and interpreting the relationships between them and the shift of focus in the strategy formation process recognized. Together, the three case chapters provide the arguments for synthesizing the concepts employed in this thesis, and for providing a 'strategy-as-force' interpretation of the Rotterdam CityPorts case.

Notes

1   Others might label the scientific fields of inquiry referred to here simply as those of 'planning' and 'management', or in other ways altogether. We have chosen these labels and respectively added the adjectives 'spatial' and 'strategic' to specify what the literature studied for this thesis is about, and to distinguish the field of 'spatial planning' from the term 'planning' commonly used in management literature.

2　This also means that whether or not the project should be initiated at all is not the primary concern of this study; we leave such concerns to the realm of politics. What matters to us is that the project was initiated, and what decisions and actions have been deployed to affect its realization.

3　Giddens (1984: 348) quotes management scientist Charles Taylor on the difference between natural and social science theory: 'While natural science theory also transforms practice, the practice it transforms is not what the theory is about. [...] We think of it as an "application" of the theory'. In the social sciences, 'the practice is the object of the theory. Theory in its domain transforms its own object.'

4　Mintzberg (1994: 323) makes a somewhat similar claim after he has consistently overstated the role of experiential, intuitive thinking over instrumental thinking in strategy-making. He asserts: '[...] we never had any intention of so dismissing [instrumental rationality], although the tone of our discussion may well have given that impression. Instead, by overstating our criticisms, we have tried to draw the debate on [instrumental rationality] to a more viable middle ground, away from the conclusion that [instrumental rationality] can do everything or nothing. To draw from one extreme (where we believe [instrumental rationality] has always been) toward the middle, one has to pull from the far end [...].'

5　For a discussion on three distinct types of institutionalism, see Hall & Taylor (1996).

6　In taking this approach, we depart somewhat from social institutionalism. Scharpf (2000) explains that he treats actor orientations – i.e. perceptions and preferences – as a distinct category, influenced but not determined by the institutions within which interactions take place. In his view, this is to take a less deterministic approach to these perceptions and preferences than is apparent in theories of sociological institutionalism. However, in the account of sociological institutionalism followed in this thesis – that of Giddens' theory of structuration (1984) – institutions are clearly not assumed to be fully determinant for an individual's perception of things. This is why we feel it is possible to combine Scharpf's (1997; 2000) concepts with those of Giddens (1984) in this thesis.

7　Scharpf (1997) also defines a fourth component: interaction orientations. We have left this component out of our conceptualization because we have already found that, in Dutch practice, these orientations will be biased towards consensus (see Chapter 1).

8　Healey (2007: 198) also calls these arenas institutional sites or spaces where 'many parties learn what it means to "see" the issue of concern to them in new ways.'

9　Mintzberg (1983: 26-27) explains that he retained the use of the term 'coalition' only after a good deal of consideration, because it normally refers to a group of people banding together to win some issue. His use of the term, however, refers to a set of people bargaining among themselves to determine a certain distribution of control over collective decisions and actions. In this thesis, we use the term 'arena' to indicate such a set of people.

10　See Mintzberg (1983: 8-21) for an overview of the way scholars have, through the years, conceptualized business organizations. In the overview, the concept of a rational, goal maximizing actor is ultimately challenged by a political arena with no goals whatsoever. Here, the organization is portrayed as a marketplace in which incentives between reward-pursuing individuals are negotiated and exchanged. Organizational behavior becomes the result of an ongoing bargaining process.

11　See De Wit & Meyer (2004) for a broad collection of articles on strategy and comparisons between concepts.

12　According to Mintzberg (1994: 245), there is only one condition – or as we shall shortly argue: only one power configuration – under which all of the assumptions of strategic planning hold up: 'That is when the organization has the power to impose its own plans on its environment'.

13　This is also reflected in the concept of planning-as-learning as brought forward by Faludi (2000).

14　To our mind, this relates closely to what is meant when contemporary urban development projects are defined as 'wicked' or 'complex' societal problems (e.g. Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004; Teisman, 2005). On the

difficulty of analyzing intentions, see also Verbart (2004).

15　Here, we refer to an argument made by Mintzberg (1983), where he defines goals as the intentions behind decisions and actions. He argues that the official goals of an organization – i.e. what they claim to be their goals – often do not correspond with the ends they actually seem to pursue. Hence, 'it is unacceptable simply to ask the members of an organization, including its chief executive, what its goals are, or to read pronouncements of what we have called *official* goals. The manager "must put his resources where his mouth is if something is to be considered a goal"' (*ibid.*: 248).

16　Two classic works frequently referred to by planning scholars are Banfield (1961) and Dahl (1961/2005).

17　Here, we need to clarify that Mintzberg's (1983) power configurations should be seen as distinct from his 'power school', i.e. one out of the ten schools of thought presented in Mintzberg *et al.* (1998).

18　Mintzberg *et al.* (1998: 345) contrast their idea of 'quantum change' with theories built on alternatives, like incremental or revolutionary change. We recognize the idea of incremental change – i.e. periods of stability combined with rapid change – in other theories used to approach spatial planning phenomena, like those of complexity and transitions (see section 2.7). We do not depart from these theories, because seeing change depends only on how close one studies a phenomenon, i.e. by what characteristics one defines a phenomenon's stable state.

19　The terms structure and agency have an active connotation in Giddens' (1984) theory of structuration, while institutions and actors are passive.

20　Giddens (1984) defines this dynamic as follows: 'Power within social systems which enjoys some continuity over time and space presumes regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities in contexts of social interaction. But all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors. This is what I call the *dialectic of control* in social systems' (Giddens, 1984: 16, italics in original).

21　This definition is inferred from Mintzberg (1983: 4), where he defines power as 'the capacity to effect (or affect) organizational outcomes'.

22　Our definition is somewhat similar to that of 'organizing capacity' of Van den Berg *et al.* (1996), who define it as 'the ability to enlist all actors involved, and with their help generate new ideas and develop and implement a policy designed to respond to fundamental developments and create conditions for sustainable development.' However, in this definition, 'enlisting all actors' and 'implementation' seems unproblematic – i.e. it seems to assume generative power only, and a passive, acquiescing external environment.

23　In his book on power in and around organizations Mintzberg (1983: 22) describes this process as follows: 'The organization first comes into being when an initial group of influencers join together to pursue a common mission. Other influencers are subsequently attracted to the organization as a vehicle for satisfying some of their needs. Since the needs of influencers vary, each tries to use his or her own levers of power – means or systems of influence – to control decisions and actions. How they succeed determines what configuration of organizational power emerges. Thus, to understand the behavior of the organization, it is necessary to understand which influencers are present, what needs each seeks to fulfill in the organization, and how each is able to exercise power to fulfill them'. We have chosen to operationalize these questions in terms of rules and resources.

24　Our eight resource categories have been discussed and refined several times in open PhD sessions during the course of the research, in which we have been attending to a somewhat similar categorization by Van Vliet (1999), who defines eight resources for a so-called 'change agent' in technological innovations. However, many singular or collective resources feature the literature examined for this thesis. A classic example is perhaps Dahl (1961/2005: 128), who concludes: '[To] pass from idea to reality every [urban development] proposal required an expenditure of critical resources – money, time, energy, attention, skill, political sup-

port. The Development Administrator's influence rested in part on the fact that it was his responsibility to assess the costs and the gains – economic, social, political – of the various possible proposals generated by himself, his associates, and his subordinates, to arrive at a judgment about a few that seemed worthwhile, to explore these with the Mayor, and to develop the ones that met with the Mayor's approval to a stage where the Mayor could begin securing the necessary support and approval from others'. Another example are Koppenjan & Klein (2005: 46-47), who talk about the importance and substitutability of resources, and refer to resource categories like money, organization, humans resources, or authority, legitimacy, and strategic capability. Mintzberg (1983: 24-25) discusses general bases for power like a resource, technical skill, a body of knowledge, legal prerogatives, and access, as well as 'will and skill', i.e. the willingness to spend time and energy on something and then do things in a clever manner. Healey (2007: 21), in reference of Giddens (1984) writes of 'allocative structures' as the way material resources like finance, land, and human labor are allocated, and of authoritative structures as the constituents of norms, values, and regulatory procedures. In addition, she also defines several 'sources of power' through which so-called strategic orientations may be legitimized (*ibid.*: 197): electoral mandate, legal rules/principles/contracts, science/formalized knowledge, conventional frames and practices, expert practical judgment, strategic actors and the politics of interest, experiential and tacit knowledge of key actors, local/situated knowledge, and discursive seduction. Finally, we have also been inspired by a categorization by Healey *et al.* (1997), who write about relational and knowledge resources on three levels between structure and agency.

25 For compelling discussions on the contrast between the two, see for example Flyvbjerg (1998a) and Hillier (2002). For insightful arguments for one or the other, see Richardson (1996); Huxley & Yiftachel (2000); Flyv-bjerg, (2001b); Flyvbjerg & Richardson (2002); Healey (2003).

26 On this point, see the famous 'Noam Chomsky-Michel Foucault debate' that took place in the Netherlands in 1971 on www.youtube.com.

27 The active pursuit of more freedom and democracy is, we believe, what Foucault means when he concludes that faith in Enlightenment requires 'work on our limits, that is, a patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty', Rabinow (1984: 50), or when Friedrich Nietzsche, as quoted in Flyvbjerg (1998b: 225) states: 'Democratic contrivances are quarantine measures against that ancient plague, the lust for power: as such they are very necessary and very boring.'

28 Interviews were conducted with architect Kees Christiaanse and representatives of the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH, the Hamburg Port Authority, and several Hamburg Ministries in 2005 and 2006.

29 Flyvbjerg (2001a: 133) refers to the work and arguments of Nietzsche and Foucault in advocating the importance of focusing on these 'little things' if we really want to find answers to problems of a social organization.

30 For a recent review of the influence of pragmatist philosophy on research and theory development in the field of spatial planning, see Healey (2009).

31 In his definition of *phronesis*, Flyvbjerg (2001a: 130) talks about an objective to increase the capacity of individuals, organizations, and society to think and act in value rational terms.

32 Healey & Hillier (2008) show that the work of Flyvbjerg (1998) has strong parallels with a pragmatic approach, but acknowledge that he himself has never drawn out these linkages.

33 This particularly occurred around the publication of a Dutch article in September 2006 (Daamen, 2006a).

34 Fieldwork for the Antwerp *'t Eilandje* case has only been done in a preliminary fashion, by conducting interviews and conversations in the context of two conferences in 2006 and 2007.

35 A chance offered to me as early as the year 2003 by the now retired dr. Jan van 't Verlaat of the municipal *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf* Rotterdam (OBR), to whom I am most grateful.

36 In contrast to the 'average' case that is more suited for a serial investigation with a closely defined, limited, perhaps even quantifiable set of variables.

Chapter 3 Orientations between City and Port

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, we presented the way we will approach and interpret the decisions, actions, and events that shape the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy. However, before we describe and analyze the actual interaction that constitutes our case, we first ask ourselves what we can expect from the actors involved in it (see Figure 3.1). In order to answer this question, we connect the substantive characteristics of our case to the institutionalist argument that human action is structured by the orientations shared among actors in a situated practice. This means that since the Rotterdam CityPorts project is situated on the geographical boundary between a contemporary European city and a port, we are able to theoretically explore the orientations port-city actors involved in similar urban development projects tend to have in common. In this chapter, we will do this by reviewing some of the relevant literature, and by filtering out the orientations we will subsequently be able to compare to those found in the Rotterdam case presented in the next three chapters.

Figure 3.1 Focus on the first main research question.

The orientations we are looking for in this chapter consist, on the one hand, of the perceptions actors are likely to have of the challenge the Rotterdam CityPorts project is supposed to meet. On the other, they consist of the role-specific interests and norms that actors involved can be expected to be guided by. Because actors often act on behalf of a larger group or organization, like a port authority, information about the behavior of such organizations will allow us to infer from it the orientations we are looking for. As we will show in this chapter, there is in fact a vast amount of academic literature with which we

can thoroughly argue what actor orientations we can expect to play a role in our case. In doing so, we will consecutively explore scientific work available on port evolutions (section 3.2), on port-city relations (section 3.3), and on waterfront development projects (section 3.4). In the concluding section, we will then draw together the actor orientations that appear most evidently in the literature. We will define some common perceptions about the challenge urban development projects in port cities are supposed to meet, and describe some of the interests and norms we are likely to encounter among key actors in our case study. All this will also contribute to the further substantiation of the critical quality we assign to our case: a quality that will ultimately allow us to draw conclusions that reach beyond the Rotterdam CityPorts situation alone.

3.2 Understanding Port Evolutions

In order to understand the evolution of ports like that of Rotterdam, we need to approach this complex phenomenon from at least three perspectives: the port as a spatial entity, the port as a transport node, and the port as a place. Each of these three perspectives provides an explanation of the way a port's cargo handling and related activities have evolved over the years – an evolution often leading to alternative land uses in older parts of the port. Beginning in the 1960s, each of the views discussed in this section will draw us closer to the complex scene witnessed in many seaports today. In doing so, we get a theoretical idea of the strategic questions port authorities and other actors inside the port are most significantly confronted with today, and what kind of actor orientations this involves.

The Port as a Spatial Entity

Leading scholars in the fields of economic and transport geography have always reiterated that the development of a port primarily depends on assessments made by human decision makers (Hoyle & Pinder, 1992a). However, in port research, it has until recently been possible to push this fact into the background. Since the 1960s, the development of ports has been dominated by a so-called 'rationalization' in the world's production and transportation system. This rationalization process has been economically driven, seeking out ways to manufacture and move goods in ever more cost and time efficient ways. As places of manufacturing and transhipment, the spatial lay-out of ports has been affected by this push for efficiency in very similar ways. In 1963, it was geographer James Bird whose study of the United Kingdom's major seaports[1] thus led to the conception of the 'Anyport' model.

The Anyport model conceptualizes seaports as homogeneous spatial entities in which form follows function (Olivier & Slack, 2006). It visualizes the way ports, through time, move beyond the geographical limits of the towns they originally occupied (see Figure 3.3). First, they jump to the riverbank opposite of its original (sometimes medieval) location, making large cuts into the banks or extending jetties into the water (I-III). Next, ports increasingly migrate out of town, usually seawards in search of deeper waters (III-VI). In the process, ports extend, elaborate, and specialize their quays, as the diversity of cargo grew and the ways of handling and storing it became more specific. Altogether, the Anyport model distinguishes six eras of port development, each visualizing a particular increase in the size and scale of maritime operations.

To a large extent, Bird's Anyport model is still relevant today when it comes to explaining port evolutions (Slack & Wang, 2003). The reason for this is that port actors are still continuously looking for more efficient (e.g. 'just-in-time' or 'no-stock') ways of handling cargo in order to compete, and innovations in maritime and transport technology continue to play a leading role in their search. Here, the fact that Bird (1963) performed his research around the introduction of container transport seems essential. This innovation would cause significant changes in the whole transport industry, because many types of general cargo could now be moved over road, rail, and waterway inside one standardized metal 'box'. Even before the definite decision about sizing these boxes into twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), Bird already estimated that the handling costs for a ship carrying cargo in containers would be only one-ninth of those for a conventional vessel. What followed since has often been called a cargo transport 'revolution' (Notteboom, 2006; Wang *et al.*, 2007).

In the decades following Bird's observations, containerization would fundamentally transform the structure of vessels, cargo handling methods, and material lay-out of ports. Today, the amount of containers handled by a port is one of the key measures of its performance, and the projected growth in containerized cargo throughput one of the major arguments for port authorities to seek expansion. As the world's largest ships grow to carry well over 10,000 TEUs, harbors have become larger and deeper and quays wider than ever. Consequently, the port has moved farther and farther away from its original town, 'moving like a great liner inexorably towards the sea' (Hoyle, 1989: 432).

FIG. 2 The Site of *Anyport*
A left bank tributary of an estuary has caused an embayment, largely dry at low tide (coarse stipple in the estuary) and flanked by slightly higher land, before estuarine marshes begin downstream (fine stipple on the right of the diagram). North points, scales, and diagram borders have been omitted on purpose from the illustrations in this chapter of the hypothetical *Anyport*.

FIG. 3 *Anyport* After Three Eras of Development
I—The *Primitive Port*.
II—*Marginal Quay Extension*.
III—*Marginal Quay Elaboration*.
W—Warehouses; Quayside buildings, warehouses or transit sheds; Semi-circular town wall, with stronghold where the wall meets the estuary downstream.

FIG. 4 *Anyport* at the End of Four Eras of Development
I–III as Fig. 3.
IV—*Dock Elaboration*.
DD—Dry dock associated with later docks; Q, Continuing *marginal quay extension*, T and W, Transit sheds and warehouses.

FIG. 5 *Anyport* Complete
I–IV as Fig. 4.
V—*Simple Lineal Quayage*, over 1,500 feet uninterrupted in one line, 26 feet of water L.W.O.S.T. alongside, with, if necessary, an entrance lock 750 feet long.
VI—*Specialized Quayage*, notable at T-head jetties and at large wharves in the river.
Q—Continuing *marginal quay extension*.
T—Transit sheds, or, in the river, jetties serving a continuous frontage of industry.

Figure 3.2 James Bird's Anyport model (1963).

During the 1980s and 1990s, the idea of a port as one migrating and expanding spatial entity was complemented by a spatial spread of cargo handling and storage functions. As the land side connections between a port and its hinterland – i.e. the geographical area where most transport destinations and origins are concentrated – improved due to new infrastructures, it had become financially attractive to locate port and port related activities in locations beyond original port territories. Hence, spatially clustered port and port related activities started to scatter throughout a port's hinterland, giving rise to a process known as 'port regionalization' (see Figure 3.3).[2] This has given rise to an extension of Bird's Anyport model with freight corridors leading to distribution centers that now reach well into the port hinterland. Today, ports can thus no longer be seen as coherent spatial entities. Many have seen part of their activities move to locations beyond original port territories. In spatial terms, ports are now more accurately perceived as multiple cargo handling facilities and corridors spread out through the port city region. However, in order to explain this regionalization process, we need to adopt another popular perspective on port evolutions: the port as a transport node.

Figure 3.3 Extending Bird's Anyport model with port regionalization (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2005: 298).

The Port as a Transport Node

Although the way ports evolve is primarily due to technological progress and efficiency principles, it is clear that the primary precondition for this evolution is a growth in port bound economic trade and transport activities. In the second half of the twentieth century, this growth has largely been caused by the relocation of the world's production centers to predominantly Eastern low-wage countries and the rise of consumption-led service economies in the West (e.g. Hall *et al.*, 2006). The sequence of different transport modalities involved in getting a particular good from its original location to its final destination has become known as a 'global supply chain' (Wang *et al.*, 2007). Each link in such a chain refers to a so-called 'modal shift', e.g. a transfer of goods from a ship onto a truck, or from an ocean carrier onto an inland vessel. Hence, ports have come to be perceived as 'nodes' in global supply chains, i.e. as attractors of different flows of cargo. The biggest of these nodes, like the port of Rotterdam, are often also indicated as 'gateway', 'hub' or 'feeder' ports, indicating that they are able to receive the world's largest intercontinental ships. These expensive ocean carriers are then (partly) unloaded, after which their cargo may be 'fed' to smaller short-sea or inland going vessels (*ibid.*).

Port competition mainly occurs between those serving the same hinterland

(Kreukels & Wever, 1998). This is the geographical area between the port and the geographical area where its primary market locations – producers, retailers, and consumers – are concentrated. In Europe, the ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Antwerp are thus leading competitors among a series of ports in what is known as the Hamburg–Le Havre range (see Figure 3.4). At comparable distances, the hinterlands of these seaports particularly extend to the Rhein-Ruhr area, which is a densely populated area in Germany with

Figure 3.4 An overview of Europe's most important ports (Port of Rotterdam, 2009).

high concentrations of industrial facilities. This port market organization is distinctive for Western Europe compared to North America and Asia (see Figure 3.5). The ongoing integration of Europe makes it possible for ports to compete within an increasingly liberalized and deregulated market environment without (most) national barriers (Hoyle & Pinder, 1992a).

Notteboom & Rodrigue (2005) explain that the spatial regionalization of ports described above is mainly due to market forces that seek to reduce inland transportation costs. According to them, these costs range from 40 to 80 percent of the total costs of container shipping, making inland logistics a primary area of concern for shipping lines. In relation to this development, port authorities have also been investing outside their territories. Much like private companies, such investments are aimed at gaining control over the land side sections of particular value chains. However, moving beyond the port perimeter incurs some significant financial and political risks. Private competitors may profit disproportionately from nearby inland investments – so-called free rider behavior – while

the direct economic returns for a port authority and its administrative city-region stay contestable. This has made it hard for western, often government controlled port authorities to make politically accountable investments throughout their respective hinterlands: areas where negative external effects like congestion and pollution are highest, and where the added value of operations are low or hard to validate (De Langen, 2003). While port authorities from autocratic states like Dubai and Singapore have been allowed to invest in port infrastructures all over the world, such strategies are largely impossible due to European legislation (Jacobs, 2007).

Figure 3.5 Port market organization in North America, Western Europe and Asia (Ducruet, 2007).

The Port as a Place

The globalization of the world's production and transportation system has gone hand in hand with the rise of large transnational shipping companies and terminal operators (Olivier & Slack, 2006). Since the 1990s, several mergers and acquisitions have yielded enormous, mostly private enterprises[3] that play an increasingly dominant role in the world's transportation industry (Hayuth, 2007). In Europe, these global players now often own and run a significant part of a port's container transhipment operations. The liberalization and deregulation process has thus made port authorities lose control over the port's future, as final decisions about cargo flows are now made by transnational corporations operating cargo handling facilities in ports serving the same hinterland (Olivier & Slack, 2006). Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) and A.P. Möller-Mearsk (APM) Terminals are prime examples of such global operators.

Parallel to the rise of these private giants, many European port authorities have more or less gone through a so-called corporatization and commercialization process. Though definitions differ, this process mainly implies the privatization of cargo handling operations inside the port, and a port authority which conforms to the role of a landlord (Verhoeven, 2007). Next to the neo-liberal push toward the reduction of public sector involvement in port operations, many port authorities have also felt an increasing need to escape direct government control. The main argument for this is that a corporatized authority can respond more effectively to the demands of port clients. As a result, many port

authorities in Europe have been transformed into publicly owned enterprises in diverse legal forms, but the extent to which this has yielded real financial autonomy and freedom from political influences remains obscure. Moreover, differences in national legislation tend to produce international competitive advantages that disturb the 'level playing field' desired between ports in the European Union (Jacobs, 2007).

In the new millennium, port evolutions have become subject to such a complex set of factors that it has become increasingly hard to produce any general insights. In fact, port researchers have found it difficult to maintain the concepts that present 'the port' as

Factors of Port Growth
Economy | Growth in consumption and trade, globalizing networks of production/transport
Technology | Containerized shipping and information technologies (just-in-time logistics)
Energy | Transport costs and sustainability concerns (modalities, producer relocations)
Factors of Port Competition
Location | Land available for expansion, distance to markets and secondary port functions
Efficiency | Reliability and flexibility in relation to port costs
Infrastructure | Quality of sea (depth) and landside (road/rail/water/pipeline) connections
Factors of Port Regionalization
Politics | Trade agreements (tariffs/safety), infrastructure provision (subsidies), external effects
Employment | Labor costs and conditions (union power)
Legislation | Environmental regulations, labor and immigration laws, taxes, customs
Factors of Port Reform
(Geo)Politics | Liberalization and deregulation, declining public involvement in port operations
Effectiveness | Responsiveness to market demands, financial autonomy (investments).

Figure 3.6 Overview of factors affecting the ongoing evolution of European seaports.

a homogenous entity in light of empirical realities. Although it is still common to see the port as a somehow coherent space, the diminishing control of local port authorities over cargo handling operations – to name but one process – has made such spatial expressions obsolete. Similar to what scholars have done for their contemporary urban counterparts (e.g. Amin & Thrift, 2002), Slack & Olivier (2006) propose to present the port as a 'place' rather than a 'space'. According to these scholars, contemporary ports are better to be seen as places where forces are played out among a pluralistic port community striving for common internal and external goals. For them, understanding this port community translates into questioning power imbalances among port stakeholders – imbalances in which the role of global terminal operators is of critical concern.

Though a research focus on terminal operators in large container ports can be expected to produce important insights towards the future, it has recently also been argued that the factors fundamental to port evolutions throughout history should not be neglected (see Figure 3.6 for an overview). For example, Hall *et al.* (2006: 1406) point out that low energy costs have been an important prerequisite for the globally organized transportation networks we witness today. According to these scholars, continuing variations in oil

prices and increasing awareness of the unsustainable character of road and air transport could propel shifts towards more energy efficient modes of transportation like rail and inland shipping. In the long run, another geographical rearrangement of the world's major production sites could become a possibility. Clearly, such processes will have serious impacts on the level and type of activities in seaports everywhere – not least in Rotterdam.

3.3 (Re)Exploring Port-City Relations

The evolution of ports explored in the previous section has gone hand in hand with significant changes in their urban counterparts. Much like ports, cities have come to be perceived as nodes or places inside networks attracting different kinds of economic activities (Sassen, 1998). And much like ports, technological progress and infrastructure improvements have caused a spatial fragmentation of cities across their respective regions (Graham & Marvin, 2001). In this section, we will discuss how particularly western ports and cities have nevertheless become increasingly disassociated from one another. Then, we will explore the concept of the port-city 'interface' in order to substantiate the conflicts by which urban development projects in old port areas are often characterized. Finally, we will take note of the new port-city links that have emerged in the last decade.

Port-City Dissociation

While the growth of ports and cities has historically been deeply related, this relationship has grown much more complex since the 1960s (Norcliffe *et al.*, 1996). Figure 3.7 illustrates how ports and cities have evolved and spatially separated over time, and how this process created 'non-place' ports leaving abandoned waterfronts behind in the city. What it does not show, however, is that this evolution and separation has also had important (socio-)economic and related political consequences. Both have caused what may best be characterized as a port-city dissociation: a process that has made the fate of the city become less and less dependent on the fate of its port and vice versa. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge that few port cities today find themselves in a state of equilibrium in terms of size or function. A quantitative study by Ducruet (2007) resulted in a typology of nine port-city relationships in which the port city merely forms the balanced center (see Figure 3.8).[4]

Figure 3.7 Big places and big ports, evolution and separation over time (Norcliffe *et al.*, 1996).

Technological progress like the introduction of container shipping has not only caused the port to expand and specialize its quays outside its city, it has also created the opportunities to mechanize an increasing amount of labor historically

done by dockworkers. Hence, port employment for urban residents has dramatically diminished over the last century, leaving a large part of the blue collar workforce in port cities unemployed and unequipped to perform alternative labor activities (Norcliffe *et al*, 1996). As a result, many western port cities have become places with a diminishing middle income group, giving way to the emergence of 'dual' cities characterized by social tensions (Castells, 1993).

Since the 1960s, western cities have gone through an economic restructuring process in which activities of production have largely become supplanted by knowledge-intensive service functions (Harvey, 1990). While some port cities have managed to maintain their ties with significant port related financing and insurance companies, many have seen such firms move to other places (Norcliffe *et al*, 1996). This and the regional migration of value adding storage, manufacturing and production activities have made it increasingly hard for port authorities to establish the economic effects of ongoing port activities. In turn, this has made it hard for local politicians to argue the economic necessity of funding new improvements in port infrastructures. This is also why ports have become increasingly

Figure 3.8 A matrix of port-city relationships (Ducruet, 2007).

dependent on the support of higher tiers of government when it comes to strategic investments: the economic effects of such investments tend to have a regional or national scope rather than a local one (Wang *et al.*, 2007).

The dissociation between port and city does not only have (socio-)economic and political dimensions. As we have already mentioned in the previous section, port authorities have also sought increasing independence from their city administrations (Notteboom, 2006). This has loosened the traditional institutional connections between city and port, making the relationship between port and city planners and decision makers more distant and formal (IACP, 1997). In addition, environment and safety regulations have made it increasingly harder and less attractive for urbanites to approach and tangibly experience the port at close range. In fact, port installations today are mostly designed to keep people out, and have migrated out of the city completely also in order to rid themselves of any environmental and safety restrictions. As the port disappears behind the urban horizon, social ties between the port and the inhabitants of its city are weakened even further, making social relationships with the port distant, immaterial, and symbolic (AICP, 1997).

Figure 3.9 The port-city interface as a zone of conflict
and co-operation (Hoyle, 1989).

The Port-City 'Interface'

The concept of the port-city interface was introduced by Hayuth (1982). He noticed that next to technological progress and the related modernization of port operations, an increasing public concern over the use of waterfront zones had emerged. These developments accelerated the trend of ports abandoning the central areas of cities for sites downstream. As a result, ports had to compete increasingly for waterfront space – both inside and outside the city. Not only was there a growing demand for waterfront locations for alternative uses, the approval of port plans by various – particularly environmental – authorities had also become a long and tedious process (Hayuth, 1982).

Hoyle (1989) picked up the concept of the port-city interface, as it refers to and expresses all dimensions of the changing interactions between ports and cities. To him, the concept accurately signifies why waterfront zones are often the subject of conflicting ideas and objectives: 'Sometimes, there is co-operation and harmony, sometimes there is hostility and disagreement. These contrasts, commonplace in the general sphere of port- city interrelationships, are often thrown into sharp focus in the context of the redevelopment of urban waterfront zones' (*ibid.*: 429, see also Figure 3.9). Hoyle & Pinder (1992a) later concluded that due to the need to reconcile all the influences, objectives and interests involved, politics had become an increasingly important factor for the planning and implementation of waterfront development schemes.

While Bird (1963) already anticipated the adaptation of older port areas for new uses, he probably did not expect that these uses would largely be non-port. In the decades following his famous study, the attention for waterfronts with new office, retail, leisure, and residential uses led to a widespread conviction that the port-to-urban transformation process was inevitable and ongoing (see Figure 3.10). However, in port cities like Rotterdam and Antwerp, where the port is not a faint remainder of the industrial era, this conviction would be contrasted by examples in which old port areas have been regenerated in order to accommodate new port uses (Charlier, 1992). Still, such examples are widely considered as temporary exceptions, given the overwhelming commercial and architectural results achieved on the waterfronts of port cities throughout the world. The contemporary port-city interface is thus the subject of ongoing debate about alternative land uses. Those that have closely studied the phenomenon conclude that the waterfronts situated in these contested areas ask for sensitive and appropriate policies and plans for development (Hoyle & Pinder, 1992a).

More recently, Hoyle (2000) argued that it is important to acknowledge that the motive for a waterfront development initiative may be found in the sphere of urban plan-

ning rather than in a port migration process fuelled by maritime technology. In relation to this, Hayuth (2007) speaks of a growing conflict. Because this also represents an explicit substantiation of our case selection, we quote him at length (*ibid.*: 142):

> 'Ports, as a dependent element of the maritime transportation system, were and are committed to competition, productivity, technological advance, business development, and profitability. The port city, for its part, strives to fulfill such other objectives as promoting the wellbeing and quality of life of its residents in an accommodating environment and responding to the priorities of its citizens in regard to the urban waterfront, among other things. Such different goals easily result in conflicts of interest, which can cause many difficulties in the compatibility of the two entities, whether on a daily basis or in regard to the development of future plans.'

upstream   ⟶   downstream

past

Growth				
Maturity	Growth			
Obsolescence	Maturity	Growth		
Dereliction	Obsolescence	Maturity	Growth	
Redevelopment	Dereliction	Obsolescence	Maturity	Growth

present

Figure 3.10 The life-cycle concept of port areas after Charlier (1992).

New Port-City Links

Next to the growing conflicts of interests and goals between port city actors with regard to their interface, Hayuth (2007) also recognizes that port and city share some common, mostly economic goals. Some of these are still based on the handling of cargo, though weakened due to falling direct employment and a relative increase of cargo forwarded directly to places beyond the port region. Others are based on the port related economic service functions situated in town, and on the provision of high quality infrastructure to and from the port city. In addition, 'clusters' of import-processing industries have emerged around port functions, often also attracting other non-port but more labor-intensive businesses (De Langen, 2003).

As Hoyle (1998) depicts in figure 3.11, new urban waterfronts have themselves triggered a new association of the port with the city (see phase VI). This new port-city association can primarily be expressed in cultural terms, because the re-use of historic symbols and objects of port industrial heritage have reinforced the port's image inside the city. In this regard, Merkcx *et al.* (2004) observe that urban development initiatives in old port

areas influence the relationship between critical actors, and that they can serve as a tool in the public acceptance of ongoing port expansion downstream. Hence, these scholars suggest that older docks and quays may well prove to be of great strategic importance for port authorities. The extent to which this changes a port authority's behavior towards urban development initiatives remains, however, an important empirical question. According to Van Hooydonk (2007: 127), port authorities tend to underestimate or totally ignore the 'soft values' generated by the urban re-use of old docklands. As the awareness of such values grows, it can be expected that more constructive attitudes between port and city authorities will emerge with regard to new waterfront development questions in the future.

STAGE	SYMBOL ○ City ● Port	PERIOD	CHARACTERISTICS
I Primitive port/city		Ancient/medieval to 19th century	Close spatial and functional association between city and port.
II Expanding port/city		19th - early 20th century	Rapid commercial/industrial growth forces port to develop beyond city confines, with linear quays and break-bulk industries.
III Modern industrial port/city		mid - 20th century	Industrial growth (especially oil refining) and introduction of containers/ro-ro require separation/space.
IV Retreat from the waterfront		1960 s - 1980 s	Changes in maritime technology induce growth of separate maritime industrial development areas.
V Redevelopment of waterfront		1970 s - 1990 s	Large-scale modern port consumes large areas of land/water space; urban renewal of original core.
VI Renewal of port/city links		1980 s - 2000+	Globalization and intermodalism transform port roles; port-city associations renewed; urban redevelopment enhances port-city integration.

Figure 3.11 Different stages in the traditional port-city interface (Hoyle, 1998: 47).

3.4 Waterfront Development (Re)Solutions

Now that we have explored the evolution of ports and port-city relationships, we are able to zoom in on waterfront development projects. In this section, we present two distinct interpretations of waterfront development projects situated in the 'interface' between city and port. The first interpretation is most common in the literature available on this worldwide phenomenon, and primarily defines waterfront development projects as concrete problem-solving interventions. The second interpretation is interaction-oriented, focusing on the processes of politics and planning behind waterfront development schemes. As we have argued from the beginning of this thesis, both of these interpretations are relevant for understanding the strategy behind projects like these. Moreover, they will help us to perform a penetrating analysis of the real efforts involved in the case study central in this thesis.

Waterfront Development as a Solution
After an extensive study, Breen & Rigby (1996: 12) ascribe the success of urban waterfronts to a combined effort 'which usually involves some degree of private initiative along with municipal or other governmental intervention – an exercise of community will to

make things better'. In addition, they state that what 'is important is that cities are doing what they have to in order to remain competitive, and using vacant land near cleaned-up waterways is an obvious step' (*ibid.*). These two statements reflect some persistent assumptions about waterfront development projects which have in fact been thoroughly criticized and rejected by those who have studied or been involved in them closely. The first assumption is that these projects stem from some kind of unified effort between private players, government bodies, and community actors. The second is that they represent an obvious way for cities to enhance their competitiveness towards others. Before we explore some of the insights that strongly nuance these assumptions, let us first outline how they were established.

The first steps towards waterfront development projects were taken in the North American port cities of Boston and Baltimore by the end of the 1950s, when urban authorities decided to re-open the waterfront to the wider public (Bruttomesso, 1993). Beset by old cranes and warehouses, deserted and rundown docks in the middle of town would become the venue of large events like the Baltimore City Fair, which was conceived to settle the civic unrest and ethnic tensions that reigned this port city in the late 1960s (Harvey, 1990). After the City Fair attracted an unexpected amount of visitors in its first years, Baltimore's Harbor Place grew out to become a permanent commercial spectacle including an aquarium, a convention center, a marina, hotels and entertainment centers. The emergence of this waterfront phenomenon went hand in hand with the broad process of de-industrialization and urban economic restructuring throughout western countries. During the 1970s, which were signified by a worldwide recession, urban authorities were desperately looking for ways to enhance the attractiveness of their city for people and new economic sectors. Baltimore and Boston, differing physically due to a long linear shoreline (Boston) and an enclosed inner harbor (Baltimore) would often be visited and reported upon. They became 'models' for similar development efforts all around the globe (Hall, 1993).

After the commercial and architectural success of the first projects, private development companies started to specialize in waterfronts. The attractiveness of waterfronts to people proved tremendous, and the ongoing economic restructuring in western countries triggered a high demand for distinctive places with new residential, office, retail, and leisure functions. Large-scale, underutilized docklands near the urban core of port cities thus became an obvious target for powerful development companies like Olympia & York (Samperi, 1986). As private interests mounted, these developers increasingly took the lead in waterfront development projects – particularly in the United States and Great Britain. Though urban authorities had often initiated the development process, development plans would often be overtaken by commercial actors once the limits of public expenditure were in sight (Pinder *et al.*, 1988). This seemed of mutual interest once city authorities became aware of the 'competitive advantage', with which their renewed waterfronts could provide them. But due to this commercial focus, the local interests of community groups tended to stay unheard in the waterfront projects of the 1970s and 1980s. City authorities were often unable to compete with the specialized private waterfront developers, both in terms of finance and expertise. Urban waterfront schemes were subsequently reproduced in one port city after the other, with varying results (Hall, 1993).

By the beginning of the 1990s, different studies had emerged in which several famous waterfront development projects were evaluated. In Baltimore, the spillover effects

Positive Effects
- more visitors to the city, increasing the level of expenditure and creating employment and investment
- improvement of infrastructure
- improvement of urban 'experience'
- increase in cultural amenities
- reinforcement of (inter)national position
- abatement of congestion in the urban core

Disappointing Effects
- overestimation of demand
- overestimation of positive effects on incomes, expenditures, investments and employment opportunities
- no improvement of urban recreation facilities

Negative Effects
- displacement of original inhabitants
- decline of investments elsewhere in the city
- increased volume of traffic and increased journey to work
- decline of office functions and retail quality in the urban core
- visual annoyance
- separation of the residential environment and the river
- more vacant housing and reduced maintenance of housing in adjacent areas.

Figure 3.12 The impact of urban renewal projects in 28 European cities including waterfront development efforts (Van der Knaap & Pinder, 1992 after Buit, 1989).

that were expected to improve the neighborhoods surrounding Harbor Place remained negligible (Harvey, 1990). In Britain, London's Docklands had become the symbolic failure of a market-led planning regime (Brownhill, 1990).[6] Based on a European study, Van der Knaap & Pinder (1992) conclude that in contrast to the natural tendency to regard the waterfront movement as a highly successful aspect of urban development, these projects are in fact less valuable to society than their exterior suggests. The findings of a study performed by Buit (1989), which includes evaluations of several waterfront projects throughout Europe, substantiate this conclusion by demonstrating that the positive effects of urban renewal projects tend to be accompanied by significant disappointing and negative outcomes (see Figure 3.12). Hence, retaining planning objectives – in terms of social housing renewal, (socio-)economic impact, or public accessibility – proves extremely difficult and costly. Experience has brought experts to describe waterfront development projects in port cities as 'the tough stuff' (Hall, 1993), and to stress that these projects need the enduring support of powerful public officials in order to ensure qualitative outcomes (Gordon, 1997a). According to Samperi (1986: 47), the waterfront is in fact – by almost any measure one wishes to choose – the most difficult and complex area to develop in comparison with other forms of urban development. As a solution to problems of economic restructuring and inter-urban competition, the waterfront 'model' had thus proven extremely difficult to realize.

Waterfront Development as a Resolution

As a phenomenon, the urban waterfront has often been presented as one of the most tangible exemplars of the modern to post-modern transition in western society (e.g. Harvey, 1990; Norcliffe *et al.*, 1996; Meyer, 1998). So, not only is its emergence related to an economic transition, the urban waterfront can also be regarded as a cultural expression of post-modern variety, individualism, and consumerism emerging in advanced capitalist countries since the mid 1970s (e.g. Marshall, 2001). Many have criticized the exclusive character in waterfront development plans, as the high-value architecture in waterfront areas tends to be designed only for attracting capital and people 'of the right sort' (Harvey, 1990: 92). But while neo-Marxist examinations of waterfront schemes explain results primarily in terms of enhanced capital accumulation, others have tried to draw more practical conclusions after digging into the actual process behind waterfront development projects. These investigations point out that many of the difficulties in making these projects materialize are due to the whims of local governance and politics, of real estate finance, and of urban planning and design (Falk, 1992; Bruttomesso, 1993; Jauhiainen, 1994; Gordon, 1997abc; Bassett *et al.*, 2002; ULI, 2004; Garcia, 2008). The case studies that feature these investigations consistently draw a picture of fierce negotiation and conflict. Here, waterfront development projects become resolutions: the contested outcome of an ongoing struggle between powerful actors.

Problems		No. of respondents
1	Securing agreement on proposals	16
2	Providing infrastructure	15
3	Arranging sufficient public sector finance	13
4	Attracting private sector finance	10
5	Carrying out engineering site works	12
6	Acquiring land	9
7	Resolving conflicts between planners, architects, landscape architects, developers, consultants, etc. over areas of involvement	9
8	Drawing up plans	9
9	Reaching agreement over proposed water use or recreational facilities	8
10	Inducing firms to set up or expand in the area	8
11	Attracting people to live or work in the area	3

Figure 3.13 Waterfront development problems which have proven most difficult to resolve (URBED waterside development survey 1989 in Falk, 1992). Most of the total 23 respondents selected several problems.

In reference to an investigation of British examples, Falk (1992) argues that planners often have little understanding of the immense problems involved in dockland regeneration projects (see Figure 3.13). To begin with, the port areas in question are usually characterized by dereliction, unemployment, inaccessibility and social tensions – places to which people and new firms are hardly attracted. In addition, preparing old and contaminated port land for urban development normally requires significant public sector funding before private actors are persuaded to step in. Hence, waterfront development projects

are mostly initiated by city administrations, to be joined by private developers in a special purpose agency – i.e. a development company or corporation – only at a later stage (Hall, 1993). Therefore, a strong vision which incorporates all main interests – both commercial and local – is considered essential. According to Falk (1992), successful are those who strive to re-use historical buildings and structures, perform research and consultations for qualitative and supported plans, and stimulate real community involvement during the development process (cf. Hoyle, 2000).

Falk (1992), Hall (1993) Jauhiainen (1994) and Gordon (1997b) also observe that many of the lessons learned from the first three decades of waterfront development efforts did not reach the actors involved in new ones. In fact, public agencies were often in a process of trial and error based on prior experience, which sometimes made development plans very vulnerable to the changing nature of local politics and real estate markets. In relation to politics, Gordon (1997b) uses a theory by Peterson (1981) to explain that waterfront development projects are often the result of 'developmental policies' meant to contribute to the economic well-being of the city. However, such policies should be expected to shift towards so-called 'allocational' or 'redistributive' policies, which will either focus on the interests of the city as a whole – allocational, i.e. open space, public access – or more specifically on the needs of community groups – redistributive, i.e. affordable housing, jobs. If a waterfront development project is to survive such shifts successfully, the authority in charge is well-advised to adjust its development program to new political demands. Keeping plans flexible is thus of the essence, as an unwilling local government can severely frustrate and delay implementation efforts, even if the agency owns all the land and has legal planning authority (Gordon, 1997a).

With regards to finance, government bodies should acknowledge that all waterfront schemes need substantial public grants before any private sector initiative can be expected – all of which are rarely, if ever, repaid.[7] Moreover, the development agencies studied by Gordon (1997ac) in New York, London, Toronto, and Boston needed six to fifteen years to reach coverage of their operating expenses after the first public expenditures were made.[8] This made these agencies extremely vulnerable as politicians tend to use the absence of significant developments as evidence of a project's failure. On top of that, every waterfront development plan should also provide ways by which to respond to the cyclical nature of private real estate investments. In fact, a sound anticipation of a market upswing combines speedy developer selections and efficient plan approvals with a resistance to pressures for increasing building densities. In contrast, downswings need to be met with the construction of new infrastructures and affordable housing in order for an agency to survive and a project to enhance its market appeal (Gordon, 1997c). As a project recovers, an intelligent urban design should allow for proper phasing, i.e. completing one phase at a time to minimize 'construction site' appearance for early residents. The overall plan should invoke a diverse feel by allowing small developers to create fine grain architecture early on, and providing large developers with clear design guidelines as market demands pick up (Gordon, 1997a).

Figure 3.14 lists the characteristics of a hypothetical waterfront development agency successfully managing the changing political environment of a project over the long term. Here, 'successful' refers to a balanced process that, through time, has managed to serve all three of the above mentioned policy types. In this regard, Jones (1998: 439)

1. Maintaining a good relationship with its sponsoring government by supporting the latter's policy agenda, avoiding surprise financial requirements and visibly succeeding in developing its site.
2. Appointing a board of directors well connected to all levels of government, and able to influence its management on political strategy and long range planning.
3. Building strong links to local governments, ideally with direct board appointments. Its senior managers and consultants are well connected to the staff of the local government and respected for their technical expertise and understanding of local values.
4. Anticipating the arrival of residents on the site and appoints senior officer responsible for liaison and planning for their needs.
5. Actively seeking opportunities to link public benefits with private development.
6. Seeking benefits that serve the wider community, such as public parks.
7. Managing the symbolic content of its physical development to highlight these public benefits and vigorously promotes the benefits of its efforts to the wider community.
8. Changing the program of its physical plan to adapt to new policy priorities.

Figure 3.14 Characteristics of a hypothetical waterfront development agency successfully managing the political environment of a waterfront development project over the long term (after Gordon, 1997ab).

argues that European practices – including those in the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Spain – have provided better examples of such balanced processes than North American projects. However, in Europe, waterfront development projects tend to be propelled by a catalyst event like the Olympic Games (e.g. Barcelona) and the Expo (e.g. Lisbon), or by a catalyst function like a knowledge center (Van den Berg *et al.,* 2007). All take considerable public investments with essentially debatable societal returns.

From the overview provided in this section, we can conclude that development pressures in the contemporary port-city interface come from all sides as both port and city authorities vie for space while business and resident communities demand an accessible and attractive urban environment (Bruttomesso, 1993). Hence, at a closer range, the urban waterfront turns out to be the outcome of an expensive, contested, long-term endeavor in which powerful port city actors negotiate, argue, and eventually determine who wins and who loses (Malone, 1996; Doorne, 1998; Jacobs, 2007; Mathews & Satsangi, 2007; Garcia 2008). Now that we have established the substantive elements of this waterfront struggle, we can move on to our final conclusions.

3.5 Port-City Orientations

In this chapter, we have explored a selection of the vast and eclectic body of literature concerned with port evolutions, port-city relations, and waterfront development projects. Our intention was to explore the knowledge produced on these three port-city phenomena, because we aim to find out to what extent such knowledge plays a role in the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy. This means that we assume that the knowledge of actors involved in our case is bounded, and that we can thus expect that this will force them

towards particular decisions and actions instead of other available options. Following Scharpf (1997), we have defined these potentially structuring forces as actor orientations, and specified them as perceptions and preferences (see Figure 3.15). In this section, we use the literature explored in this chapter to define some of the actor orientations we can expect to encounter in the Rotterdam CityPorts project situation. We will define some common perceptions of the challenges projects like Rotterdam CityPorts are supposed to meet, and draw together some of the actor-specific interests, norms, and identities, with which actors involved in our case are likely to associate themselves. However, we will first discuss some of the insights provided by previous studies centered around waterfront development projects in the port city of Rotterdam. This will underline some of the expectations subsequently defined, and draw us closer to the urban development rules that are actually at work in the CityPorts case.

Actor Orientations		
Perceptions	Combinations of knowledge and ignorance shared among actors in a particular situation on the basis of which action is taken	
Preferences	*Interests*	Specific (e.g. individual or organizational) requirements for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth
	Norms	Specific expectations, conditions or restrictions in relation to particular action, or to the purposes to be achieved thereby
	Identity	Stable emphasis on certain aspects of interests and norms in order to simplify choices and reduce uncertainty towards others.

Figure 3.15 Definition of actor orientations: perceptions and preferences (based on Scharpf, 1997).

The Rotterdam CityPorts Situation

Several scholars referred to in this chapter have argued that urban waterfronts can be considered as one of the most tangible products of a broad modern to post-modern shift in western society (Harvey, 1990; Norcliffe *et al.*, 1996; Meyer, 1999; Marshall, 2001). Focusing on Rotterdam, Wigmans (1998) confirms this view when he places these particular port city's changing land policies against the background of post-modernization described in section 3.4. This caused the Rotterdam administration to slowly change its behavior from a supply-led urban 'planner' to a development-led 'facilitator': an attempt to facilitate and attract market forces and private investments that are becoming increasingly 'footloose'.

Analyzing Rotterdam's municipal apparatus more closely, Wigmans (1998) argues that port land policies have been based on development-led principles for decades, and that the valuation and production of port land adheres to its own distinct logic. In fact, the municipal port authority in Rotterdam has been developing its own 'wet' land use principles as early as the 1950s in order to compete with other ports throughout its European hinterland. This trend was followed by an urban counterpart only forty years later, when the need for a development-led approach toward 'dry' economic functions was finally formalized in a separate municipal estate department (a so-called *grondbedrijf*). In the meantime, port and urban land use and valuation principles in Rotterdam had been able to develop in their own separate ways.

In the 1990s, the internally oriented social character of Rotterdam's urban land policies inexorably started to shift toward externally oriented economic objectives. While port and port related activities were escaping all territorial bounds and started to spread throughout the hinterland (i.e. regionalization), an inter-urban competition had emerged in the Netherlands in which local governments strived to facilitate and compete for new economic activities inside their respective territories. While the spatial dimension of ports was losing its significance, the city was discovering the competitive advantage of having distinct and attractive places to offer close to its urban core. Within the Rotterdam apparatus, a strict division between 'dry' and 'wet' economic development policies was nevertheless retained. In the forty years that had passed, the municipal port authority had built up a considerable distance and independence from local politics and planning (Wigmans, 1998: 250).

In their study on European waterfront development phenomena, Van der Knaap & Pinder (1992) label Rotterdam as an 'exception' in light of the highly commercial examples elsewhere (see also Hall, 1993). Since the 1970s, significant public investments had been made in Rotterdam to allow for affordable housing projects in old dockland areas near the city center. However, like Wigmans (1998), Van der Knaap & Pinder (1992) also register an 'entrepreneurial' turn in Rotterdam's urban policies by the end of the 1980s (cf. Harvey, 1989). A policy reorientation towards the development of office functions, and the

Figure 3.16 *Kop van Zuid* design by Teun Koolhaas Associates in 1986 (Meyer, 1999).

urge to reconnect the city to the river and the southern riverbank gave rise to a new waterfront development scheme called the *Kop van Zuid* or 'Head of South' (e.g. McCarthy, 1996). Although this large waterfront development project would later be adopted by the Dutch Ministry of Spatial Planning as one of its so-called Key Projects, most of the initial office program (see Figure 3.16) would later have to be changed into residential functions once public infrastructure investments did not yield the expected market interest. Nevertheless, just like a similar project on Amsterdam's *IJ-Oevers* (Malone, 1996), the *Kop van Zuid* project is renowned for its social character (e.g. Hall, 1993) and its pragmatic development approach (McCarthy, 1996). Currently still uncompleted, the *Kop van Zuid* project would be followed up by several other urban renewal projects south of the river, and by the Rotterdam CityPorts initiative further downstream (see Figure 3.17).

Perceptions of Port-City Challenges

One of the research questions we aim to answer in this chapter is: what are the perceived challenges that an urban development project in the port-city interface is supposed to

meet? The literature reviewed in this chapter clearly shows that these projects started out as practical answers to questions of dereliction emerging in old port areas since the late 1950s. However, the 'success' of urban waterfront projects has since then produced considerable incentives for city administrations and private developers to propose a new future for docklands which may in fact still be (partly) occupied by port and port related uses. Against the background of the western economic transition from production to consumption, urban waterfronts have become places by which port cities can distinguish themselves in the attempt to attract and facilitate new business activities, capital investments, visitors, and residents. On their part, ports have migrated out of town towards deeper waters in order to become technologically advanced and efficient centers for the handling, storing, and manufacturing of goods. In sum, the exploration in this chapter gives rise to three distinct perceptions of the port-city challenges we have been looking for – perceptions we can expect to encounter in the case of Rotterdam CityPorts.

Figure 3.17 Birds-eye view of the Rotterdam CityPorts project area (Port of Rotterdam).

The first and most obvious perceptions we can expect to be shared among actors in Rotterdam are those of *economic growth and competition*. More precisely, it is likely that actors will perceive the Rotterdam CityPorts project as a tool by which such growth and competitiveness can be realized. Its visible and distinctive waterfront features and its location inside the existing port city structure will be considered a guarantee for the area's potential attractiveness for both people and business (see Figure 3.16). Hence, implemen-

tation of the project will be associated with job creation, higher land values and increased local tax revenues. The project will primarily be perceived to be stimulating private investments and public expenditure inside the port city, and thus to economically benefit the entire port urban community. In light of these perceptions, it can also be expected that the disappointing and negative effects that may occur throughout the rest of the port city will be ignored or downplayed. Moreover, the fact that existing port functions may still be of economic significance is likely to lead to considerable resistance toward alternative land uses.

The second perception we are likely to encounter in our case study is that of *ongoing port migration* illustrated by the port area life-cycle (see Figure 3.10). As we have shown in this chapter, the spatial migration of the port towards locations downstream is the most tangible and consistent process in its evolution. Therefore, port city actors are likely to be commonly oriented towards its continuation. For the port authority, this provides the opportunity to offer new, specialized, and possibly dedicated terminals to its clients, while opening up a new frontier for the development of the city. As observed by leading scholars on the topic, waterfront development schemes today are not only the result of voluntary port movements, but also of deliberate planning decisions to relocate old or obsolete port industrial functions and facilitate the development of alternative urban land uses. While this 'push and pull' has proven to be the source of considerable conflict in the past, Merckx *et al.* (2004) notice that port authorities could currently find it more beneficial to cooperate in urban waterfront development initiatives in order to create public support for ongoing port activities elsewhere. So although the exact motives behind it may differ from place to place, waterfront development opportunities are still likely to be perceived as the result of a continuing process of a port moving away from its traditional urban core.

The third and last perception we expect to play a role in the Rotterdam CityPorts case focuses on environmental issues. As found by Hayuth (1982), these issues have been increasingly influential in the decision-making around the future of ports, and this trend can be expected to continue due to growing sustainability concerns (Hall *et al.*, 2006). Urban development projects situated in the port-city interface will therefore be perceived to offer alternative land use functions with less significant impacts on the environment, and the opportunity to relocate environmentally unfriendly functions to more suitable locations. Recently, these perceptions have been joined by a heightened awareness of flood risks in delta regions due to climate change (Priemus & Rietveld, 2009).[9] This issue has added to the substantive complexity of waterfront development assignments in these regions, which has made it even harder to find a comprehensive spatial planning approach for them (Meyer, 2009). Still, shared perceptions towards *increasing the environmental quality of port and urban land uses* are likely to play a role in our case. In Rotterdam's port-city interface, it can therefore be expected that the CityPorts project will be used to meet this common challenge.

Preferences of Port-City Actors

Next to the perceptions we expect to be shared among port city actors, the exploration in this chapter also allows us to hypothesize on the preferences that key actors involved in our case are likely to adhere to. Here, we will particularly distinguish between interests,

norms, and identities of actors that act on behalf of the *port authority*, and those that are likely to conform to the preferences of the *port city administration*.

The explanations in this chapter give rise to the expectation that port authorities will be very protective of their jurisdictional territory, and that they are not likely to give up their autonomous control over older docklands. In fact, a port authority's main interest is to facilitate their clients with maximum operating space, preferably without any constraints or restrictions. The unpredictable demand for port operating space also makes it likely for port planners to strive for maximum flexibility. Rather than re-designating them for urban functions, this means that port authorities are themselves more likely to hold on to older docks and quays in order to answer any unforeseen market demands. According to Hoyle & Pinder (1984), such flexibility is a logical reflection of the open-ended gateway function to which all seaports – including Rotterdam – are inherently dedicated.

Hence, we can conclude that actors acting on behalf of the Rotterdam port authority are likely to protect a port's landlord identity. This means that we can expect them to emphasize and protect the autonomous position of 'the port' in developing its land use policies and plans, and that they are likely to uphold a strict division between 'wet' and 'dry' economic land uses (Wigmans, 1998). The interests of port authority actors will be oriented towards facilitating growth in the port's cargo handling capacity and efficiency, while stimulating value adding manufacturing and storage functions inside the port's territory. Hence, these actors can be expected to have strong arguments in favor of new port uses for older docklands close to the existing city – perhaps more so in Rotterdam (Charlier, 1992).

Port-City Actor Orientations		
Perceptions (shared)	• Economic growth and competition • Ongoing port migration for dockland redevelopment opportunities • Increase environmental quality of port and urban land uses.	
Preferences (role-specific)	Port authority	• Facilitating growth in cargo handling capacity and efficiency, stimulating value adding manufacturing and storage functions (interests) • Autonomy and flexibility in land use designations and investment decisions (norms) • Landlord (identity).
	Port city administration	• Attracting economic (service) functions, increasing resident quality of life (interests) • Timely attainment of policy and planning objectives (norms) • Facilitator (identity).

Figure 3.18 Port-city actor orientations likely to be found among actors in the Rotterdam CityPorts case.

Although those acting on behalf of the port city administration will not necessarily be against the prosperity of its port, the exploration in this chapter points out that conflicts in relation to areas in the port-city 'interface' can be very well expected to arise. In section 3.3, we quoted Hayuth (2007) to characterize how the interests of the port city administration differ from those of the port authority. The actors acting on behalf of the administration can be expected to take the economic well-being and quality of life of the city as a general point of departure. This means that, while they may support port growth, they will also be engaged in drawing new economic activities to the port city. Because waterfront

sites have proven to be extremely attractive locations for both people and business, the designation of such locations for non-port uses is bound to become a politicized issue. In relation to waterfront sites, actors acting on behalf of the port city administration will thus be oriented towards using them to realize policy and planning objectives. They are likely to take on a facilitating role, providing the necessary conditions – like infrastructure improvements, land preparations, and planning approvals – to stimulate private investments. As can be derived from the insights provided by Gordon (1997abc), the timely attainment of policy and planning objectives will be a likely norm put forth particularly by politicians. For our study of the Rotterdam CityPorts case, we can thus expect the strategy identified to reflect a mounting tension between commercial and community interests, and a tendency of local politicians to uphold the latter as power relations start shifting. In the next chapters, we will find out to what extent this is actually the case.

Notes

1 Bird's (1963) 'major' ports of the United Kingdom were determined by analyzing the total weight and the total value of the trade handled in 112 U.K. ports, leading to a set of 12 ports responsible for nine-tenths of the total foreign trade by value.

2 Notteboom & Rodrigue (2005) also include the emergence of hub terminals on offshore locations or islands as part of this regionalization. In Europe, Gioia Tauro, Algeciras, Malta, Taranto and Cagliari in the Mediterranean are examples.

3 According to Hayuth (2007), exceptions are State-owned operators like Singapore's PSA Corporation, Dubai Port Authority, and Hamburg-based HHLA.

4 Ducruet (2007) more specifically related port and city to each other in terms of intermediacy (exogenous cargo attraction power) and centrality (endogenous trade generation power).

5 Charlier (1992) specifically mentions the establishment of the *Haven Participatie Maatschappij* (RHPM) by the Rotterdam port authority in collaboration with the largest stevedoring companies in the port. Together, they took over some smaller companies and created a new, efficient terminal by reclaiming land between a few exiting narrow finger piers in the *Waalhaven* basin (see also next chapters). This created the opportunity to move some companies from the *Merwe-Vierhavens* on the northern riverbank to the new and improved terminal on the southern riverbank.

6 Brownhill (1990) mentions that in 1989, the Docklands counted 3,000 empty residential units and 42 percent of the office space vacant, clarifying how heavily the project relied on government investments in public transport and in social employment and educational programs.

7 Gordon (1997c: 262) estimates a volume of USD200,000-500,000 per acre for infrastructure and working capital on top of the ownership of free land, before private investments begin.

8 Gordon (1997b) argues that there is a strong relationship between this duration and the number of government bodies involved in the approval of the waterfront development plans.

9 In a special issue of *Built Environment*, editors Priemus & Rietveld (2009) assert that, currently, no broad body of scientific literature on the relationships between climate change, flooding risk and spatial planning exists. First research results show that differing perceptions of flooding risks and levels of expertise among involved stakeholders – a situation sustained by existing system of planning, law, and property rights – hamper the implementation of new spatial planning approaches like the recent 'room for the river' policy in the Netherlands (Hartmann, 2009) and Sustainable Urban Drainage Systems in England (White & Alarcon, 2009).

Chapter 4 The Case of Rotterdam CityPorts

Period I: From Hierarchical Planning to Area-based Learning

4.1 Introduction

In the first two chapters of this thesis, we explained the way we have chosen to analyze and interpret the phenomenon central in this thesis: the case of Rotterdam CityPorts. In chapter three, we prepared ourselves for our case study by exploring some of the information available on the development of ports, port cities, and urban waterfronts. By doing so, we have grown more aware of the challenges urban development projects in port cities are supposed to meet, and thus of the bias that is likely to play a role in our case. According to our research framework, this helps us to analyze and interpret the decisions and actions studied in a (more) comprehensive and transparent way. Within our research framework, it enables us to recognize the substantive interests and norms apparent in the decisions and actions recorded, and identify the resources mobilized.

This is the first of three chapters in which we present the results of our case study. Each chapter represents a specific strategic period in the Rotterdam CityPorts project episode (see Figure 4.1) – a period in which those that intend to realize the project significantly change the focus of their decisions and actions. What we will witness in this first period is a strategic change from *hierarchical planning* to *area-based learning*. The narrative will show that the initiation of the CityPorts endeavor is the product of a vision for a larger framework of projects in Rotterdam, and information about waterfront development efforts picked up elsewhere by a few resourceful actors. The planning process that follows shifts to a process of learning as those involved become acquainted with the

Figure 4.1 Three Strategic Periods – Three Chapters

characteristics of the CityPorts area. As conflicts of interest between top decision makers and their base organizations emerge, the resources deemed necessary to realize the project are strongly negotiated about. Seemingly resolved, our period ends on December 31, 2003 – the day before the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) was formally

established. In our analysis, the CityPorts project strategy will then move toward another strategic turn.

In the following sections, we will first chronologically describe the decisions, actions, and events around the project's initiation between October 2002 and January 2004 (section 4.2 to 4.4). In section 4.5, we will conclude our account of the strategy formation process 1) by defining the resources mobilized during the strategic period identified, 2) by identifying the interests and norms of the actors involved, and 3) by grouping the decisions and actions of those that intend to realize the project according to our fourfold perspective on strategy. However, we will first travel back to the year 2000, tracing the decision by which the CityPorts initiative was prepared.

4.2 Prologue: A Triple Strike

Our story of the case of Rotterdam CityPorts begins in May, 2000. In a report signed by Mayor Ivo Opstelten and official representatives of three nature and environmental organizations, common ambitions for 'a qualitative development of Rotterdam as a whole' were presented. The document was meant to support State-level discussions on the expansion of the port of Rotterdam, and consisted of the substantiation of a vision that had already been outlined by the Dutch Cabinet in earlier documents.[1] What characterized this new report was its comprehensiveness. Emphasized by the title *Visie en Durf* or 'Vision and Dare', it complemented the perspective on Rotterdam's future with a tangible proposal that combined a significant port expansion plan with several coastal zone compensation measures and the realization of a large nature and recreational reserve.[2] In addition, execution of the proposal was also meant to enhance the 'spatial and environmental quality' of the city of Rotterdam by restructuring remaining port installations close to urban functions, and by transforming sites that would eventually be abandoned by port business due to seaward shifts. It was therefore argued that the expansion of the port would also induce the further development of the city. For the development and renewal of Rotterdam after 2010, the document noted that the prospect of vacated space on the borders of port and city was considered of great importance. Hence, the foundations for a widely supported, comprehensive package of measures for a 'stronger and more diversified economy, more nature, and a flourishing city' were now defined. The mayor and his partners made it clear that Rotterdam wanted to meet the twenty-first century head on with projects that reflected the interests of port and city authorities as well as environmental organizations.

Towards Tangible Results

From October 7 to 11, 2002, the Rotterdam municipal Council Committee for Economy, Port, and Environment (EHM) conducted an international study trip. Chair and Councilor Van der Heijden led a delegation to the port cities of Hamburg and London. Next to other Council members, the group was accompanied by responsible Port Alderman Van Sluis and several public officials. The formal goal of the trip was to build a relationship with their German and British peers, and discuss the way recent developments in the air and maritime port sectors can be connected to economic redevelopment prospects and

associated environmental issues. The ideas acquired during the study trip would soon become important motives for the CityPorts project.

Box 1
Hamburg HafenCity

HafenCity is one of the most significant projects of the 'Free and Hanseatic' City-State of Hamburg still under construction. With a total size of 157 hectares, it is designated to expand the adjacent historic city center by 40 percent. The project is meant to add 5,500 homes for 12,000 people, and 1.8 to 2.0 million square meters of built gross floor area. The organization responsible for the development is *HafenCity Hamburg GmbH*, a development corporation that controls the land appropriation and sales in the area. The ownership and final transactions of land, however, are in the hands of the Hamburg City-State. A careful and secretive land acquisition process in the 1990s made it possible for the Hamburg administration to buy over 80 percent of the land in the area before presenting the HafenCity plans to the public in 1997. The Hamburg Port Authority – at the time still a municipal department and formally the area's landlord – agreed to the plans after arrangements were made for the development of a new terminal on the banks of the (deeper) Lower Elbe. The construction of the *Altenwerder* Terminal would thus be supported by about 500 million Deutsch Marks (€250 million, year 2000) of HafenCity's land revenues. Hence, the focus of the project is on high-yielding real estate products (quality office, retail and residential functions) in order to balance its costs. After a German/Dutch Masterplan was presented to the public in the year 2000, HafenCity would slowly begin to materialize. In 2003, the first buildings were completed. In October 2006, HafenCity received a new priority status in the Hamburg parliament. Since then, its development plans are discussed in a Supervisory Board featuring key political decision makers to ensure an effective process. In 2009, the realization of HafenCity is well underway. The construction of a subway line, and the 7.9 hectare mixed-use project (with an emphasis on retail) called the *Überseequartier* in the heart of the area, are important next steps.

Sources: Schubert (2001a; 2001b) www.waterfront-net.org, wwww.hafencity.org, and several interviews (see Appendix 4).

Throughout their foreign expedition, the Rotterdam delegates gained a lot of interest in the projects they visited. The waterfront development project *HafenCity* in Hamburg was particularly inspiring. What struck the Rotterdam group was the way *HafenCity's* financing had taken the involvement of several government bodies. This had made it possible to combine a phased approach of early land acquisition, depletion, and plan realization with the relocation of port activities to a new terminal elsewhere in the port of Hamburg (see also Box 1). Although the project would still take ten to twenty years to complete, the timely realization of public transport connections to the area was nevertheless considered key. In addition, the development of functions for living and working were to be complemented by waterfront recreation amenities for all Hamburg inhabitants. On top of that, the attraction and involvement of large companies in the plan-making process had also been of clear importance, as had the conscious cultivation of a 'start image' in order to attract additional businesses to the area.[3]

The EHM Committee's study trip took place while Rotterdam municipal departments were working on a draft version of a document called the *Havenplan 2020* or 'Port Vision 2020'.[4] Before the elections earlier that year, Port Alderman Van Sluis and his party *Leefbaar* [Liveable] *Rotterdam* had promised the electorate tangible results. After they received a formidable mandate during the March elections, they were pushed to deliver such results. One of these would be identified as the effectuation of an urban development assignment that was emerging in port areas adjacent to the city. Like its preceding administration, Rotterdam's municipal executives still expected that the desired port expansion project *Maasvlakte 2* would trigger a migration process of deep-sea shipping activities toward the North Sea, providing space for the development of urban functions (see also Box 2). Recognizing similarities between the situation in Hamburg and Rotterdam, several members of the Committee subsequently prepared a proposal for the Rotterdam City Council due for deliberations on November 12 and 14. Alderman Van Sluis and port authority Director Scholten, who was also a member of the same Committee and had already been deeply engaged in the 'Vision and Dare' negotiations a few years earlier, were also involved in the process.[5] Later on, these actions and subsequent decisions would become known in Rotterdam as an 'administrative triple strike', formalizing the relationship between 1) the corporatization of the Rotterdam port authority, 2) the financing of the port's *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan, and 3) the founding of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR).[6] In 2006, OMSR Director De Ruiter would recall:

> 'So, one should give Willem [Scholten] credit on two levels: on the one hand concerning "Vision and Dare", in which he played a large role and which he finalized under the administration in office until 2002. And on the other the development of CityPorts. CityPorts was effectuated by the administration assembled in 2002, in which [Alderman] Wim van Sluis would not only corporatize the port authority, but would also be a driving force for City-Ports' (OMSR, 2006b: 40).

Before we elaborate on the latter of the three 'strikes', we will shortly outline the decisions and actions behind the first two. Figure 4.2 depicts the relationship between the *Maasvlakte 2* port expansion plan and the area that would soon become known as that of Rotterdam's *stadshavens* or 'CityPorts'.

Figure 4.2 The Rotterdam-Rijnmond City-Region with the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan and the CityPorts Area.

Port Authority Corporatization

During the 1990s, Director Scholten of the Rotterdam's *gemeentelijk havenbedrijf* (GHR) campaigned fiercely for more independence of the port's management body from its municipal mother. Scholten had tried in a number of ways to push his political superiors towards decisions for further corporatization of the GHR.[7] He often argued that the port authority needed to operate more entrepreneurially, and that it should be able to take on more financial investment risks in the increasingly competitive and globalizing maritime transport sector. The Rotterdam municipal Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W), which was traditionally flanked by a City Council with a large Labor majority, was generally skeptic about the idea of a more independent port authority. Negotiations resulted in a compromising 'package deal' in 1999, which provided the GHR Director with a larger financial mandate. This gave Scholten the opportunity to found the investment corporation Mainport Holding Rotterdam (MHR) in return for a higher annual contribution to the municipal purse. The venture would later turn out largely unsuccessful.[8] However, the political tide in Rotterdam took a radical turn in 2002. New opportunities for the ambitious GHR Director emerged.

The charismatic Pim Fortuijn headed a new political party, *Leefbaar Rotterdam*, toward the 2002 municipal elections while also featuring at the top of the *Leefbaar Nederland* voting ballots on the State level. After national newspaper *de Volkskrant* published a controversial interview with him on February 9 of that year, *Leefbaar Nederland* executives decided to ban their popular leader. Unimpressed, Fortuijn founded his own political party *Lijst Pim Fortuijn* (*LPF*). As his popularity grew, it became clear that the 2002 elections would cause significant political changes in Rotterdam and the Netherlands. On the municipal level, Fortuijn was still at the top of the *Leefbaar Rotterdam* list of candidates. Early March 2002, the party won 17 of the 45 municipal seats, making it the largest faction in the Rotterdam City Council. Moreover, for the first time since the Second World War, Labor party *Partij van de Arbeid* (*PvdA*) found itself out of power in

Rotterdam. Subsequently, the same was expected to happen after the State-level elections set for May 15, 2002. On May 6, however, a gripping event took place when Pim Fortuijn was assassinated by an animal rights activist in the media town of Hilversum. While this democratic catastrophe made headlines around the world, the Netherlands found itself in a historic shock. After consultation with *LPF* party officials, it was decided not to postpone the State elections. Because it was legally impossible to modify the ballots on such a short notice, Fortuijn became a posthumous candidate. The *LPF* went on to set a record debut in the Lower House of Parliament known as *De Tweede Kamer* [The Second Chamber]. In 2002, it won 26 of the 150 seats.[9]

Much like his political adversaries, Fortuijn was a pronounced opponent of the push of the port authority in Rotterdam towards more independence, more funding, and more space. However, after Fortuijn's death, *Leefbaar Rotterdam* Alderman Van Sluis decided not to make the party's political beliefs, but the interests of the port and city of Rotterdam central in his reflections on the GHR's continuing requests.[10] Hence, GHR Director Scholten found Van Sluis to be an ideal political partner in his efforts to develop and expand Rotterdam port business. The results spoke for themselves: since Scholten's appointment back in 1992, the port authority had managed to let the port's turnover grow sixfold, to over €400 million in 2003.[11] His wish for a more independent, corporatized port authority would soon become a reality. On June 5, 2003, the Rotterdam City Council passed the proposition to transform the *gemeentelijk havenbedrijf* into the Port of Rotterdam PLC (in short: HbR), a public limited company. Scholten would become its President Director, and Alderman Van Sluis was to become Chair of the supervising Board of Commissioners. Port land would still be owned by the municipality, but would be controlled by the new HbR through perpetuate lease – a so-called economic ownership. Subsequently, the port's corporatization cleared the road for Scholten's primary growth ambition: the realization of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan.

The Maasvlakte 2 Expansion Plan

The plans to expand the Rotterdam port area into the North Sea by land reclamation already emerged officially as early as 1989 in the Dutch State's *Tweede Structuurschema Zeehavens* [Second Structure Scheme Seaports] (Brolsma 2007: 335). The *gemeentelijk havenbedrijf* (GHR) presented the plans in 1991 with the publication of the *Havenplan 2010* subtitled: 'Future image of the Mainport Rotterdam'. The term 'mainport' was first officially coined by the Dutch State in the 1988 Fourth Bill on Spatial Planning, which acknowledged the maritime port of Rotterdam and the airport of Amsterdam Schiphol as the 'engines' of the Dutch economy.[12] The *Havenplan 2010* estimated a need for 2,500 hectares [6,178 acres] of dry terrain of which 1,050 hectares [2,595 acres] would be found through intensified use of existing port land. Hence, a demand of 1,450 hectares [3,58 acres] of port space remained unaccounted for. The *Havenplan 2010* therefore proposed, next to some other smaller measures, a land reclamation plan for about 1,000 hectares [2,471 acres]. The *Maasvlakte 2* – named after its adjacent predecessor – was designated particularly for the transhipment and distribution of containers and dry bulk (see Figure 4.3). Although the estimations of the port's market opportunities were widely accepted, the financing of the enormous reclamation plan was hardly a done deal. In any case, the realization of *Maasvlakte 2* would involve an unprecedented participation of the Dutch

State and the Rotterdam mu-
nicipality together with private
investors. Consequently, it was
not before late in the year 2000
that State Minister of Finance
Gerrit Zalm officially suggested
a solution to the financing
problem in a Lower House de-
bate. Zalm linked the Cabinet's
commitment to the Rotterdam
expansion plan with the possi-
bility of the State's participation
in a corporatized port authority.
The link suggested by the Min-
ister subsequently forced the
municipal Board of Mayor and
Alderman (B&W) in Rotter-

Figure 4.3 Computer generated birds-eye view of the *Maasvlakte 2* expan-
sion plan (www.portofrotterdam.nl).

dam to reassess their position on the port's form of government (Brolsma, 2007: 328-9).
However, a renewed political position would really begin to take shape after the municipal
elections in March 2002, when the long-standing *PvdA* tradition was discontinued by a
Leefbaar Rotterdam-Christian-Liberal coalition.[13]

4.3 Initiating the CityPorts Project

In the previous section, we described some important political shifts in favor of the long-
awaited corporatization of Rotterdam's port authority and the execution of the *Maasvlakte
2* expansion plan. However, Rotterdam City Council deliberations on the plans were long
and elaborate: What did the city itself benefit from all this? Although expectations about
the provision of space for urban development projects in older port areas had been ex-
pressed several times, it became clear that the port authority was expected to agree to a
compensation in order to receive majority support for their plans. In November 2002,
Councilor Van der Heijden answered the City Council's demands on behalf of his political
party and coalition member *CDA*.[14] It is in these actions that we find the first traces of the
Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy.

CityPorts Intentions
During Rotterdam City Council deliberations on Tuesday November 12, 2002, Councilor
Van der Heijden explicitly linked the forthcoming proposal for the corporatization of the
municipal port authority to the realization of the *Maasvlakte 2* port expansion plan and a
new large development plan for 'old port areas'. The Chair of the EHM Committee argued
that these areas could provide ample opportunities to create a 'pleasant new working and
living environment within the city'. More importantly, the Councilor's party saw the re-
newal or the port's management and exploitation as two pillars in a company that should
repay the city with a 'dowry'.[15] This, he explained, was also exactly why port land should

not be transferred in full ownership to a possibly corporatized port authority. The position of the *CDA* was that the port's territory should come under port control on the basis of perpetuate lease. Port terrains that would eventually be returned to the city could then be used to generate the necessary capital to fund – among other things – the activities of a development company that would take on the redevelopment tasks.

Arguing the Development Company idea even further, Van der Heijden expressed his party's wish to stimulate connections between the new port authority and the existing municipal urban development department OBR. The *CDA* suspected that a more collaborative attitude between these organizations would produce clearer communication to the public and a firmer grip on the economic development of the city of Rotterdam. He added that the idea to coherently develop old port areas in the next 20 years could be supported by the results of the study trip his EHM Committee had undertaken to the port cities of London and Hamburg (see Box 1). According to the Christians, the idea represented a great opportunity for the development of a large residential area. In conclusion, the Councilor explicitly named the port areas his party was thinking of in relation to the proposed development company, as well as the way this new body should be organized and funded. The municipal clerk recorded:

> 'It would be a very good thing, in order to develop the *Waalhaven*, a big part of the *Eemhaven*, and across the river the *Merwehaven*, to found a development company that could manage and take the lead in elaborating the agenda I just spoke of. I think that the founding should take place in a joint venture between the municipal port authority and the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* [OBR], for which both should make a start-up contribution, one by bringing in its land and the other through the first revenues out of the lease-sell conversion, both of which would be a very good investment. I think that the *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* [urban planning department dS+V] would be a fitting third collaborating partner here. This way, these three can re-bundle this big responsibility.' (F.J. van der Heijden, taken from the minutes of the Rotterdam City Council meeting on Tuesday November 12, 2002, pp. 1127)

After a debate on Councilor Van der Heijden's proposal, a motion called *Stedelijke Ontwikkeling Havengebieden* [Urban Development Port Areas] was passed by the Rotterdam City Council on November 14.[16] When the votes were cast, socialist party SP had unsuccessfully moved against the founding of a separate development company. Newspaper *Rotterdams Dagblad* published an article in which the decision was called 'a license of incompetence' for those working in the municipal urban planning and development departments, dS+V and OBR.[17] Nonetheless, the approved founding of a semi-independent port city joint venture was formally argued by the need for space to facilitate 'dry' economic activities and residential locations in Rotterdam, and by:[18]

- The expectation that the forthcoming realization of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan would lead to growth and relocation of port business, making way for new urban development – particularly in the *Waalhaven*, *Eemhaven*, and *Merwehaven*;
- The earlier procurement of the so-called '*Baristerrein*'[19] on the riverbanks of the *Waal/Eemhaven* area, which meant an almost exclusive municipal land ownership in the port areas;

Box 2
The Port City of Rotterdam

The Dutch city of Rotterdam is best known for its maritime port. Originating from medieval settlements on the fenland rivers of the Rotte and the Schie, Rotterdam has evolved to beset the shores of the river New Meuse in the middle of the Rhine-Meuse-Scheldt delta – a delta flowing into the North Sea. Port installations extend from Rotterdam's core to beyond *Hoek van Holland*, which makes the port about 40 kilometers long. Today, the port of Rotterdam is characterized by combining the storage, distribution, and transhipment of goods and containers, with a large industrial cluster specialized in agricultural products, maritime technology, and petrochemistry.

The growth of the port of Rotterdam seemed relentless until the Municipal Port Authority's 'Plan 2000+' of 1969. It consisted of an expansion plan that outlined a vision for the development of the port and its industry combined with housing, recreational, and environmental facilities. Later that year, growing public resistance against the port's growth led to a rejection of the plan, marking an important turn in Rotterdam port policies. The construction of an adjusted *Maasvlakte* [Meuse Plain] expansion would eventually still be approved, but the settlement of a large steel factory on it would be halted by the Rotterdam City Council. Nevertheless, the global oil crisis and the emergence of containerized shipping in the first half of the turbulent 1970s reinforced the people's conviction that the port of Rotterdam was of critical economic importance. Still, the post-war policies of industrialization were regarded too one-sided, making port operations very vulnerable to global economic developments. Consequently, it was not before 1995 that the port's transhipment would definitively regain and supersede its mid 1970s handling level. In 2006, the port of Rotterdam handled more than 378 thousand metric tonnes of cargo, a volume surpassed only by the ports of Shanghai and Singapore. According to figures provided by the Port of Rotterdam, it created an added value of around €12 billion in 2005, equal to 6.8 percent of the Dutch Gross Domestic Product. In addition, direct employment was reported to a total of 58,000 that same year, whereas about 315,000 people are indirectly employed due to Rotterdam port business.

In 1965, the population in Rotterdam peaked at 730,000, but would decline sharply in the following years. This depopulation was caused by the poor quality of housing, the enormous traffic, the relative unattractiveness of the new city center, and the severe air pollution. The protest movements mentioned above also led to the first waterfront redevelopment plans in the 1970s in order to provide space for new housing, recreational, and cultural functions. Slowly, Rotterdam would become aware of the potential of its waterfront for 'urban' uses, although that potential would never be fully exploited. In the year 2007, Rotterdam counts just under 600 thousand inhabitants within its municipal limits, and about 1.2 million people within the conurbation known as the *Stadsregio Rotterdam-Rijnmond*.

Sources: Brolsma (2007); Meyer, (1999); Van Hooydonk & Verhoeven (2007).

- The interest of existing users to have clarity about the municipal intentions in these three port areas, about what steps could be expected next, and about how the Municipality of Rotterdam intends to manage these steps.

A month later, on December 20, the Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) followed up on the City Council's approval to found a new body, and named it the *Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens Rotterdam* or Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR). Former dS+V Director De Ruiter, who had also been involved in the negotiations leading up to the earlier 'Vision and Dare' document, was appointed Director of the new company.

CityPorts Elaborations

In a letter sent to the City Council by the Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) in May 2003, the Board explained to the Council that the OMSR would become a limited or incorporated company after a short start-up phase.[20] This way, private investors could eventually also be allowed to participate in the company next to the municipality and the ultimately corporatized port authority. It was then confirmed that the founding of the OMSR had indeed become part of an administrative triple strike. With reference to preceding waterfront development projects (see Box 3), B&W pointed out that the expected relocation of port activities to *Maasvlakte 2* is hardly new in Rotterdam. However, they stressed that the enormous size of the CityPorts area is unprecedented. This would make the area highly dependent on a 'careful re-allocation process' of businesses in the port before it could start to accommodate the demand for urban economic functions, housing, and amenities that Rotterdam was unable to offer elsewhere in the conurbation. Furthermore, B&W argued that:

> 'In order to manage this assignment as well as possible, the choice is made to bundle the organizing strength of the closely involved municipal bodies of the port authority [GHR], the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* [OBR] and the *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* [dS+V]. This bundling has taken shape in the *Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens* [OMSR], as a separate management and procurement organization, in which these three bodies participate and to which they will deliver. In doing so, the possibility of friction losses is eliminated, and a clear approach for entrepreneurs, stakeholders, and project developers toward the Rotterdam apparatus is created.' (Extract from letter of the Board of Mayor and Alderman to the Rotterdam City Council, May 8, 2003)

In addition, B&W also explicitly explained three ways in which the municipality, in order to secure the public interest, could still influence the activities of the OMSR and the GHR once they are corporatized:[21]

- Influence exercised through exclusive legal instruments provided by Public Law;
- Influence exercised through rights provided by the municipal ownership of land in the CityPorts area;
- Influence exercised through its authority as a shareholder of the OMSR (of which it will own half of the shares) and of the HbR (of which it will own a majority of the shares).

Bringing capital into the OMSR, of which the transfer of land is an essential part, was still to be elaborated upon by its potential shareholders. However, it was made clear that all port land within the Rotterdam diamond would not be transferred to the OMSR in full. Instead, it was decided that the transfer of land would be 'phased', meaning that land transfers would only take place when the areas would actually have become ready for transformation. B&W clarify:[22]

Box 3

Waterfront Development Projects in Rotterdam

Rotterdam has a long tradition in waterfront development efforts starting as early as the 1970s on locations along the river Rotte. However, ideas to strengthen the connection between the inner city and the south side of the river New Meuse emerged as early as 1933. In those days, it was Director for Urban Development Gerrit Witteveen who launched the idea of *Zuiderstad* [South City], which would be connected to the inner city by bridge. More than four decades later, between 1979 and 1982, a special architecture division of the *Rotterdamse Kunststichting* [Rotterdam Arts Foundation] would organize a series of events known as 'Architecture International Rotterdam' (AIR). The events resulted in a competition to create experimental urban designs for the areas on the south banks of the river known as the *Kop van Zuid* [South's Head]. It were these designs, and particularly those of Italian architect Aldo Rossi, which triggered the idea of developing a 'Manhattan on the Meuse', a phrase by which contemporary Rotterdam is often typified.

In 1987, Department of Urban Development Director Riek Bakker followed up on the AIR results by presenting 'The New Rotterdam' plan, which featured two areas eligible for renewal and a new symbiosis between city and port. The first was *Delfshaven Buitendijks* in the western part of the city, and the second was the *Kop van Zuid*. Proposals for the first were partly based on plans initiated by the municipal port authority for the *Merwehaven* and *Vierhavens*, where an integrated port terminal for fruit and fruit juices was to be developed. Bakker combined the port authority's plans with ideas to use the *Müllerpier* and *Lloydpier* for inner city functions. 'The New Rotterdam' plan envisioned a combination of a city park, a park lane, and a new expansion area with modern urban functions. Port related companies were suggested to build their headquarters in the park lane.

Although the further development of the city on the north side of the New Meuse seemed logical, it was eventually the *Kop van Zuid* that got precedence over the other plans. Shaped by a 1987 plan by Teun Koolhaas Associates, the project was seen as the creator of cultural and political consensus in Rotterdam, as the symbol of a socially and spatially undivided city, and as the link between the Dutch spatial economic zones on both sides of the Meuse, giving it a status of national importance. The Rotterdam City Council approved the zoning scheme for the *Kop van Zuid* in 1991, after which the project was implemented. With the inauguration of the monumental Erasmus Bridge in 1996, the connection suggested by Witteveen back in 1933 was finally realized, and gave the *Kop van Zuid* project national and international publicity.

Box 3 (continued)

The Lloyd Quarter and *Müllerpier* have become the scene of a large urban development project, in which a number of older buildings have been integrated. The surrounding *Parkhaven*, *Sint-Jobshaven*, and *Schiehaven* were built between 1890 and 1909, and the docklands were home to historical companies like *Wm. H. Müller & Co*, *Blauwhoedenveem*, and the *Rotterdamsche Lloyd*. Their offices or warehouses have now been converted into modern offices and loft apartments. After completion, this new city district will provide about 2,000 new homes. It is already the seat of the Shipping and Transport College and an audio-visual cluster situated in the old *Schiecentrale* – a converted power plant.

Before the construction of the *Maashaven* and the *Rijnhaven* between 1893 and 1907, the village of *Katendrecht* was home to wealthy city folk. In the 1930s, however, *Katendrecht* had become a land finger between the two *havens*, it was home to Europe's largest Chinese community, and it was a real seaman's 'playground'. After many port activities moved out west, a period of dereliction and nuisance due to the still remaining prostitution led to the decision to turn *Katendrecht* back into a residential neighborhood. In 1984, the *Eerste Katendrechtse Haven* was filled in to make room for a new residential area. In the meantime though, many locals had left the area and there has ever since been an influx of poor ethnic minority groups. The once thriving nightlife district has thus become a social problem area. Drawing inspiration from the *Kop van Zuid* project, an ambitious masterplan was worked out in the late 1990s for the development of *De Kaap* – the area situated at the base of the docklands. See also Chapter six.

Sources: Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (illustration); Meyer (1998); Van Hooydonk *et al.* (2007).

'A full land transfer was canceled, because this would immediately give the OMSR a heavy maintenance and operation task for the existing businesses in the area. This would result in a complicated agreement between the OMSR and the HbR, and cause unnecessary obscurities for port customers.' (Extract from letter of the Board of Mayor and Alderman to the Rotterdam City Council, May 8, 203)

The eventual founding of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC (OMSR) was set for January 1, 2004, in conjunction with the founding of the *N.V. Haven van Rotterdam* (HbR). OMSR articles of association were to be embedded in the articles of the HbR, and become part of a 'Port Agreement' in which the corporatizations would be officially ratified. All land under control of the municipal port authority – including the designated CityPorts area – would be transferred to the new organization on the basis of perpetuate lease without charge. In the event that land within the CityPorts area would become eligible for redevelopment, it was agreed that the HbR would transfer that particular piece of land to the OMSR in exchange for a fee. The attorneys working out the agreements explained that this fee should be calculated on port use premises, not taking into account the (possible) value increase due to planned land use changes.[23] This fee calculation would then provide the OMSR the opportunity to generate the necessary funding for tasks like land appropriation and the realization of public works. According to the lawyers, this valuation principle was to be recorded in the Port Agreement. Moreover, with regard to the OMSR's goal, they also pointed out another aspect that should be taken into account:

> 'It should be acknowledged that the OMSR will have its "own" goal, and that the OMSR will not automatically be an extension of the parties involved. Therefore, the purposes and interests of the port authority, the municipality and OMSR will not by definition be parallel. The statutory goal will be […] aimed at certain strategic, long term objectives on behalf of the city of Rotterdam.' (Rotterdam Municipal Decision Notice, July 3, 2003, paragraph 3.8)

City-Port Relations

In the eventual Port Agreement, of which a concept version was still public,[24] the goal of the OMSR was to develop the CityPorts areas in such a way that a transformation of a port industrial area into an urban living and working area could take place. In addition, the Port Agreement also recorded a combination of port terrains, urban economic locations, as well as living and recreational areas as an explicit possibility. The development task was to 'initiate, facilitate, and stimulate' this transformation. It was agreed that land in the designated CityPorts areas would be transferred to the OMSR as soon as the required land development in a particular area would need to start. However, the financial premises of the transfer remained obscure, save that it was announced that they would be primarily based on HbR 'book values plus'. A policy advisor of the *gemeentelijke bestuursdienst* (BSD) recalled some heavy discussions about this part of the 'triple strike' with the Port Alderman. At the time, officials from the urban planning and development departments were not ready to thoroughly argue their claim over port land. Then, the BSD took over the negotiations. In an interview, the advisor remembered the following:

> 'The question [for the BSD] always is: what are the most important things that you have to take care of? That's because such a corporatization, and an OMSR on top of that, will always leave you with a lot of loose ends. That's simply inevitable. At a certain moment in time, you also have to set a deadline, stating when results have to be achieved. That's when taking care of every detail will just take too long, and the momentum to turn it into a viable organization could pass you by. That sometimes left us with some difficult choices. But it was good

that things worked out the way they did although we couldn't take care of everything equally well.' (BSD Interview November 2008)

Eventually, the skepticism about the OMSR's founding was also due to the new organization's position as a separate entity between a renewed port authority and existing municipal departments. Doubts about its relationship to the existing apparatus, as expressed earlier in the City Council, were shared among all those involved. A strategist from the municipal OBR recalled:

'Within the OBR, you noticed something like "well, why can't we do this ourselves?". It was already like that at the founding. […] Creating a separate vehicle for CityPorts was really seen as a political decision.' (OBR Interview July 2006)

Port authority employees generally shared the feelings of their OBR colleagues. In an interview at the HbR head office, a corporate development official explained that:

'People have seen [the OMSR] as a competitor from the very start. I feel that things weren't right from the beginning. I don't know why exactly. […] Look, you can't be self-sustaining, generate returns, you can't do that without land. But you shouldn't do that anyway, because you'll get yet another land expropriator next to the others. We really never wanted that. […] And that's where politics come in.' (HbR Interview February 2006)

Consequently, even before its official founding, it was clear that the new *Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij* would have a lot to prove toward their municipal and port authority colleagues. By recruiting employees from its parent bodies, OMSR executives assumed that the new organization would be able to overcome the initial reservations towards its venture. Moreover, by appointing professionals from the port authority (GHR) as well as urban development (OBR) and planning (dS+V) oriented departments, the OMSR was believed to incorporate the necessary expertise to gain the trust and authority it needed to function. Later on, an OMSR employee explained that the expectations among its earliest members were high:

'You felt that you were chosen to work on a special assignment. After all, one doesn't found a development company for nothing.' (OMSR Interview December 2006)

4.4 The Development Company Start-Up

While the status of the new development company was still under discussion, Rotterdam's administration continued its push for results. On February 1, 2003, the newly appointed Director of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC (OMSR) therefore confidently began to start up his organization. At that point in time, the OMSR was still formally part of the *Gemeentelijk havenbedrijf* (GHR), and consisted only of a Steering Committee. Here, we find the positions of the project's key actors. Next to OMSR Director De Ruiter, the members of the Steering Committee were:

- Alderman of Traffic, Transport, and Organization (FIBS, also Chair);
- Alderman of Economy, Port, and Environment (EHM);
- Director of the port authority (later: Port of Rotterdam PLC);
- Director of the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR);
- Director of the *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V); and
- Director of the *Gemeentelijke Bestuursdienst* (BSD).[25]

Organizing a Team

During the first half of 2003, De Ruiter recruited the first OMSR employees. The people to join De Ruiter in the CityPorts assignment were indeed mostly municipal employees, working for either the port authority, the OBR, or the dS+V. Eventually, these civil servants would be accompanied by people from private organizations or other government bodies. The aim was to equip the organization with a workforce that reflected the nature of its founders and the character of its development assignment. Getting to know each other, it was assumed, would lead to a better understanding of the different interests involved in the OMSR's tasks. Moreover, there was awareness of the fact that the responsible municipal bodies had very different technical and financial principles on which port and urban land was appropriated, developed, and maintained. It was believed that the skill and experience of the OMSR employees would bring in the necessary expertise to bridge the gap between the two 'regimes', and reach a basis for port-city collaboration and a mutually beneficial CityPorts development 'vision'.

The initial OMSR organizational structure reflected what was meant to become its primary tasks. Figure 4.4 depicts the OMSR organizational structure in its initial form mid 2003. Next to Director De Ruiter, one person was appointed to lead the maintenance and operating activities, and two people were chosen to manage the communications and strategy portfolios. Next to this, five 'development managers' were selected. Each development manager would eventually become responsible for a particular part of the CityPorts area. However, in the first months on the job, their activities would mainly be aimed at gathering information about the area in order to compose a first 'position paper', to be presented to the Steering Committee early 2004. The initial OMSR organization was completed by two office managers supporting all operations. Among other activities, the OMSR's work comprised of analyzing the running lease contracts of companies in the area, the potential business movements in the entire port industrial complex, and the land registry data of all sites in the CityPorts area. In that year, the OMSR employees were placed within the GHR's corporate development department. As such, accommodation was arranged for in the World Port Center, which has been the Rotterdam port authority head office since 2001 (see Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.4 Organizational structure Rotterdam CityPorts (OMSR) mid 2003 (Source: OMSR, 2004).

Figure 4.5 The World Port Center (WPC) is home to the Port of Rotterdam organization since 2001, and is situated on the Wilhelmina Pier next to the historic Hotel New York (OMSR).

Positioning the Area

In July 2003, the OMSR formulated a consultancy assignment for the 'further elaboration on the economic positioning' of CityPorts (OMSR, 2003). The brief accompanying the assignment counted as the very first document in which preliminary lessons about the development assignment were recorded. The CityPorts team wanted some external advice on the (potential) attractiveness of the area for new business functions. The assignment was motivated by the lack of readily available 'dry' business sites within Rotterdam city boundaries, and the fact that the city and regional authorities repeatedly had to decline bids from companies interested to locate their activities in Rotterdam. Moreover, the consultancy assignment brief argued that the Rotterdam region was showing a shortage of about 540 hectares [1,334 acres] of industrial business sites towards the year 2010. In addition, the document pointed out that Rotterdam was coping with an unbalanced population in terms of income, and an oversupply in the regulated social housing sector. Hence, claimed was that the city was in need of housing in the middle and upper price ranges, particularly within existing city limits. In a newspaper article, Alderman Van Sluis explained: [26]

> 'This is a good opportunity to realize new and high value housing on and around the *Waalhaven*, with examples of the London Docklands and similar old port areas in Hamburg and Copenhagen. And we are talking about high value housing for middle-high and high incomes. Just think: living on the waterfront, so close to the city!'

In effect, the CityPorts area – and the *Waalhaven* and *Merwehaven* areas in particular – was designated to offer opportunities for new industrial business activities and a differentiated supply of housing. Of the 58,000 residential units to be built in the Rotterdam City-Region by State decree[27], the Rotterdam municipal urban planning department (dS+V) would assign up to 15,000 units to the CityPorts area – to be developed particularly in the *Waalhaven* area (OMSR, 2003). Difficulties due to strict environmental regulations were downplayed. The CityPorts area was expected to become the subject of a regulatory experiment organized by the State Ministry of Housing, Urban Planning, and Environment (VROM) to temporarily allow port and urban functions to mix.[28] By inserting living and recreational functions between the existing and new business activities, it was believed that an undesired decay of the area after port migrations could be prevented.[29]

The plans for the *Waalhaven* area were not limited to housing and industrial business functions. In the summer of 2003, a delegation consisting of Port Alderman Van Sluis, GHR Director Scholten, OMSR Director De Ruiter and other Rotterdam notables visited cities in the United States and Canada. The goal was to visit and study the combination of stadiums with large exhibition centers. In Rotterdam, the stadium of football club Feyenoord and exhibition center Ahoy would soon become eligible for thorough renovations or even for relocation. In case of the latter option, the delegates believed that reclaiming part of the *Waalhaven* basin could provide the opportunity to realize an enormous event center – already labeled the World Port Plaza – that could trigger developments throughout the CityPorts area.[30] Although it was acknowledged that these ideas were very long-term, the conviction that a large-scale project or event was necessary in the CityPorts area was widely shared among the project's executives. In spite of much skepticism, the possibility of a 'leap-of-scale' would persist (see also Chapter 6). The support for the CityPorts project within the Rotterdam administration was clear. After his presentation of the preliminary version of the *Havenplan 2020* late 2003, Alderman Van Sluis explained:[31]

'It is a unique opportunity for Rotterdam to build a large addition to the city. [The CityPorts areas] will be gigantic development sites that you will be unable to find anywhere else in Europe.'

Sobering Insights

In contrast to the enthusiasm of the Alderman, the OMSR's consultancy brief reflected some sobering insights about the CityPorts area. In the document, the OMSR pressed that any kind of positioning of the area should be in line with existing Rotterdam policies. In addition, proposals should entail a transformation process that could be controlled and phased, and should only contain plans that would lead to a mix of living, working, and water activities. In addition, it was made clear that many of the transhipment or other water bound – i.e. 'wet' – activities in the CityPorts area were not expected to leave the area soon, and that relocations could not be stimulated. Instead, any advice was to be concentrated on locations where 'natural' movement of businesses was likely to occur. Here, the eastern and southern sides of the *Waalhaven*, and the *Heijplaat* industrial area were named, particularly the location of the financially troubled *Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij* (RDM, see Figure 4.6). 'Cleaning out' scenarios for other parts of the CityPorts area were

explicitly dismissed, as buying out companies would render every plan financially unfeasible. Moreover, the production of any concrete planning schemes was prohibited. Media attention for the CityPorts project had reached existing port entrepreneurs with long-term lease contracts in the area. According to the OMSR, this could stimulate strategic behavior among port companies and make land acquisition efforts extremely costly. Relocations were thus stimulated only if companies were willing to leave for better operating opportunities elsewhere in the port of Rotterdam. A potential new office development project in the Eastern *Waalhaven* was regarded as a prime example of such a 'passive relocation policy'.[32]

Figure 4.6 The CityPorts Study Area in 2003 (OMSR).

The contrast between the reservations made in the OMSR's consultancy assignment and the CityPorts ambitions recorded in the media were striking. Behind the scenes, a struggle had been unfolding over the future of the docklands – particularly with regard to the large *Waal/Eemhaven*. While the port authority was registering considerable growth in the area's port activities, the OMSR Director would defend an urban, predominantly residential takeover according to municipal projections. During the negotiations, the port authority's already thin support for the CityPorts project had faded away completely. Moreover, the unmotivated urban planning and development departments did not help the OMSR team make their case.[33] The conclusions of the discussions were subsequently reflected in the OMSR consultancy brief.

The economic positioning assignment of the consultancy firms was executed between November 2003 and February 2004. Parallel to their study, the OMSR continued its work by performing analyses of the spatial features of the CityPorts area, and doing studies regarding water, road and subway accessibility and environmental sound, air and safety issues. It also explored labeling possibilities for the character of different locations in the area, investigated potential housing concepts, and performed stakeholder consultations. If specific expertise was needed to fulfill these activities, the OMSR would – as was agreed upon at the outset of their venture – commission them to existing municipal bodies, particularly the *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V) and the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR). This was also how the OMSR would present itself: as a small size management and procurement organization that, due to its semi-independent status, could respond effectively to new opportunities for development in the CityPorts area. Meanwhile, the consultancy firms planned a detailed survey on issues underlying the future demand of economic functions in the Rotterdam region (DEGW, 2003). In addition, an Expert Seminar was planned to take place early January 2004. In fact, the event was planned to follow the long-awaited corporatization of the municipal port authority, and the consequent founding of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC on New Year's Day 2004.

4.5 Confrontation: Orientations, Resources, and Strategies

So far in this chapter, we presented our evidence of the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy in a largely chronological narrative. In this section, we order and discuss the first part of our story according to our research framework. We will start by providing an overview of the actors that are involved in the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project, and by summarizing their apparent interests and norms. Sketching out the relative position of actors towards the project's realization, a depiction of the Rotterdam CityPorts actor arena will support the first part of this final section. After that, we will filter out the allocative and authoritative resources mobilized by those that intend to realize the project in this strategic period. Our views will be motivated by pointing out the decisions or acts in which they are implied. Finally, we will conclude this chapter by specifying the strategic change apparent in this period: a change from hierarchical planning to area-based learning.

Actor Orientations
Our prologue to the Rotterdam CityPorts case (see section 4.2) shows how the mayor of Rotterdam worked together with Port Director Scholten and dS+V Director De Ruiter to produce the 'Vision and Dare' document. While this document was primarily meant to find a way forward for the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan by combining it with environmental measures, the arguments recorded to ensure 'a qualitative development of Rotterdam as a whole' eventually also led to the CityPorts proposal. This balancing act between port and urban development interests continued in 2002, embodied by the imminent *Havenplan 2020* and signified by three major decisions: the realization of *Maasvlakte 2*, port authority corporatization, and the development of the CityPorts area. Approval by the Rotterdam City Council confirmed the overt relationship between these three measures, although the latter two were clearly subservient to the port's long-awaited expansion. These facts

are crucial to the purposes of our study, as it provides insight in the specific dependencies between those involved in the Rotterdam CityPorts project.

Figure 4.7 depicts the interests and norms apparent in the decisions and actions of the actors that played a role in this period of the CityPorts strategy formation process. However, the case material clearly shows that the municipal departments responsible for port urban planning and development (OBR, dS+V, and GHR) were only marginally involved in the political decision-making that initiated the project. In fact, not only the necessity, content, and scope of the CityPorts intervention were discussed in the City Council. Also the organization and material resources by which the project should be implemented had been completely planned out by the politicians working with Councilor Van der Heijden. In addition, our account indicates that Port Alderman Van Sluis and Port Director Scholten were deeply committed to the process. The information obtained in Hamburg and London clearly inspired the motion to be recorded the way it did. Hence, the municipal departments normally engaged in the implementation of port or urban projects were surpassed in the decision-making process, but were still expected to contribute and deliver to the forthcoming project and company. This created a widely confirmed skepticism and envy among representatives of these departments towards their superiors and the new company. The subsequent recruitment of employees for the new development agency among the OBR, dS+V, and GHR only added to the subsequent loss of commitment among the municipal departments, even though the motives behind it were respected.

Actor Orientations		
Actor	Interests	Norms
Port Alderman Van Sluis	Delivering tangible policy results to the electorate	Results achieved within ruling period (port authority corporatization, *Maasvlakte 2* financing, CityPorts start up)
Port Director Scholten	Realization of port growth and autonomy (*Maasvlakte 2* and corporatization)	Realization CityPorts project in relation to *Maasvlakte 2* and corporatization
Councilor Van der Heijden c.s.*	Propose and induce substantive policy objectives (attractive residential and work areas)	Port expansion and corporatization dependent on implementation CityPorts project
Municipal departments (OBR, dS+V, GHR)	Execution of port and urban development and planning tasks	Restricted responsibilities and jurisdictions (division of tasks by land use control)
gemeentelijke bestuursdienst (BSD)	Support feasibility and substantive quality of policy proposals ('triple strike')	Protection of municipal control over the development of the CityPorts area (control)
OMSR Director	Realization of the CityPorts project.	Transformation (port industrial functions to residential and 'urban' economic functions).

*refers to all Rotterdam City Council members that eventually supported the motion that led to the initiation of the CityPorts project.

Figure 4.7 Interests and norms of port city actors involved in the realization of the CityPorts project (period November 2002-January 2004).

The above list of the interests and norms of the municipal departments involved in our case give rise to some additional conclusions. In our story, intra-municipal negotiations around the so-called 'triple strike' were clearly focused around several land transfer agreements. While the first transaction – from the municipality to a corporatized port authority – would be complete and free of charge by January 2004, the timing and costs of the second – from the port authority to the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) – were left obscure. Our analysis points out that this is partly because the interests and norms of the municipal departments conflict in relation to the CityPorts docklands. Hence, not only port land, but also the responsibility and jurisdiction to appropriate, develop, and maintain that land would eventually have to be transferred from the port authority to the new organization. The departments of urban planning (dS+V) and development (OBR) historically positioned at the receiving end of such a transfer, were now sidelined. As we shall see in the following chapters, the half-way solution recorded in the Port Agreement would create both problems and opportunities for those intending to realize the CityPorts project.

Figure 4.8 The Rotterdam CityPorts Arena (period November 2002-January 2004).

Resources Mobilized

From our story and conclusions above, it clearly follows that *land* is considered a crucial element for the realization of the CityPorts project by all those involved. Hence, we identify this as our first and most obvious allocative resource. With the effectuation of the Port Agreement, the new port authority would become formally committed to transfer the land it controls as soon as that land becomes eligible for a functional transformation. The idea was that such transfers would then provide the new development company with the 'earning capacity' by which they could raise the funds to do their job. However, when and by whom land transfers would actually be decided remained largely open at this stage in the process. This is why actors close to the administrative negotiations were worried about the division of power in the CityPorts area that was implied by the agreement. Whatever

the outcome, it clearly shows that the capacities associated with land ownership in our case are very high.

Recognizing land as a crucial resource makes it striking how little reference is made to those that actually use the CityPorts *property*. Our analysis points out that the significance of this group of actors – particularly the port companies – was acknowledged only after the CityPorts team gathered and analyzed *information* about the area's land use. Although clarity towards these existing users was formally argued in the decision-making process, actions that followed did not duly reflect this concern. Long-term lease contracts clearly enable existing port companies in the CityPorts area to exert considerable influence over the land on which they operate their business. Moreover, compensating business relocations was found extremely costly in relation to expected financial development returns. Launching the CityPorts plans into the public added to the predicament, because it made existing port companies uncertain about their future operations in the area. As the area's landlord, programming a development of 15,000 new residential units in the *Waalhaven* area was particularly unsettling to the port authority. 'Strategic behavior' among its customers and heavy restrictions for port operations due to environmental regulations rendered every development plan virtually utopian. Voluntary relocations creating space for port related office developments – one of which had already been set in motion – were now emerging as the only feasible option.

Action Resources		
Allocative	Authoritative	Mobilized by…
Property (land use control)*	-	Municipal departments, Port companies
Instruments (media statements)		Municipality of Rotterdam, Port Alderman, Councilor SP
-	Legitimacy	City Council
-	Expertise (policy options)	EHM Council Committee, Port Alderman, Port Director, OMSR Director (through study trips)
-	Commitment (administrative, political, and executive decision-making)	Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W), Port Director, Councilor Van der Heijden c.s. (through HbR and OMSR shares)
-	Expertise (development options)	OMSR Director (through staff recruitment)
-	Information (user location and development decisions).	CityPorts team (through port authority).

*refers to decisions (i.e. commitments to action).

Figure 4.9 Action resources of actors intending to realize the Rotterdam CityPorts project (period November 2002-January 2004).

In the strategic period described, press statements about the importance of the project have particularly been given by the Port Alderman (see section 4.4). Also, arguments made by political party *SP* against the founding of a semi-independent agency have

been recorded (see section 4.3). Both can clearly be recognized as the public disclosure of a City Council deliberation process around the 'what' and 'how' of the project. In addition, the personal *commitment* toward the project's realization – as portrayed by the Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) and the Port Director – is identified as a separate authoritative resource. While this commitment implies significant power over the 'triple strike' decision-making process in Rotterdam, it does not secure definite *legitimacy* for the project. In figure 4.9, we thus define these resources distinctively, and group them both in the authoritative category. We will return to these in the next chapter.

Recruiting professionals from the port authority as well as from the municipal departments responsible for the development of the city of Rotterdam can also be recognized as an important resource mobilization. Here, the resource is identified as *expertise*. OMSR Director De Ruiter – himself also an experienced urban planner – recruited experienced individuals from the different municipal departments, and complemented their expertise with that of others. In addition, the CityPorts team consulted with experts inside or outside the Rotterdam apparatus. This way, specific knowledge was mobilized to induce the project's realization. At an earlier stage, the same could be said to have occurred when the EHM Council Committee visited Hamburg and London. However, in this instant, the expertise mobilized here was not used to reflect on the CityPorts assignment. Rather, experiences from the project's abroad were used as information to argue and work out the decision to initiate the CityPorts project.

Most of the work done by the CityPorts team in 2003 (see section 4.4) was focused on getting to know the characteristics of the area and its (existing and potential) users. It was particularly the port authority that could mobilize this *information*. The logical place for the CityPorts team in that period was therefore the World Port Center – the home office of the port authority organization. Here, the information needed could easily be accessed, and questions about the area could quickly be answered. In effect, the mobilization of information by the CityPorts team empowered them as a discussion partner for maintenance, development, and operation decisions in their study area. In the meantime, however, information from the other municipal departments was seriously lagging behind, which made more balanced negotiations difficult to compile. In light of the decisions and actions that followed, we can distinguish all this information as an explicit authoritative resource essential to the first *strategic learning* operations of the CityPorts team (see next subsection).

In chapter two, we defined decisions as commitments to action. This definition is particularly useful with regard to the documents reviewed to reconstruct our case in this chapter. The Port Agreement, for example, records commitments to action that imply significant changes in the actors' power relations. The signers – here: formal representatives of the municipality and port authority – will be legally obligated to effectuate all the land transfers recorded in the agreement. Our account shows that the actors involved are explicitly aware of the shift in power relations here. This is confirmed by the way B&W sum up their potential to influence the future activities of the new organizations, based particularly on legal prerogatives and land use control. Whether or not the designated 'exclusive legal instruments' or 'shareholder authority' will indeed be mobilized is described in the next chapters.

Strategy: From Hierarchical Planning to Area-based Learning

Now that we have discussed the actor orientations and action resources that can be inferred from the first period of the Rotterdam CityPorts case, we can move on to identify the strategic change that occurred in this period. To do this, we have grouped the decisions and actions described in this chapter in figure 4.10 according to the four processes of strategy formation defined by Mintzberg (2008).

Although the initial *Visie en Durf* agreement signed in 2000 was the result of a new perspective on the future development of 'Rotterdam as a whole' adopted by all those involved, we can recognize this decision – and the following motion Urban Development Port Areas – as the most significant *strategic visioning* in this chapter. Thus, almost all the subsequent decisions and actions relevant to our case are initially those of *strategic planning*: they are deliberate and are aimed to tangibly substantiate and organize implementation of the earlier vision. Hence, the case material shows that the CityPorts initiative was the result of decisions and actions consciously aimed to realize the long-awaited *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan and the desired corporatization of the Rotterdam port authority. What followed were decisions and actions to position the CityPorts area as a place to develop a clear result: the new residential and industrial business sites that Rotterdam was so inclined to offer. Moreover, the principles and type of organization by which the project

		Strategy Process	
		Deliberate Plan	**Emergent Pattern**
Strategy Content	**Tangible Positions**	*Strategic Planning* • Making spatial plans (*Havenplan 2020*). • Writing up agreements and calculating land transfer options. • Making work programs and operation schedules. • Projecting a program for residential and industrial business functions to the CityPorts area. • Negotiating voluntary business relocations (port companies). • Promoting CityPorts program.	*Strategic Venturing* • Accommodating office developments for maritime services companies (Eastern *Waalhaven*). • Commissioning an economic positioning study (market exploration).
	Broad Perspective	*Stragic Visioning* • *Visie en Durf* agreement for a 'qualitative development of Rotterdam as a whole'. • Motion Urban Development Port Areas.	*Learning* • Conducting study trips. • Studying accessibility and environmental information (water/road/subway connections, sound/air/safety regulations and procedures). • Recruiting port/urban planning and development professionals from municipal departments. • Collecting information about CityPorts land users and lessees.

Figure 4.10 The Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy (period November 2002-January 2004).

should be implemented were also defined by the politicians involved, and discussed specifically by means of what was seen in port cities abroad.

The way municipal departments were passed over by the *hierarchical planning* efforts of their superiors was not well-received. Their responsibilities and jurisdictions toward the CityPorts area were limited, as their roles were merely to 'contribute' and/or 'deliver' to a new port urban development company. However, as soon as the new team commenced its company start-up, the CityPorts project strategy started to make a turn. The information obtained from the port authority had quite a sobering effect on the plans, as the CityPorts team learned about the pressing accessibility and environmental issues in the area. In addition, studies of the relevant lease contracts and other user rights had taught the CityPorts team that significant interventions in the area could only be made feasible by developing a large-scale program – an event center and/or stadium – on reclaimed land. Although it can be called one-sided, a *strategic learning* process emerged. It became clear that the water bound business activities in the area could not be relocated as soon as was expected. Moreover, the 15,000 residential program assigned to the *Waalhaven* would soon be downplayed, as port entrepreneurs running their business in the area expressed their concerns. In effect, more overt planning activities were considered undesirable by the port authority. Projections of complete transformation were adjusted to programs focused on 'a mix of living, working and water activities'. Hence, the perspective of the future of the CityPorts area had changed, and the CityPorts strategy was now focused on *area-based learning* rather than hierarchical planning. In this light, we also identify the accommodation of office developments on the banks of the Eastern *Waalhaven* as emergent rather than deliberate. Positioning this location as an attractive one for maritime services companies would occur only after the first ideas proved feasible. This positioning and the public promotions performed by the Port Alderman can be recognized as acts of *strategic planning*, even though those directly involved were learning that the plans promoted were unwelcome and unfeasible. Hence, in this period, we recognize a shift from the tangible and deliberate to the broad and emergent in the CityPorts project strategy. In the next chapter, we will see how this process of strategy formation continued to develop.

Notes

1   Particularly the document 'PMR op Koers' [PMR on Course] produced by the Ministry of Transport and Water dated June 1999.

2   Report 'Visie en durf' [Vision and Dare], Rotterdam, dated May 2000.

3   Study trip report of the Committee Economy, Port, and Environment October 7-11, 2002, dated December 19, 2002.

4   Whereas the word havenplan would normally be translated as 'port plan', the port authority of Rotterdam translated the title of the document as 'Port Vision 2020' (www.havenplan2020.nl).

5   Alderman Van Sluis and Port Director Scholten have not been interviewed to verify their exact role in this process. In an interview with a policy advisor who worked for Mayor & Alderman (B&W) at the time, the remark was made that 'you never know whether a motion was created spontaneously or that it was deliberately organized. [But] of course, it is logical that the responsible Alderman and Director had a leading role here.' (BSD Interview 2008).

6   For reasons of recognizability, we will use the commonly known Dutch terms and abbreviations. See the table at the end of this thesis for translations.

7   According to national newspaper *Algemeen Dagblad* on September 10, 2004, Scholten's decision to buy a large interest in container transhipment company ECT was a way for him to 'force' a breach between the Port Authority and the Rotterdam administration.

8   NRC Handelsblad (2004), 'Een Rotterdamse havendirecteur denkt groot; Willem Scholten was nog lang niet klaar met het uitbouwen van zijn Havenbedrijf' [A Rotterdam Port Director thinks big; Willem Scholten was far from being finished expanding his Port Authority]. October 16, 2004, page 25.

9   Taken from the website http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pim_Fortuijn on July 10, 2007. The Lower House of Parliament in the Netherlands is more commonly known as the *Tweede Kamer* [Second Chamber], where legislation can be proposed, amended, and rejected. The 150 members of the *Tweede Kamer* are elected in direct elections, which are held every four years or after a cabinet crisis. The provincial assemblies are directly elected every four years as well. The members of the provincial assemblies elect the 75 members of the *Eerste Kamer* [First Chamber or Upper House], which has less legislative powers, as it can merely reject laws, not propose or amend them.

10 NRC Handelsblad, 'De koning van zijn eigen havenrijk' [The King of His Own Port Empire]. August 13, 2004, page 13; NRC Handelsblad, '"Gewoon centjes verdienen" Wethouder: Tweede Maasvlakte is triomf voor haven en rijk' ["Simply Earning some Money" Alderman: Second *Maasvlakte* is a Triumph for Port and State]. June 26, 2004, page 25.

11 See 5.

12 Brolsma (2007: 315) found the State's definition of a 'mainport' in the *Tweede Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer* (*SVV*) [Second Structure Scheme Traffic and Transport] to be: 'A mainport is a central port in a part of the World to which the most important intercontinental transport flows are directed and from which further distribution through that particular part of the world takes place.'

13 The official names of the Parties participating in the 2002-2006 coalition with election-winner *Leefbaar Rotterdam* [Liveable Rotterdam] are Christen Democratisch Appél [Christian Democratic Appeal] and Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy]

14 *Christen Democratisch Appèl* or Christian Democratic Appeal. Each Council Committee is related to a particular policy portfolio and effectively prepares the Council's decision-making. Next to several members of the Council, the Committee for Economy, Port, and Environment – in short, Economic Infrastructure – would also consist of the responsible Alderman, and the port authority Director.

15 Minutes Rotterdam City Council meeting, November 12, 2002 (Afternoon Session) page 1126

16 Next to Van der Heijden (*CDA*), the Liberal Councilor Woudenberg (*VVD*) and Councilor Maronier of the Maronier Faction also signed the motion.

17 Rotterdams Dagblad, 'Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens overbodig' [Development Company CityPorts redundant], July 4, 2003.

18 Rotterdam Municipal Council document 2002-1001, dated November 12 and 14, 2002.

19 The procurement of this area, which was formerly part of the *Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij* (*RDM*), and was owned by a project developer, was controversial. Nevertheless, the transaction was approved by Port Alderman Kombrink at the time. Port Director Scholten negotiated a price of €84 million; a price the Port Alderman suspected was far to steep for the old shipyard (NRC Handelsblad, October 16, 2003, page 25).

20 Rotterdam Municipal Council document 2003-541, dated May 8, 2003, page 1.

21 See 18, page 2.

22 See 18, page 3.

23 Rotterdam Municipal Decision Notice, dated July 3, 2003 on the 'Legal Design of the Rotterdam CityPorts

Development Company Ltd.', submitted to the Council on May 8, 2003 by a legal consultancy firm.

24   Second 'work design' of the Port Agreement, concept date April 18/28, 2003.

25   For translations see the table at the end of this thesis.

26   Staatscourant, 'De Waalhaven wordt een stad: "Het is hier geen Drenthe aan de Maas."' [The *Waalhaven* becomes a town: "This is not a province on the Meuse"], April 1, 2003.

27   A decree recorded in the so-called *VINEX* Bill in 1993, a supplement to the *Vierde Nota voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening* [Fourth Bill for Spatial Planning], which appeared five years earlier in 1988.

28   Trouw, 'Regels opzij voor huizen in de haven' [Rules aside for houses in the port], December 31, 2003.

29   Algemeen Dagblad, 'Havens worden wijken. Rotterdam krijgt flink stuk stad erbij als Tweede Maasvlakte doorgaat' [Ports become neighborhoods. Rotterdam will add a big piece of city if *Maasvlakte 2* continues], November 29, 2003, page 2.

30   On August 13, 2003, national newspaper *Algemeen Dagblad* registered the possible development of a new stadium for football club Feyenoord, combined with a new Sport Palace Ahoy' on the *Waalhaven* docklands. For this purpose, a Rotterdam delegation comprising of Feyenoord Chairman Van den Herik, Port Alderman Van Sluis, Ahoy' Director Van der Vegt, and Port Director Scholten, made an orientating journey through American cities like Boston and Chicago two months earlier. A Feyenoord representative announced that the plans were very long-term, and that they were part of a very wide variety of possible plans for the *Waalhaven* area.

31   See 27.

32   The necessity of such a passive policy was confirmed in an OMSR interview in February 2006. The voluntary relocation of roll-on roll-off (ro/ro) shipping company DFDS Tor Line from the *Waalhaven* to the *Maasvlakte* vacated two piers in the south-eastern corner of the basin. See also chapter five.

33   These points were confirmed in several informal conversations and several interviews conducted in 2007 and 2008. See chapter six for more reflections.

Chapter 5 The Case of Rotterdam CityPorts

Period II: Area-based Learning to Competitive Venturing

5.1 Introduction

In the previous period of the Rotterdam CityPorts strategy formation process, we observed a shift from *hierarchical planning* to *area-based learning.* An early vision that was primarily aimed to bring the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan closer to realization produced a framework of projects that included the area around the port-city interface – the area of Rotterdam CityPorts. A strategic planning effort by a few top decision makers subsequently resulted in the intention to found a development company predestined to affect the realization of Rotterdam's port urban ambitions. Soon, a process of learning emerged among those involved. The content of the project's ambitions as well as the resources by which those ambitions were to be attained would soon need to be reconsidered. Nonetheless, the political agenda within which the CityPorts project was included needed to take advantage of its momentum. Hence, the establishment of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) was made official on January 1, 2004. This is the point where we pick up our case.

Figure 5.1 Full Conceptual Framework – Emphasis on answering the second main research question.

In this chapter, we explore the process toward the above decision in the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy formation process. In doing so, we particularly pursue the answer to the second of our three main research questions: *What is actually done?* Our pursuit is necessarily elaborate. We include all decisions, actions and events that we found to have influenced the realization of the CityPorts project. Similar to the previous chapter, our account will show a significant change of convergence in the urban development

project strategy explored. Again, we will start descriptively (sections 5.1 to 5.7) and will then present the actor orientations, action resources, and strategies we identified (section 5.8).

The second period in the CityPorts strategy formation process runs from January 2004 to February 2006 – a period of just over two years. What we will witness is a strategic change from *area-based learning* to *competitive venturing*. Conflicts of interest in relation to the future of the CityPorts area will lead to a new compromise between city and port authorities. Not the project itself, but the control over resources necessary for realizing it would now be renegotiated.

5.2 The CityPorts Assignment

Early January 2004, the brand new *NV Haven van Rotterdam* [Port of Rotterdam PLC] published a booklet called 'Rotterdam, from CityPorts to Port-City'.[1] In its preface, President Director Scholten introduced the CityPorts assignment, and typified it as a 'novel approach' to a set of Rotterdam city docklands unique in size. Instead of the port making way for urban uses like it has done in the past, the port would now stay present and active in the area. Scholten explained that port functions in the CityPorts area are still expected to move west towards the North Sea. Nonetheless, this migration process was expected to primarily create space for new enterprises that 'can (and shall) still be port related'. No 24-hour activities, but port and industry related office or service functions were named as prime examples. Besides these new business activities, the popular President Director also mentioned the possible realization of housing and amenities in the CityPorts area. Scholten was confident that the environmental regulations, which made these functions virtually impossible to combine with port industrial activities, could be dealt with 'creatively'. He added:

> 'The horizon for the plans for the *stadshavens* will run until after 2020. The planned transition has not been fixed in advance. The point is to spot opportunities, and to create and utilize them as they arise. Quite a challenge for the *Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens Rotterdam NV* [Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC]. This project organization will be given the freedom and the resources to [go] to work with great fervor. This means more than just making plans.' (HbR, 2004)

Founding the OMSR

On December 31, 2003, the founding of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC (OMSR) went hand in hand with the awaited founding of the Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR). In its official articles of association, the overall goal of the corporatized port authority was 'to (affect) the exercise of the port company, and to strengthen the position of the Rotterdam port and industrial complex in a European perspective on the short- and long-term'. According to the official HbR articles, the overall goal consisted of three parts, the third of which was understood to ensure the HbR's 'social responsibilities':[2]

1.   Stimulate an effective, safe, and efficient handling of shipping traffic, taking care of

nautical and maritime order and safety, and acting as a qualified port authority in the Rotterdam port area;

2.   Develop, construct, maintain, and operate the Rotterdam port and industrial area, in the widest sense of the word; and

3.   Deliver contributions to the urban development, the development of cityports, and the improvement of the residential, working, and living climate of the city and region of Rotterdam, also if these activities are (initially) unprofitable for the company.

Hence, the new HbR President Director Scholten, municipal plenipotentiary Berg, and Director De Ruiter founded the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC (OMSR) by signing a Shareholder Agreement. According to this agreement, the OMSR goal was:[3]

> 'to facilitate, stimulate, and realize the transformation of so-called "CityPorts areas", which are part of the Rotterdam port and industrial complex, into a combination of port locations, urban economic locations, housing areas, and leisure and recreational areas, with an eye on an optimal societal and economic yield for the municipality of Rotterdam.'

Next to the OMSR goal, which was referred to as a 'functional change process', the shareholders defined two other 'types of transformation' in the agreement to be organized by the OMSR. The first type is described as 'physical', consisting of building and spatial arrangement projects, and the other as 'institutional', encompassing a change process toward a mixed port urban maintenance area. The three transformation assignments led to the following core tasks for the OMSR:[4]

•   Organize the realization of a vision and a plan for the future spatial arrangement of the area (i.e. a strategic development vision);

•   Seize opportunities for the realization of short-term and long-term projects that fit the perspective to be developed (i.e. projects);

•   Carefully maintain and operate the port areas (or let them be maintained and operated) during the transformation process (i.e. maintain and operate).

According to the shareholder agreement, the operational costs of the OMSR would be financed by its shareholders pro rata of their evenly divided shares in the company. For 2004, budget estimations equaled little over €6 million, so the owners would each contribute half that amount during the first year. Each year, the OMSR would be obliged to produce a plan for the coming twelve months, including budget estimations. This yearly plan was to be submitted for approval to the Shareholder Meetings, which would initially be held every four months. Other major OMSR decisions would also be subjected to the Shareholder Meetings, and prepared by so-called Director Meetings.[5]

In the event that a part of the CityPorts area would become eligible for a 'change of color' – i.e. a loss of direct port use – the HbR agreed that it would transfer its lease rights for those terrains to the OMSR, though no earlier than January 1, 2007. Land in legal ownership of the municipality of Rotterdam would be sold to the OMSR for a fee equal to its HbR book value. Subsequently, after a transfer has taken place, the OMSR's economic use of the land would remain free of municipal charges. Hence, the starting point was that the

OMSR would create its own 'earning capacity', i.e. it would be able to finance its operations by revenues 1) from business activities still present on the sites transferred, and 2) from the future transformation of the land into alternative, potentially higher yielding uses. Moreover, profits were expected not only to be financial-economic, but also of a broader societal value added to the municipality of Rotterdam.

The CityPorts 'work area' consisted of the *Waalhaven* and *Eemhaven* on the south banks of the river (see Box 4), and the *Merwehaven* and *Vierhavens* on the north banks (see Box 6). However, the shareholder agreement also excluded all the *Eemhaven* docklands as potential transformation locations. Instead, only a mutual obligation to inform each other about the situation on these docklands would be recorded. Port activities in the *Eemhaven* – particularly in the short sea transhipment sector – projected significant growth towards the future, and existing companies were not considered eligible for future relocation. Thus, only the *Waalhaven* docklands and the *RDM* docks north of the village *Heijplaat* (see Box 5) were still part of the CityPorts area on the south banks of the river. Next to a (public) strategic development vision, the OMSR was also expected to compose a confidential 'relocation vision' for the remaining CityPorts docklands. In this regard, explicit reference was made to developments in and around the port of Rotterdam, and the realization of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan. Hence, it was still expected that the port expansion would trigger a seaward migration of deep-sea transhipment activities from the *Waalhaven*, and that this would lead to opportunities for the development of alternative uses.

5.3 Getting to Know the CityPorts Area

The CityPorts area is a significant part of the port of Rotterdam. In its 2004 demarcation, the area encompassed almost 1,500 hectares of land and water – excluding the New Meuse River – of which little over 1,000 hectares [2,488 acres] consisted of land. The municipality of Rotterdam owns the vast majority, namely 782 hectares [1,932 acres] of the CityPorts land. Of that total, 628 hectares [1,552 acres] is operated by the new Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR), while several municipal bodies lease out the remaining 154 hectares of land. Of the remaining land in the area, 80 hectares [198 acres] is State-owned, leaving only 38 hectares [94 acres] in the hands of private proprietors, and another 107 hectares [264 acres] for parks, infrastructure, and public space. In the first years of the current millennium, the CityPorts area provided room for close to 850 businesses, together providing work for about 20,000 people. Moreover, transhipment in the area equaled roughly 13 percent of the port of Rotterdam in total. In those years, about 40 percent of all container handling activities in Rotterdam were situated within the CityPorts area – particularly in the *Eemhaven* (OMSR, 2005b).

CityPorts Study Results[6]
During the first Shareholder Meeting in April 2004, the OMSR presented the results of its studies of the CityPorts area, as well as the results of the 'economic positioning' investigation performed by two consultancy firms. The results underlined the existing economic significance of the CityPorts area, and the uniqueness of the OMSR's development assignment. Nationally as well as internationally, no precedents could be found in terms of

Box 4
The Southern Docklands

The *Waalhaven* on the south side – or left shore – of the New Meuse was originally constructed in three phases. Municipal Works Director G.J. de Jongh headed the discussion for growth of the port of Rotterdam at the turn of the 20th century. After strong debates, the City Council approved De Jongh's plans for the *Waalhaven* mid 1907, and the first ship would moor in the new *Waalhaven* a year later. After expropriation of the areas of *Robbenoord*, *Plompert*, and *Boven Heijplaat*, the first expansion of the *Waalhaven* would be realized between 1912 and 1922, and the second between 1922 and 1931. After completion, the *Waalhaven* had become the largest harbor basin in the world, using its water surface for innovative 'on stream' transhipment, transferring cargo from ship to ship by floating cranes and lifts.

The *Eemhaven*, planned as early as 1913 but built in phases between 1930 and 1965, was originally planned as an industrial port. However, general cargo traffic took a great flight in Rotterdam during the 1950s, and the *Eemhaven* would soon be expanded and converted for cargo handling. Then, in the mid 1960s, Port Director F. Posthuma convinced the American company Sea-Land that the *Eemhaven* was particularly suited for the – at the time still infant – container transhipment. In 1966, the first Sea-Land container vessel from New York would arrive in the *Eemhaven*, unleashing a real container revolution in the Port of Rotterdam.

In 2003, the docks around the *Waalhaven* basin (see figure below) can roughly be divided into three parts. The east side is dominated by small port related and urban or 'dry' businesses, as well as by general cargo transhipment. The south end of the basin – originally the area of an airport – is beset by production companies and maritime and logistics services. The docks on the west side of the *Waalhaven* and around the whole *Eemhaven* are used by container and general cargo transhipment companies, along with some maritime industrial functions. The area around the village *Heijplaat* and the areas on the edge of the New Meuse are used by port related and urban activities.

Sources: Dicke & Van der Zouwen (2006).

size – 1,500 hectares [3,707 acres] opposed to an average of 150 hectares [371 acres] of other well-known waterfront projects – or in terms of its point of departure: an area that is still in use, and economically vital to its region. In contrast, other, particularly international, examples featured the redevelopment of obsolete and decayed areas that virtually completely lost their port functions. In this regard, the CityPorts area is characterized by diversity and growth. Apart from the large transhipment operations, research results showed an intermixed community of 'wet' and 'dry' businesses in the area, with a possible expansion of 40 percent – i.e. an increase of about 10,000 jobs. After filtering out business clusters for environmental, size and location, or local competitive reasons, potentially successful segments like maritime services, construction, port technology, international distribution, and leisure emerged. The location, identity, and size of the area could thus make an increased contribution to the Rotterdam urban and regional economy. The eastern shore of the *Waalhaven*, which had already been pointed out for potential re-use prior to the OMSR's founding, would become the first location for development to take place as maritime services company Smit Internationale had decided to locate its head office there. Meanwhile, the *Waalhaven* basin was subject to additional reclamation studies, possibly adding 50 hectares [126 acres] of new land to the CityPorts area.

Beyond the Eastern *Waalhaven*, the OMSR found very little opportunities for further redevelopment activities. Analyses showed that the vast majority of the companies in the CityPorts area have long-term (sub)lease contracts. Most contracts would still last for over 25 years to beyond the year 2030. This made possibilities for short-term dockland restructuring quite limited. Hence, much would depend on the availability of more appropriate land for port business further downstream. Particularly companies searching to expand their water bound activities would then have an incentive to relocate and renegotiate their lease rights. Some of the companies in the CityPorts area already seemed in search of alternative locations. However, they would merely create space for other economic functions to take root in the area, because only the relocation of large, environmentally imposing transhipment activities would create enough space to accommodate alternative functions. Plans to develop housing and amenities would thus be very prone to conflict with environmental regulations. Therefore, the development focus for the short-term would have to be on strengthening the port and urban economic profile of the area, whereas the development of housing – under condition of a seaward business migration – could only be expected on the long haul.

Figure 5.2 Dockworks is the first new office location in the CityPorts area, and home to the maritime services company Smit Internationale.

In conclusion, the OMSR's own and delegated studies showed that the CityPorts area possessed a unique identity which needed to be stimulated. In an Expert Seminar held on January 6, 2004, participants stressed that the added value and potential of the CityPorts area was to be found in the conservation, adjustment, and re-use of the port landscape, which was exemplified by port industrial landmarks and quay structures. The

Box 5

The Garden Village of *Heijplaat*

An important landmark for the docklands between the *Waalhaven* and *Eemhaven* is the garden-village of *Heijplaat*. This residential area with about 2,000 inhabitants dates back to the 1930s as part of the settlement of the *Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij* (*RDM*). Just south of its ship-building wharf on the head of the *Waalhaven* docklands, the visionary RDM Director De Gelder decided to construct a village for his employees. The *Bouwmaatschappij* [Construction Company] *Heijplaat* was founded in May 1914, and the RDM provided the necessary capital to start the construction of 311 homes designed by Amsterdam architect Baander. They were completed in 1917, after which De Gelder's successor Endert Jr. added another 180 houses designed by The Hague architect De Clerq. Only the employees of the RDM would be allowed to live in the village featuring several churches, a school, a library, and other amenities. Dismissed personnel would initially also be forced to leave the village, which was regarded an unavoidable facet of living 'on' *Heijplaat*. *Heijplaat* was eventually extended to just under 900 homes, and many of its streets were named after the ships built at the shipyard. When RDM business declined towards the end of the 1970s, the company decided to sell the rental homes 'on' *Heijplaat* to Housing Corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers*. In the 1990s, the estate came under threat as the Rotterdam administration concluded from an environmental report that the settlement, by modern standards, was no longer fit for residential functions. *Heijplaat* residents disagreed and staged a protest. After an intense campaign they won their appeal. Instead of being demolished, the village was actually renovated.

Sources: Dicke *et al.* 2006; Van Hooydonk *et al.* 2007; OMSR (illustration)

water would also embody a great potential, and in light of the existing land use situation, interventions would only have to take place on a few strategic locations. Creating 'the right conditions on the right spots' was considered essential, and the organization

of leisure activities and events were recommended in order to improve the generally bad and negative public image of Rotterdam's port industrial areas. With these insights, the OMSR's actual assignment started to take shape.

The CityPorts Headquarter

During the Shareholder Meeting of March 2, 2004, Alderman of Physical Infrastructure Marco Pastors chaired the meeting, and openly regretted that the initial OMSR Steering Committee – which also included the Directors of the municipal *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V) and the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR) – had now been divided into two groups. After a discussion, the gathering continued with the decision to review the composition of the Shareholder Meeting. It was eventually agreed that the municipal organizations mentioned would indeed be given the opportunity to contribute to the substantive discussions during the Shareholder Meetings.

In the remainder of the first Shareholder Meeting, it was announced that the OMSR would inform the press about the status of its operation in June 2004. The ongoing State-level negotiations about the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan were expected to be closed by then, and a few (research) projects would be sufficiently completed in order to draw some preliminary conclusions. Moreover, the OMSR was planning to move to its new headquarters in the heart of the CityPorts area: the

Figure 5.3 The OMSR office, located in the former home of the historic *Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij* (OMSR).

former offices of the *Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij* (*RDM*, see Figure 5.3), the company for and by which the garden village of *Heijplaat* was originally built. The OMSR expected that it would also be able to open its representative office in June, after which it would pick several moments in the second half of 2004 to inform the public about its progress on concrete projects. Eventually, the Seminar 'New Economic Dash in the CityPorts of Rotterdam' on June 16 would lead to a number of public debates organized by the OMSR. Next to this Seminar, a plan was being prepared for a more discrete communication process with the 850 businesses within the CityPorts area. Indeed, the shareholders had stressed that no material interventions would take place before these companies were fully informed about the OMSR's intentions. In addition, the OMSR also announced that it would compose an Advisory Board in order to hear a maximum variety of opinions on future OMSR activities.

Port Urban Ambitions

In July 2004, the OMSR published its first newsletter. The OMSR role in the CityPorts area would be redefined as 'the driving force behind the redevelopment of this economically

(still) well functioning port area', in which the 'living-apart-together relationship between city and port has to be converted into a good marriage, giving both partners the possibility to unfurl' (OMSR, 2004d). In the newsletter, the OMSR stressed that this was not a transformation process with which Rotterdam was familiar. Not urban renewal, but 'economic renewal' would be its focus.[7] The expectation that a large number of companies would be able to find a new location on *Maasvlakte 2* was still named as an important driver for change in the area, as well as reclamation and a more intensified use of land in the CityPorts area itself. Existing businesses would be given the opportunity to expand, and the development of housing in the middle and high end of the market was considered a serious possibility. OMSR Director De Ruiter pointed out a two-phased plan, taking the future 'dynamics' in the area – i.e. uncertainty about the exact movements, complete relocations, and future development opportunities – as a given. De Ruiter explained:

> 'The 24-hour cluster in the *Eemhaven* and the companies in the Southern *Waalhaven* have to further develop themselves in the next couple of years. In addition, a change will present itself if Seabrex [a fruit handling company] decides to leave the *Merwehaven* – though this is still highly uncertain. But if that happens, a location will become vacant which, in principle, is suitable for housing. These are the three spots where I'm foreseeing significant developments in the next ten to fifteen years.' (OMSR, 2004d)

Execution of a second phase, entailing true changes of function, was only considered to be possible after 2020. In and around the village *Heijplaat*, where the OMSR organization had officially opened its office doors, only small development activities were possible. Nevertheless, opening up the riverfront to the public at *Heysehaven*, and constructing a landing stage for the water taxi were considered important interventions by the OMSR. De Ruiter (OMSR, 2004d): 'Creating and utilizing opportunities is an important part of our strength.'

Exemplifying the Director's words, the newsletter announced a few more small-scale initiatives. One was the exploration of the possibilities to collaborate with the municipality of Schiedam. In anticipation of the possible future development of up to 5,000 homes on the *Merwehaven* docklands, a meeting between the Schiedam and Rotterdam Courts of Mayor and Alderman was orchestrated. During this meeting, the city administrations agreed to collaborate in creating a development vision for the adjacent industrial business area *Nieuw Mathenesse* – through which the municipal border runs – and its surroundings. In the other docklands on the north shore of the river, in the *Vierhavens* area, another OMSR activity focused on some vacant land parcels and buildings. Here, opportunities for 'creativity and leisure' were being investigated, as well as more conventional business prospects.[8] Again, the demand for space by the fruit juice cluster would determine the feasibility of these possibilities and prospects, but also the intended closure of the prostitution zone in the area was considered a significant positive impulse. Finally, the Rotterdam Harbor Museum was willing to use one of the docks and warehouses of the RDM wharf as a depot for its expanding collection (OMSR, 2004).

The OMSR confirmed that given the circumstances, no detailed plan for the CityPorts area could be produced. Yet, it did work on one of its primary tasks – a strategic development vision – without excluding rigorous spatial interventions in the long run. The OMSR's early involvement with the area gave them the opportunity to anticipate change,

Box 6
The Northern Docklands

The *Vierhavens* area – consisting of the *Keilehaven*, *Lekhaven*, *IJsselhaven*, and *Koushaven* – was an idea of Municipal Works Director De Jongh in the first decade of the 20th century. Where the *Waalhaven* was meant for transit activities, the ports on the north side of the river were still designated for industry and general cargo activities. In contrast to customers of the *Waalhaven*, the general cargo sector needed a relatively small water-surface with long quays for hauling boxes, crates, and bales onto shore. The *Vierhavens* were realized between 1912 and 1916 – World War I notwithstanding – primarily in order to keep up with the competition in other European ports. The adjacent *Driehavenplan* [Three Port Plan] was launched in 1916 by De Jongh's successor Burgendorffer. It was in a period of discussion about the port of Rotterdam's competitive position with respect to Antwerp, and its relation with Dutch State government. This, and speculation about the types of goods to be handled in the port, delayed the plans significantly. Moreover, the area of the new docklands extended well into Schiedam, which led to serious negotiations with the neighboring municipality. Similar to the development of the *Vierhavens*, the required land was annexed, and construction of the *Driehavenplan* finally commenced in 1925. The new docks were completed in 1932, and would soon become known as the *Merwehaven*.

Nowadays, the *Vierhavens* and *Merwehaven* docklands are dominated by a cluster for handling fruits and juices, known together as 'Fruitport'. Off the waterfront, maritime and logistics services and other, more urban oriented businesses are located. On the north-east tip of the two port areas lies the junction *Marconiplein* [Marconi Square], where offices are located that provide workspace for the municipal Development Corporation (OBR) and the *Dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V). In the 1990s, the areas in and around the docks of the *Merwehaven* and *Vierhavens* have been subject to dereliction. Off the *Keilehaven*, the *Keileweg* has been home to regulated prostitution, causing problems of safety and decreasing the general quality of the area. Combined with the busy arteries of road and rail running around the north edges of the harbors, the streets in the areas off the waterfront have become rather unwelcoming to pedestrians. In addition, many businesses have decided to move to other accommodations because the areas and the buildings, much in need of refurbishment, no longer fitted their needs.

Sources: Dicke *et al.* 2006; OMSR (illustration).

and fill in the gaps in the area as they would emerge. That way the decay Rotterdam had seen in its southern districts before would not be given a chance. Moreover, the OMSR now had the time to develop an overall scheme and think about subjects like roads, public transportation, and a shore connection in the area. This would specifically entail the extension of a subway line to the southern part of the *Waalhaven*, and construction of a new bridge or tunnel crossing the New Meuse in the heart of the area. Even the future development of an enormous sports and entertainment complex was still under consideration. De Ruiter announced that the first version of the strategic development vision would be ready by the end of 2004. The document was planned as the starting point of a discussion with the CityPorts' 'surroundings'. Inquiries with stakeholders from the area itself, and with experts from abroad during a closed International Conference in November 2004, would be used as the vision's input.

As the OMSR expected the first land transfers from the Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR) early 2007, it was working with the HbR and the municipal Development Corporation (OBR) to work out its financial framework. It had become clear that the operation of port versus urban land involved very different financial principles. For one thing, port earnings consist of harbor dues and site letting, while the revenues on urban functions are composed of calculations on the land issued – particularly the amount of floor area to be realized on a particular plot. What's more, prices are determined in two entirely different 'worlds'. Port prices have to compete in an international marketplace, where rates in competing ports highly influence each other. Urban land pricing, in turn, is a much more regional matter. A complicating factor was that land and water might well be in the hands of the port authority, but that the buildings or maritime structures on them are not. Nonetheless, the OMSR member leading the maintenance and operation preparations mid 2004 was confident about the financial collaboration between the HbR and the municipal bodies, particularly the OBR (OMSR, 2004d): 'The mutual interests in this area are acknowledged, and people are able to rise above their own discipline'.

5.4 (City)Ports Challenges

The mutual interests of the port and city of Rotterdam in the development of the CityPorts area were reflected in the *Havenplan 2020*, which was finally approved and published by the Rotterdam administration in September 2004. However, a month earlier, the Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR) was beheaded. President Director Scholten was forced to leave office by his Board of Commissioners due to a financial scandal. Scholten was – among many others things – one of the founding fathers of the CityPorts initiative, and was seen as the patron of the OMSR operation. Port Alderman Van Sluis, who would survive the public inquiries into the

Figure 5.5 Project Mainport Development Rotterdam logo.

port's financial housekeeping, would now be the only one still in power to have advocated the CityPorts agenda from the very start. Then, while the 'RDM Affair' (see Box 6) was still a hot topic in Dutch media and politics, the *Havenplan 2020* was presented to the public.

▦	Short-sea Container Cluster	▱	Rotterdam Inner City
▦	Fruitport Juice Cluster	▱	Distribution Park
▯	Other Port Functions	▨	Ongoing Transformation Projects
▱	City/Port Function Mix	⬚	Highway Connections
▥	Existing Business Districts	⬚	Water Traffic
▱	Strategic Areas City/Port Function Mix	⬚	Potential Shore Connection (location to be decided)
▱	Existing Urban Centers	⬚	Proximity Circles around (Subway) Stations
		⬚	Park Lane and *Groene Kruisweg* [Green Crossway]

Figure 5.4 CityPorts 'Map of Chances': Position and Accessibility. Printed in the *Havenplan 2020* (Port of Rotterdam, 2004).

Plans, Agreements, and a Scandal

In the *Havenplan 2020*, the Rotterdam administration and the new Port of Rotterdam PLC formally committed themselves to the CityPorts project by giving it a prominent place in the port's projected future. The HbR official in charge of the *Havenplan* preparations confirmed that 'the *Havenplan* was the first official document that put CityPorts on the map, showing exactly what area it is about' (OMSR, 2005a). Figure 5.4 depicts one of the charts taken up in the *Havenplan 2020*, underlining the intentions of the city and port administrations for the area. In the accompanying text, they explain that the execution and speed of the CityPorts process would depend on the construction of the *Maasvlakte 2*, on the development of companies and business sectors, on the scope of legislation and regulations, and on technological innovations. Completion of *Maasvlakte 2* would

Box 6
The RDM Affair

On August 30, 2004, Rotterdam Alderman and Chair of the Board of Commissioners Van Sluis announced the decision of the Board to suspend Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR) President Director Scholten. A few days later, Scholten would be forced to resign after more than 12 years in office. According to the announcement, the reason for the Board's decision was that Scholten had guaranteed a total of €100 million in bank loans to the *Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij* (RDM) [Rotterdam Dry Dock Company]. Scholten had done this without informing the other HbR Directors, the Board of Commissioners, or the Rotterdam Court of Mayor and Alderman. Presumably, the guarantees were given in order to protect the interests of the Port of Rotterdam in relation to submarine orders.

The owner of the RDM was the contested businessman Van den Nieuwenhuyzen. He claimed that his wharf was on the verge of closing a contract with Taiwan for the delivery of submarine technology. Due to severe State level political pressure and with the prospect of compensation orders, Van den Nieuwenhuyzen declined the deal. However, no compensation orders were ever placed. Instead, the Port of Rotterdam offered to guarantee the loans that would give the RDM the opportunity to deploy new activities. In doing so, the Port of Rotterdam would buy off the displeasure of China, which threatened with a boycott against Rotterdam. Nevertheless, the RDM still went bankrupt, banks called in their guarantees, and the whole issue would soon come to light.

After a few (dependent and independent) inquiries, it became clear that the loan guarantees issued to protect the RDM totalled €183.5 million, of which more than €107.2 million were still open. The Rotterdam administration and the Port of Rotterdam jointly declared that the guarantees were issued without the proper authorizations – something that the banks could reasonably have known. Hence, there were no political consequences, and there was no obligation of repayment to the banks. Naturally, the banks would fight Rotterdam's joint position in court, but lost or settled all their appeals up until January 2007.

Sources: HbR press releases of August 30, 2004 and January 25, 2007; *NRC Handelsblad* and *Volkskrant*, September 1, 2004; *Mainport News*, 2004 no. 10, pp. 30-31; Brolsma (2007: 332).

bring about a relocation process of deep-sea container transhipment from the *Waalhaven* and of – possibly to be containerized – fruit handling from the *Merwehaven*. Particularly the *Waalhaven* was expected to be relieved of all 24-hour activities, paving the way for residential development opportunities. The northern docklands of the *Merwehaven* and *Vierhavens* would be characterized by a mix of functions, especially due to the intensification of the fruit juices cluster on the latter. Innovative companies starting up their business, knowledge institutes, housing, recreation, and cultural facilities were projected on the southern riverfront, while the short-sea cluster on the docklands of the *Eemhaven* would be strengthened for container handling. Mentioned concerns in relation to these plans were the external safety of the area from port operations, and the accessibility of the *Waalhaven* and the area around the village *Heijplaat* – particularly by public transport.

Hence, development opportunities in the CityPorts area were still regarded particularly dependent on the realization of *Maasvlakte 2*. In June 2004, roughly half a year after

the official corporatization of the Rotterdam port authority and before the finalization of the *Havenplan 2020*, a government agreement on the *Project Mainportontwikkeling Rotterdam* (*PMR*) [Project Mainport Development Rotterdam] was reached. The agreement involved the Dutch State, the Province of South Holland, the *Stadsregio Rotterdam-Rijnmond*, and the new Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR). It encompassed financing and realization arrangements for three sub-projects: the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan combined with several coastal zone measures, a 750 hectare [1,853 acre] nature and recreational reserve, and some smaller projects on existing Rotterdam land.[9] The agreement provided the Dutch State with an equivalent of €500 million of HbR shares, equal to one-third of the total stock. The cumulative project costs in the agreement were estimated on €2.575 billion.[10]

Although the *PMR* agreement was reached in June 2004, it was not before September 2005 that it was finally signed. A major reason for this delay was the financial scandal mentioned above, which triggered a large-scale investigation into the port's financial investments. On top of that, the Dutch Council of State annulled the initial PMR agreement in January 2005 due to three environment related deficiencies in the plans. After a year-long rectification process, the Lower House of Parliament accepted the renewed agreement in October 2006, paving the way for final steps in the planning and permit procedures. One of these steps was taken in April 2007, when the Rotterdam City Council approved the initial *Milieu Effecten Rapportage* (*MER*) [Environmental Effects Report] and Land Use Plan. On September 1, 2008, the execution of the Rotterdam port expansion plan was made official by Mayor Opstelten. Finalization of *Maasvlakte 2* was expected in the year 2013.

Full Speed Ahead?

Parallel to the finalization and presentation of the *Havenplan*, the OMSR went full speed ahead informing the public about its intentions via its website and communiqués. Stressed were the qualities of the area with reference to its water, its views, and its functional diversity. In addition, the architectural and cultural value of the houses in the *Heijplaat* village, and of the warehouses and hangars on the riverfront were highlighted. Where earlier that same year, OMSR Director De Ruiter announced that 70 to 80 percent of the area would keep its existing economic functions, the OMSR was now sure that in almost 40 percent of the area opportunities for change would eventually occur.[11] Relocations would occasionally have to take place, but existing rights and contracts would be respected. After 2015, a substantial and diverse residential program, complemented with amenities like schools, shops, bars, sport accommodations, and greenery would become a concrete possibility in the *Merwehaven*, around *Heijplaat*, and on the riverfront of the Eastern *Waalhaven*. In addition, the 'leisure economy' also showed great potential for the CityPorts area. The RDM complex could become a museum center, and parts of the *Vierhavens* area offered perspectives for art, culture, and caterers (OMSR, 2004e).

The OMSR activities in the last few months of the year 2004 were overshadowed by the Port of Rotterdam PLC's (HbR) financial scandal. The agreement for the Project Main-

Figure 5.6 Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company Logo.

port Development Rotterdam (PMR) was accompanied with the condition that the port authority's financial position should first be cleared up. The Lower House of Parliament demanded postponement of the State's preparations to procure HbR stock until matters were properly investigated. In November 2004, the Dutch Cabinet informed the Lower House that this so-called 'B-investigation' had to be extended for half a year until well into 2005 due to obscurities in the HbR books. Part of the investigation was the collaboration of the HbR with a project developer that had obtained a large portion of land in port territory, particularly in the *Waalhaven*. The collaboration was said to be of mutual interest, as the HbR wanted to keep a firm grip on land uses within its boundaries – possibly to accommodate forthcoming business relocations.[12]

Meanwhile, the OMSR was continuing its stakeholder consultations, and organized a closed International Conference on November 18 and 19. Representatives of port cities like Antwerp, Dublin, Barcelona, Copenhagen, and Glasgow were invited to give their views on the CityPorts assignment, and a preliminary concept of the CityPorts Development Strategy. Several members of the HbR and Rotterdam municipal bodies – the Municipal Development Corporation (OBR), *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V), and Municipal Works (GW) – were also invited. In addition, workshops, design clinics, and other (stakeholder) meetings complemented the extensive investigations of the OMSR. Further studies on soil contamination, sound volume regulations, possible land reclamation, and financial argumentation were executed or announced. Long-term opportunities for residential and leisure functions in specific parts of the area were repeatedly emphasized. The awaited strategic development vision was now expected to be published in January 2005. Also in November 2004, Smit Internationale opened its 240 employee head office, which is part of the 'DockWorks' office strip in the Eastern *Waalhaven*. The project developer that initiated the successful DockWorks project opted for the development of an additional 20,000 square meters [over 215,000 square feet] of office space on the southern shore of the *Waalhaven* basin. The agreement between the project developer, the Municipality of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam PLC, and the OMSR was signed before the end of the year, and would be named 'Port City'.

In the Shareholder Meeting of December 6, the OMSR 2005 Year Plan with a renewed budget of around €6 million was approved. However, the shareholders demanded that attention would be paid to the security of the space needed for the residential program projected earlier. In addition, the OMSR also had to provide clear prospects that investments made in the area could eventually be recovered. These prospects should be packed in so-called 'business cases' – one for each particular project. Moreover, the creation of support for the CityPorts ambitions on 'a national level' would have to be addressed, and it was again stressed that the importance of the existing business community should never be lost out of sight.[13] With the demands made and assignments issued, the OMSR entered a turbulent year.

5.5 Changing Tides

Early 2005, the effects of the RDM Affair started to take shape. New HbR President Director Hans Smits personally led the State-enforced B-investigation into the HbR's financial

housekeeping. Correspondingly, in an interview with a reporter from national newspaper *Algemeen Dagblad*, Smits promised that the former *gemeentelijk havenbedrijf* [Municipal Port Authority] was ready to operate more entrepreneurially:

> 'The Port of Rotterdam has to become a real, transparent enterprise. […] We looked through 12 dossiers […] and found that the choices made in the past were sound, but that the subsequent elaborations left much to be desired. […] We are going to dispose of 15 to 18 participations not belonging to the core business of the port authority.' [14]

Indeed, the participations the HbR had built up under Smits' predecessor were a hot topic in Rotterdam. In an earlier newspaper article, the possibility was pointed out that the European Union's Competition Commission could decide to look for indications of illegal State aid through the HbR participations.[15] Since the Dutch State had agreed to take a 33 percent share in the HbR in exchange for their contribution to the *Project Mainportontwikkeling Rotterdam* (*PMR*), the HbR participations became of central concern in the B-investigation. Clearly, the CityPorts joint venture with the Municipality of Rotterdam was one of these. Moreover, the annulment of the PMR plans by the Dutch Council of State threatened the progress of the port authority's flagship project *Maasvlakte 2* even more directly. Hence, the OMSR learned that the HbR's commitment to the CityPorts operation had come under serious external pressure.

External Support

While the HbR administration worked hard to secure its deal with the Dutch State, the OMSR continued its efforts and sought its own connections to the national government. As was also pointed out in the Shareholder Meeting early December 2004, the OMSR approached the Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) to present its case. The OMSR objective was twofold. Firstly, the aim was to acquire State funding by applying for the so-called *Nationaal Sleutelproject* [National Key Project] status for the CityPorts project. Given the Ministry's earlier interest in the future of the southern docklands in the CityPorts area (see Box 7), the OMSR figured it had a good chance to receive a Key Project nomination. Secondly, the OMSR wanted to continue discussions on possible ways of coping with the environmental regulations obstructing certain functional changes in the CityPorts area. Relating the CityPorts situation to the forthcoming *Interim Wet Stad & Milieu* [Interim Law City & Environment] could give the OMSR an early insight in – and possibly some influence on – the new law's scope and workins.

Representatives of several State Ministries visited the CityPorts area on March 22, 2005.[16] The visit was officially part of the information and consultation round in preparation of the OMSR's official strategic document named the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Strategy. After a concept of the document was finished in February 2005, the first round of discussions was set up. The State representatives were very interested in the CityPorts project. Eventually, a Key Project proposal was submitted followed by a mandatory 'Societal Cost-Benefit Analysis' (MKBA). As a result, the CityPorts project became an important candidate on VROM´s list of projects. From that time on, the OMSR and the Ministry worked together to make the potential regional and national socio-economic effects more explicit. The troublesome environmental procedures around the *Maasvlakte 2*

Box 7
The National Spatial Strategy and CityPorts

In the spring of 2004, the Dutch Cabinet presented a National Spatial Strategy named the *Nota Ruimte* [Spatial Brief], addressing the State's priorities for the future spatial development of the Netherlands. Like in its preceding editions, the *Nota Ruimte* prominently featured the Dutch 'Mainports' – the Port of Rotterdam and Schiphol International Airport. As the 'backbone' of the *Nationale Ruimtelijke Hoofdstructuur* [National Spatial Framework], the future development of these infrastructure 'hubs' was regarded crucial for Dutch urbanization and economic activity. In addition, the State Brief paid a lot of attention to the existing urban surrounding of its Mainports. It emphasized the apparent social, economic, and environmental problems, particularly in the four largest cities, the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht. Restructuring, revitalization, and transformation of existing urban areas would have to contribute to the improvement of a diverse urban living environment. Next to an important urban renewal assignment in existing urban housing districts, the *Nota Ruimte* also pointed out the need to address the deterioration of business terrains:

> 'Existing business terrains do not always answer to contemporary demands. Sometimes revitalization is an option, but in the event of function loss (like old railroad yards, ports, and industrial areas) transformation to new living and working areas can be a real possibility. Here, one can think of obsolete terrains on the north banks of the IJ river in Amsterdam, and of the *Waal-* and *Eemhaven*s (as part of the stadshavens) in Rotterdam.'

Hence, the Dutch State explicitly pointed out the southern parts of the Rotterdam CityPorts area as locations where transformation was expected to occur due to a loss of functions. *De Tweede Kamer* (the Dutch Lower House) approved the *Nota Ruimte* in May, 2005. *De Eerste Kamer* (the Upper House) gave its fiat on January 17, 2006, making the *planologische kernbeslissing* [core planning decision] final.

Source: Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment *et al.*, 2004, pp. 43 and 144 (italics in quote added).

expansion plan had made everyone wary of making time-consuming mistakes. The collaboration between the OMSR and State officials was therefore meant to make CityPorts applications arrive at the proper reviewing bodies in a timely and (more) complete fashion (OMSR Interview 2006).

Next to the *Havenplan 2020* and the National Spatial Strategy, another significant policy agenda was drawn up that featured the CityPorts assignment: the 'Economic Vision Rotterdam 2020'. The document was a product of the Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR), which was initiated by Port Alderman Van Sluis and founded by the Rotterdam Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) in 2003.[17] The EDBR consists of 32 representatives from the Rotterdam business, art and knowledge community, an International Advisory Board, and an Executive Committee (EDBR, 2004). In the 'Economic Vision Rotterdam 2020', which appeared in January 2005, the EDBR designated the East-

ern *Waalhaven* as the top international office location for port and port related companies. Moreover, the CityPorts area was also designated as one of eight 'hot spots' (EDBR, 2005).

Figure 5.7 Logo Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR).

'The Rotterdam waterfront is the international *unique selling point* of Rotterdam and its entire conurbation. Rotterdam works hard to make its waterfront even more attractive. At the same time, the city uses its riverbanks to give Rotterdam more radiance as a city of enterprise and living. In this respect, CityPorts is the biggest and most important project. It aims to adapt the *Waalhaven*, the *Eemhaven* and the *Vierhavens* area on the north bank into a sparkling city and port area.' [p. 49, italics in original]

The EDBR was initially approached with great skepticism by the opposition in the City Council. They claimed it was performing tasks designated for the municipal Development Corporation (OBR). Other critics believed that the EDBR members were not the very best the Rotterdam business community had to offer.[18] However, the general objectives of the EDBR and its 'Economic Vision' were widely supported, and its advice taken seriously. Steven van Eijck, former State Secretary of Finance and Chair of the EDBR, underlines the sense of urgency that binds the EDBR members in an interview with national newspaper *Het Financieele Dagblad* late 2004.[19] He pointed out that the EDBR's time is 'invested without self-interest'. All they would expect is to be taken seriously by Rotterdam polity – by the current as well as by the forthcoming.

Besides its long-term 'Economic Vision', the members of the EDBR are also aiming for short-term results. Two members of the EDBR who already had contact with the OMSR, were particularly interested in the RDM site on the riverfront due to its history in ship building and education.[20] *Albeda College* Chair Boekhoud and *Hogeschool Rotterdam* Chair Tuytel, representing two college institutes with 45,000 students combined, had adopted a plan to locate their education program for port industrial manufacturing and applied art on the site. Student housing in the adjacent village *Heijplaat* and public water transportation were designated conditions for the plan. In an interview late 2004, Boekhoud and Tuytel announced that negotiations for a renewed RDM were in an advanced stage:

'Among other things, a waterbus still has to be arranged, but the plan has to become reality within a year. The [RDM] hangar has already been appointed to us.'[21]

However, a few months later, the anticipated doubts of the plagued port authority towards their CityPorts venture would take on explicit proportions.

A Change of Heart

On April 15, 2005 a preliminary meeting to the first Shareholder Meeting was arranged in Rotterdam City Hall. In absence of Physical Infrastructure Alderman Pastors, his *Leefbaar Rotterdam* colleague and Economic Infrastructure Alderman Van Sluis chaired the

meeting. Among others, Van Sluis also welcomed the new Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR) President Director Smits and HbR Marketing Director Van Kleef to the Shareholder discussion. While the goal of the meeting was to talk about the general tasks of the OMSR for the years 2005 and 2006, the HbR Directors announced a change of heart regarding the OMSR's working area. Their position was that the OMSR's 'interference' concerning the *Eemhaven* and the Eastern and Southern *Waalhaven* should come to an end. Hence, five concrete 'business cases' were proposed in which the OMSR needed to specify the necessary financing behind its plans. These five business cases were:

1. the RDM site on the southern riverside north of the village *Heijplaat*, featuring the large hangars of the historic wharf and its monumental head office now partly occupied by the OMSR;
2. the *Sluisjesdijk*, the large riverside docklands in the Eastern *Waalhaven*, characterized by a fragmented business, lease and ownership profile;
3. the *Marconistrook* [Marconi Strip], the northern border of the *Merwehaven* docklands dominated by an obsolete railway yard;
4. the *Merwehaven*, primarily occupied by a large fruit handling cluster, and adjacent to the industrial business terrain *Nieuw Mathenesse* of neighboring municipality Schiedam;
5. the *Nieuw Scheepvaartkwartier* [New Shipping Quarter], comprising of the Eastern and Southern *Waalhaven*, where the office project DockWorks was already in progress.

Given the HbR objections on the OMSR's planning exercises in the *Waalhaven*, the discussions following the OMSR business case proposals led to a rejection of the New Shipping Quarter idea. The OMSR was asked only to perform a 'quick scan' of the area: investigation of the possibilities for land reclamation – 50 hectares [124 acres] – and for the realization of better accessibility by road and subway (OMSR, 2005c). Therefore, the actual development of the area would be left to the Commercial Affairs department of the HbR. In light of the agreement between the municipalities of Rotterdam and Schiedam, the proposals on the north shore of the river were combined in order to gain a quantified overview of the costs and benefits of potential operations. Hence, the three business cases would have to demonstrate the financial consequences of a maintenance, operation, and eventual development process in these areas (see Figure 5.8). In the meantime, the short-term investments the OMSR had planned in the areas – i.e. the accommodation of the two college institutes on the RDM site – would be taken from the OMSR budget surplus of the previous year and the expected surplus of 2005. The Shareholders agreed to the investments, and the continuation of an equal €3 million annual contribution.

Roles and Responsibility

Before the year 2005, the departments responsible for the development of the port and city of Rotterdam – departments of the new port authority (HbR), the Municipal Development Corporation (OBR), and *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V) – were often consulted by the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR). A lot of information on the existing situation in the area was gathered, and studies of the area's potentials were made. Particularly the dS+V conducted many assignments for the OMSR, both by

official commission or informal request. In spite of some close individual relationships, a considerable distance between the organizations persisted. A dS+V official concluded the following:

'You could say that the municipal shareholder was hardly involved in the products of the OMSR, both in terms of content and decision-making. As dS+V, we delivered people to the OMSR. Here, these people were called "the gang of five", which basically says it all. Urban designers, traffic designers, landscape architects, planners, lawyers – you name it. Together with the OMSR, they made different products. So dS+V was basically hired by the OMSR, but what we never did was co-organize our public responsibility. […] This means, for example, that when it comes to living in CityPorts, that this will have consequences for the rest of the city. Or when it comes to infrastructure interventions that they have to fit in the overall infrastructure picture. You could say that the people that worked there, worked there without the context of the city. The "gang of five" consisted of practically the best people of the department – it is after all a fantastic project. But the involvement of management, of the directors – including feeding back what had been done into all the municipal documents we were making […] – that relationship was never realized.' (dS+V Interview November 2008)

Figure 5.8 OMSR: three business cases and a 'quick scan' (April 2005).

The poor relationship between OMSR products and Rotterdam-wide planning documents did not go unnoticed. As a result, the OMSR commissioned a few studies that were meant to correct the matter. A striking example in this regard is a complementary study by the OBR and the HbR of the area's economic potential, which counted as a follow-up on the earlier consultancy report. Where the earlier study had primarily focused on the area itself, this study would view CityPorts on 'higher levels of scale'. The investigation aimed to shed more light on the area's (inter) national, conurbation, and local economic position, on the possibilities to attract more business to the area, and on the question whether this position and attractiveness fitted well with the OMSR's long-term ideas for CityPorts (OBR/HbR, 2005). The main conclusion of the investigation was that the CityPorts area was, from a market perspective, not one area, but many. According to

the OBR and HbR, different sites within the area showed several development and market potentialities, predominantly due to the qualities of neighboring areas outside CityPorts. Examples were locations along national highway A15 – which runs south of the CityPorts area in a west-east direction – and the northern docklands surrounded by 'existing urban fabric'. In general, the report stresses that accessibility of the CityPorts area is essential, and that a subway line extension should therefore still be seriously considered.

Aside from planning conclusions, the OBR and HbR reached some other significant insights. In the report, they made references to an organization for joint acquisition and marketing activities: a collaboration to be established explicitly between OBR and HbR acquisition staff. This joint organization would seek to attract business activities for the whole port and its surroundings, and also for the CityPorts area. How such a body would relate to the OMSR was not mentioned. In addition, the report also revoked earlier projections of business area deficiencies within the conurbation. Economic stagnation, among other things, had not led Rotterdam to the severe problems in the supply of business terrains expected at the turn of the millennium (see previous chapter). According to the report, the CityPorts area had clear potential. However, the demand for space in the area could no longer be expected to come from land scarcities elsewhere in the conurbation (OBR/HbR, 2005: 46). In the forthcoming year, the demand for office space in the Rotterdam conurbation could also be provided for outside the CityPorts area. Nonetheless, the report acknowledged that a new demand for office locations had presented itself in the CityPorts area – particularly by maritime services companies.

The announced decline in the demand for business terrains in the Rotterdam conurbation did not help the OMSR's cause. Moreover, the bodies usually involved in Rotterdam's port urban planning and development did not involve themselves emphatically with the CityPorts operation. Shareholder Meetings and some personal contacts aside, the involved directors of the Rotterdam apparatus did not have a lot of attention for the last port areas within the Rotterdam diamond. Their priorities were focused on other projects in the areas north and south of the city, and some prestigious projects inside the urban core. Hence, the directors of the involved municipal departments rarely attended the CityPorts meetings. An HbR corporate development official explained:

'The aim was to let the HbR, the OBR, and dS+V collaborate. But I don't have the idea that this really occurred. People have seen [the OMSR] as a competitor from the very start. […] The Alderman was involved with the founding [of the OMSR]. He also has heart for it. But he's going to leave office [in March 2006]. Things may change, I don't know.' (HbR Interview February 2006)

The Development Strategy

On May 19, 2005, the OMSR Shareholders gave their approval to publish the 'Rotterdam CityPorts Development Strategy', of which a concept had been ready since February of that year. The introduction of the awaited strategic document was made public in June 2005, and declared a twofold OMSR ambition:

'In the next decades, the Rotterdam CityPorts area will change significantly. The port will remain present in all its dynamics, but the city will increasingly intermix with its fabric. The

ships, the cranes, the continuing industry and the fabulous views will become the background of a very special living and working environment. City and port are entering a new alliance.' (OMSR, 2005b: 17).

Hence, the OMSR aimed to answer to the future spatial claims of the city *and* the port, with an emphasis on 'economic renewal'. According to the document, one of the functions of the Development Strategy was to provide an integrated framework of short-term maintenance measures, mid-term strategic projects up to 2015, and possible images of the CityPorts area after 2030. Secondly, the document gives an outline of (partial) transformations in the area: concrete plans for several locations within the area were to be presented later in 2005. Thirdly, the Development Strategy was meant as a basis for communication with the 'users and surroundings of the area' in another round of information and consultation (OMSR, 2005b).

Hence, the spatial interventions projected by the Development Strategy document were presented as preliminary conclusions. To discuss these conclusions, the Development Strategy provided an overview of the existing situation in the CityPorts area, summarizing the information the OMSR had collected. In addition, the document provided an indication of the trends that were expected to influence the future demand for both port and urban functions in the area. Next, the position of business interest groups towards the CityPorts plans, and the relevant public policy frameworks would be summed up. Finally, the studies and analyses led to a list of ten ambitions – six 'programmatic' and four 'conditional' ambitions (see Box 8). In the introduction, the OMSR emphasized the mutual benefits involved with the intended development of the CityPorts area. In this regard, the 'tension between city and port' was described on the basis of straightforward spatial planning considerations. The documents carefully characterized the OMSR's predicament by stating:

'The CityPorts area provides the opportunity to let city and port increasingly profit from each other. There is a clear win-win possibility. […] A condition for achieving that win-win situation is the prevention of a possible competition between city and port. Housing and amenities need an active port, because it provides liveliness, while the port economy needs sufficient environmentally useable space. Attending to the tension between these two requires good directing.' (OMSR, 2005b: 20)

In the document's 2015 projections, residential functions would only appear in the *Merwehaven* on the northern shores (see Figure 5.9). South of the river, only the RDM site showed some concrete functional changes, whereas the *Sluisjesdijk* on the riverfront was only expected to provide 'chances' for economic renewal in the 'leisure' and 'creativity' sectors of the economy. At the base of the *Waalhaven*, the Development Strategy proposed land reclamation activities (see Figure 5.10) for port and port related companies. In these sectors, a yearly demand of 5,000 to 10,000 square meters could still be expected. Redevelopment of the Southern *Waalhaven* would have to be complemented by the construction of a subway station and restructuring of the existing business terrain in order to ensure the attractiveness of the area. This would then trigger the land value increases mandatory to make the project's budget estimations close.

Box 8

The Rotterdam CityPorts Development Strategy – Ten Ambitions

1. Position the area as a diverse urban environment for living and working
2. Continue facilitation of current business activities
3. Expand, broaden, and strengthen business activities
4. Realize new living environments
5. Strengthen the area with urban amenities
6. Create a scale jump possibility
7. Excel with water
8. Make the area accessible with more transport modalities
9. Utilize existing urban and landscape qualities
10. Make the environment central in the internal qualities of the area

Programmatic Ambitions (1-6)

Conditional Ambitions (7-10)

Source: OMSR (2005b)

The OMSR Development Strategy also referred to several projects managed by actors other than themselves. The port authority was involved in the expansion and intensification of the juice cluster in the *Vierhavens*, and in the reinforcement of the short-sea activities in the *Eemhaven*. The municipal Development Corporation (OBR) worked on a roof park and park lane project east of Marconi Square. In addition, the collaboration with the municipality of Schiedam for their part of the New *Mathenesse* industrial business area was well under way. Lastly, housing corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers* – owner of virtually all residential units in the village of *Heijplaat* – was working on a plan for the renewal and renovation of the estate.

Concluding its 2015 project proposals, the OMSR also asked the Rotterdam administration for some land reservations in the CityPorts area. These reservations had two possible 'major spatial interventions'. The first could be a large-scale public amenity like a museum, an exposition center or an event, for which the South Eastern *Waalhaven* or the RDM site could provide the necessary space. The other major intervention would be a shore connection extending from the *Vierhavens* area to either the village *Heijplaat* or the *Sluisjesdijk*. In addition, the OMSR would sketch three scenarios for the development of the CityPorts area after 2020. One image featured a prevailing port, the second showed urbanization of the Eastern *Waalhaven* and the *Merwehaven*, and the third portrayed large urban projects on the southern riverfront and total transformation of the northern CityPorts docklands.

The Development Strategy document closes with the announcement that the projects proposed would be worked out financially during the rest of the year 2005. Moreover, the OMSR declared that a calculation model – incorporating both port and urban land exploitation principles – had been developed to financially support its forthcoming maintenance, operation and development tasks. Finally, the OMSR asked the Rotterdam municipal and port administrations to approve its Development Strategy, thus letting it

Projects 2015

CityPorts Rotterdam
1. A New Shipping Quarter
   - Land reclamation southern *Waalhaven* (phased)
   - Subway station (M) and improved road access
   - Restructuring South *Waalhaven*
2. Renewal RDM and surroundings
3. Chances for leisure and creative economy (*)
4. Public transportation over water
5. Housing *Merwehaven* and border *Nieuw Mathenesse* after move fruit cluster

Port of Rotterdam
A *Eemhaven* – Short-sea cluster including buffer *Bunschotenweg*
B Juice cluster – expansion and intensification

Rotterdam Development Corp.
C *Vierhavens*strip / Roof park and Park lane

Municipality of Schiedam
D Restructuring *Nieuw Mathenesse*

Woonbron Maasoevers
E Restructuring garden village *Heijplaat*

Figure 5.9 Rotterdam CityPorts Development Strategy: Projects up to 2015 in the CityPorts area (OMSR, 2005b; 2005c).

proceed with the plans as presented. The approval of its shareholders would be followed by three processes. For the period up to September 2005, the OMSR announced that it would:

1. Consult a group of relevant stakeholders about the CityPorts Development Strategy;
2. Organize deliberations about their plans within the Rotterdam administration and City Council (Committees);
3. Work out a 'project program' in terms of marketability, planning, finance, public responsibilities, and collaboration with private actors.

Hence, little over a year since its official founding, the OMSR seemed ready to work towards more tangible results. In the Development Strategy document's preface, OMSR Director De Ruiter emphasized that his organization would need full support to realize the CityPorts ambitions: 'The enthusiasm of many for our work area and for the possibilities that occur gives us the confidence that this support will also be granted.' (OMSR, 2005b: 5)

5.6 CityPorts Elaborations

Between April and October 2005, the OMSR executed an elaborate 'information and consultation round' to discuss its Development Strategy document. Next to administrative bodies on all levels – State, Province, City-Region, Municipality, and Boroughs – discussions were organized with business representatives, housing corporations, and environmental organizations. Also, discussions with educational institutes, the EDBR, and the OMSR Advisory Board were continually orchestrated. The general public had recurrently

Figure 5.10 A land reclamation study by the *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V) commissioned by the OMSR.

been informed and consulted through different kinds of media and events. Eventually, the round did not lead to any severe changes in the Development Strategy document. Within the municipal apparatus, the document was generally considered a 'development vision' rather than an 'implementation strategy' (OMSR, 2005e). Several specific projects had to be elaborated upon, and some overarching themes needed more detailed attention.

Projects and Themes

In a written response of five municipal directors[22], the OMSR was complimented for the 'development vision' it had presented. However, the projects presented by the OMSR Development Strategy for the period up to 2015 (see Figure 5.9) were not regarded specific enough to provoke the interest of 'the market'. This meant that the concise character of the document's chapters about the projects and their financial consequences would have to be elaborated upon. Thus, the production of a so-called *Uitvoeringsprogramma* or Implementation Program 2005-2015 was recommended. Such a Program would make clear what material interventions were specifically proposed, how much funds these would claim from the public purse, and how many private investments these could invoke. A rough calculation had estimated a public deficit of €350 to €620 million – a calculation that excluded a much more costly 'active land acquisition strategy'. Hence, according to the municipal directors, the CityPorts plans were to be based upon a 'temptation strategy' aimed at stimulating and seizing development opportunities as they presented themselves. Nonetheless, the OMSR was also pressed to clarify what results could be expected within the upcoming municipal ruling period 2006-2010 (OMSR, 2005e). Only then could a final municipal judgment on the Development Strategy be passed.

With a workforce of about fifteen people, the CityPorts team prepared the distinguished business cases – those of the RDM terrain, of the *Sluisjesdijk*, and of the *Merwehaven/Marconi Strip* projects – and the controversial 'quick scan' of the *New Shipping Quarter* in the South Eastern *Waalhaven*. The studies were meant to clarify the financial and programmatic feasibility of each plan, and to elaborate on the conditions under which the proposed projects could take place. The arguments made for each case were under-

stood as the ground work for further decision-making between the municipality and port authority – particularly about the necessary investments.

Box 9

Environmental Regulations and CityPorts

According to the Rijnmond Environmental Protection Agency (DCMR), an increasing concentration of people, port activities, industry, and related transport makes Rotterdam a unique and challenging place in terms of the environment. In this regard, CityPorts holds an extraordinary position: all of the above factors come together in one area. A high amount of (cargo) transport across both land and water causes sound pollution, high concentrations of air contaminating substances, and safety hazards. Without changes to the port industrial activities of the area, the future addition of residential functions to the area cannot be allowed – not least due to changing European environmental directives. For the CityPorts area, sound pollution is the most relevant of environmental aspects. The 24-hour activities that characterize the existing port functions make the CityPorts' ambitions toward the creation of a port urban mix extremely difficult to realize. Since 2005, the OMSR and the DCMR have worked together intensively to find possible solutions and work out the consequences of different relocation scenarios. The image below presents the so-called 'T+ acoustic zones' effective in the CityPorts area. These zones are part of an administrative agreement that allows port activities to intensify within the recorded limits, at least until the year 2010. Although the OMSR was involved in an evaluation of the T+ agreement in 2006, no adjustments to the acoustic zones were effectuated.

Sources: OMSR (2005e; 2006a); Gemeente Rotterdam (2006b); Port of Rotterdam/OMSR (illustration).

Next to the business cases and quick scan, the activities of the OMSR centered around three themes that concerned the whole of the CityPorts area. The first concerned the environment. The regional Environmental Protection Agency (DCMR) was asked to put together a report that could function as an 'environment strategy', clarifying all the (im)possibilities when it comes to creating a port urban mix in the CityPorts area (see Box 9). In addition, a so-called 'Route Map' – designed by the OMSR in collaboration with DCMR officials and others from different public bodies – would provide a clear view of the requirements and durations of the relevant legal procedures as soon as plans were ready for realization (Kroep, 2007).

'Water' was the second theme addressed by the OMSR. From May to June 2005, the Second Rotterdam Architecture Biennale titled 'The Flood' took place. Landscape architect and Harvard professor Adriaan Geuze was curator of the event, and started a fierce public debate by making an argument against the development of a large-scale residential area in the *Zuidplaspolder* northeast of Rotterdam. Geuze held that the polder contained some of Europe's lowest geographical points – more than six meters below sea level. Besides its vulnerability to water floods, the urbanization of the polder would pull the already small middle class out of the city.[23] According to Geuze, Rotterdam's urban sprawl had to come to an end. All polders around Rotterdam were needed for recreation and occasional flooding. That same year, a study by Geuze's own architecture firm West 8 would therefore designate several areas within existing city limits – including the *Merwehaven* and *Maas/Rijnhaven* docklands – that are suitable for residential functions (OMSR, 2005e). Besides the clear attractiveness of CityPorts' waterfronts to potential residents, the OMSR nevertheless continued to emphasize the importance of water bound economic and leisure functions in the area. Therefore, it had made an overview of Rotterdam's water management organizations and conducted several studies of international maritime water plans. In addition, the OMSR was making a reference book with examples of different water bound events and leisure functions, and commissioned a study to the Municipal Works (GW) department into possible flood risks inside the CityPorts area.

The demand for 'economic' uses in the CityPorts area preoccupied many of those involved in the project. Several OMSR activities continued to focus on this third theme. Together with the Economic Development Board (EDBR), the OMSR designated the so-called 'creative sector' – visual art, film, multimedia, graphic design, internet services and web design, architecture, fashion, and product design – as an important target. Different entrepreneurs in this sector approached the OMSR to provide them with design studios, repetition rooms, or locations for parties (OMSR, 2005f). The subsequent OMSR project 'Mapping Creativity' revealed a total of 125 creative enterprises inside the CityPorts area – particularly around the RDM terrain and the *Vierhavens* docklands.[24] Moreover, an earlier study commissioned by the municipal Development Corporation (OBR) had already shown a yearly 8 percent growth of the 'creative industry' in the Rotterdam conurbation (TNO, 2005).[25] Hence, the OMSR had enough reasons to stimulate 'creative production' in the CityPorts area. Different exhibitions, conferences, festivals, sport competitions, and other cultural events were hosted inside the CityPorts area.[26] Motivated by the success of these events, several OMSR officials attended a speech by Carnegie Mellon professor Richard Florida – author of several books on his 'creative class'.[27] They returned inspired.

Combined with the progress of the office developments in the – also broadly defined – maritime services sector, the OMSR's focus on creativity started to take tangible shape. In November 2005, Alderman and OMSR founding father Van Sluis was asked to give a statement on the CityPorts Development Strategy and the results of the information and consultation round:

'The area has been put on the map. Possibilities, opportunities, and desired developments have been listed. Now, Rotterdam is more aware of the area's potential – an area of more than 1,450 hectares near the city center. […] The Development Strategy has accelerated this awareness process. This kind of change always takes a lot of time. Big interests and amounts of money are involved. The transformation is nevertheless starting to move. You can see it, for example, by looking at the development of the RDM terrain and the construction of offices at the Eastern *Waalhaven*. […] It's *not* a full transformation into a one hundred percent residential area. That would mean a huge destruction of capital. A lot of healthy companies with perfectly good locations can be found in these old ports. You can't meddle with those. The transhipment in the port is growing every year – we desperately need the CityPorts area for that.'

The RDM Enclave

By the summer of 2005, the renovated head office of the old *RDM* shipyard was becoming a well-known venue in Rotterdam. Next to those working on the CityPorts project or related tasks, a variety of visitors was attracted by the building, its raw port industrial surroundings, and the neighboring garden village. The OMSR building – called '*Droogdok 17*' – provided a growing amount of space for 'creative' enterprises, for expositions, small conferences, education, and small businesses. In the field of architecture, students and professionals were inspired by the historic building and the contrasts of the surrounding area. Hence, the OMSR, the Rotterdam Architecture Institute (NAi), the Academy of Architecture and Urbanism, and the *Hogeschool Rotterdam* decided to investigate the possibility of founding an 'International CityPorts Academy'. While the *Hogeschool* and the *Albeda College* were negotiating a significant residence inside the enormous hangars of the former shipyard, an international 'Summer School' would be a pilot by which the viability of such an Academy could be tested. Forty students from seventeen different countries eventually participated in the program taking place July 4-15. Student housing was co-organized with *Woonbron Maasoevers* – the housing corporation still owning most of the residential units in *Heijplaat*.[28] Under the label 'Big and Beautiful', the Summer School would eventually become a great success. An OMSR representative announced that the event would return every summer:

'In the meantime, we are working together with the Academy of Architecture and Urbanism to create a foundation that could implement [the next Summer Schools] and take care of things like the acquisition of funds' (OMSR 2005d).

In the months that followed, the presence and work of the OMSR in and around the former *RDM* buildings was intensified. The interests and enthusiasm of different knowledge institutes – resulting in different on-site programs, workshops, and tours – were incorporated into what was announced as OMSR's 'social obligation'. In an interview

focusing on the OMSR's social activities, Deputy Director Van der Hoek explained that bringing together entrepreneurs, social organizations, and other actors in the CityPorts area was considered part of their task:

'A part of our social assignment […] could be to bring together […] parties that do not automatically find each other. Someone suggested to me that we should let these parties "dance" together. We are going to translate this social assignment into additional attention for projects and initiatives in which youngsters, schooling, innovation and creativity are central' (OMSR, 2005d).

Public communication by the OMSR reached its peak in the fall of 2005, when two newsletters (in September and November) informed the community about its activities – particularly those concerned about the development of the 'RDM enclave'. While the first newsletter was titled 'Working Together on Knowledge' (OMSR, 2005d), the second featured the meeting 'Creativity Meets Business'. The goal of the latter was to discuss the development of the RDM hangars into a center for 'innovation and creative manufacturing for companies, knowledge institutes, and education' with a total of 175 attendees (OMSR, 2005e).[29] The meeting was complemented by another seminar with entrepreneurs, artists, and residents of the 'Greater Heijplaat' area, comprising of the RDM terrain, its surroundings and Heijplaat village. As a result, the OMSR announced that the old RDM initials would now stand for Research, Design, and Manufacturing. An international idea competition titled 'Unorthodocks' would accompany the plans, asking anyone under the age of 35 to design a future for the Dokhaven – the central part of the RDM terrain (see Box 5 and Figure 5.11) – and her surrounding waterfront.

Figure 5.11 Birds-eye view of the village *Heijplaat*, *Droogdok 17* and RDM hangar designated for educational use (OMSR, 2006a).

5.7 Port and City Claims

While the RDM enclave started to take root, some significant changes had occurred inside Rotterdam's municipal apparatus by the end of 2005. First, in September, OBR General Director Stam and his Director of Economy were forced to leave their positions by responsible Alderman Marco Pastors.[30] A few months later, on November 8, the Physical Infrastructure Alderman himself had to resign. Continued media statements on topics outside his own traffic, transport, and organization portfolio had irreparably damaged the Rotterdam City Council's trust in the Alderman.[31] Hence, Pastors had to leave his *Leefbaar*

Rotterdam colleague and Alderman Van Sluis as the only original member of the OMSR Steering Committee. Because these events occurred only four months before Rotterdam's municipal elections, Mayor Opstelten stepped in to supervise the Physical Infrastructure portfolio. On December 13, the Council appointed Adriaan Visser as the new OBR Director. As a consultant, Visser had been closely involved in the negotiations around port expansion plan *Maasvlakte 2* and the corporatization of the Rotterdam port authority.[32]

The Needs of the City

The information and consultation round following the CityPorts Development Strategy fostered a lot of activities for the OMSR. By the end of 2005, up to 30 people were working on the CityPorts project directly or by OMSR commission. One of the most important activities initiated in 2005 was a study that addressed 'the meaning of CityPorts for the city of Rotterdam as a whole' (OMSR, 2005e). Public officials in the Rotterdam apparatus had expected more of an 'advertizing image' for the CityPorts area – a 'brand' that would clarify its distinctive place within the future development of the Rotterdam conurbation. A large-scale intervention like the earlier idea of a World Port Plaza (see Chapter 4) was still considered imperative, but the idea of a new football stadium in the *Waalhaven* had been dismissed.[33] Again, international comparisons pointed out that the CityPorts venture needed a project of considerable size and significance to really take off. By the end of 2005, the pressure on the OMSR to deliver comprehensive plans that related well to other urban development projects in the city mounted. At the same time, the tangible but small-scale results achieved by the CityPorts team were often dismissed by their municipal or port authority colleagues. Four months before the municipal elections, in December 2005, the OBR and dS+V delivered an OMSR commissioned report titled 'For the City of Need: New opportunities in the CityPorts area' (OBR/dS+V, 2005).

In an interview, an OBR strategist recalled that the document that appeared late 2005 was a first attempt to write down what the municipal departments thought about CityPorts and the Development Strategy document. Up to that point, the departments had never felt responsible for the project. However, that attitude started to change when they realized that several proposals made by the OMSR could evoke a regional competition – e.g. in the supply of residential and industrial business functions, and in the attraction of (subway) infrastructure funds. Some of the CityPorts development proposals could therefore potentially hamper and conflict with other projects planned by the Rotterdam urban planning (dS+V) and development (OBR) departments:

> 'So, among the departments, this led to a closer reflection on what we actually wanted with the area. It's nice what Fred [the OMSR Director] has put forth, but what do we actually want? Was this really what we wanted? Apparently not' (OBR Interview October 2008).

The answers of the two municipal departments were very substantive, and would in general terms incorporate some of the OMSR's achievements. The OMSR was recommended to focus the development of residential functions in the northern parts of the CityPorts area. After 2015, a conditional relocation process would have to free the *Merwe/Vierhavens* docklands for ground tied housing projects up to 5,000 units. The *Maas/Rijnhaven docklands* were considered eligible for residential developments in the nearer

Box 10
The Netherlands' Institutional Structure

After capital Amsterdam, Rotterdam is the second most populated city of the constitutional monarchy of the Netherlands. Rotterdam is part of the Province of South Holland, one of the twelve Dutch provinces. Together with the Provinces of North Holland, Utrecht, and Flevoland, South Holland is part of the *Randstad* metropolitan area, also known as the Deltametropolis. The *Randstad* encompasses the country's third and fourth largest cities, The Hague and Utrecht. This makes it a pluricentric metropolitan area of 7 million people, situated around a rural landscape called *Groene Hart* or Green Heart.

Between the administrative levels of State, Province, and Municipality, several regional or supra-regional collaborations have been initiated or enforced by State decree. Among these is the *Platform Zuidvleugel* in which The Hague and Rotterdam collaborate (see illustration). The other is *Stadsregio Rotterdam-Rijnmond*, in which Rotterdam works together with surrounding municipalities on infrastructure and environmental questions. Rotterdam itself is divided into eleven boroughs.

In the Netherlands, political representatives on all State, Province and Municipal levels of government are elected directly within a democratic multi-party system. Public administrations have a standard ruling period of four years.

Sources: www.wikipedia.org, www.zuidvleugel.nl, www.stadsregio.info, Salet *et al.* (2003).

future. Although these southern docklands were not formally part of the CityPorts area – and moreover: already under OBR control – they did represent the current geographical connection between the existing city and the port. The OBR/dS+V (2005) report therefore projected the development of 1,500 to 3,000 ground tied residential units in the *Maas/Rijnhaven* area, and designated this as Rotterdam's next port urbanization phase. Hence, just like the *Eemhaven*, the plans for the *Waalhaven* docklands would be restricted to 'a combination of dry and wet business'. The *Eemhaven* would keep its transhipment functions, while the South Eastern *Waalhaven*, the *Sluisjesdijk*, and the *RDM* terrain would

eventually be transformed into a 'mixed economic area'. According to the report, the to-
tal area showed a growth potential of 10,000 jobs. However, the optimal development of
the southern docklands had an important precondition: its accessibility needed a serious
upgrade. For this, the CityPorts project needed to be embedded in Rotterdam's regional
development plans. As a whole, its candidature as one of the National Key Projects could
also be justified. In collaboration with other municipal departments, a Key Project bid
book was therefore being prepared – only this way could the necessary public funding be
obtained (OBR/dS+V, 2005).

Rotterdam's regional body – *Stadsregio Rotterdam-Rijnmond* – is the most impor-
tant organization for the city-region's infrastructure development. Among other things, it
allocates city-regional infrastructure budgets, and is responsible for drawing up a *struc-
tuurplan*, which formalizes the spatial policies of (part of) the Province of South Hol-
land.[34] The Province uses the *structuurplan* to assess municipal land use plans, after which
approved land use plans become legally binding documents. In December 2005, the *Stads-
regio* and the Province of South Holland published the final and approved version of their
RR2020 – Rotterdam's official city-regional spatial plan.[35] The plan would be effective for
a period of ten years and featured a city- regional development strategy with ten impor-
tant points and an implementation agenda. The CityPorts project featured as one of the
projects already running in Rotterdam's river zone. According to the *RR2020* document,
all projects in this zone needed to be 'stimulated and facilitated in order to transform into
an advertizing residential and working environment by the water'. Figure 5.12 depicts a
map presenting the *RR2020* implementatio program.

Figure 5.12 *RR2020* implementation program featuring the CityPorts project (#2), the *Maasvlakte 2* port expan-
sion plan (#3a), *Zuidplaspolder* (#5) and the Rotterdam Central Station project (#1).

Meanwhile, on the supra-regional level, an administrative collaboration called the *Zuidvleugel* [South Wing] concentrated on all large-scale projects and other spatial planning activities in the southern part of the *Randstad* area.[36] In this lower part of Holland's most important metropolitan region (see Box 10), 'ten priority projects' and three 'coherent sets of activities' were identified. Decisions to stimulate these 'priorities of the v' were made in close collaboration with the Dutch State in order to connect them to the framework of the National Spatial Strategy – the *Nota Ruimte*. In a document that was prepared for an administrators conference on December 7, 2005, Rotterdam CityPorts was recorded as one of the *Zuidvleugel*'s Top Ten projects. Identifying the combination of a scarce quantity of remaining space with a high pressure for urbanization as *the* problem of the *Zuidvleugel*, CityPorts was designated as an area where a much needed quantity of new urban development space would become available. According to the document, the first objective of the CityPorts project is to preserve and – if possible – expand the economic strength of the area. In addition, plots issued on *Maasvlakte 2* could eventually be expected to evoke certain large port companies to move out of the CityPorts area, providing space for the project's second objective: answering to the growing demand for inner city space to accommodate new economic functions, housing, and amenities (BPZ, 2007: 22). State Minister of Spatial Planning Sybilla Dekker supported the priorities identified by the *Zuidvleugel* platform. Rotterdam Alderman Van Sluis was documented as official devotee of the CityPorts project.

The Port States its Claim

In the *RR2020* and *Zuidvleugel* documents, the upcoming realization of the *Project Mainportontwikkeling Rotterdam* (PMR) including *Maasvlakte 2* was clearly marked. Consequently, the port migration process that had been a driving argument behind the CityPorts project was repeated in the city-regional and supra-regional plans. Both the Rotterdam port authority and the OMSR had been involved in the city-region's consultation process (SRR/PZH, 2005: 125). The OMSR had hosted visits by civil servants working on the *Zuidvleugel* plans.[37] However, the delays in the *Maasvlakte 2* planning process had led to more pressure on the CityPorts docklands, particularly the *Waal/Eemhaven*. Unexpected growth in short-sea container transhipment had forced the HbR to adjust its projections for the future port use of the *Waalhaven*. Hence, the port authority expected that port companies in the area would experience an unforeseen increase of port, and port related activities like empty depot, ship repairs, and other services. In addition, the possible relocation of fruit handling company Seabrex from the Northern *Merwehaven* to the Southern *Waalhaven* would put even more pressure on these docklands and their connecting road and rail infrastructure.[38] Moreover, lashing and on stream transhipment activities still occurring in the *Waalhaven* basin were also designated for intensification. More landings for inland ships were part of the HbR's *Waalhaven* plans too (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006b).

The port authority's claim on the *Waalhaven* seemed well-argued, and put the OMSR Shareholder Meetings under serious stress by the end of 2005.[39] The financial and legal conditions by which the future development, maintenance, and operation of the CityPorts area could eventually be transferred to the OMSR still remained obscure. In fact, the HbR was not prone to transfer any of the southern CityPorts docklands. A HbR corporate development executive recalls:

'Look, it's all about negotiation. The HbR didn't want the *Waalhaven* to go to the city. […] And City Hall didn't want the *Waalhaven* to stay under port control. Well, we found a nice compromise. That was the idea for a [development company]. […] What [the HbR] did not estimate correctly back then was that the growth in the existing port area would occur much faster. That was due to the fact that *Maasvlakte 2* started much later than we expected. If *Maasvlakte 2* had started in 2003-2004, as the first prognosis had claimed, then the development of CityPorts would have taken place differently. But, CityPorts was, particularly in the *Waal/Eemhaven*, of significant importance due to the growth in containers. We never expected that. Also, the adjacent office developments: unexpected. […] Within the HbR, land transfers have never really been a point of discussion' (HbR Inerview July 2007).

In the last months of 2005, the HbR announced that it wanted to take on the further instigation of office developments for maritime services in the South Eastern *Waalhaven* themselves. After the success of project DockWorks, this came as no surprise. All of this implied that the HbR prepared to withdraw its participation in the OMSR. In the last Shareholder Meeting of December 2005, the HbR officially announced its agenda. However, Port Alderman and CityPorts founding father Van Sluis refused to accept an HbR withdrawal, and forced the participants of the Meeting to come up with an alternative. Ideas ranged from reducing the OMSR to a 'discussion platform' to the effectuation of a 'project bureau' that would still be allowed to take on the development, maintenance, and operation of large parts of the CityPorts area.[40] A final decision would be postponed until the next Shareholder Meeting in February 2006. While the March elections were moving closer, the future of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company remained extremely uncertain.

On December 22, 2005, the building *Droogdok 17* was officially opened by Alderman Van Sluis. He publicly announced that the opening of the refurbished RDM buildings acknowledged the history and distinctiveness of the CityPorts docklands.[41] Earlier that month, a two-day international conference had also underscored the uniqueness of the project and its approach.[42] In contrast, negotiations between Rotterdam's city and port authorities on their control over the area's future remained largely hidden to the public.

5.8 Crumbling Support

On New Year's Day 2006, the Dutch State became an official shareholder of the Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR). A process of more than a year – from June 2004 to September 2005 – had been needed to modify the plans for the Project Mainport Development Rotterdam in such a way that it met the earlier objections of the Dutch Council of State. In addition, the investigations following the RDM Affair had put a magnifying glass over all HbR investments and participations (see section 5.4). Before the Dutch State could become an HbR shareholder, it had to be made clear that none of the investments related to the PMR could eventually be explained as a form of illegal State aid. In anticipation of an assessment by the European Union's Competition Committee, Dutch State officials also raised an objection against the HbR's original articles of association. It was argued that the original statutory goal that demanded HbR contributions to the urban development of

the city and region of Rotterdam could not be maintained. State representatives acknowledged that the port authority surely has a role to play in Rotterdam's urban development, but recording it as a primary statutory objective was considered excessive.[43] Therefore, when the State's participation became official, the objective was deleted from the HbR's articles of association. In effect, the CityPorts project and several other port participations ceased to be of the port authority's statutory concerns. The way the HbR's 'social responsibilities' could nevertheless be assured by its public shareholders remained a subject of ongoing administrative investigation and debate.

The North-South Deal

Early 2006, the OMSR team made a review of their achievements in the past two years and summarized them in their fifth public newsletter (OMSR, 2006a). After a year of drawing up a Development Strategy, and another year of elaborations during the subsequent 'information and consultation round', OMSR Director De Ruiter concluded:

> 'We have reached clear agreements with the business community, port authority, and municipal administration. In addition, we are working together closely with several educational institutions. We closed a covenant with the municipality of Schiedam about the plans around the *Merwehaven*. And we managed to get the CityPorts project high on the so-called Key Projects list for which funds are made available by the State government. These are, after all, good results.'

In the newsletter, the OMSR made it clear that its shareholders had reached a geographical division of responsibilities for the CityPorts area. The OMSR would now focus their activities only on CityPorts' northern docklands and the former *RDM* terrain, while the HbR would take the lead in the development of the *Waalhaven*. The pressure on all existing port areas caused by the delays in the development of *Maasvlakte 2* was an acknowledged argument for this so-called 'north-south deal'. In addition, several maritime companies had expressed their interest to locate their head offices on soon to be reclaimed edges of the *Waalhaven* basin. The commercial affairs department of the port authority was looking forward to 'stimulate and strengthen' this development. In addition, it was expressed that the HbR was aiming to

Figure 5.13 Alderman Wim van Sluis (standing) congratulates Chairs Jasper Tuytel (*Hogeschool Rotterdam*), Piet Boekhoud (*Albeda College*), Director Fred de Ruiter (OMSR) and Peter de Regt (Housing Corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers*) with the official agreement to develop the western RDM terrain for educational purposes (OMSR, 2006a).

stay involved in the OMSR's remaining activities (OMSR, 2006a). One of these activities, supposedly, was the development of the western part of the RDM terrain for educational purposes. The agreement that formalized the initiative was signed late 2005 in the presence of Alderman Van Sluis (see Figure 5.13). Chairman Tuytel of the *Hogeschool Rotterdam* explains that additional support was needed:

'We [the *Hogeschool Rotterdam*], the *Albeda College*, CityPorts Rotterdam, and the government, are sticking our necks out. We are showing that we feel there is potential here, and have the audacity to invest millions. Now, it is important that the rest of the city embraces this crazy idea, and that we shape it together' (OMSR, 2006a).

Hence, middle and higher education programs preparing students for industrial professions in product development and automobile technology were being relocated to the CityPorts area. To support the RDM West development, the realization of a crucial waterbus connection was being negotiated with the Municipal Works (GW) department and a waterbus company. Meanwhile, housing corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers* prepared to demolish 350 residential units from the 1950s just south of the RDM terrain in exchange for new, larger units. It was announced that the consequences of these developments were being communicated and discussed with existing residents, companies and other stakeholders in the surrounding area. Thus, OMSR officials involved in the development around RDM West felt like initiators, decision makers, mediators, and motivators (OMRS, 2006a). The work they had been doing for the development of the rest of the *Waalhaven* area, however, was now prohibited. In an interview, an OMSR development manager commented on the north-south deal:

'I think it's weak. But that weakness has a flip side. [On the one hand] it has really started to deviate from the original idea and organization of CityPorts, namely: collaboration between port and city, between the port authority and the municipal departments. [But on the other hand, you] can also interpret it as a clear division of tasks and responsibilities. That second, positive interpretation does count for something. In an area that will largely maintain its port functions, to let those that are most knowledgeable about these functions handle it. [A lot of work has gone overboard], and that's difficult. You deploy a collaborative relationship, but your shareholders don't seem particularly interested.' (OMSR Interview April 2006)

It was clear that the negotiations among OMSR Shareholders had produced a compromise that left all those involved with a feeling of ambivalence. While the HbR underscored its claim over the eastern part of the RDM terrain by stacking up a large amount of empty containers on the edge of the *Dokhaven*, the OMSR was contemplating its next steps. OMSR Director De Ruiter was convinced that the approach he had chosen was sound. He had experienced the power of local, area-based organizations before. To his mind, the OMSR had closed the gap between many of CityPorts' actors and the port authority. While the HbR focused primarily on the larger companies throughout the port, the OMSR had found that it could organize significant initiatives just by bringing together entrepreneurs and other people inside and outside of the CityPorts area. According to De

Ruiter, the presence of the OMSR in the area had given local actors the focal point they needed to develop their personal plans and express every reservation toward the CityPorts initiative. He concluded that the opportunities offered by the area's buildings and terrains could only be cultivated locally (OMSR, 2006b: 28-9).

Rotterdam: Gateway to Europe

While the negotiations between the OMSR shareholders took place, Mayor Opstelten had found himself in meetings on different government levels in which Rotterdam's ability to clearly decide upon its spatial future was being questioned.[44] It was felt that Rotterdam had simply planned too many port urban development projects, and that it would become politically and financially difficult to support and realize them all. What the municipal administration thus needed to do was to choose. With the elections close, Opstelten commissioned an analysis of all of Rotterdam's current port and urban planning documents in order to filter out the common grounds and identify priority projects. In that regard, particularly the *Havenplan 2020*, the Economic Vision 2020, and the *RR2020* were considered leading (GR, 2006a). Once completed, the Rotterdam administration could clearly state what spatial developments it was aiming for, and what support it would need from higher authorities. Mayor Opstelten and Port Alderman Van Sluis prepared the document with a select group of municipal experts around the turn of 2006. Results were expected prior to the elections, which would make them count as 'an advice by the current administration for the coming ruling period' (*ibid.:* 5). On February 28, the booklet called 'Rotterdam: Gateway to Europe' was officially established by the Rotterdam Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W).

Figure 5.14 Five Top Priorities for the Rotterdam Region until 2030 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006a).

The official goal of the 'Gateway' document was to sketch out Rotterdam's position within the metropolitan region and to define an agenda for deliberations with higher government authorities on the port city's spatial future. Five top priorities were

defined within a policy framework consisting of two tracks. The first track focused on expanding Rotterdam's port industrial complex, its modern and complete inner city, and its status as an international infrastructure junction. The second focused on the improvement of Rotterdam's 'living climate', i.e. to make Rotterdam an attractive place not only to work, but for people to 'live' in the widest sense of the word. Rotterdam City-Ports was designated as one of the port city's top priorities next to the development of the *Maasvlakte 2* (#1), the area around Rotterdam Airport (#3), the inner city (#4), and the residential areas along the northern rim (#5) of the city's surrounding motorway (see Figure 5.14). Again, scale increases and intensifications within the port were argued to propel a migration process that would offer space for new material developments. This time, however, these developments were designated as 'port related knowledge and service activities' (GR, 2006a: 13). The *Waalhaven* was particularly suited for these activities, while the *Maas/Rijnhaven* was designated to accommodate 'attractive, mixed environments with ground tied dwellings and companies that are resident friendly' (*ibid*). Hence, the geographical scope of the CityPorts area was extended, that is, the *Maas/Rijnhaven* was officially added to the assignment. Moreover, the 'Gateway to Europe' brief concluded that higher public authorities needed to be called upon to support the choices and priorities Rotterdam had formulated. For the period from 2006 to 2010, estimated contributions necessary from State, Province and City-Regional authorities totaled €900 million. After that, the State would be expected to fund Rotterdam's priority projects with multiple times that amount.

In spite of the administrative support for the CityPorts project declared in the 'Gateway' document, the north-south deal closed by OMSR shareholders was considered a vote of no confidence by Director De Ruiter and other OMSR officials. By March 2006, it was felt that all external support for their approach started to crumble. While political negotiations around Rotterdam's municipal elections reached their peak, communication between the OMSR and the municipal apparatus diminished (OMSR Interviews 2007). After evaluating his own role and responsibility in the process, OMSR Director De Ruiter announced his resignation. In June 2006, he would retire from his active career as an urban planner.

5.9 Confrontation: Orientations, Resources, and Strategies

We presently leave our account of the Rotterdam CityPorts case in order to identify and discuss the actor orientations, action resources and strategies apparent in the above story. Like in chapter four, we will again provide three overviews of the variables that are of specific interest to us. We do this, because we aim to assess the connections between the processes of strategy formation recognized, and the orientations and resources embedded in our case material. This way, we will be able to draw our general conclusions in chapter seven, when we discuss the relationships proposed in our theoretical framework. The extent to which the resources mobilized in our case can explain the defined change in the urban development project strategy will subsequently determine the theoretical value of our insights.

Actor Orientations

Our second period of the Rotterdam CityPorts case begins in January 2004, with a statement by the President Director of the brand new *NV Haven van Rotterdam* (HbR). Instead of a 'transformation', the CityPorts project was referred to as a 'transition' where port activities were expected to make way for port and industry related services. Hence, in contrast to the past, Rotterdam's port growth would not only occur due to an expansion into the North Sea, but also due to a 'novel approach' toward the port's older docklands. We interpret this as a subtle but significant change in the orientations of the President Director. His norms were now more aligned with those of his organization, which kept insisting on control over all port areas including those of CityPorts. With Scholten's nuanced statements, the effects of the more autonomous position of the HbR toward the CityPorts project immediately started to show. Lessons learned about the area were clearly apparent in the executive's words. Nevertheless, the new Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) was explicitly promised the 'freedom and resources' for its long-term effort. This was in accordance with the HbR's third statutory goal (see section 5.2), which formally enforced its commitment to the urban development project. Underestimating the burdens of environmental regulations once again, the port authority still found itself in an obviously ambivalent position toward the CityPorts endeavor. The persisting difference in the orientations of the HbR President Director and the rest of his organization defined in Figure 5.15 reflect this notion.

If we compare the actual decisions and actions of the OMSR in this period with its statutory goals, we observe that it has indeed realized the Development Strategy document and seized opportunities for a few concrete projects – particularly those on and around the RDM terrain. However, such an evaluation would dismiss all the work that was done in preparation and evaluation of the stipulated document and project initiatives. Although its basic interest was undoubtedly also 'to realize', we also observe that the OMSR was necessarily oriented towards the 'facilitation and stimulation' for which it was founded as well. The decisions and actions described show that these basic interests were indeed propagated with the expected fervor, creating a wide-spread and positive public image of Rotterdam's *stadshavens* – particularly among 'creative' entrepreneurs and manufacturers.

In spite of its area-based efforts, the prevailing absence of a clear long-term perspective for CityPorts in conjunction with a short-term realization of projects led to mounting criticism among OMSR shareholders and peers. Paradoxically, it was the OMSR's shareholders and peers who (initially) did not involve themselves with what was clearly meant as a collaborative effort between 'city and port'. In our study, the reasons for their indifference were hardly obscured. The organizational framework of the CityPorts project did not reflect the division of responsibilities and jurisdictions that was valued so highly within the municipal and port authority departments. For the OMSR, these persisting port urban norms would force it into a rather vulnerable and isolated position. Real executive attention returned only after several more pressing issues and projects in Rotterdam – not least that of *Maasvlakte 2* – had been cleared up. By that time, Port Alderman Van Sluis was the only one left in office to defend the original organizational structure. With municipal elections forthcoming, things were set for change.

Actor Orientations		
Actor	Interests	Norms
Mayor Opstelten	Qualitative development of Rotterdam as a whole	Clarity about Rotterdam's development priorities toward higher administrative bodies
Port Alderman Van Sluis	Delivering tangible policy results to the electorate	Results achieved within ruling period (CityPorts project)
HbR Pres Dir Scholten*	Realization of port growth and autonomy	'Transition' in CityPorts area in relation to *Maasvlakte 2*
Port of Rotterdam (HbR)	Exercise of port company tasks and strengthening the position of Rotterdam's port industrial complex	Restricted responsibilities and jurisdictions (focus on land use control)
OMSR	Facilitate, stimulate, and realize the transformation of the CityPorts area	Focus on local conditions and opportunities, improve general public image
Municipal departments (OBR, dS+V)	Execution of urban planning and development tasks	Restricted responsibilities and jurisdictions (focus on land use control)
gemeentelijke bestuursdienst (BSD)	Support feasibility and substantive quality of policy proposals	Protection of municipal authority over the development of the CityPorts area
EDBR** (economic development)	Support the economic development of Rotterdam.	Combine long-term visions (policy advise) with short-term results (project support).

*until September 2005

**refers more specifically to EDBR members Boekhoud (Chair *Albeda College*) and Tuytel (Chair *Hogeschool Rotterdam*).

Figure 5.15 Interests and norms of port city actors involved in the realization of the CityPorts project (period January 2004-February 2006).

While its port urban peers were preoccupied with more urgent matters, the OMSR was busy mobilizing support for its ideas more externally. The actors also identified in figure 5.15 are thus added to the CityPorts strategy arena in figure 5.16 (see also Appendix 2) because their decisions and actions portray clear intentions towards realization of the CityPorts project. Several State ministries, the Province of South Holland, the *Stadsregio* Rotterdam-Rijnmond, and the *Zuidvleugel* Platform all became explicit supporters of Rotterdam CityPorts, because it substantively connected to the policy objectives dominating their orientations. However, the project's isolation was fully exposed when the supra-municipal authorities pointed out the lack of coherence and prioritization within Rotterdam's spatial policies and projects. This is where Mayor Opstelten stepped in, as in his role on the level of the *Zuidvleugel* his attention had been drawn to the ambivalence surrounding the CityPorts project and Rotterdam's overall port urban development plans. Acting decisively, he commissioned the 'Gateway to Europe' document in which CityPorts was identified as a priority project. This, however, would not have occurred if *stadshavens* had not been recorded already in earlier documents like the municipal *Havenplan 2020*, the EDBR's *Economic Vision 2020*, the city-regional *RR2020*, and the *Zuidvleugel* priorities.

This way, the OMSR organized a basis for the long-term administrative commitment and financial support needed if the project was to be realized.

On a more local level, we again identify the port companies in the CityPorts area as an involved but not necessarily supporting actor (see Figure 5.16). Their interest is the ability to keep running and developing their business, with a comprehensive view on the future of their location and surroundings. Lastly, we recognize a group of actors that was also involved in the OMSR's plans and consultations from the very start. The orientations of these 'local users and inhabitants' are personal – and are thus not taken up in our overview in Figure 5.15 – but the case material shows that they have been attended to by the OMSR. For these actors, the lack of big impressive projects was compensated by the organization of small-scale events and the realization of temporary projects that catered to (some of) their needs.

Next to our interpretation of the actor orientations in terms of interests and norms, our account of the CityPorts process of strategy formation also points out two external events that have influenced the perspectives of involved actors. The first of these events is centered on water issues. In a debate launched by Architecture Biennale Adriaan Geuze, the development of new residential districts outside of Rotterdam was strongly criticized due to the districts' location in polders with high flooding risks. Next to the accompanying argument that the developments would only attract Rotterdam's already diminishing middle class, the debate reflected a much broader perspective on water issues taking root in the Netherlands. This perspective propagated on working *with* the water that Dutch engineering had historically worked *against* so effectively. Hence, the polders outside Rotterdam were needed to allow occasional flooding during peak water levels. In addition, it was argued that new solutions of living in a water-rich environment should be found within existing urban areas – particularly in areas like that of Rotterdam CityPorts.

Figure 5.16 The Rotterdam CityPorts Arena (period January 2004-February 2006).

The second external event we recognize to have influenced the perceptions of the actors involved is that of the broadly defined 'creative' economy. Fuelled by American professor Richard Florida, Rotterdam picked up on the apparent relationship between the attractiveness of contemporary cities and the size of their 'creative class'. Moreover, a study into the professions associated with creative work showed an above average growth in Rotterdam. As general attention for this sector of the economy increased, the OMSR decided to pick up on the emerging trend. Local business initiatives in the CityPorts area were now labeled as 'creative', and were thus stimulated and accommodated. Later on, the growing creative economy in the area would contribute to the positive image of the whole CityPorts endeavor.

Resources Mobilized

The initial statutory goals of the *NV Haven van Rotterdam* (HbR) clearly show how the *commitment* of the port authority to the realization of the CityPorts project was secured by the municipality. In the OMSR shareholder agreement, *land* was arranged to be transferred starting January 2007. Additionally, annual contributions were set to *finance* OMSR operations, which now included support for emerging 'creative' business opportunities and educational activities. These property and finance resources are identified as the most tangible and allocative of our case. Like in the period described in the previous chapter, it should still be noted that the land that had now come under HbR control was not transferred to the development company yet. All would formally depend on the future eligibility of the CityPorts docklands for a 'change of color' – i.e. transformation from water bound, 'wet' port activities to 'dry' urban functions. However, this chapter also shows that the formal commitment to take action by the port authority was under a lot of pressure due to the port's still uncertain expansion and the general skepticism towards the CityPorts project. After the HbR President Director was forced to leave office, the efforts to withdraw from the joint venture were obvious despite the strategic importance of the CityPorts project declared in the *Havenplan 2020*. The emergent port authority agenda concentrated particularly on the Eastern and Southern *Waalhaven*, where it wanted to take on the development of offices for port related service functions independently.

Outside the western RDM terrain and the *Droogdok 17* headquarters, the OMSR was never able nor allowed to take over the responsibilities and jurisdictions from the HbR. However, its embedded location in the heart of the CityPorts area did give the OMSR the opportunity to function with relative freedom. Moreover, the RDM Affair and annulment of the *Maasvlakte 2* plans by the Council of State dominated the port authority's strategic activities. Hence, their secluded location enabled the OMSR to become a focal point for smaller port companies, users, and inhabitants around them. Here, it could continue its area-based activities.

Executive interest in the CityPorts project from municipal departments dS+V and OBR was small if not absent in our second strategic period, at least well into 2005. This lack of commitment would later be fully acknowledged, but only after the OMSR had found support for its plans elsewhere in Rotterdam and on higher government levels. Before that time, the efforts of the dS+V staff commissioned by the OMSR were frowned upon by their colleagues, and their products were initially disregarded in Rotterdam's larger planning frameworks. Hence, the OMSR focused on being recorded in the city-region's

Action Resources		
Allocative	Authoritative	Mobilized by…
Property (land use control)*	-	Municipality of Rotterdam, HbR, Port companies
Instruments (plans, presentations, newsletters, websites, media statements)	-	OMSR, EDBR, City- Region/Province (*RR2020*), Municipality of Rotterdam/HbR (*Havenplan 2020*), B&W (Gateway)
Finance (operations, support creative businesses, educational activities)	-	Municipality of Rotterdam, HbR (shareholder contributions), *Albeda College, Hogeschool Rotterdam*
Buildings (RDM office and hangars, DockWorks project, student housing)	-	HbR, Housing Corporation *Woonbron*
-	Commitment (policy decisions and plans)	State Ministries, Province/*Stadsregio, Zuidvleugel*, Port Alderman Van Sluis, Housing Corporation *Woonbron*, 'creative' businesses EDBR**
-	Expertise (development options)	OMSR (by hiring DCMR, OBR, dS+V and HbR staff)
-	Information (user location and development decisions).	OMSR (by HbR, OBR, and dS+V commission).

*refers to decisions (i.e. commitments to action)

**refers more specifically to EDBR members Boekhoud (Chair *Albeda College*) and Tuytel (Chair *Hogeschool Rotterdam*).

Figure 5.17 Action resources of actors intending to realize the Rotterdam CityPorts project (period January 2004-February 2006).

RR2020, and argued its significance for spatial policy objectives on inter-municipal, provincial, and national levels of scale. In our analysis of the CityPorts case, we recognize the *commitment* mobilized as an explicit resource positively influencing the realization of the CityPorts project. In addition, the OMSR's plans, presentations, newsletters, websites, and other communicative instruments added to the public acquaintance and image of the CityPorts project, and the RDM terrain in particular. Media attention and self-organized deliberations in the Rotterdam community – for example by running the Summer School pilot – thus delivered the support the OMSR needed in order to motivate and continue its work.

The case study points out that the initial lack of commitment among the development company's shareholders was particularly related to the absence of tangible results signified by the actual realization of projects. However, next to the office project Dock-Works on the edge of the Eastern *Waalhaven*, our story does register the planning and realization of some significant projects associated with the CityPorts area. The credits for these projects were claimed not by the OMSR, but predominantly by those still formally responsible: the port authority and municipal departments. Hence, the intensification of the juice cluster on the northern docklands, the roadwork in the *Waal/Eemhaven*, and the roof park and park lane projects along the *Vierhavens* could not be proclaimed as tangible

results of the *stadshavens* effort. Though this was partly because the initiation of these projects had taken place before the OMSR was officially established, our case material indicates that it also had a lot to do with the perceived ownership of the projects and the eventual credits for work well done. In the next chapter, we will witness the confirmation of this point. Nonetheless, an ambitious urge to complement smaller projects with a large-scale initiative like the retracted World Port Plaza still smoldered. Agreements closed between the OMSR, housing corporation *Woonbron*, and several educational institutions for the renewal of the village *Heijplaat* and the RDM terrain, were disregarded by the municipal apparatus.

Outside of the troublesome meetings between the project's top decision makers, the expertise and information mobilized by the OMSR through a wide range of professionals and databases was relentless. The interviews and informal conversations integrated in our story point out that all environmental, port, and urban planning experts involved were very much dedicated to their CityPorts work. Though aware of the difficulties on executive levels, no doubts about the relevance and necessity of the project were uttered. Hence, all those working for the OMSR seemed extremely motivated. Up until the end of the strategic period described in this chapter, the information needed to bring the CityPorts project forward was distributed without hesitation. In the next chapter, we will see how this changed soon after.

Strategies: From Area-based Learning to Competitive Venturing
We conclude our account of the second strategic period in the CityPorts case with a discussion of the decisions and actions summarized and grouped in Figure 5.18. Here, we recognize a continuation of the *strategic learning* performed by the OMSR staff. However, the resources identified above already pointed out that this *area-based learning* occurred particularly among those without direct authoritative power over OMSR executive decisions. Moreover, the studies performed were predominantly focused on the CityPorts area itself. After the weak links between CityPorts project proposals in the OMSR's Development Strategy document became apparent, additional studies were meant to correct the matter. Meanwhile, the OMSR's efforts to prepare the desired *plans* and *business cases* were flanked by the actions and decisions that we interpret as *strategic venturing*. The area-based approach of the OMSR had fostered several more or less contingent opportunities to designate specific functional profiles to different parts of the CityPorts area. The opportunities that presented themselves on and around the RDM terrain are the most significant here. An initiative among EDBR members of the *Albeda College* and *Hogeschool Rotterdam* was connected to the ambitions of housing corporation *Woonbron* to improve the *Heijplaat* village. With the support of Port Alderman Van Sluis, the OMSR could finally position its 'enclave' at RDM West as a location for 'research, design, and manufacturing'. Nonetheless, this *competitive venturing* proved too late as negotiations between its shareholders moved inexorably towards the north-south deal.

The fact that the CityPorts Development Strategy document was presented as a communication vehicle is important to note here. Thus, the plan was seen as a preliminary result meant to communicate what the OMSR had learned and what consultations and deliberations it aimed to organize. To some, this proved that the OMSR staff still did not have a clear perspective of what the future of the CityPorts area could look like. To others, the

		Strategy Process	
		Deliberate Plan	Emergent Pattern
Strategy Content	**Tangible Positions**	*Strategic Planning* • Analyzing information about CityPorts land users and lessees • Analyzing economic profile of companies in CityPorts area • Preparing operation plans and budget estimations for executive decision-making • Making a Development Strategy document (scenarios, projects, communication) • Calculating 'business cases' for local projects (RDM, *Merwe/Vierhavens, Sluisjesdijk*) • Preparing a financial calculation model for the maintenance and operation of CityPorts land.	*Strategic Venturing* • Supporting office developments for maritime services companies with municipality and port authority (Eastern *Waalhaven*) • Stimulating and accommodating 'creative' businesses' initiatives (CityPorts area, RDM) • Attracting events and tenants to the OMSR headquarters (*Droogdok 17*) • Accommodating (the development of) educational facilities and programs in design and manufacturing (RDM) • Closing a collaboration agreement with Housing Corporation *Woonbron* (*Heijplaat*/RDM) • Orchestrating a collaboration agreement between Rotterdam and Schiedam (New *Mathenesse*) • Applying for State funding (Key Project) • Applying for record in (supra-) municipal spatial plans (city region/province, *Zuidvleugel*).
	Broad Perspective	*Strategic Visioning* • Promoting RDM terrain as area for 'Research Design and Manufacturing'.	*Strategic Learning* • Organizing stakeholder consultations, shareholder deliberations, expert meetings, seminars, and conferences • Organizing design workshops and competitions • Studying accessibility and ground infrastructure issues (subway/bridge/water taxi, pipelines, foundations) • Studying environmental regulations and procedures (sound/soil/air contamination) • Studying land reclamation possibilities (technology and finance) • Studying water issues (flooding, water bound economy and leisure) • Commissioning economic positioning studies (wider market exploration, creativity) • Commissioning cultural and architectural heritage studies.

Figure 5.18 The Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy (period January 2004-February 2006).

Development Strategy represented the transparent and open-ended approach that seemed to fit the complexity of the CityPorts assignment. The subsequent conclusion of municipal

studies was that the different parts of the CityPorts area had contrasting development trajectories, which could not (yet) be translated into one broad perspective. The northern docklands and RDM site had roughly proven to be attractive for creative entrepreneurs, knowledge institutions, and long-term residential developments. In contrast, the vast majority of the southern docklands were eligible only for port and port related functions – partly due to unforeseen increases in port business demands, but also to the financial and environmental limitations of any transformation scenario. Nevertheless, it was particularly the economic development focus of the CityPorts project that had aroused the interest of supra-municipal administrations. The disintegration of the project implied by the north-south deal was considered extremely undesirable within the municipal apparatus, as this would seriously damage the project's chances to be granted the public funding that was proving to be vital to its realization. Hence, the OMSR project strategy had validated and even enlarged the scope of the CityPorts project. The remaining question was how the development company itself would be allowed to continue its emerged competitive attitude toward its port urban context.

Notes

1 Although the booklet says *Rotterdam – CityPorts – Rotterdam – Port City* [Rotterdam – stadshavens – Rotterdam – havenstad] on its cover, the colophon adds the words 'from – to'.

2 Article 2.2 of the *NV Haven van Rotterdam* [Port of Rotterdam PLC] articles of association.

3 The OMSR articles of association were part of the Shareholder Agreement between the Municipality of Rotterdam, Port of Rotterdam PLC, and Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC, December 31, 2003, and were added to it as Appendix C, named the 'OMSR Founding Act'.

4 Taken from article 2.3 of the OMSR Founding Act.

5 Shareholder Meetings were composed of the Alderman of Physical Infrastructure, the Alderman of Economic Infrastructure, the President Director of the Port of Rotterdam PLC, and a member of the Board (not being the Chair). Director deliberations were composed of 1 representative of the municipal Administrative Service, 2 representatives of the Port of Rotterdam PLC, 2 representatives of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (one of which its Director), 1 representative of the municipal *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting*, and 1 representative of the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam*.

6 Results taken from the Buck/DEGW study *Ruimtelijk-economische positionering Stadshavens Rotterdam: een eerste verkenning* [Spatial economic positioning CityPorts Rotterdam: a first exploration], dated April 26, 2004, and the powerpoint presentation *Economisch perspectief Stadshavens* [Economic Perspective City-Ports], dated February 4, 2004, and the minutes of the Shareholder Meeting, dated March 2, 2004.

7 In the Netherlands, *stedelijke vernieuwing* [urban renewal] is generally associated with residential functions.

8 The 2004 newsletter more specifically announces the expected relocation of coffee distributor Santas into the former building of Müller-Thomsen (designed by architects Brinkman, Van den Broek and Bakema) on the *Keilestraat*. The company already operated from a building in the area. This building would be designated by the OMSR for a 'creative function'.

9 Though implicit, the CityPorts area was one of these areas.

10 Press release by the *Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst* (*RVD*) [State Information Service] for the Council of Ministers, June 25, 2004.

11 Compare OMSR (2004d) with OMSR (2004e).

12 NRC Handelsblad, 'Weeskind aan de Waterweg; Losse moraal zet toekomst Rotterdams Havenbedrijf op het spel' [Orphan on the Waterway; Loose moral puts future Rotterdam Port Authority in jeopardy]. November 20, 2004, pp. 22.

13 Minutes of the Shareholder Meeting of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR), December 6, 2004, attended by Alderman Pastors (Physical Infrastructure), Alderman Van Sluis (Economic Infrastructure), HbR representative Van Kleef, *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* Director Stam, OMSR Director De Ruiter, and OMSR members Van der Hoek, Dekkers, and De Knegt.

14 Algemeen Dagblad, 'Smits wil meer dan op de winkel passen' [Smits wants more than just to mind the shop]. December 31, 2004, pp. 9

15 Rotterdams Dagblad, 'Haven in zaken' [Port in business]. September 10, 2004.

16 Representatives from the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management.

17 Het Financieele Dagblad, 'Rotterdam: Van doen naar denken – Wereldhaven heeft ambities op de wal' [Rotterdam: from doing to thinking – World port has ambitions on shore]. Supplement, December 7, 2004.

18 See 18, pp. 10-11.

19 See 18, pp. 6.

20 In an interview with the OMSR, Boekhoud recalls that employees of the former RDM ship building company trained his students one day a week twenty years earlier. Later, many of these RDM employees became teachers at the *Albeda College*.

21 See 18, pp. 27-28.

22 The document, dated February 19, 2005 was considered an 'integrated advice' of five municipal department directors: the *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V), the Development Corporation (OBR), the department of Municipal Works (GW), the Administration Service (BSD), and the Finance & Control department (dMC).

23 *De Volkskrant*, 'Rotterdam gaat in de stad bouwen' [Rotterdam is going to build inside the city]. February 13, 2007 and television program *Tegenlicht* (March 26, 2006): 'New Orleans in de polder: de eenmansoorlog van een landschapsarchitect' [New Orleans in the Polder: the one-man-war of a landscape architect].

24 The original Dutch phrase for this study was 'Creativity in kaart', of which the result – a map showing all 'creativity' entrepreneurs in the CityPorts area – was officially handed over to the responsible Alderman in September 2005.

25 The report by TNO (2005) distinguished three domains in the creative industry: arts, media & entertainment, and creative business services.

26 In June, 2005, a foundation for small theatre events organized a series of shows titled 'Stories from the *Droogdok*' in the *Heijplaat* village. A movie theatre made out of sea containers showed a motion picture. In addition, an arts competition named 'Follydock' was initiated by an artist living in the CityPorts area, and a student design competition for 'the bridge of the future' would be organized by the Municipal Works (GW) department.

27 On November 11, 2005, Economic Infrastructure Alderman Van Sluis opened the event 'CityLive2005' co-organized by the Rotterdam Economic Development Board (EDBR) in the New Luxor Theatre. Next to Carnegie Mellon professor Richard Florida, Harvard professor Adriaan Geuze (see also note 23) also provided a keynote lecture at the event.

28 In September 2005, the OMSR (2005d) announced that they closed a collaboration agreement with this housing corporation for the development of a vision, feasibility studies, maintenance plans, and the realization of concrete projects such as the reconstruction of the *Heysehaven*.

29 The separation between 'knowledge institutes' and 'education' made here is meant primarily to distinguish

universities – in our case: Delft University of Technology and Erasmus University Rotterdam – from non-academic educational institutes like the *Hogeschool Rotterdam*, and the *Albeda College*.

30 In an article in Cobouw, former OBR Director Stam could only disappointingly speculate about the true reasons behind his dismissal: 'A few months ago, I made some agreements with Alderman Pastors about the policies to be effectuated toward the elections. It is distressing that all my proposals were approved, but that I was subsequently forced to leave office without any direction'. December 7, 2005.

31 *Het Parool*, 'Raad stuurt wethouder Marco Pastors (Leefbaar Rotterdam) weg na moslimuitspraak; "Dit is opzet van links, waarbij het CDA verraad pleegde"' [Council dismisses Alderman Marco Pastors (Liveable Rotterdam) after Muslim statement; "This is intended by the Left, in which the CDA committed treason"]. November 9, 2005. The *CDA* (Christian Democratic Appeal) was a 2002-2006 coalition partner, but sided with opposition and Labor party *PvdA* in a vote against Alderman Pastors.

32 Press release of Rotterdam's municipal Administration Service (BSD) dated December 13, 2005.

33 The search for a new location now concentrated on the area around the existing Feyenoord stadium.

34 The *Stadsregio Rijnmond* is a State-enforced collaboration between all municipalities in the region. It is therefore located between the municipal and provincial levels of government.

35 According to the document, all those interested in the design version of the *RR2020* have had the opportunity to react. In a legally prescribed period of three months, all government bodies concerned were informed and heard, and all of the region's residents were offered the opportunity to participate in the finalization of the plan.

36 The so-called *Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel* (*BPZ*) [Administrative Platform South Wing] emerged at the turn of the millennium.

37 Confirmed in an OMSR interview in April 2006.

38 There had been a discussion about "*Fruit op Zuid*" or "Fruit on South" from the very beginning of the CityPorts venture, because the fruit handlers needed to transport their goods to a distribution cluster in Barendrecht – a town situated on the south shores of the river.

39 The researcher was provided with the minutes of all the Shareholder Meetings until August 2005. The content of the Shareholder Meetings that occurred after that has therefore been reconstructed by comparing the statements of those that attended these meetings and other documents.

40 According to several OMSR Shareholder Meeting attendees. Interviews conducted in 2006 and 2007.

41 The speech by Alderman Van Sluis at the opening of *Droogdok 17* can be viewed on the internet (in Dutch): http://www.picturethis.tv/clients/stadshavens/webtv/webtv_dok17.htm (visited last May 2009).

42 The event was organized by the OMSR and the International Association of Cities and Ports (IACP) on December 1-2, 2005.

43 Letter and appendix of the Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) to the Rotterdam City Council, dated December 14, 2006. HbR Interviews 2007.

44 dS+V Interview November 2008, OMSR Report dated May 17, 2006.

45 Confirmed in several interviews conducted in November 2008 (see Appendix 3).

46 For the period 2010-2020, necessary State funding was estimated €3.5 billion. After 2020, another €2-4 billion was considered mandatory.

Chapter 6 The Case of Rotterdam CityPorts

Period III: From Competitive Venturing to Comprehensive Visioning

6.1 Introduction

In December 2006, several Dutch national newspapers recorded the decision to close down and dismantle the *Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens Rotterdam* (OMSR). The two shareholders of the OMSR – the Rotterdam municipality and port authority – officially announced that they would take the future development of the CityPorts area (back) into their own hands. One newspaper added that the city and port authorities of Rotterdam had come to this decision, because they found it more 'logical' to redevelop the CityPorts area themselves rather than to have a separate development agency do the job.[1] The decision concluded a process of negotiation that had lasted for almost a year. After less than three years of implementation efforts, the OMSR was to be replaced by a new project organization largely embedded in existing municipal and port departments.

Figure 6.1 Three Strategic Periods – Three Chapters.

In this chapter, we unfold the last part of the Rotterdam CityPorts case. The above excerpt reflects some decisions and actions central therein: a reorganization marking the start of a significant shift in the power relations between actors involved in the project. At the same time, the new setting also leads to another change of focus in the decisions and actions of those intending to realize it. Hence, what we will find in this chapter is a process of strategy formation moving from *competitive venturing* to *comprehensive visioning*. Formally presented as a clear break from the learning and positioning of the OMSR, the actors leading the project will now emphasize the concrete implementation of development plans. Although the process first reverts toward the necessary strategic planning, the decisions and actions that will slowly convert to take on a much broader viewpoint. To secure the commitment and legitimacy of their plans, the actors involved become convinced that a long-term perspective for the CityPorts area is essential to its success. As earlier ideas for CityPorts are connected to more wide-ranging development issues, a deliberate visioning effort will start to unfold.

The strategic period described (sections 6.2 to 6.6) and discussed (section 6.7) in this chapter runs from March 2006 to May 2008. Like the previous chapters, our story is necessarily detailed and specific. Hence, our aim is not to revert into abstractions about the decisions and actions that pushed the project forward, nor do we intend to obscure the small successes or failures involved. There is much to learn from all the decisions and actions described. In the descriptive part of our case chapters, we thus refrain from presenting a simple and clear-cut notion of a process that, in reality, obviously is not. Only then can we return to our research framework to explore the strategy-as-force relations proposed in chapter two.

6.2 Entering a New Phase

On March 7, 2006, over 58 percent of Rotterdam's enfranchised constituents went out to cast their vote in the municipal elections. Would political party *Leefbaar* [Liveable] *Rotterdam* (*LR*) again prevail over its Labor rivals? The results turned out negative. Labor party *PvdA*, traditionally leading in Rotterdam, regained its place as the port city's largest faction. Gaining seven seats on top of the eleven already occupied, the party would now hold 18 of the total of 45 seats in the Rotterdam City Council. *Leefbaar Rotterdam* lost three seats and thus came in second with 14 seats of the total amount. The only other political party to win seats was Socialist Party SP, advancing two seats to reach a total of three.[2] After all the votes were counted and confirmed, Christian Democrat Piet Boekhoud – Chair of the *Albeda College* and member of the Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR) – was charged with forming a new municipal coalition.[3] Because a Labor-Leefbaar coalition was unthinkable after four years of political mudslinging, a Labor-Christian-Liberal-Green coalition would emerge from the negotiations. Before *Leefbaar Rotterdam* was finally forced into the opposition, the party's Port Alderman announced that he would withdraw from politics. Van Sluis would soon become the Chair of Deltalinqs, an interest organization for industrial and logistics companies in the port of Rotterdam.

Figure 6.2 The Rotterdam Coat of Arms reads 'Stronger by Struggle'.

Creativity and Knowledge

Before the March 2006 elections, the municipal 'City of Need' and 'Gateway to Europe' documents had made a strong case for the significance of the CityPorts project for Rotterdam's future. The personal involvement of Mayor Ivo Opstelten, who had been informed closely by his *gemeentelijke bestuursdienst* (BSD), had a significant positive impact on the administrative support for the project.[4] In effect, the project featured in several municipal as well as regional, provincial, and State level policies and plans. The forthcoming *Stadsvisie*, or City Vision, was expected to confirm its position as one of the most prominent urban development projects in Rotterdam. In contrast, the fading support for the organization implementing the project had moved Director Fred de Ruiter to hand in his resignation to the Rotterdam City Council. In fact, the restrictions imposed upon Rotterdam

CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) had taken their toll on many CityPorts officials. Feelings of disappointment and resentment were not uncommon within the team. Without its experienced helmsman, the OMSR would nonetheless have to find a way to rise to the occasion and attend to the areas it was still committed to develop.

In a newsletter that appeared in June 2006, Acting OMSR Director Wil van der Hoek announced that the CityPorts project was entering a new phase. The OMSR would restrict its work to the further development of the terrain of RDM West and the *Merwe/Vierhavens* areas. For the latter docklands, a new project team was being formed to complement the team that led the developments around the RDM site. Meanwhile, a strategic plan for the maintenance of the northern part of the CityPorts area was to be prepared. Concrete, though possibly temporary uses demonstrating the development possibilities in this area were to become part of the plan.[5] For this end, several creative ideas – thought up by architecture students – had already been presented to the public. The results of several studies into the area's cultural and industrial heritage were also considered as an important input. According to the Acting Director, the time of exploring, consulting, and pioneering had to come to an end: 'Now, it will be about concrete strengthening, improving, and upgrading' (OMSR, 2006c).

On May 11, 2006, State Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning, and Environment (VROM) Sybilla Dekker visited the CityPorts area. Her motive was an exhibition of the contributions to the design competition 'Unorthodocks' (see Figure 6.3) in a former hangar for wood construction. A week later, several winners were selected out of the 97 (inter)national ideas that gave the *Dokhaven* – the dock right in front of the OMSR head office on the RDM terrain – a new, temporary and flexible exterior. A booklet and website would complement the exhibition, all of which would generate considerable media attention. A national newspaper commented that the winning ideas will probably not be realized: 'The competition is primarily meant to inspire people that live and work in the area, and those that are engaged in its further development.'[6]

Figure 6.3 Unorthodocks: Idea Guide for Rotterdam's *Dokhaven* (OMSR/010).

Next to the Unorthodocks exhibition, the OMSR was preparing the second Architecture Summer School in the CityPorts area together with its educational and housing partners. The success of the first edition in 2005 had produced an initiative to found the 'CityPorts Academy Rotterdam' in which different educational institutes, housing corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers*, and several private companies were willing to participate.[7] An OMSR official explained that the Academy should be seen as a center of expertise that combines and supports different (inter)national initiatives and educational programs that take CityPorts as their object of study (OMSR, 2006c).[8] For the realization of studios and college rooms, several construction companies, project developers, and engineering bureaus would be approached to provide a financial and substantive contribution to what would eventually become known as the 'RDM Campus'. This way, the RDM terrain could combine its educational ambitions with a complementary center for innovative and

creative products. In relation to the latter, an RDM hangar was already in use as a testing ground for hydrogen-fuelled racing carts. More companies had already notified the OMSR that they would be interested to move (part of) their activities to the RDM terrain.[9]

Reshaping CityPorts Management

While the OMSR fiercely tried to accomplish and show some tangible results, municipal and port authority directors were contemplating a new way of managing the CityPorts project. The north-south deal closed on February 6 left many questions of responsibility and accountability for the ongoing maintenance, operation, and development of the docklands unanswered. The *NV Haven van Rotterdam* (HbR) was still formally responsible for the northern *Merwe/Vierhavens* area, and had just realized a so-called Truck Park – a parking lot for trucks with 24-hour surveillance – for the juices and fruit cluster there. The OMSR managers involved were left frustrated by their subservient position during the negotiations between their municipal or port authority colleagues and clients. Although their suggestions were heard and remarks would be taken into account, the OMSR managers would never have a final say. Hence, they increasingly felt that the voice of the OMSR counted as a third-party opinion on what the future of CityPorts area should be all about (OMSR Interviews May 2006).

Figure 6.4 OMSR organizational structure mid 2006.

During a meeting on June 16, shortly after former OMSR Director De Ruiter had officially taken his leave, several municipal and port directors discussed how the agreements made in February could best be formalized. Again, questions about the timing, conditions, and financing of land transfers needed answering.[10] The possible relocation of certain transhipment and storage companies, land contamination, and environmental issues were discussed. The business cases drawn up by the OMSR in 2005 were either unknown to the directors, or underlined their impression that development ideas would prove financially unfeasible. In fact, the civil servants did not seem particularly interested in any of the OMSR products. They were preoccupied with the details of the north-south deal, and issues that would still necessitate the CityPorts developments to be taken as one single project. Finally, it was decided that all aspects of the north-south deal should be cleared up before the retreat of the Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) in the beginning of September 2006, such that final decisions could quickly be made by then. Meanwhile, the OMSR was granted permission to continue its efforts in the *Merwe/Vierhavens* and the RDM West terrain. How and in what legal form it would continue to function after the B&W deliberations in September remained unclear.[11]

Unable to wait for administrative validations, Acting Director Wil van der Hoek reorganized the OMSR to reflect its orientation towards concrete interventions (see Figure 6.4). Almost thirty people were, either full-time or part-time, still very much engaged in the CityPorts project. Following a new municipal decision-making model,[12] a so-called

'area exploration' was the first step towards a masterplan for the docklands of the *Merwe/ Vierhavens* area. The OMSR announced that the exploration would be ready in October 2006, followed by a vision mid 2007 after which an urban masterplan could be drawn up. For the *Vierhavensstrook*, or *Vierhavens* Strip, four project developers were asked to provide a 'market vision' – perspectives of commercially interesting developments on the edges between the existing city and the *Vierhavens* quays. The project was to complement a roof park project commissioned by the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR), over-arching the secondary motorway between the port area and the neighboring residential area. Meanwhile, a joint Development Vision for the industrial business area *Nieuw Mathenesse* was approved by the Rotterdam administration in March 2006, after neighboring municipality Schiedam had already done so half a year earlier. In addition, several private initiatives to renovate and re-use some old warehouses and structures in the *Vierhavens* area were monitored and supported by the OMSR team (see Figure 6.5).[13]

Figure 6.5 Overview of the *Merwe/Vierhavens* docklands on the northern riverbank (Google Maps).

Next to the work done for the development of *Merwe/Vierhavens* and the RDM terrain, several activities concerning all CityPorts docklands were still being performed. These 'overarching tasks' focused on environmental regulations, on cultural history, on research and education, and on communication (OMSR, 2006d). A so-called Route Map, initiated by the OMSR and environmental protection agency DCMR, would provide a clear view of the procedural and substantive problems that could occur due to future in-terventions.[14] The Route Map would be complemented by an environmental report on the regulatory (im)possibilities in the CityPorts area, and a 'tool' that could be used to assess the historical significance of existing buildings on the docklands.[15] All these products were intended to assure the CityPorts organization of swift and smooth procedures as soon as large-scale interventions would start to appear. This way, time-consuming mistakes in the complicated and dynamic environmental and spatial planning procedures were meant

to be avoided. In this regard, a new spatial planning law and the temporary *Wet Stad & Milieu* [City & Environment Law] were two among several Dutch regulations that were expected to be revised in the coming years.

In terms of communication, an OMSR-commissioned historical atlas of the City-Ports area (Dicke & Van der Zouwen, 2006) was presented to the newly appointed Alderman of Economy, Port and Environment (EHM) Roelf de Boer on June 16, 2006.[16] In addition to such products, the OMSR counted four officials coordinating and performing its communication 1) toward its corporate and public environment, and 2) toward the companies, entrepreneurs and inhabitants of the CityPorts area itself. Hosting visits to and events in the CityPorts area, and providing presentations about its development had become weekly activities for the OMSR staff. Commenting on these activities, an OMSR executive explained that many of its activities were not predefined:

'We had to discover what [our assignment] was really about. This wasn't clear to us [at the start]. Sure, your personal experience gives you some ideas […]. You could feel right away that it could become a complex matter. You knew that you couldn't solve things with a masterplan. That's why we eventually chose a more processual approach. That is also the reason why we didn't immediately invite big international urban designers to our table. As if we could say: "Well, you just make a plan for us and then we'll just go ahead and realize it"' (OMSR Interview January 2006).

According to OMSR executives, the 'processual approach' adopted by the OMSR had produced a lot of support and trust in Rotterdam's 'mid-field' – particularly with those that had committed themselves to the developments on and around the RDM terrain. State and provincial officials were also very interested in the approach that had emerged. However, some reservations were in order:

'[At] the same time, such a processual approach, as you could call it, makes you vulnerable. Now, we are three years along and everybody asks us "what have you done?" and says "show us!". [The design competitions] have provided us with images to demonstrate. That was our interest in organizing them: to give ourselves the pictures we needed. We communicated thoroughly that we did not directly intend to realize any of them. However, now that land transfers are being prepared, well, things could become more serious.' (*ibid*)

The RDM Campus

While the Summer School 2006 titled 'Living on the Docks' successfully attracted 49 (inter)national students, a new Steering Committee for the 'knowledge initiatives' on the RDM terrain worked out its goal and tasks. The OMSR, the *Hogeschool Rotterdam*, housing corporation *Woonbron*, a project developer and Delft University of Technology effectively created the foundation CityPorts Academy Rotterdam, which would have its official kick off on December 31, 2006. Before that time, several education and research activities occurred in the course of 2006 that are relevant to the course of the CityPorts project strategy. Here, two research activities performed by subsidiaries of the Erasmus University Rotterdam should be mentioned. The first was an international comparative study performed by Euricur[17] on 'education and culture as a catalyst for waterfront redevelopment',

and the second was the application of an innovative management approach to the City-Ports project by a research group known as Drift – the Dutch Research Institute for Transitions. The latter was an approach that specifically aimed for a long-term sustainable development of the CityPorts area under the label 'CityPorts: Creating on the Edge' (CAR, 2008).

In September 2006, the developments on and around the terrain of RDM West would officially be labeled 'RDM Campus'. A business plan for the landing of a waterbus was being finalized, and its final location discussed with the inhabitants in the surrounding area. The first automotive educational program was expected to start in the RDM hangars as early as January 2007, and a restructuring of the village *Heijplaat* would create the opportunity to move some of its amenities towards the RDM site. For the development of the most western part of the terrain, around the *Heysehaven*, a €2.6 million subsidy by the Province of South Holland and State Ministry of Economic Affairs was granted. The core of the plan was a flexible dock with a 'work island' that could grow along with

Figure 6.6 The RDM Campus Logo (2006).

the developments around it. While the plan was elaborated upon by the port authority, housing corporation *Woonbron* had occupied part of an old office building on the *Heysehaven* waterfront in order to coordinate its *Heijplaat* activities from there. The building *Droogdok 17*, seat of the OMSR, now provided space to over 80 people as an international shipping company now resided in the same building.

CityPorts Reconfirmed

By the summer of 2006, the developments going on in the CityPorts area were well-embedded in several plans on provincial and State levels of government. Following a document in December 2005 that identified ten priority projects in the *Zuidvleugel* [South Wing] of the *Randstad* area (see Chapter 3), a new 'vision' would reiterate the significance of the CityPorts project for the Rotterdam city-region in August 2006. In the renewed document, explicit reference was made to the municipal 'Gateway to Europe' document instigated by Rotterdam's Mayor Ivo Opstelten.[18] On top of that, the State Ministry of Economic Affairs published a brief called *Pieken in de Delta* [Peaks in the Delta] in which the CityPorts area was defined as an economic priority in need of restructuring (MinEZ, 2006). The Ministry grouped the CityPorts project together with several other projects in the *Zuidvleugel*, and had henceforth already agreed to financially support a development at the RDM's *Heysehaven* mentioned above. Soon, the municipality of Rotterdam – which had just formed a new administration – would answer by announcing the establishment of a new strategic spatial plan called the *Stadsvisie* [City Vision] for

which several studies had already been initiated. Meanwhile, the relevant municipal departments (dS+V and OBR) were also finalizing a position paper in order to apply for long-term State funding. In the paper's concluding section, the Dutch State would be asked to contribute a total of €1.0 billion to the CityPorts project over a period of 30-40 years. Figure 6.7 depicts the State contributions applied for in relation to expected private investments.[19]

Investments	Public	Market	Total
Until 2020	€0.6	€1.0	€1.6
After 2020	€0.4	€5.5	€4.9
Total (bandwidth)	€1.0 (€0.7-1.5)	€6.5 (€4.0-8.0)	€7.5 (€5.0-10.0)

Figure 6.7 Overview of public and market investments in the CityPorts project per phase in billions (GR, 2006b).

After closing their coalition agreement on March 7, the Mayor and his newly appointed Board of Alderman started their 100-day administrative start-up period. In that period, the new Alderman of Economy, Port and Environment Roelf de Boer visited the CityPorts project and talked to RDM-based entrepreneurs, to members of the OMSR, and to port authority officials about their development efforts in the area (OMSR, 2006e). Images delivered by students of the Summer School were also displayed for the Alderman. He was impressed. Come Summer 2006, the CityPorts project would eventually be taken up in the *Collegeprogramma*, or Board Program 2006-2010, a program that would adopt a 'Rotterdam approach' characterized by clear priorities, a focus on implementation, accountability for the results achieved, and involvement of the Rotterdam population and business community.

In the Board Program, the CityPorts would once again be related to the port expansion plan *Maasvlakte 2*. Under the heading 'Economy', the CityPorts project was expected to contribute to two out of three main economic sectors that would be explicitly stimulated by the current Board: the port and industrial complex, and the creativity and leisure economy. This way, the Board argued that Rotterdam's old port areas would doubly contribute to their overarching policies and plans (*ibid.:* 21):

> 'The *Maasvlakte 2* plan provides an impulse to the renewal, intensification, and transformation of existing port areas. The CityPorts project contributes to this transformation. City-Ports strengthens [Rotterdam's] mainport position *and* improves the living and economic climate of the Rotterdam region. […] In this period, a combination of education, innovation, and energy related entrepreneurship is being realized on the former RDM terrain. This way, business and education are able to profit from each other'. (emphasis also in Dutch original)

For the redevelopment of the *Rijn/Maashaven* area and the RDM terrain, the new Rotterdam Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) reserved a total of €30 million. By doing so, the new administration confirmed that the *Rijn/Maashaven* area was now an integral part of the CityPorts endeavor. To those unfamiliar with the project, the decision was merely logical: the original exclusion of the *havens* around *Katendrecht* from the CityPorts area seemed unfounded due to obvious geographical relationships, substantive similarities in the development assignment, and comparable land transfer issues (see Figure 6.8).

Figure 6.8 The CityPorts Area with *Nieuw Mathenesse* and the *Rijn/Maashaven* docklands (Summer 2006).

However, to those closely tied up in the project, the *Rijn/Maashaven* addition left plenty of questions unanswered. What were the organizational consequences of this decision? Would the OMSR assignment be expanded, or would the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR) keep taking the lead in these docklands? And what was the port authority's position – still coordinator of the shipping activities in the area – in all this? Once again, questions of responsibility and jurisdiction would trouble Rotterdam's top decision makers. Following a retreat on September 5-6 just after the yearly World Harbor Days[20], B&W came up with a clear but uneasy answer.

6.3 Reorganizing the CityPorts Project

By September 2006, it became clear that the CityPorts project would be organized differently than was initially intended. Not a semi-autonomous agency, but several teams integrated in the traditional municipal and port authority organizations would now become responsible for the project's sub-areas. The first formalization of this decision, however, would take at least another three months. In the meantime, part of the OMSR officials was simply devastated by the news that their organization would soon cease to exist. Others had – due to earlier rumors – already anticipated things and quickly seized the opportunities presented by the new situation. While municipal and port authority officials worked out the principles of a continued collaboration, Acting Director Van der Hoek had taken on the task to continue some of the OMSR tasks and prepare an archive that could eventually be handed over to the new organization. Another OMSR official recalled:

'In the summer [of 2006], a lot of work was done regarding the north-south deal although things were never put down on a sheet of paper. There were basically two options: one was a north-south deal with the OMSR intact, and the other was a north-south deal without the OMSR, but with the *Maas/Rijnhaven* added to the assignment. The latter option would eventually be recorded in the Headline Agreement. There were a lot of informal discussions during that summer. Finally, in September, we were notified […] that the [OMSR] would be dismantled' (OMSR Interview July 2007).

Negotiations and Discussions

In October 2006, the OMSR issued another newsletter in spite of its uncertain situation. This newsletter underlined the successful visit of Alderman De Boer to the RDM site, and insights that came out of two surveys held in Rotterdam were also presented in the newsletter.[21] Moreover, the external support for the CityPorts project, particularly by the Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR) and the Ministry of Spatial Planning (VROM), was constantly being emphasized by the organization.[22] At the same time, several OMSR officials were getting ready to be transferred (back) to departments within the municipal and port authority organizations. There, some would be expected to continue their work on the CityPorts project. Although the Rotterdam administration had made it clear that it wanted to retain the expertise carried by the OMSR staff, some employees were determined to continue their working careers somewhere else. Those remaining in the OMSR office continued to work on the most promising achievements of the OMSR's efforts.[23] For example, those involved in the initiation of the CityPorts Academy Rotterdam went ahead full speed, launching a start-up seminar on October 31 encompassing presentations, workshops, and debates (CAR, 2008). That month, State approval of the Project Mainport Development Rotterdam (PMR, see Chapter 5) including the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan came through. The HbR could finally go through with its long-awaited flagship project.

Overall, the fall of 2006 was signified by formal negotiations and informal discussions about the future of the CityPorts project and its four sub-areas. The municipal departments and port authority were convinced of the necessity to continue the project, but the specifics of that continuation still remained unclear. In those months, representatives of the port authority and several municipal departments worked hard to formalize the financial and organizational details in the Headline Agreement CityPorts Project.[24] While the OMSR organization fell apart, responsible Alderman De Boer had to take a leave of absence due to health problems in November. Mayor Opstelten – who had formally committed himself to the CityPorts project through the 'Gateway to Europe' document earlier that year – decided to supervise the Alderman's portfolio.

With a sense of urgency towards higher government authorities, Mayor Opstelten (see Box 11) knew that the decision-making around the Headline Agreement could not be allowed to take long. The implementation of the CityPorts project needed to commence if the appropriate funding applications on provincial and State levels were to be submitted in time. This was why all political deliberations necessary had to be settled as soon as possible. Not the City Council, but the responsible Council Committee[25] had been chosen as the appropriate venue to get the approvals necessary 1) to begin building a new project

organization and 2) to start drawing up the plans and applications necessary for the (sub-) project's financing and execution. The approval would involve a joint municipal port contribution of €1.5 million, which was necessary to clear up the 'frictions' accompanying the new port-city alliance. The discussions with the Council Committee, however, would not run smoothly. One of the officials involved explained:

'Look, [Alderman] Roelf de Boer was ill, so you need the support of other administrators. That is when [Mayor] Opstelten played an important role. There was some political tension, and the Council had also uttered its concern about the whole thing.[26] […] As supervisor of the port portfolio, he defended CityPorts in the Council Committee and got the Headline Agreement approved. […] He really put a positive mark on it. [It] turned out that he really supported the CityPorts project. [He] thought it was too important, and that it already had taken too long. He wanted [the project] to happen' (BSD Interview February 008).

Box 11
Mayor Ivo Opstelten

Ivo Willem Opstelten was born in Rotterdam on January 31, 1944. He is a member of the Liberal party *VVD*, the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy. After becoming the Netherlands' youngest Mayor in 1972 in the town of Dalen, he consecutively also held the same position in Doorn (1977), Delfzijl (1980), Utrecht (1992), and became Rotterdam's primary citizen in 1999. On January 1, 2009, Opstelten left his position as Mayor of Rotterdam in order to focus on his responsibilities as the new Chair of the VVD – a function for which he was elected on March 31, 2008. By 2007, Opstelten was widely acknowledged as the most powerful individual in Rotterdam, and as one of the best mayors in the Netherlands. About the Rotterdam CityPorts Implementation Program 2007-2010, Opstelten commented: 'We are standing on the brink of a unique project, a major operation for which city and port are joining hands. The frameworks are clear, we know exactly where we want to go. Now, it all depends on vigor. Support of the State, but also of education, business, and housing corporations, is crucial in this assignment.'

Sources: wikipedia; *Management Team* no. 20, vol. 29, 2007; PbSR (2007a); GR (2006a, illustration).

By November 2006, the Rotterdam City Council – particularly the leading political party *PvdA* – was getting anxious to know how the CityPorts project would continue. It had not yet been informed about the new arrangements between the municipality and port authority, and wondered why things were not brought under discussion in an official Council-wide consultation. The press had also gotten wind of the stagnating activities and obscure division of responsibilities in the CityPorts area. In October, a Rotterdam news-

paper reported how an initiative to start a 'music factory' on the *Sluisjesdijk* had first been embraced, only to be rejected half a year later due to environmental regulations. It turned out that the music factory would be too close to the hazardous goods of a neighboring company. The entrepreneur involved commented:[27]

'I asked CityPorts, the municipal project developer of the area, to explain. […] They told me that they had given their responsibility for the development of the *Sluisjesdijk* back to the Rotterdam port authority. Striking. During eight months, I was in constant contact with both parties, but they never told me that.'

In addition, an article published by national newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad declared that the utopian ideas produced for CityPorts earlier had been 'pulled down to earth'. Aware of the initiatives on the RDM terrain and the office development projects in the *Waalhaven*, the article nevertheless headed:[28]

'Imagination seemed to be in power in 2003, when Rotterdam decided to transform its city ports, encompassing 1,500 hectares, into areas for living and working. What has happened since then? The possibilities have been mapped out, but paper is patient. Now, the waiting is for results.'

The Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) answered the concerns of its City Council by stating that the arrangements made in the forthcoming Headline Agreement did not concern the continuation of the CityPorts project itself. No substantive policy decisions were involved for which Council-wide consultations were necessary.[29] Hence, the port-city arrangements recorded in the Headline Agreement would again only be submitted for review to the relevant Council Committee. The members of this Committee could then discuss things with their respective factions. However, while the Mayor was primarily concerned about securing support for the CityPorts project on higher government levels, the Council members involved focused more on the new agreement's local implications. Issues of employment and sound pollution in the borough of *Charlois* adjacent to the large *Waalhaven*, and concerns about the progress of the educational initiatives at RDM West needed to be clarified. On December 14, B&W attempted to answer the Council's questions by sending it a draft of the Headline Agreement accompanied with a written explanation.[30]

A New Port-City Agreement
Based on the earlier municipal 'Gateway to Europe' brief and Board Program 2006-2010 as well as the *Zuidvleugelvisie*, B&W declared to the Rotterdam City Council that the City-Ports project needed to boost 'the effectiveness and efficiency' of its approach:[31]

'Municipality and Port Authority observe that the abstract ideas of 2003/2004 about the transformation of obsolete port areas have been brought a step closer to the development vision of the OMSR, and that the CityPorts project is proceeding to a next phase. Herein, we can speak of transformation, intensification, and operation of the areas. This requires a different organization than in the visioning phase.'

The most important precondition for turning the earlier north-south deal into a new port-city agreement was a clear view of the financial consequences involved in eventual land transfers between city and port. Particularly the *gemeentelijke bestuursdienst* (BSD) had been concerned about the obscure agreements around these land transfers from the very start of the CityPorts endeavor in 2003 (see Chapter 4).[32] In addition, the State's participation in the *NV Haven van Rotterdam* (HbR) resulted in an agreement that forced the HbR to make clear arrangements around eventual land transfers before it could withdraw from its OMSR participation. The subsequent negotiations between municipal and port officials resulted in an abandonment of initial OMSR agreements that prescribed a transfer of port land against HbR financial book values. Following the north-south deal, it was agreed that the autonomous control of the HbR over the *Waal/Eemhaven* docklands would be extended for another 25 years. In return, the HbR agreed to transfer its control over the rest of the CityPorts area in two phases, free of charge. The first phase – running up until 2025 – would encompass the docklands in the *Maas/Rijnhaven* and significant parts of the *Merwe/Vierhavens*. Costs involved in relocating the inland shipping docks from the *Rijnhaven* would be shared between the parties, and all land transfers would primarily be geared to expiring leases in the area to minimize pre-investments. If business relocations would nevertheless turn out necessary, these costs would also be shared. Finally, the HbR agreed to transfer land with a level of soil contamination equal to the appropriate port standards. Improving contaminated land to urban standards – that is: a level suitable for urban functions – would subsequently become the responsibility of the municipality as costs could be claimed from those responsible and State funds could be addressed.[33]

The new land transfer arrangements concretely meant that the *Rijn/Maashaven* would be transferred to the municipality before July 1, 2007. The transfer included the *Rijnhaven* water basin for which, under shared costs, existing inland shipping docks would have to be relocated. B&W promised the Council that it would record the agreements made in a legal Collaboration Agreement within the next six months. If parts of the Headline Agreement were still unclear by July 1, the situation of January 1, 2004 – i.e. the OMSR situation – would be reinstated. Moreover, it was made clear that the eventual agreement would have to be approved by the Rotterdam City Council, the HbR Board of Commissioners, and the Dutch State before the actual dismantling of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) could be effectuated. OMSR personnel would be replaced within HbR and municipal departments in order to 'maintain a maximum amount of knowledge and expertise'.[34]

Anticipating the forthcoming *Stadsvisie* (City Vision), B&W confirmed that the CityPorts project would indeed be enlarged by the *Maas/Rijnhaven* area. The parties involved had learned that the different sub-areas of the CityPorts area had contrasting development trajectories and durations. Initial prospects of diminishing port activities and a high demand for urban, particularly residential waterfront space had been progressively revised, resulting in new insights. This led to a north-south division of the area, which was subsequently translated into the project's new organizational structure (see Figure 6.9). Four coordination teams – *Merwe/Vierhavens*, *Rijn/Maashaven*, *Waal/Eemhaven*, and RDM – were set up to manage the development of each of the sub-areas defined. Where the municipality would take the lead in the first two, the HbR would be responsible for the latter two. All overarching questions such as the environment, accessibility, coherence,

Key Project status, and contacts with the State would be addressed by a newly founded organization, named Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR). The coordination teams and PbSR would answer to a renewed Directors Meeting consisting of (GR/HbR, 2007: 45):

- Director(s) of the Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR);
- Director of the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR);
- Director of the *dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting* (dS+V);
- Director of the regional environmental protection agency (DCMR); and
- Director of the *Gemeentelijke Bestuursdienst* (BSD).

Figure 6.9 Organizational structure of the Rotterdam CityPorts project (GR/HbR, 2007).

According to B&W, the Directors Meeting would monitor the 'coherence and integrality' of the CityPorts development in sub-areas. Possible problems would be addressed in the Directors Meeting and, if needed, placed on the agenda of the larger Steering Group Meetings. In those meetings, at least one – but eventually three – Alderman would take seat next to all members of the Directors Meeting and the HbR President Director.

City Council Reservations

In the discussions following the explanation and draft of the Headline Agreement, it was widely acknowledged that the substantive and political significance CityPorts project had grown on several government levels. The argument that such a project should be managed under the direct responsibility of the municipality – and not by a semi-independent body – was also well-received. However, the Council Committee reviewing the Headline Agreement was not convinced that the substantive results achieved by the OMSR

were sufficiently protected.[35] What if the RDM's educational developments turned out too costly for the HbR later on? What if the waterbus, which would have to ensure the area's accessibility, could eventually not be realized? Did the control over port lands until 2025 not provide the HbR with too much autonomy, particularly in the Eastern *Waalhaven*?[36] These and other questions plagued Mayor Opstelten and his team in the first months of 2007. Emphasizing the necessity to act quickly towards higher government bodies, B&W answered the questions of the responsible Council Committee on February 7, 2007.[37]

Although the base of the new agreement was proclaimed to be an exchange and not an enforcement of interests, B&W ensured their Council that it could guarantee municipal control over developments under port coordination through the instruments provided by Public Law. If strictly necessary, legal planning instruments could be utilized to restrict the developments within the CityPorts project. However, given the proposed organizational and decision-making structure, the Board did not expect that such measures would become relevant. In addition, B&W promised that public water transport would be realized even without a timely concession of the responsible regional body. Development goals agreed between the OMSR, *Hogeschool Rotterdam*, *Albeda College*, and housing corporation *Woonbron* in December 2005 would be taken over by the port authority. No developments with negative effects for residential functions would be allowed in RDM's *Heysehaven*,[38] and transhipment functions in the Eastern *Waalhaven* would be minimized to avoid nuisances in adjacent areas. Hence, the goal of the CityPorts project was twofold: it was meant to strengthen the 'mainport' and improve the living and economic climate of the Rotterdam region. All would be recorded in the announced Collaboration Agreement which would again be subject to the ESHMV Council Committee's approval. With the recorded commitments of the Rotterdam administration in place, no more pressing objections were raised by the Committee.

A City Vision

While the Collaboration Agreement was being formalized, the civil servants involved worked hard to specify what the CityPorts project could deliver within the administration's ruling period. In April 2007, Mayor Ivo Opstelten and HbR President Director Smits eventually presented a joint Implementation Program 2007-2010. The two declared that the scope of CityPorts was unprecedented: 'A new type of assignment asking for an innovative approach. An approach that we do not avoid, but rather seek out' (GR/HbR, 2007: 5). The Implementation Program appeared only after a Rotterdam-wide policy document had already confirmed that CityPorts was now considered as a project of strategic importance. That spatial strategy document had become known as Rotterdam's *Stadsvisie*.

After the document 'Rotterdam: Gateway to Europe' had been presented to several relevant government bodies, it turned out that Rotterdam's plans needed to be further elaborated upon. Regional, provincial, and State bodies – including the so-called *Zuidvleugel* platform – recognized and supported the main ideas presented in the Mayor's document. However, a more specific argumentation and prioritization was mandatory to grant the necessary government funding (GR, 2007b). This, in spring 2006, resulted in the initiative to start formalizing a 'spatial development strategy 2030' that would be the *Stadsvisie*, or City Vision of Rotterdam. In January 2007, a concept version of the document was released in order to conduct a broad societal consultation among civilians,

public and private organizations, and advisory bodies. A report on that consultation phase would be presented in July 2007, after which the *Stadsvisie* was finalized and approved by the Rotterdam City Council by November that same year.

Responsible Alderman of Living and Spatial Planning (WRO), Hamit Karakus, presented the concept of the *Stadsvisie* early 2007 with the following words:

> 'Rotterdam mainport, a city that has great meaning. But that meaning cannot be taken for granted. To preserve and strengthen the position of Rotterdam as a mainport, it is of vital importance to keep building a strong economy and an attractive city to live in. In 2030, the Board wants Rotterdam to be the most important port city in Europe in the field of knowledge and innovation, and, moreover, an attractive and beloved place to live in for young and old, student, starter, and particularly also for families.'

The words of the Alderman summarized the conclusions drawn from an analysis of the port city's contemporary situation, and the twofold objective the Board of Mayor & Alderman had put forth. In short, it was concluded that Rotterdam's port industrial history has provided the city with a relatively high amount of inhabitants with little schooling and a small income.[40] Attracting and retaining middle and high income families and 'knowledge workers' to the city had therefore become one of the municipality's top priorities. In addition, the growth and development of the port into a highly sophisticated transport hub has offered the city a high value knowledge industry in port and port related sectors like cargo logistics and petrochemistry. In the city, the medical and so-called 'creative' sectors of the economy are relatively strong and rising. The argument that attractive living conditions do not only draw people into the city, but also positively affect business location decisions, brought the municipal administration to formulate the double objective referred to by Alderman Karakus: a strong economy in order to create more employment, and an attractive city to live in, in order to balance the composition of the city's population. These living conditions were to be created inside existing city limits, rather than in the polders outside – plans which have been fiercely criticized for some time (see Chapter 5).[41] The CityPorts project was subsequently presented as one of thirteen 'VIPs' (Very Important

**Figure 6.10** Depiction of the CityPorts project in Rotterdam's 'City Vision – Spatial Development Strategy 2030' (GR, 2007a/b).

Projects) contributing most to realizing the objectives defined.

The City Vision document explicitly states that it conforms to the existing frameworks erected by earlier government briefs. The National Spatial Strategy, the *Zuidvleugelvisie* priorities, the regional *RR2020*, and the municipal Gateway to Europe (see Chapter 5) were all considered as important references to the current *Stadsvisie*. In the document, a 'development strategy' consisting of ten core administrative decisions was complemented by an 'implementation strategy' translating the decisions into (parts of) the thirteen VIPs. The CityPorts project featured under several of those core decisions, because it would 1) realize a knowledge and innovation cluster, 2) provide space for initiatives in the creative sector, 3) create office locations for maritime services companies, and 4) produce attractive residential environments. The document took all 'areas of transition' along the river as 'the face of Rotterdam', with the river itself as its lifeline (GR, 2007a: 76). In reference to the *Havenplan 2020* – in which the CityPorts project was officially defined for the first time – the logic of relocating transhipment functions due to the development of *Maasvlakte 2* was recapped again. It explicitly stated that this logic only applied to deep-sea activities, as short-sea transhipment functions would even be intensified – particularly in the *Eemhaven*.

6.4 The Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau

In the early spring of 2007, few of the *Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens Rotterdam NV* (OMSR) officials were still present at the former RDM building *Droogdok 17*. Only re-appointed Director Wil van der Hoek, OMSR Secretary Neumann, and a communications expert were left to guide the dismantling of the organization. They were assigned to replace the OMSR staff, finish the mandatory financial reports, and prepare 'transfer dossiers'. These dossiers comprised of all OMSR documents ordered and allocated by themes like Creative Economy, Environment, *Merwe/Vierhavens*, and CityPorts Academy. Transfer of the dossiers would occur prior to the signing of the awaited Collaboration Agreement set for July 1. Secretary Neumann was the only person to become a durable member of the new Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR). He looked back upon the past year with mixed feelings:

'What I find regrettable is that in February 2006, we started to work extremely hard on the areas for which we would become responsible – or so we thought. We rigged up all kinds of things, organizationally and financially, concerning the RDM West. […] We even informed the tenants that we had become their new landlord, asking them to transfer due rents directly to us. […] Those efforts turned out to be futile, and I think that some people at the municipality and port authority already knew that. For us, however, things were only starting to become clear during the summer [of 2006]. Looking back, that was a waste of energy and money. [It] produced unnecessary obscurities towards the tenants in the area. [But] somehow, we had been unable to interest the [OMSR] shareholders for the process we were in. […] Now – and that's why I still like working here – I see that the ideas we came up with earlier are being adopted by one or both parties. What was judged as unfeasible or unrealistic before, is currently simply being implemented. And that's because now, they are

discovering things for themselves. Like land reclamations in the *Waalhaven*. […] Or the establishment of the schools. Earlier, the latter idea was simply dismissed by the port authority. Not our responsibility, they said. That's also why they rented out the RDM terrain to us: in order to transfer their responsibility. In a few months time, that mentality has changed completely. Now, they are developing the site themselves!' (OMSR Interview July 2007).

New Assignment

In the new Directors Meeting of the Rotterdam CityPorts project, the main tasks of the new organization were being elaborated and assigned to officials working for the different port and municipal departments involved. The announced Collaboration Agreement was the first priority of the Directors. Next to that, the new Project Bureau (PbSR) needed an experienced Director, a communications advisor[42], a program manager, and someone to assist the newly appointed secretary and controller. In addition, coordination groups for the CityPorts sub-areas also needed assembling, and responsibilities for addressing the relevant environmental aspects had to be divided. Moreover, up until a new PbSR Director was found, the municipal urban planning department (dS+V) would be responsible for positioning the CityPorts project for State funding. Because short-term developments in the overall area focus primarily on economic functions (see Figure 6.11), it had become clear that applying for a subsidy from the State Fund for Economic Structure enforcement (FES) – due April 2007 – was most promising. In relation to the FES application, a clear 'communication strategy' needed to be worked out. The first step of that strategy was to inform every involved director about the main figures of the project in order to avoid confusion about the general characteristics of the CityPorts assignment and program. Through (in) formal communication in different (supra-)municipal meetings, all directors were pressed to maximize the familiarity of State administrators with the project. This way, it was believed that the chances for public funding to be granted to CityPorts would be increased.[43]

Area	Industrial business (m² GFA)	Office (m² GFA)	Residential (units)
Waal/Eemhaven			
Eastern and Southern *Waalhaven*	1,100,000	60,000*	-
Eemhaven and Western *Waalhaven*	460,000	-	-
RDM terrain	400,000	-	-
Rijn/Maashaven	100,000-300,000	-	3,000-5,000
Merwe/Vierhavens	130,000-230,000	-	4,000-5,000

*maritime head offices
Employment: a total increase of 10,000 jobs
Container transhipment: 1.2 to 3.6 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in *Eemhaven* and Western *Waalhaven*.

Figure 6.11 The long-term CityPorts Program per sub-area (PbSR, 2007b).

Because it was clear that April would become a crucial month, municipal and port officials geared up to do the work and finish all mandatory documents in time. For the CityPorts project, the first and most important task was the timely publishing of an ap-

proved Implementation Program 2007-2010. The document, in which the CityPorts program and necessary State funding would be defined (see Figure 6.11), was now planned to be presented to the Director General of the Ministry of Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM) on April 25. For the port authority, however, that event was considered of minor concern. On April 11, the Rotterdam City Council approved a renewed Environmental Effects Report (MER) for the development of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan. Two weeks later – and a day before the presentation of the CityPorts Implementation Program – the European Commission announced that it would not raise any objections against the Dutch State's contribution to the package of projects that made the port's expansion possible. Hence, the road towards the realization of *Maasvlakte 2* was finally cleared, and the port authority could now move ahead full speed. Back at CityPorts, however, the environmental problems in the area were everything but solved. Officials of the regional environmental protection agency DCMR were involved in the process to prevent regulatory problems from emerging in the plans. The involvement was part of an 'environmental strategy' that would need to be elaborated upon by the agency in the months to come. Adjustment of the outdated T+ acoustic zones (see Box 9) was one of many measures that needed to be addressed in order to make the new plans legally possible.

Next to the different aspects of the environmental strategy, subsequent steps in the communications strategy mentioned above were also effectuated. In the first months of 2007, all decision makers involved in the CityPorts were interviewed by an independent advisor in order to hear their individual views and judgments of the CityPorts project. The process was complemented by a group discussion that was meant to align all conflicting ideas and ensure a common perspective among the municipal and port directors. Later on, the directors would inform the members of the Steering Group about the satisfactory results, and propose to broaden the scope of interviewees to the Council Committee that monitored their activities and products.[44]

Planning Projects
On April 7, 2007, Liberal Mark Harbers was officially appointed as the new Alderman of Economy, Port, and Environment (EHM) after it had become clear that his Labor colleague Roelf de Boer would not return from his sick leave soon. One of the new Alderman's first tasks was to approve the Rotterdam CityPorts Implementation Program 2007-2010 together with his fellow Alderman and Mayor. The document was announced as the 'first concrete result of the new collaboration between port and city' in order to bring 'ambitions toward implementation' (GR/HbR, 2007: 5-7). Hence, the objective was to present a concrete set of local projects within the overarching framework of Rotterdam CityPorts. The municipality and port authority effectively invited everyone to invest in the area in order to get its realization going. As expected, the Implementation Program addressed one party in particular (*ibid.*: 9):

> 'The government has to make substantial, condition creating financial investments. These are pre-investments, particularly in the realm of infrastructure, cultural heritage, public space, and environment. Market parties will subsequently take care of the largest part of the investments, namely those in economic enterprises and real estate. [General] conditions are currently positive. The economy is growing, and cargo flows are increasing. The faster

mandatory government investments are made, the sooner economic, social, and societal spin-off will be raised. The contracts that have already been closed and the actual projects that have started show that market parties are prepared to invest in Rotterdam's CityPorts.'

The argumentation in the Implementation Program was oriented towards the national economic significance of the CityPorts area and the projects it encompassed. Strengthening the Dutch international location and business climate and affirming the position of its maritime 'mainport' in terms of cargo flows were explained as objectives that go hand in hand. Rotterdam was the only city in the Netherlands that could significantly contribute to those objectives – i.e. through realization of the CityPorts project. According to the document, port migration would provide room in the area for the development of innovative technologies and urban-oriented economic activities, such as maritime services, creativity, and IT. Alliances with education facilities based at RDM would bring these and other new industries into effect, not least in order to realize the municipality's ambitions concerning the environment. Taken together, it was considered possible to add ten thousand jobs to the CityPorts area (*ibid.:* 13).

Figure 6.12 Overview of the 15 projects in the Implementation Program 2007-2010 (PbSR, 2007a).

Next to the objective to create room for innovation, the approach to the CityPorts project itself was also considered to be innovative. That innovativeness was particularly expressed in relation to its pressing environmental issues, for which a so-called 'transition approach' was being developed. The core of that approach is that all parties involved would be able to react timely and flexibly to the changes in the area's business profile,

and introduce new and revolutionary environmental solutions. Adjustment of the area's acoustic zones, and the creation of special residential functions above and on water would contribute to the innovations in mind. Significant adjustment of existing infrastructures, for which State funding was duly needed, was considered to be a crucial condition for provoking private investments (*ibid.:* 21).

The Implementation document continues with a long-term perspective and a short-term program. Figures 6.12 and 6.13 provide an overview of the CityPorts program up to 2010, including the necessary financing, as depicted in the document. Figure 6.13 concludes by presenting a €141 million deficit on the necessary public investments. Within the FES framework, the document concretely applies for a State contribution of €44 million in order to finance six projects defined in the program.

			Still to be financed		
Location	Investments until 2010 (millions €)	Covered	Total	Municipality of Rotterdam/Port of Rotterdam PLC	State application
1. *Waalhaven*-East	85.9	22.5	63.4	46.4	17.0
2. *Waalhaven*-South	6.5	-	6.5	3.5	3.0
3. *Eemhaven*	-	-	-	-	-
4. RDM-West	37.1	14.0	23.1	13.1	10.0
5. RDM-East	-	-	-	-	-
6. *Heysehaven*	11.0	2.6	8.4	8.4	-
7. Quarantine terrain	-	-	-	-	-
8. Waterbus	5.8	2.4	3.4	2.4	1.0
9. *Rijnhaven*-East	100.3	86.3	14.0	4.0	10.0
10. *Katendrecht*	98.8	91.3	7.5	7.5	-
11. *Rijnhaven*	8.5	-	8.5	8.5	-
12. *Maashaven*	6.6	-	6.6	3.5	3.1
13. *Vierhavens*-East	59.5	59.5	-	-	-
14. *Merwehaven*-East	-	-	-	-	-
15. *Keilehaven*	-	-	-	-	-
Total	**420.0**	**278.6**	**141.4**	**97.3**	**44.1**

Figure 6.13 Overview public sector investments and coverage 2007-2010 (PbSR, 2007a).

Building Relations

On May 1, 2007, Hans Beekman was appointed Director of the new Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR). As Project Director, he became member of the CityPorts Steering Group and Directors Meeting, and became responsible for the coherence and overarching aspects of the project. As such, his first and primary task was to attend to the applications

for government subsidies. For this end, clear and complete communication with all parties involved – municipality, port authority, other government bodies, business community and educational institutes – was considered of utmost importance (PbSR, 2007a).


Figure 6.14 Rotterdam Climate Initiative Logo (RCI).

Appointing Beekman had been thoroughly considered by the CityPorts Steering Group. The experiences around the project's earlier leader De Ruiter had made the decision makers wary to select someone who had been historically involved in the processes leading up to the project. Prior to his appointment, Beekman was Director of the municipal Department of Youth, Education, and Society. He only had some distant knowledge about urban development issues. In an interview, Beekman himself explained:

'I do not have a history in this sector, or at least not a recent one, which meant that I was acceptable to all parties. What I encountered here was an organization that was pretty much jammed. With also a lot of personal grief. A lot of emotions. But at the same time – and that was the reason for me to accept the assignment – a common interest was evidently present. The thing that was actually really strange, given that interest, that we couldn't find a way forward. That common interest is present – with different angles of course, but there is a core and sense of urgency to build up something like Rotterdam CityPorts' (PbSR Interview October 2008).

In his first month as Project Director, Beekman decided to work out his assignment into a plan for his Bureau.[45] However, first, he had to attend to and become acquainted with the activities that had already been initiated. One of these activities concerned an international knowledge exchange with port cities London and Hamburg. A visit by several Board members of the London Thames Gateway project was being prepared for early June, and a visit by a Rotterdam delegation to Hamburg's *HafenCity* was being planned for later that year (see Chapter 4, Box 1).[46] Moreover, State Minister Cramer of Spatial Planning, Housing, and Environment (VROM) visited the CityPorts area on May 3. Hosted by Mayor Opstelten, the Minister was impressed by the project's early achievements. She was confident about the project's potential to support her Ministry's policy objectives in terms of a multiple and careful use of existing urban space.[47] Soil contamination, which could render any project like CityPorts legally and financially unfeasible, was acknowledged by the Minister as a major point of concern.[48] The two Aldermen initially taking seat in the Steering Group – those of Living and Spatial Planning (WRO) and Economy, Port, and Environment (EHM) – noted that the issue should be carefully dealt with in the Collaboration Agreement. The signing of the Agreement was set for June 12.

In Rotterdam, May 10 was signified by the launch of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative (see Figure 6.14). The municipality of Rotterdam, the Port of Rotterdam PLC, environmental protection agency DCMR, and Deltalinqs decided to designate Rotterdam as the 'World Capital of CO_2 free energy' by reducing Rotterdam's CO_2 production by 50%

in 2025 compared to the level in 1990. Mayor Opstelten traveled to New York City to present Rotterdam's plans at the Clinton Climate Conference held May 14-17. Rotterdam was asked by the Clinton Climate Initiative to be one of fifty cities around the globe to set an example. According to a RCI press release, combining Rotterdam's port, industry, and city into one reinforcing entity is considered unique in the world.[49] Substantive links between the initiative and the CityPorts project would soon emerge.

Next to the relations built up with the Ministry of Spatial Planning, the relationship with the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ) was also attended to. Negotiations with the first Ministry would focus on elaborating the FES application by setting up a Societal Cost-Benefit Analysis (MKBA)[50]. Meanwhile, the port authority had signed a final agreement with the involved schools – particularly the *Hogeschool Rotterdam* and *Albeda College* – to relocate part of their educational facilities from the city to the RDM terrain. However, no definite position of the port authority towards the upcoming establishment of – or participation in – the CityPorts Academy Rotterdam (CAR) was decided upon yet. Delays in the necessary municipal decision-making had also caused the opening of the transformed RDM hangar to be rescheduled to May 2008. The 'RDM business case', in which the financial consequences of the RDM development (see Figure 6.15) were worked out, had to be completed soon in order to make final decisions and inform the City Council. Because preliminary calculations had revealed a deficit of around €44 million, the members of the Steering Group were deeply concerned about the final outcome.[51] However, a full RDM business case and a vision for the surrounding *Waal/Eemhaven* area would not be completed before September 2007.


Figure 6.15 Implementation Program 2007-2010 image RDM terrain (GR/HbR, 2007).

6.5 Setting Course

In July 2007, the Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR) published a final newsletter in the format of the former Development Company (OMSR). With the signing of the 'Collaboration Agreement CityPorts' between the Rotterdam municipality and port authority on June 12, the decision to dismantle the OMSR was made official. The newsletter itself was dedicated to report the official presentation of the Implementation Program 2007-2010, which had taken place on April 25. During the event, Mayor Opstelten (see Box 10), the port authority's President Director Smits, and Port Alderman Harbers had all confirmed their dedication to the CityPorts project. OMSR Director Van der Hoek was present to symbolically hand over all of the development company's knowledge to the new organization. According to the newsletter, the CityPorts project had finally arrived in a new, realization-oriented phase (PbSR, 2007b).

Generating Support

In anticipation of the financial and procedural difficulties involved in the realization of the CityPorts program, raising the necessary government support was one of the new organization's primary concerns. Fortunately, Dutch State-level election campaigns had drawn attention to the problems around many spatial planning procedures throughout the country. After the installation of the new State administration in February 2007, it thus became clear that one of its major targets would be to significantly improve the pace and quality of regulations and procedures around spatial projects. Hence, the initiatives already deployed by the OMSR to this end were quickly adopted and extended by the PbSR. While the contacts with the Ministry of Economic Affairs had resulted in the application of a so-called 'TOPPER'-contribution[52], the relationship with the Ministry of Transport and Water (VenW) had resulted in the adoption of the CityPorts project in the 'Urgency Program *Randstad*' (UPR, also *Randstad Urgent*) published in June 2007.[53]

Rotterdam CityPorts counted as number 19 out of a total of 33 projects initially adopted in the *Randstad Urgent* program (see Figure 6.16). In order to secure persistent and continuous administrative support, the Ministry of VenW assigned an 'administrative duo' to each project. For CityPorts, that duo was Spatial Planning Minister Cramer and Port Alderman Harbers. In addition, if the pace of processes around the project would slow down, an independent project ambassador would be responsible to steer things up. Early 2008, Anthony Burgmans – known primarily as the former Chair of multinational corporation Unilever – would start his representation of the CityPorts project in this regard. The Ministry's 'naming' would, in conclusion, be combined with a method of 'faming and shaming', in which those responsible for a project's progress or delay would be singled out (VenW, 2007).

During the CityPorts Steering Group and Directors Meetings in the fall of 2007, the 'UPR application' was a recurring point on the agenda. The application was closely associated to several other activities, such as specifying an overall development plan for CityPorts and commissioning the necessary environmental procedures. The Director of environmental protection agency DCMR had expressed his concerns about the incompatibility of existing legal instruments with the substantive ambitions and time path of the CityPorts project. Negotiations and intensive consultations with the responsible Ministry

of Spatial Planning (VROM) were considered necessary to tackle the problem. In preliminary discussions, Ministry officials had expressed their willingness to work towards an 'environmental arrangement'. The directors involved confirmed that the project should be prohibited from getting caught in 'a bureaucratic swamp'.[54] Hence, a special meeting would be orchestrated with the ministry to discuss the expected bottlenecks.

Next to arrangements about environmental constraints, it was also deemed necessary to perform the regulatory Societal Cost-Benefit Analysis (MKBA) parallel to overall plan-making. For this, State approval and support would also be necessary. Thus, Alderman Harbers agreed to discuss the issues with Spatial Planning Minister Cramer dur-

Figure 6.16 The CityPorts project as one of the most urgent projects in the Dutch *Randstad* (VenW, 2007).

ing a dinner organized for the *Randstad Urgent* program.[55] The PbSR prepared the event, after which arrangements for a parallel procedure – signified by the joint signing of the *Rand-stad Urgent* Brief on October 29 – would indeed be made.[56]

Formalizing Activities

In the CityPorts Collaboration Agreement signed on June 12, 2007, arrangements made in the earlier Headline Agreement were confirmed and elaborated upon. The most significant parts of the agreement were concerned with the timing and (financial and legal) conditions under which the transfer of port controlled land to the municipality would take place. Firstly, however, the agreement's general considerations were worked out. Here, it was again stated that the different development trajectories of the four sub-areas and the division of responsibilities made in the north-south deal had rendered the OMSR organization obsolete. Moreover, the State's participation in the *NV Haven van Rotterdam* in order to finance the crucial *Maasvlakte 2* port expansion had forced the port authority to 1) announce its withdrawal as an OMSR shareholder and 2) strike its contribution to the urban development of the CityPorts area as one of its core tasks (see Chapter 5). Port authority participation in urban development projects were now understood as being part of its statutory 'societal responsibility'.

In the new agreement, the new port-city collaboration was explicitly connected to Rotterdam's overall spatial policy objectives. Moreover, it was explicitly made clear that the north-south deal did not diminish the necessity to continue a joint port-city effort for the whole CityPorts area, as State or even European contributions demanded an overarching vision and approach. Hence, the focus on four sub-areas with different development horizons had to be complemented by an overall approach to secure State support and address general development issues like accessibility and environmental sound, soil, air, and safety.

Organizationally, the Project Bureau and four 'coordination groups' (see Figure 6.9) were to be complemented by several underlying 'working groups'. While the coordination groups were formally charged with several tuning and monitoring tasks, the working groups focused on formal plan-making and the preparation of land transfers. The Project Bureau, consisting of a staff of six people, would be formally responsible for:[57]

- Preparing the Directors Meetings: monitoring the project's progress and preparing decision-making;
- Drawing up an overarching development framework, with a program, time plan, spatial (spot) plan, and financing plan;
- Tuning the realization of overall issues like accessibility and environmental measures;
- Communicating with (higher) government bodies within the framework of the Key Project status, relation management, and promotions;
- Keeping the administration and archiving up to date;
- Preparing and coordinating of applications for subsidies and other financial resources for Rotterdam CityPorts, such as FES resources for the coming period of 2007 and the next.

The Collaboration Agreement concludes with a full obligation between the parties to exchange all information relevant to the CityPorts project. An exception to this obligation, however, was again made in reference to competences provided by Public Law. Similar to the earlier Port Agreement (see Chapter 4), the current contract provided the municipality with the possibility to move against the set collaboration without penalties if its public responsibilities demanded it to do so. With this condition in place, the continuation of the CityPorts project was finally made official. No formal objections to the agreement by the reviewing Council members or the wider public were registered.

Pushing Towards Results

The CityPorts Collaboration Agreement and Implementation Program 2007-2010 are closely connected to Rotterdam's new *Stadsvisie*, which was finalized late 2007 after performing a region-wide consultation round. However, the Implementation Program also relied on some concrete local projects initiated in the years prior to its establishment. By the end of summer 2007, some of these projects were well underway. Their progress would be monitored by the City Council in a Rotterdam-wide 'large projects monitor' for which the PbSR would prepare the necessary documents. Next to formal progress reports, the three Aldermen now residing in the Steering Group[58] also pressed for attracting public attention to the projects in order to maintain the necessary political support. Projects and

other activities starting before the end of the ruling period in 2010 were thus agreed to be taken up and communicated in an official project calendar. The PbSR was sensitive to the needs of the politicians. As soon as results were ready, the PbSR team would orchestrate an event and then fade into the background. PbSR Director Beekman explained:

'I am rarely, if ever, in the picture. The Alderman is. [The HbR President Director] is. [The OBR Director] is in the picture. Everyone is in the picture, but the Project Bureau really is not. That a lot of work is done behind the scenes, that we take on that role, is all fine. But the stakeholders can make the scores. We score due to the fact that the things we are working for eventually also take place. Everybody knows that we have a part in that. But being in the picture, that's what others do. They receive the credits' (PbSR Interview October 23, 2008).

A primary example of a project that was covered in the media was called 'Port City'. After the success of the earlier project DockWorks (see Chapter 5), several maritime services companies had decided to locate their offices along the *Waalhaven* waterfront too (see Figure 6.17). Hence, four new buildings were announced to arise on a reclaimed edge of the Southern *Waalhaven* basin. In addition, construction plans for the roof park and park lane on the edges of the *Vierhavens* area were being finalized, and the realization of the European China Center (ECC) in the *Rijn/Maashaven* area was underway in spite of some delays.[59]

Figure 6.17 Computer generated impression of the CityPorts project on the southern edge of the *Waalhaven* (Port of Rotterdam).

The above mentioned developments notwithstanding, the educational facilities on the RDM terrain and the 'creative' business initiatives in the entire CityPorts area were still regarded as the most significant potentials of the project. Together, these projects represented the most potent opportunities to break out of the CityPorts' one-sided economic structure (PbSR, 2007). Thus, when the port authority finally presented a deficit of over €50 million in the RDM business case in November 2007, some tough negotiations between the port and city officials were needed to divide inevitable losses and risks. As could be expected, the port authority's inheritance of RDM's procurement debt (see Chapter 4) would be a central issue during these negotiations. The project's applications for a total of €20-26 million in public funding looked promising, but were nonetheless still uncertain. In addition, planning issues such as the monumental significance of the site,[60] its accessibility, the location of amenities, and air pollution also demanded more attention. Convinced of their mutual interests in the project, the parties would nevertheless reach a workable solution in the first months of 2008.[61] In effect, all committed to a maximum effort to make and keep the project financially and legally feasible.

Next to new economic functions, new and innovative types of living for middle and high income target groups were announced. These were planned to emerge first in the *Rijn/Maashaven*, and secondly in the *Merwe/Vierhavens* after the area was cleared. In relation to the first, resistance among inland shippers threatened the progress of the developments. After their views had been discussed in personal conversations with Port Alderman Harbers, a temporary solution in the *Maashaven* needed to be considered. Meanwhile, the port authority was negotiating a future relocation with fruit handler Seabrex from the *Merwehaven* to the south side of the river. For both areas, experimental housing projects on the water were starting to become a real possibility – an experiment called 'Concept House Village' was already being initiated by the CityPorts Academy on the RDM terrain (CAR, 2008).

6.6 Creating on the Edge

'[To] meet each other face to face is important. To get into a conversation and start understanding why one party values the other in a particular way. That makes an enormous difference. You don't always have to agree with each other. But if you understand why the other acts the way he acts – to recognize his rationality, so to speak – than you're already well on your way. [So], what I did is just make a round and talk to all stakeholders that were pointed out to me, simply because I didn't know all of them. [It was clear to me that these] were the people on which things will eventually, looking at their positions, all depend' (PbSR Interview October 23, 2008).

By the end of 2007, Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR) Director Beekman was mandated as the official representative of the CityPorts project during State-level meetings and discussions.[62] This way, the CityPorts project would have a single spokesperson towards the state ministries. The mandate was also a sign of good faith: Beekman and his team had consciously invested a lot of time and effort to gain the trust of all the Rotterdam administrators and directors involved. Moreover, timely and qualitative progress reports

were combined with clear communication about deadlines and expected results. Within the municipal and port departments, the CityPorts coordination and working groups had been seriously put to the test – sometimes even to their detriment.[63] To the motivated PbSR team, this was the only way that an 'unorthodox' approach to the CityPorts assignment could be pursued. Beekman's judgment was that only this approach could make the CityPorts project work.

Unorthodox

Although the OMSR 'studying phase' was still being criticized due to its lack of results, several of its projects were now being realized and ideas launched prior to its demise were being picked up. The proven cultural significance of buildings in the area was now being used to attain additional funding, and locating an Information Center on or around the RDM terrain had also been an OMSR scheme. Hence, next to accommodating the small Project Bureau, the office at *Droogdok 17* would soon be made ready to receive its first public visitors. Books and other publications made earlier were now used as gifts. The former OMSR Secretary Neumann observed:

> 'Often, the new people need to go through that process again – picking up something from the past is not something they do easily. They first have to make it their own. But it's good that you see these things returning. That the money and time invested in those three years has not been lost' (PbSR Interview February 2008).

In several interviews[64], the PbSR staff member acknowledged that the general atmosphere around the project had significantly changed for the better. Particularly the pace in which that change had taken place in the past months was striking. He remembered how the dismantling of the OMSR had justly raised a very critical attitude among those external to the project. But as soon as it became clear that the project would be forcefully continued, the support for it was quickly recaptured. Next to the work done by the municipal and port authority departments, the role of the Project Bureau was considered particularly crucial here. Given past experiences, the supporting role it had positioned itself in had surprisingly changed into a much heavier role. In this regard, the mediating efforts of PbSR Director Beekman were particularly praised.[65] According to the former OMSR official, building personal support and trust among the project's key decision makers had been an essential activity. It helped that the involved Aldermen and directors were also relatively new to the assignment, and that they were now – given the new agreements – formally responsible for the project's progress and results.

The idea that the CityPorts project would need a 'novel', 'innovative', or 'unorthodox' approach had been uttered by municipal and port authority executives before.[66] Now, PbSR Director Beekman and his team worked hard to make this approach more explicit. Working towards an environmental *status aparte* for certain parts of the CityPorts project, particularly for water born residential functions close to port activities, was one of its elements. Another was the ambition to parallel CityPorts' plan-making with a regulatory Societal Cost-Benefit Analysis (MKBA), which was necessary to justify eventual State expenditures. Both procedures were being performed in close collaboration with the responsible authorities, which built up a common cause and responsibility. To these ends,

formal meetings and presentations were combined with many informal discussions and negotiations. According to Beekman, the 'strategies' deployed had changed the way officials involved perceived their work. Problems came to light early on in the process, and solutions were jointly found. Essential to the unorthodox approach, however, was a continuing time pressure. Within the Rotterdam apparatus as well as within the ministries involved in the *Urgentie Programma Randstad* (UPR), completing the necessary procedural products on time was of the essence:

> 'One of the things that helped enormously was to apply [time] pressure. That pressure makes everything fluid. And after that, nobody thinks of giving up anymore. Of submitting [products] too late or of refusing to submit [them]' (PbSR Interview October 2008).

Hence, the meaning of the unorthodox approach overtly propagated by the PbSR Director had been made explicit and adopted by his team and its collaborating peers. Within the Project Bureau the approach had been worked out into several 'strategies' that encompassed all of the CityPorts project's 'overarching' issues: a communications strategy, an investments strategy, an accessibility strategy, and an environmental strategy. Eventually, the unorthodox approach's ground rules would be recorded as the project's most evident success factors. These factors were sixfold. According to the PbSR, the 'sustainable transition' of CityPorts would firstly demand 'high ambitions', which would be based on an inspiring perspective, combined with the necessary 'societal pressure'. Secondly, 'short-term success' embodied by advertizing projects was considered of the essence, although plans would be handled flexibly in order to allow for 'unexpected opportunities'. Thirdly, 'coalitions' with market players would have to lead to previously estimated private investments (see Figure 6.7). Fourthly, 'government involvement' in terms of public funding and regulations would be necessary to stimulate project realization. The fifth ground rule was to show that things were 'serious' by making the necessary 'pre-investments' in accessibility and public space – investments that would subsequently induce private development initiatives. Finally, 'real choices' and priorities would have to prevent money and energy from seeping away into projects 'that do not make the difference' (PbSR, 2008b: 18).

Images of the Future

Next to monitoring the progress of projects, attending to State funds and environmental regulations, and taking care of clear internal and external communication, putting together an 'overall development framework' had become one of the PbSR's most pressing concerns. Towards the end of 2007, discussions among municipal and port authority departments pointed out that accessibility and sustainability were two common issues among the four sub-areas. A preliminary document, which had been labeled *Koers Stadshavens 2025* [Course CityPorts 2025], was also well-received by the municipal and port directors.[67] In the meeting of November 29, 'sustainable mobility' was suggested as a comprehensive theme that could be emphasized in the final document. After some discussions, PbSR Director Beekman concluded that the *Koers* document may be a good start, but that 'the mechanism to secure commitment for the unorthodox approach in the long run has not yet been found'.[68] In addition, the directors pointed out that the project's 'hot spots' had to be focused upon in a final document. A small and simple set of themes or issues had to

be found to bind them all together. To this end, an interview round among six prominent lecturers and scientists in Rotterdam had already been commissioned. In addition, so-called 'intermezzos' would be conducted by the PbSR among a selection of experts from the public and private sector. Organized in the last months of 2007 and the first of 2008, the *Koers 2025* was set to be presented to VROM Minister Cramer in May 2008.

Every 'intermezzo' towards the *Koers 2025* would consist of substantive discussions among experts with various professional positions and backgrounds. Here, the PbSR used a public-private division. Public sector intermezzos would include a session with directors of the involved State Ministries – those of Spatial Planning (VROM), Transport (VenW) and Economic Affairs (EZ). Next to these, administrators of the Province of South Holland, of the City-Region, and of CityPorts' neighboring municipalities would be consulted. In addition, the administrators of the involved Rotterdam boroughs would be heard, and an 'external orientation' with the ESHMV Council Committee would be orchestrated.[69] Private sector intermezzos would be organized as evening-long sessions with groups of about ten experts, all participating without any compensation. The groups consisted of private consultants, urban designers, and representatives of several project developers, housing corporations, and a maritime services company. Some of the scientists and lecturers that had been interviewed before were also among these intermezzo participants.[70] In a booklet titled 'CityPorts Rotterdam: Six Images of the Future', the results of these earlier interviews were published in December 2007.[71]

One of the interviewees featuring in the PbSR booklet (see Figure 6.18) was Erasmus University professor Jan Rotmans. His research group Drift – the Dutch Research Institute For Transitions – of the Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) had already been involved in the CityPorts project in 2005 during the OMSR period. By the end of 2007, Rotmans was convinced that the project was extremely fit to accommodate a 'sustainable transition' in the port city of Rotterdam. To him, the CityPorts area could provide

Figure 6.18 Booklet 'CityPorts Rotterdam: Six Images of the Future (PbSR, 2007).

excellent breeding grounds for sustainable initiatives (PbSR, 2008a). However, a different mode of thought among top decision makers and some regulatory room for experiments would be important preconditions for a truly sustainable transition to occur.[72] Obviously, these preconditions had also become an important part of the unorthodox approach to the CityPorts project, and of the activities already deployed by the PbSR team. Communicatively building up a common perception of the CityPorts problem among the diversity of stakeholders involved was the most important aspect of the transition tools applied in practice.

Hence, together with Wageningen University professor Pier Vellinga, professor Rotmans had inspired many around the CityPorts project to adopt their sustainability

agenda.[73] Confirmed by other participants of the PbSR consultations and intermezzos, a 'sustainable ambition' would soon become a dominant feature of the discussions towards the final *Koers 2025*.[74] In conjunction to Rotterdam's city-wide Climate Initiative, sustainable development thus turned out to be the attractive driver for which those intending to realize the CityPorts project were looking. The PbSR official also involved in consultation rounds performed by the OMSR a few years earlier noticed some important similarities to the current process:

'I am making that comparison. Others see it as a completely different way of doing things. Back then, the goal was a Development Strategy, followed by half a year of consultations. The Koers document is smaller, and based on the past. We discussed it for only three months – you're not discussing what should happen to RDM again. Elements have been added and updated. The term sustainability has a stronger role. What is similar is that we are talking about [it] with external parties. What is different is that we do that in sessions of about ten people, here, downstairs [at *Droogdok 17*, TD]. Last time, it was based on interviews, but also on collective meetings. The principle of involving the outside world is the same – putting things to the test in our societal surroundings' (PbSR Interview February 2008).

A Course towards 025

During a New Year reception held on January 9, 2008, Minister of Spatial Planning (VROM) Jacqueline Cramer put those preparing the *Koers 2025* under serious pressure by stating that good plans would surely make her 'open her wallet'.[75] Hence, although State funding would still depend on more detailed development plans per CityPorts sub-area plus going through the necessary procedures during the year 2008, expectations around the *Koers* document mounted. Rotterdam's *Stadsvisie* featuring CityPorts had been finalized and approved by the City Council in November 2007 (see Figure 6.19), and a special meeting labeled 'Areas in Transition', was orchestrated by VROM on December 19 in order to discuss the bottlenecks in relevant environmental regulations and procedures. Now, presenting a clear and persuasive direction for the future of the CityPorts area was considered of utmost importance.

In February 2008, using 'sustainable development' as a penetrating future image for CityPorts was thoroughly discussed by the project's executive and political decision makers.[76] It was agreed that the theme was able to combine Rotterdam's overall policy objectives aimed at strengthening the port city's economic competitive position and the improvement of its living conditions. In addition, the intermezzos had proven that there was growing support for a long-term image

Figure 6.19 Cover of the final *Stadsvisie Rotterdam* (GR, 2007b).

of CityPorts based on sustainability. *Randstad Urgent* ambassador Burgmans was in favor of a high ambition and quality for the project, because this could secure long-term investments. However, an often-heard precondition was that this ambition and quality needed concreteness, particularly in relation to the ambiguous term 'sustainability'. Therefore, strategic projects that supported the future image of CityPorts needed to be named, and their quality specified. The development of several projects described as 'triggers' or 'icons' was also considered: the realization of an international knowledge center focusing on 'water management' in the CityPorts area had turned out to be a serious option.

In order to strengthen the chosen image for CityPorts, a close collaboration between the PbSR and the bureau of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative (RCI) was approved. A connection with the Urgenda, an initiative aiming to speed up sustainable development initiatives in the Netherlands, was also sought.[77] This 'urgent agenda' for sustainable development and climate change was launched by professors Rotmans and Vellinga in 2007, who had also been strong messengers in favor of the course CityPorts was now taking. Professor Rotmans would provide a presentation about the *Urgenda* in a Steering Group meeting on March 13, after which the *Koers 2025* was finalized. After testing the document in a working conference with two Council Committees (ESHMV and FIBS[78]) on March 27 2008, the public presentation of the *Koers* would be officially announced.

On May 7, 2008, VROM Minister Cramer was officially handed the document 'CityPorts Rotterdam: 1600 ha Creating on the Edge' (PbSR, 2008). Next to the six success factors already described, the core of the document consisted of five substantive 'strategies for a new future' in the CityPorts area (see Figure 6.20):

1.   *re-inventing delta technology,* which referred to sustainable development with a focus on water and energy, embodied by a Climate Campus that was to open its doors before 2010;
2.   *volume & value,* referring to maritime office developments and an advanced distribution park in the *Waalhaven*, a short-sea hub in the *Eemhaven*, and several port related economic and educational activities;
3.   *crossing borders,* referring to port city connections in terms of education (RDM Campus), combinations of living and working, and accessibility;
4.   *floating communities,* referring to residential functions and amenities on the water; and
5.   *sustainable mobility,* referring to the transportation of people and goods by all road, rail, and water modalities with easy public transport connections.

Next to the *Koers* document, VROM Minister Cramer and Port Alderman

Figure 6.20 The document *Stadshavens Rotterdam*: 1600ha Creating on the Edge (PbSR, 2008) presents 'five strategies for sustainable area development' in Rotterdam's CityPorts.

Harbers also signed a Letter of Intent expressing their support for a Rotterdam Climate Campus, to be located in the CityPorts area.[79] A business plan for the initiative would have to be ready in the third quarter of 2008. In an article about the *Urgenda*, Port Alderman Harbers argued Rotterdam's choice for the future image of CityPrts:

> 'We have a lot of expertise in the field of energy and sustainability within the municipality and the port authority. We are a member of the Clinton Climate Initiative, and have many international contacts. We are very happy with the Urgenda, because it possesses a lot of knowledge about complicated transition processes. And we are talking about the biggest change process in the Netherlands. They had the objectives and the ideas, we had the people and the resources. We contribute to each other well.'

6.7 Epilogue: CityPorts Questions

Since May 2008, the Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau has steadily continued its work, organizing – among many other things – an international master class to discuss their ambitions and plans. On May 30, The Board of Mayor and Alderman visited the port city of Hamburg, Germany. After that, a larger delegation including the PbSR team visited several port cities in Canada and the United States to learn about the experiences around development problems similar to those of Rotterdam CityPorts. PbSR Director Beekman naturally joined the group, and concluded that the study trip had brought all those working on the CityPorts closer together. Nevertheless, he was also worried. He acknowledged that the current energy surrounding the project would not last forever. During the inter-mezzos, experts had already pointed out to him that any advertizing ambition, including that of sustainable development, has a certain lifespan. Iconic projects, big events and renewed ambitions were absolute necessities for project support to be kept alive. Now that requests from the private sector were mounting, Beekman also reflected on the pace and size of the project:

> 'For me, the core of the question is no longer: how do we get this process going? How can we make something of CityPorts? The core is: How do we manage it in order not to drown in new ideas launched by investors, because we have to do everything in a well-considered way. How do we manage the tempo, because, what is the market like? [What is the] tempo that we can take? How do you organize a process of implementation that has its dynamics, its unorthodox character, and [still keep that under control]?' (PbSR Interview October 2008)

Within the involved municipal and port authority departments, the turbulent history of the CityPorts project was hardly forgotten. The way the municipal urban planning and development departments now worked together with the staff of the corporatized port authority was improving, and awareness of their interdependency had grown. Still, municipal and port outsiders would follow the role and responsibilities of the PbSR team with great suspicion. In an interview, a municipal expert explained:

'You still notice that – and that's almost Rotterdam culture – if things are partly organized at some distance, even if it is a non-leading project bureau organized by and for actors, that people feel that the project CityPorts is placed with the project bureau. Those who work on the project do not experience things that way, but the rest of [the department] who are not so familiar with it do. That something is organized outside of the line. Projects the city is involved in, but are nevertheless organized outside. I think that's an enduring contingency.'

Next to the project's organization, some substantive reservations are also worth mentioning here. For example, initial desires to intensify the Eastern *Waalhaven* with urban, partly residential functions were still felt within the municipality, despite the strong arguments against it. In addition, opinions about the wish and necessity to attract a big international event to the CityPorts area also greatly differed. In relation to the latter, the presentation of a business plan for the announced Climate Institute was combined with a visit by American climate change propagator Al Gore to Rotterdam in October 2008. At that time, several employees of the Rotterdam Climate Initiative had also started working on their assignment at *Droogdok 17* on the RDM terrain.

In conjunction with all those involved in CityPorts, PbSR Director Beekman realized that his personal contributions were merely temporary in comparison to the project's duration. Moreover, he acknowledged that he would also have to make way for someone more knowledgeable in the field of project development as soon as privately financed interventions would start to occur. Not only the observations in Hamburg and London, but also his local experience convinced him of this:

'It also fits within the Rotterdam concern. After four years, directors always get another job around here.'

6.8 Confrontation: Orientations, Resources, and Strategies

The sequence of decisions and actions described in this chapter concludes the descriptive part of our Rotterdam CityPorts case study. Like in the previous two chapters, the aim was to answer our second main research question: *What was actually done?* Although the story seems detailed, it is also necessarily reductive and partial. Nevertheless, it provides us with an abundance of insights by which we can interpret the strategy-as-force relations behind the CityPorts project strategy we aim to uncover. However, before we arrive at our general conclusions, we must first take some final interpretive steps. This means that in this section, we will identify and discuss the actor orientations, action resources and strategies apparent for the third and final time. In the next chapter, we will subsequently be able to assess the relationships between them, and draw our conclusions about the validity of our working hypothesis (see Chapter 2). Hence, we will then be able to evaluate the extent to which *strategy follows structure*.

Actor Orientations
The strategy formation process documented in this chapter is signified by the dismantling of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) and the design of a new project

management structure. The reorganization represents a small but significant rearrangement of formal relationships and tasks. The port authority and municipal departments are effectively reinstated as the actors primarily responsible for the project's progress. After three years of struggle, this means that the actors oriented towards executing planning and development tasks in the area are finally granted the roles they so proclaimed.

The reorganization central in this strategic period reveals no significant changes in the basic interests or normative role orientations of the actors involved. Hence, most of the port city actor orientations depicted in figure 6.21 are the same as those we found in chapter five. Nonetheless, a consequence of the reorganization is that realization of the CityPorts project is now in line with the interests and norms of the involved departments. Their decisions and actions now reflect a clear intention to realize (part of) the Rotterdam City-Ports project. Moreover, the decisions and actions of the port authority and its President Director are now also more aligned. The division of responsibilities and jurisdictions due to the north-south deal has thus conceptually moved these actors into the CityPorts strategy arena (see Figure 6.22 and Appendix 2). The distinction, if any, between the orientations of the involved departments and their executive decision makers has become less apparent.

Actor Orientations		
Actor	Interests	Norms
Board of Mayor and Alderman	Strengthening Rotterdam's economy and improvement of living conditions (attractiveness)	Focus on implementation and results within ruling period
City Council Committee	Propose and induce substantive policy objectives	Focus on local interests and accountability for achieved results
Port of Rotterdam (HbR)	Exercise of port company tasks and strengthening the position of Rotterdam's port industrial complex (*Maasvlakte 2*)	Restricted responsibilities and jurisdictions (focus on land use control)
Municipal departments (OBR, dS+V)	Execution of urban planning and development tasks (VIPs)	Restricted responsibilities and jurisdictions (focus on land use control)
OMSR*	Facilitate, stimulate, and realize the transformation of the CityPorts area	Shift of focus towards the implementation of projects (results)
PbSR**	Realization of the CityPorts project as a whole	Focus on speed and coherence (unorthodox approach)
gemeentelijke bestuursdienst (BSD)	Support feasibility and substantive quality of policy proposals	Protection of municipal authority over the development of the CityPorts area
DCMR (environmental protection)	Improve environmental quality Rotterdam city region	Conformity to relevant environmental laws and regulations
EDBR*** (economic development)	Support the economic development of Rotterdam.	Combine long-term visions (policy advise) with short-term results (project support).

*until December 2006
**starting May 2007
***refers more specifically to EDBR members of the *Hogeschool Rotterdam* and *Albeda College*.
Figure 6.21 Interests and norms of port city actors involved in the realization of the CityPorts project (period March 2006-May 2008).

The strategy formation process described in this chapter first draws attention to Port Alderman Van Sluis's withdrawal from politics and an explicit reorientation of the OMSR's decisions and actions. As announced in one of its newsletters, the focus of OMSR activities would now revert towards real material interventions signified by an organizational restructuring. However, the OMSR's shift of focus would arrive too late. The new Rotterdam administration decided that an effective continuation of the CityPorts project demanded some more dramatic steps. While local initiatives on and around the RDM Campus kept emerging, Mayor Opstelten played an important role in order to ensure a timely restart of the project. His orientation was still locked on generating the necessary government support for a clear set of priority projects in Rotterdam, including CityPorts. Adding the *Rijn/Maashaven* to the project area, and connecting existing development initiatives to municipal and supra-municipal policy objectives were clearly considered crucial steps. Presenting CityPorts as one coherent project in spite of the contrasting development trajectories of its sub-areas was also of obvious significance here. It was judged that the necessary State support for the project could only be generated this way.

Figure 6.22 The Rotterdam CityPorts Arena (period March 2006-May 2008).

The decisions and actions described in this chapter are those that occurred between the Council Committee reviewing the new agreements around CityPorts and the Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W). While the Board concentrated on moving towards implementation of the project, the Council Committee's orientations were much more local and substantive. Questions about the details of the north-south deal, such as the continued autonomy of the port authority in the controversial *Waalhaven*, had to be ad-

dressed and answered. Only the personal engagement of Mayor Opstelten would eventually satisfy the Committee's reservations, and avoid a time-consuming process towards a Council-wide debate.

An orientation towards timely decisions and actions can be found among several of the actors involved in the CityPorts project. Clearly, the adoption of the 'unorthodox approach' by the new Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau was born out of this common focus. Administrations on all levels of government were now explicitly pushing for tangible spatial planning results, and academics involved in the project also propagated an explicit sense of urgency. As the political stakes were raised due to personal administrative commitments, the opportunity to propagate unprecedented measures in Rotterdam clearly presented itself. The preparatory work done by or for the OMSR made it easy for the PbSR to seize that opportunity and accelerate or parallel some of the procedures that were needed to apply for State funding. Coherence between the project's long-term objectives and the objectives defined in municipal, provincial, and State plans is also a common orientation here.

Finally, the strategic period described in this chapter shows that the project's wider administrative and business surroundings have been deliberately involved in order to deliver some substantive input. Although the material does not point out how or to what extent local users and inhabitants have been heard, the account does make clear that public involvement – though selective – was not avoided. Hence, we conclude that the efforts to incorporate as many actor interests and norms as possible into the CityPorts plans were significant. The direct involvement of the responsible Alderman meant that objections made by specific groups – like the inland shippers in the *Maas/Rijnhaven* – could be effectively incorporated into the strategy.

Resources Mobilized

With the effectuation of the north-south deal between the Rotterdam municipality and port authority, the enduring conflicts over land use control in the CityPorts area finally came to a compromising end. After three years of development efforts, it had become clear that each sub-area had its own development trajectory. While the *Merwe/Vierhavens* and *Rijn/Maashaven* would have a largely residential and 'dry' future, the development of the *Waal/Eemhaven* area would stay predominantly water bound. This function-based division of the CityPorts area resulted in the transfer of both the land and water in the *Rijn/Maashaven* to the city, and the prospect of municipal land use control over the northern CityPorts docklands in the future. In return, the port authority was granted autonomous control over the *Waal/Eemhaven* for a period of 25 years. Here, the HbR's adoption of the initiatives on and around the RDM terrain is striking, because this area's development trajectory is, at most, only indirectly port related. The *land*, *water*, and *buildings* mobilized by the municipality and HbR are once again among the most tangible and focused upon action resources. Hence, it is clear that this part of the north-south deal is an essential step towards the realization of the CityPorts project. However, the other, much less tangible parts of the new arrangement may be considered at least as important.

Our story in this chapter shows that many of the decisions and actions revolve around creating support for the realization of the CityPorts project. This support is expressed by the provision of public funding and (semi-)private project development initiatives, both of which we define as the mobilization of *financial resources*. The other expres-

sion of support for the project is defined as *commitment* (see Figure 6.23), and has more specifically been referred to as 'support' or 'trust' during interviews with the actors involved.[81] The way that support or trust is generated has a lot to do with organizing interaction between actors involved in order to find a common perspective of the project's development trajectory. Our case shows that many aspects of the PbSR's unorthodox approach are concerned with such interaction, as many if not all of its 'strategies' require penetration of formal organizational barriers in order to foster more personal involvement of those more distant to the project – particularly State officials. In addition, we also recognize that commitment is generated by the substantive quality of the interaction organized. This is closely related to the *expertise* of those involved, and to the *information* made available by the actors that intend to realize the CityPorts project. In relation to the latter authoritative resources, we registered a conscious composition of the PbSR staff – not least in the selection of its Director – and of the coordination and working groups embedded inside the municipal and port authority departments. The information recorded in the so-called 'transfer documents' of the OMSR should also be mentioned here. These documents made it possible to make more informed decisions about, for example, the value and significance of certain historical buildings in the area.

Action Resources		
Allocative	Authoritative	Mobilized by…
Land, water and buildings (RDM office, hangars, site)	-	Municipality of Rotterdam, HbR, *Woonbron* (*Heijplaat*)
Instruments (plans, programs, agreements, presentations, news-letters, websites, media statements)	-	State Ministries*, Municipality of Rotterdam/HbR (North-South deal), PbSR
Finance (public subsidy, private investments)	-	Municipality of Rotterdam, HbR, Province of South Holland, project developers, *Woonbron*, *Hogeschool Rotterdam*, *Albeda College*
Time/Result (setting time frame for results)	-	Municipality of Rotterdam, HbR, PbSR
	Legitimacy	City Council (Committees)
-	Commitment (policy decisions and plans)	State Ministries (UPR), Province/*Stadsregio*, *Zuidvleugel*, Board of Mayor & Alderman, Housing Corporation *Woonbron*, EDBR
-	Expertise (development options)	OBR, dS+V, HbR, DCMR, OMSR staff**, PbSR staff and experts (through intermezzos)
-	Information (user location and development decisions).	HbR, OBR, dS+V, OMSR (through transfer documents).

*refers to willingness to investigate experimental status of projects
** until December 2006.

Figure 6.23 Action resources of actors intending to realize the Rotterdam CityPorts project (period March 2006-May 2008).

The necessity to realize concrete results has been emphasized by several actors in our case, particularly by the politicians involved. To the Alderman, being able to present tangible products within his or her ruling period is of crucial importance. Moreover, the Rotterdam administration defined 'accountability' as one of the focal points of its program running until 2010. Failing to deliver within the set time frame was thus not considered an option. In figure 6.23, we therefore define this allocative action resource as a duo – *time/result* – because the mere realization of real, tangible development projects is not enough: they also have to be delivered on time in order to be effective.

		Strategy Process	
		Deliberate Plan	**Emergent Pattern**
Strategy Content	**Tangible Positions**	*Strategic Planning* • Preparing project development plans and 'business cases' for executive decision-making (RDM) • Making development plans in application for public funding • Monitoring and reporting project progress. • Facilitating clear communication between actors (reports, meetings, informal discussions) • Preparing funding application documents (Topper, *UPR*, MKBA) • Realizing development projects (Offices Eastern *Waalhaven*, RDM/*Heijplaat*, European China Center).	*Strategic Venturing* • Stimulating and accommodating 'creative' business initiatives (RDM) and educational facilities.
	Broad Perspective	*Strategic Visioning* • Promoting 'unorthodox' development approaches (time pressure, regulations, procedures) • Finding overarching development images to bind together projects and sub-areas (intermezzos, consultations) • Informing City Council and testing the argumentation of decisions in Council Committee • Conforming to spatial policy. objectives in order to continue recording in (supra-) municipal spatial plans • Launching an overarching development ambition (*Stadshavens Rotterdam: 1600ha Creating on the Edge*).	*Strategic Learning* • Conducting interviews, intermezzos, and consultations (advisors) • Organizing (international) knowledge exchange and conducting study trips.

Figure 6.24 The Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy (period March 2006-May 2008).

The addition of the *Rijn/Maashaven* to the CityPorts area can be recognized as a deliberate attempt to boost the *legitimacy* of the project. The geographical connection

between CityPorts and other waterfront development initiatives on the south side of the river had now also been restored. Moreover, residential functions developed earlier on *Katendrecht* – the docklands between the *Rijnhaven* and *Maashaven* – could now be used to advertise the CityPorts plans – both to State administrators and the wider public.

Strategies: From Competitive Venturing to Comprehensive Visioning
Many of the decisions and actions described in this chapter are aimed at (re)connecting the CityPorts project to its administrative, organizational, and geographical context. By this we specifically refer to the efforts to conform the project's actual development trajectory to formal spatial policy objectives, to reshape the project's formal management and decision-making structure, and to broaden the project's geographical scope and significance. In this perspective, the new agreement between the Rotterdam municipality and port authority concluded a process of *strategic learning* and *venturing* in which the development trajectories of the CityPorts sub-areas became increasingly apparent. Now, they could be developed much less speculatively and thus much more deliberately.

The strategic decisions and actions summarized and grouped in figure 6.24 cannot be assigned to one specific actor or formal organizational structure. For example, the implementation of development projects inside the different sub-areas was now being coordinated and planned from within the respective municipal and port departments. Reports and explanations for the City Council were given by the responsible aldermen and directors. The PbSR, in turn, focused on facilitating clear communication between the actors involved and the attraction of public funding. In addition, it orchestrated discussions about the environmental (im)possibilities in the area with State officials, and worked to secure the improvement of its overall accessibility with the regional authorities. In addition, an organization like the environmental protection agency DCMR also performs some very important development tasks. These and other, less continuous activities like conducting interviews or organizing working conferences are all executed by actors from different, more or less formally connected organizations. Nevertheless, what seems to bind them together is a common intent – i.e. the realization of the CityPorts project.

Our story in this chapter started with a final attempt of the OMSR to move towards the maintenance, operation, and development of the northern docklands and RDM site. This resulted in a start-up of some *strategic planning* activities according to Rotterdam procedures, but without a clear view of what the status of its planning products would be. Eventually, these planning activities were picked up and continued by the municipal and port departments, and combined into one document by the PbSR – its Implementation Program.

Next to the OMSR plan-making, many other products or ideas that emerged before the year 2007 were also picked up in the new phase. Now, however, the efforts of the PbSR and the teams working on the four sub-areas are much more deliberate. This also explains why actors involved feel that it is an 'entirely different way of doing things'. While many of the decisions and actions of the OMSR were intuitive, emergent and focused on process, the strategies in the new phase are much more instrumental, deliberate, and focused on content. Hence, figure 6.25 shows a clear emphasis away from *strategic venturing* and *learning* toward *strategic planning* and *visioning*. What was largely accidental before – like accommodating creative entrepreneurs and educational facilities – was now thought of as purposeful action.

One of the assignments of the PbSR is to draw up an overarching development framework. Discussions about an initial framework led to the conclusion that the City-Ports project was in need of a broader perspective: an attractive ambition that could yield long-term commitments to the project and its approach. This was the start of the strategic visioning process that produced the '1600ha' document in which local scientists have played a significant deliberative role, including the idea to found and locate a knowledge center in the CityPorts area – the Rotterdam Climate Campus. The process of strategy formation had thus shifted again, towards a process focusing on *comprehensive visioning*. With the perspective of a sustainable future for the CityPorts area in place, we will now leave the current discussion and move to more general conclusions about our case.

Notes

1   NRC Handelsblad (2006), 'NV voor havens in de stad verdwijnt' [PLC for ports in the city disappears], December 15, 2006, page 13

2   See Appendix for an overview of the Rotterdam municipal election results in 2002 and 2006.

3   http://www.pvdarotterdam.nl/nieuwsbericht/2399, last visit on May 26, 2009.

4   This was pointed out by several interviewees within the municipality (OBR, BSD, dS+V), the OMSR, and the port authority (HbR), and was confirmed in the minutes of several meetings concerning CityPorts – particularly those of 2006.

5   For such temporary functions, architecture firm KCAP in Rotterdam had made some preliminary design studies under the label 'waiting land' in 2005. See KCAP (2005).

6   Trouw, 'Unorthodocks: originele ideeën voor RDM-werf - ontwerpwedstrijd' [Unorthodocks: Original Ideas for RDM Wharf – Design Competition]. April 19, 2006, page 6-7.

7   In their June newsletter, the OMSR named housing corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers*, project developer Arcadis/KNHM, and the *Hogeschool Rotterdam* as the Academy's co-founders. Delft University of Technology and Erasmus University Rotterdam were also interested.

8   This PhD research project and an 'Urban Decision Room' – a group decision-making tool making use of laptop computers and projection screens visualizing different planning decisions – count as two of such initiatives.

9   The company developing the hydrogen-fuelled cars is called Formula Zero. (www.formulazero.nl). In addition, infrastructure construction company BAM Rail and art studio *Woestijn In Blik* eventually also located (part of) their activities in the RDM hangars.

10 Sources are the minutes of the Director Meeting of June 16, 2006, and several OMSR interviews conducted in 2006.

11 The Director Meeting of June 16, 2006, was attended by two directors of the port authority's Department of Commercial Affairs, two directors of the municipal Administration Service (BSD), the directors of the Urban Planning Service (dS+V) and municipal Development Corporation (OBR), the director of the regional environmental protection agency (DCMR), and two OMSR representatives.

12 Implemented in 2004, the *Besluitvormingsmodel Rotterdamse Projecten* (*BRP*) [Decision-Making Model Rotterdam Projects] is meant to formalize and (thus) professionalize the different municipal (dS+V and OBR) phases and procedures around urban development projects in Rotterdam.

13 Examples are Design Dock Rotterdam (DDR, www.designdockrotterdam.nl) and design studio Van Lieshout (www.ateliervanlieshout.com) who (re)located themselves in the *Vierhavens* area.

14 The routekaart would eventually be produced by an OMSR-commissioned consultancy firm.

15 Produced by the OMSR in collaboration with the municipal Urban Planning and Housing Service (dS+V), and Project Bureau Belvedere – a State-commissioned body specialized in cultural heritage objects and structures.

16 The book *Stadshavens Rotterdam: De historische ontwikkeling van de Waalhaven, Eemhaven, Merwehaven en het Vierhavensgebied in kaart, woord en beeld* [in short: Historical Atlas CityPorts Rotterdam] (Dicke & Van der Zouwen, 2006) appeared after the OMSR had already published the *Atlas Stadshavens in Europa* [Atlas CityPorts in Europe] (OMSR, 2004a), *Kennisatlas Stadshavens* [Knowledge Atlas CityPorts] (OMSR, 2004b), and *Big & Beautiful: Comparing Stadshavens in Europe* (Zandbelt & Van den Berg, 2005).

17 The European Institute for Comparative Urban Research (Euricur, www.euricur.nl).

18 See for example page 17 of the *Zuidvleugelvisie* [South Wing Vision] of August 2006.

19 In figure 6.7, the investments made by the Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR) and the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC (OMSR) were considered as private (market) investments.

20 The building *Droogdok 17* and the rest of the RDM terrain had been an official excursion in the World Harbor Days 2006 program from September 1-3.

21 One survey questioned 82 Rotterdam inhabitants at a manifestation called 'Meet the Experts' in the city on Sunday September 3, 2005. Another had targeted 242 youngsters in June and May 2006.

22 The external support was also mentioned in several OMSR interviews conducted in 2006.

23 We are aware that OMSR employees reacted to the situation in diverse ways. It is not our intention to disregard those that have been heavily affected, both emotionally and psychologically, by the events surrounding the OMSR dismantling. Here, we only include what has been confirmed by several OMSR interviewees and in related documents.

24 The document would be sent to the City Council with an accompanying letter, dated December 5 and sent on December 14. The letter was signed by the municipal secretary and mayor.

25 The Council Committee of Economy, Social Affairs, Port, Environment, and Transport has representatives of all major political parties in the Rotterdam City Council.

26 On October 12, 2006, responsible Alderman De Boer had already notified two Council Committees about the fact that the administration was preparing a decision on the project's organization, management, and financing.

27 Rotterdams Dagblad, 'Muziekfabriek Rotterdam in *Waalhaven* staat op losse schroeven: Klem tussen ambtelijke molens' [Music factory Rotterdam in Waalhaven uncertain: Caught between bureaucratic mills]. October 6, 2006.

28 Het Financieele Dagblad, 'Stadshavens Rotterdam: Nog in de wacht' [CityPorts Rotterdam: Still on hold]. October 24, 2006.

29 Letter of the Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) to the City Council, dated December 19 (06BSD14356).

30 Letter of the Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) to the City Council together with the Headline Agreement CityPorts Project, dated December 5 and 14 (06BSD13783).

31 See 28, page 1.

32 The Administration Service (BSD) was called upon to play potentially conflicting roles in relation to the CityPorts project. Because the municipality is a majority shareholder of the Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR), it is the BSD's duty to advise the Board of Commissioners – chaired by the Alderman of Economy, Port, and Environment – in the best interests of the port. On the other hand, the municipality was also a shareholder of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC (OMSR), for which the BSD also had to defend Rotterdam's urban development interest. This ethical question was mentioned several times by BSD officials in two separate interviews in 2008.

33   Letter of the Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) to the Rotterdam City Council, dated December 14, 2006.

34   See 28, page 10.

35   According to the minutes of a meeting of the Council Committee of Economy, Social Affairs, Port, Environment and Transport, dated February 1, 2007.

36   *Sluisjesdijk*, a large quay on the riverfront of the Eastern *Waalhaven*, was of particular interest here. Heavy environmental burdens in terms of sound, air and soil pollution, and long-term lease contracts in the area were two reasons that made any plans for urban development on the *Sluisjesdijk* extremely costly and time-consuming. In addition, there were still enough urban business locations available in the existing city, while the existing port and port related businesses on the *Sluisjesdijk* were still very successful. According to a Letter of the Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) (see 33), port revenues from the *Sluisjesdijk* alone are still €0.5 million per annum. A port municipal land transfer would therefore cost approximately €25 million due to the necessary compensations.

37   Letter of the Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) to the City Council, dated February 7, 2007 (07BSD01215).

38   Rumors about locating an oil platform in the *Heysehaven* were dismissed.

39   In a letter on January 25, 2008, Port Alderman Mark Harbers reacts to questions posed by the Council Committee in September 2007 concerning the differences between the Headline Agreement and the Collaboration Agreement for CityPorts. In addition, the Alderman announced a five-year evaluation for the progress in the CityPorts area, the first to be held in 2012. Meanwhile, the project's progress would be registered in the Rotterdam-wide 'large projects monitor'.

40   Comparisons in the document are mostly made with the three other largest cities in the Netherlands – Amsterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht – and a national average.

41   A newspaper article recorded that particularly the criticism of Architecture Biennale curator Adriaan Geuze had moved B&W to reconsider their plans for a residential district at *Zuidplaspolder*. Mayor Ivo Opstelten explained: 'This new *stadsvisie* caters to Geuze's every need. We listened to him closely.' In: de Volkskrant, 'Rotterdam gaat in de stad bouwen' [Rotterdam is going to build inside the city]. February 13, 2007.

42   In the course of 2007, remaining OMSR communication advisor Baljon decided to join the Economic Development Board Rotterdam.

43   Minutes CityPorts Directors Meeting January 15, 2007.

44   Minutes CityPorts Directors Meeting March 1 and April 12, 2007.

45   Minutes CityPorts Steering Group Meeting May 23, 2007.

46   Later on, that visit would be postponed to early 2008.

47   According to a report about the visit on www.minvrom.nl.

48   See 40.

49   www.rotterdamclimateinitiative.nl.

50   The analysis is part of the Ministry's funding application procedure, and is reviewed by a separate government agency.

51   According to newspaper *Algemeen Dagblad*, Alderman Harbers revealed the large deficit to the press around the visit of Minister Cramer: '*Stadshavens hikt aan tegen tekort van 44 miljoen euro*' [CityPorts struggles with a 44 million euro deficit], May 11, 2007.

52   TOPPER is a fund supervised by the Ministry of Economic Affairs focused on supporting the restructuring of industrial business areas in order to improve the business location climate.

53   The program, also known as *Randstad Urgent*, is initiated by the Dutch Cabinet and involves the ministries of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM), Agriculture, Nature and Fishing (LNV), Economic Affairs (EZ), Education, Culture, and Science (OCW), Domestic Affairs (BZK), Finance. Also, all Provinces, City Regions, and municipalities in the *Randstad* area are involved in the program.

54   Minutes Directors Meeting September 20, 2007.

55   According to the Steering Group meeting minutes of October 1, the dinner was scheduled for two days later, on October 3.

56   The minutes of the Directors Meeting on September 20, 2007, also noted that Mayor Opstelten would be asked to discuss the subject in a G4 conference between the four largest cities of the Netherlands.

57   Section 14.2 of the Collaboration Agreement CityPorts between the Municipality of Rotterdam and Port of Rotterdam PLC, dated June 2 and signed June 12, 2007.

58   Alderman of Economy, Port and Environment (EHM) Harbers, Alderman of Living and Spatial Planning Karakus, and Alderman of Employment, Social Affairs, and *Grote Stedenbeleid* [Large City Policy] Schrijer.

59   The Minutes of the Directors Meeting of February 14, 2008, refer to some minor delays in these projects.

60   A monument status for the buildings around the *Heysehaven* at RDM would make renovation plans eligible for funding. The responsible Alderman of Culture would eventually grant some of the buildings a monumental status.

61   For obvious reasons, the details of the negotiation are obscured here. What is important is that port and city officials – particularly those of the municipal Administration Service (BSD) and the port authority's Commercial Affairs department – worked out an arrangement on the basis of interests and considerations beyond the purely financial.

62   Depending on the agenda of meetings with State officials, it was agreed that the PbSR Director would be joined by one or more directors.

63   Staff working on the CityPorts project would often be replaced due to the demanded pace and quality of the work delivered.

64   Conducted in February, June, and October 2008 (see also Appendix 4).

65   Based on several interviews with municipal, port, and PbSR officials conducted in 2008.

66   See chapter five.

67   A copy of this preliminary document was also made available to the author.

68   Quoted from the minutes of the Directors Meeting on November 29, 2007 (section 3).

69   According to a letter sent to the Rotterdam City Council by the Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) on May 6, 2008.

70   Based on PbSR interviews (see Appendix 4) and several documents concerning the preparation and evaluation of the intermezzos, as submitted to the Directors Meetings early 2008.

71   Since the first educational initiatives at RDM in the summer of 2005, the involvement of knowledge institutes like the *Albeda College*, the *Hogeschool Rotterdam*, and Delft University of Technology with the CityPorts project had grown significantly. The involvement was signified by organizing courses, research assignments, and design competitions – such as the yearly Summer Schools – in the CityPorts area. On December 27, the institutes founded the CityPorts Academy Rotterdam (CAR) together with housing corporation *Woonbron* and a consultancy firm. The *Hogeschool*'s Knowledge Center Transurban – focusing on questions of mobility and urban development – had a coordinating role here, and worked together closely with the CityPorts Project Bureau on several issues. In addition, the *Hogeschool Rotterdam* was preparing an educational program together with the port authority. The program would have its kick off on the 'RDM Campus' in May 2008. Here, lectures by port experts would be combined with student assignments and graduation theses on port and port related development issues.

72   ODE Magazine, 'Urgenda: Nederland als proeftuin voor een groenere wereld' [Urgenda: The Netherlands as a laboratory for a greener World]. No. 111, November 2008, page 26-31.

73   In a PbSR interview in October 2008, the influence of these two scientists was confirmed. Professor dr. ir. Pier Vellinga has been working for the Wageningen University and Research Center (WUR) since March 1,

2007. He is also director of the *Klimaatcentrum* [Climate Center] of the *Vrije Universiteit* (VU University) in Amsterdam (since September 2006) and Chair of the *Stichting Natuur en Milieu* [Foundation Nature and Environment] in the Netherlands. Professor Jan Rotmans is director of the Knowledge Network of System Innovations and Transitions (KSI).

74 According to intermezzo reports and evaluations, PbSR minutes, and a letter sent to the Rotterdam City Council by the Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) on May 6, 2008.

75 The CityPorts New Year reception was attended by the author. The statement made by the Minister was: 'Als stadshavens goede plannen heeft, trek ik de portemonnee!' [If CityPorts has good plans, I will pull out my wallet!].

76 Minutes of the Directors Meeting on February 14 and Steering Group Meeting of February 18.

77 See www.urgenda.nl (also in English).

78 The Council Committee of Physical Infrastructure, Public Space and Sports.

79 Together with the port authority, the Rotterdam Climate Initiative, the *Urgenda*, and Rotterdam Climate Proof/*Kennis voor Klimaat*.

80 See 70.

81 We should note that there are some difficulties in translating Dutch terms like *draagvlak*, *vertrouwen*, or *goede wil*, as their meanings slightly differ from the English words used here.

Chapter 7 Conclusions: Strategies between City and Port

7.1 Introduction

The goal of this thesis is to provide a useful understanding of the strategies behind contemporary urban development projects. In order to do so, we chose to adopt a sociological institutionalist approach to the decisions and actions that signify such strategies, and proposed to explain them in terms of power. We arrived at a research framework that poses three main research questions: *What can we expect? What is actually done?* and *Does strategy follow structure?* These questions reflect the main point of departure of this thesis explained in chapter one. Here, we assumed that our knowledge of the world is produced in social interaction, and that our daily behavior is structured by our own capabilities and what we think we should do or are allowed to do. This point of departure resulted in the research framework reproduced once again in figure 7.1, connecting nine concepts and their reciprocal relationships as put forward in chapter two.

Figure 7.1 Full conceptual framework.

The research framework is built around an in-depth study of a critical case of an urban development project strategy, that of Rotterdam CityPorts. Prior to the three periods of strategic change described in chapter four to six, we explored the literature substantively related to the situational characteristics of our case. The result was a definition of perceptions actors in our case would be likely to have with regard to the challenges the Rotterdam CityPorts project is supposed to meet. In addition, we drew out the role-specific orientations of two port city actors featuring the literature most prominently: the port authority and the port city administration. In the three chapters that followed, we inferred the actual orientations of these port city actors from their decisions and actions in the context of our case. We combined these with interpretations of the resources actors

involved in each period have been able to mobilize, and of the strategic changes the urban development project interaction studied have implied. In this chapter, we will assess the relationships between these orientations, resources, and strategic changes identified in order to conclude our thesis. The argument we will be making is threefold.

In the next section, we will first evaluate the critical nature of our case in terms of urban development rules. As our main research questions point out, we will do this by comparing the orientations of actors actually involved in the Rotterdam CityPorts project with what we expected after our exploration in chapter three. This will allow us to discuss to what extent the perceptions, interests, norms, and identities have structured the decisions and actions that constitute our case. In section 7.3, we will then explain how the strategic changes identified in each of our case chapters are related to the resources those intending to realize the project have been able to mobilize. Our argument will show that the strategy-as-force relations introduced in chapter two provide a useful understanding of the strategic convergences in the decisions and actions described in each period, and that these relations are constituted by the eight urban development resources necessary to bring the project towards realization. This will effectively synthesize the concepts used in our research in section 7.4, and allow us to draw our final conclusions on the strategy behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project. Finally, in section 7.5, we will then put forward some recommendations by explaining the scope and uses of our strategy-as-force model, and explain how they can contribute to our quest for a productive relationship between urban development research and practice.

7.2 Rules between City and Port

In chapter three, we explored some of the knowledge available about the development of ports, of port cities, and of waterfront development projects. This gave us insight in the perceived challenges urban development projects in port cities are supposed to meet, and in the preferences that are likely to play a role in the development of the contemporaryport-city interface (see Figure 7.2). In that chapter, we thus answered our first main re

Port-City Actor Orientations		
Perceptions (shared)	• Economic growth and competition • Ongoing port migration for dockland redevelopment opportunities • Increase environmental quality of port and urban land uses.	
Preferences (role-specific)	Port authority	• Facilitating growth in cargo handling capacity and efficiency, stimulating value adding manufacturing and storage functions (interests) • Autonomy and flexibility in land use designations and investment decisions (norms) • Landlord (identity).
	Port city administration	• Attracting economic (service) functions, increasing resident quality of life (interests) • Timely attainment of policy and planning objectives (norms) • Facilitator (identity).

Figure 7.2 Port-city actor orientations likely to be found among actors in the Rotterdam CityPorts case (results from chapter three).

search question: *What can we expect?* The institutionalist approach adopted in this thesis tells us that, by doing so, we became more aware of the bias likely to be at work in our case (Schapf, 1997). In addition, our review also enabled us to strengthen our argument about the critical nature of our case: that Rotterdam CityPorts is a case in which the forces shaping contemporary urban development project strategies are strong. Now that we have unfolded our account of the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy, we are able to evaluate to what extent actor orientations apparent in our case can indeed be identified as 'urban development rules' found between a contemporary city and port.

Port-City Challenges

A known criticism of institutionalist research frameworks is that results tend to be tautological, i.e. self-confirming (Scharpf, 1997: 60; Flyvbjerg, 2004). This occurs when researchers infer the perceptions of actors from their courses of action, only to conclude that the actors investigated behaved according to what was in fact already known. Giddens (1984: 6) explains that while actors are usually able to provide reasons for their actions, they are not necessarily aware of their perceptions – i.e. the deeper 'motives' or worldviews behind their actions. This is due to the fact that as long as these actions seem conventional in light of shared perceptions, no questions will usually be asked. However, as soon as actions start to deviate from what is expected, rationalization will usually be demanded.[1] In an institutionalist investigation, it is in such a situation that a researcher will need to pay close attention: will actors relapse towards common perceptions, or will they make an effort to change them? In the Rotterdam CityPorts case, we found the following answers.

Perception 1: Economic growth and competition

One of the striking things about the Rotterdam CityPorts case is the meaning of the word 'economy'. In Rotterdam, it is a well-known fact that developing 'economic functions' primarily refers to the functions of the port (see also Wigmans, 1998; Meyer, 1999). When a specification is mandatory, the distinction between 'wet' and 'dry' will usually be made: 'wet' for water bound economic activities, and 'dry' for businesses without a direct need for access to the water. This vocabulary is apparent in all of our three strategic periods, and reflects a certain mental image of the CityPorts area that does not conform to its reality.

When the Rotterdam CityPorts project was initiated, it was believed that the *havens* in question represented ample opportunities to create a new working and living environment within the city. That idea changed when it became apparent that the area was in fact a well-functioning 'economic' area consisting of around 850 businesses providing up to around 20,000 jobs, and municipal departments were unable to thoroughly substantiate their claim for alternative – particularly residential – land uses. A full transformation discourse would soon be abandoned and replaced by a much more nuanced story focusing on 'economic renewal' instead of on a total port urban conversion. Later, it would become clear that the *stadshavens* accommodated a wide variety of wet and dry economic functions, and that transformation would in fact incur 'a huge destruction of capital' (see Chapter 5). The seemingly rigid boundaries between city and port on Rotterdam's municipal maps did not prove a division of land uses, but rather a division of tasks and jurisdictions.[2]

The perception of *economic growth and competition* clearly resonates with the story of Rotterdam CityPorts. However, it proved extremely difficult for the responsible develop-

ment company to convince its shareholders of abandoning an 'either/or' image of the area and see its more accurate 'both/and', effectively hybrid character. Too much damage had been done during earlier projections that featured large residential areas on what proved to be viable economic locations. It was not until later, when municipal and port authority departments performed their own research, that the diversity of land uses and development trajectories of CityPorts locations were finally acknowledged. This, however, turned out to work against the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR), because the new insights did no longer match its formal transformation-oriented assignment.

We conclude that although the perspective of economic growth and competition certainly has a clear substantive effect on policies and plans that define the city and port of Rotterdam in a distinct 'either/or' manner, it does not provide a clear view of the challenge in an area where wet and dry functions actually already intermix. While a geographically drawn boundary between city and port does provide a much desired division of tasks and jurisdictions, the case also shows that economic activities do not restrict themselves to such instrumental rationales. We witnessed this when the OMSR illuminated the presence of 'creative' economic functions and started to randomly attract both wet and dry business activities, and the quest for clear tasks and jurisdictions proved more of a hazard than a security (see Chapter 5). The later imposition of a continued comprehensive approach to the CityPorts area by higher government tiers was thus much more attuned to the actual economic activities going on inside the area. Hence, while the challenge of economic growth and competition is shared among the port city actors, it proved problematic in light of their role-specific interests and norms that demanded a strict port/city land use division – interests and norms we will address below. Yet, the actors directly involved declared that the efforts of the OMSR had slowly changed their perspective of the common challenge the CityPorts project was supposed to meet. During the three periods studied, they learned that the new relationship between Rotterdam's municipal administration and now corporatized port authority was producing an unprecedented port-city challenge: an urban development project that would have to support the economic growth and competitiveness of the port *as well as* the city.

Perception 2: Ongoing port migration

A challenge the Rotterdam CityPorts project is evidently supposed to meet is that of *ongoing port migration*. This is certainly the strongest perception apparent in our case, and has in fact been one of the fundamental motives behind the Rotterdam CityPorts initiative. While the *Visie en Durf* document in the year 2000 already announced seaward shifts, the motion that initiated the CityPorts project formalized a clear expectation that 'the forthcoming realization of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan would lead to the growth and relocation of port business, making way for new urban development' (see section 4.3). In all the strategic periods of our case, this expectation has been reiterated in numerous plans and policy documents, and uttered to the public several times by municipal as well as port authority executives. During all those years, the only specification that would be given of this shift was that relocations would particularly concern deep-sea transhipment activities, while the short-sea hub in the *Eemhaven* would be designated for intensification.

The perception of ongoing port migration for dockland redevelopment opportunities in Rotterdam is undisputed. Yet, the case provides little evidence of port companies

actually relocating toward deeper waters. Moreover, the motive behind such relocations – the realization of *Maasvlakte 2* – was not planned to occur before the year 2012, and would later even be delayed for at least a year. In reality, we have come across only a single voluntary relocation in the total case episode, which was already established prior to the official founding of development company OMSR in 2004. Soon after the first lessons about alternative 'dry' functions were learned, it became clear that only a 'passive relocation policy' would be a financially feasible development approach. The migration of a fruit handling company from the banks of the Northern *Merwehaven* to the south side of the river would, if ever, be likely to take place inside the CityPorts area – not downstream. In spite of some clear business incentives, this relocation was however not expected to be completely voluntary. After the formalization of the north-south deal in the year 2007, it was thus the port authority that would start the negotiations.

We conclude that the perception of migrating port functions from the CityPorts area downstream, though based on worldwide past experiences (see Chapter 3), is extremely biased in light of actual decisions, actions, and events. The second strategic period shows that the Rotterdam port authority (HbR) even witnessed an unexpected growth in short-sea container transhipment, which has made them adjust projections for the future use of the *Waalhaven* (see section 5.6). While this adjustment further substantiated HbR claims over this part of the CityPorts area, overall projections still kept reflecting the perception of a historical process that in fact did not show any real sign of continuity. This points out that in Rotterdam, the challenge of ongoing port migration should be understood as *both* a deliberate plan and an emergent pattern. The case thus confirms that today, shifts in the boundary between city and port can be as much the result of emergent decisions of private port companies as they are the deliberate outcome of a politicized negotiation between a port authority and its port city administration. In reference of a very similar observation made by Hoyle (2000) in chapter three, we therefore conclude that this perception does indeed constitute a persisting 'urban development rule' structuring the urban development project strategy investigated. In fact, in the Rotterdam CityPorts project situation, it is a rule that has proven more deliberate than emergent.

Perception 3: Increase environmental quality of port and urban land uses

Perceptions concerning the environmental quality of the Rotterdam CityPorts area have significantly changed during the three strategic periods identified. Herein, we distinguish four phases. The first phase relates to the initial plans for a port urban transformation of the CityPorts area, in which environmental qualities were perceived to increase automatically due particularly to the relocation of 24-hour transhipment activities. When those involved first learned about the heavy sound, air, and safety restrictions imposed on the area by environmental law, a more incremental perception emerged. This perception is signified by former port authority Director Scholten, who was confident that environmental regulations could be dealt with 'creatively' as soon as housing and amenities were ready to be introduced to the area (see section 5.2).

The third perception of the environmental challenge in the CityPorts area emerged when the OMSR sought a closer collaboration with environmental protection agency DCMR and other experts (see section 5.5). It had become clear that large-scale relocations could not be expected soon, but that different procedures would have to be complet-

ed swiftly when development opportunities arrived. The environment had already been pointed out as one out of four 'conditional ambitions' in the OMSR Development Strategy (OMSR, 2005b), which made it a central concern for the future quality of the area. The 'environmental strategy' developed by the OMSR would later be picked up and continued by the new Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR). As State-level discussions about the (im)possibilities of new environmental legislation mounted, acquaintances with the disparate CityPorts situation led to proposals in which the area would become eligible for an environmental *status aparte* (see section 6.5). Now, perceptions of the environmental challenge had shifted towards a Rotterdam-wide sustainability agenda including the port. Hence, opportunities for sustainable development now seemed to emerge *due to* the stringent environmental restrictions dominating the CityPorts project, not in spite of them.

From the above changes, it follows that perceptions of the environmental challenge in the Rotterdam CityPorts were not common among the actors involved. Influenced by external campaigns promoting sustainability and water agendas, they developed from a restrictive toward an opportunistic view in which the project could even receive an experimental status. From an approach in which the challenge would be to keep conforming to new regulations and procedures, perspectives have shifted towards sustainable experimentation. This meant that the Rotterdam CityPorts project had emerged as a challenge through which new environmental regulations and procedures might be tested, and by which the implications of rising water levels might be more concretely explored.

Perceptions Compared

The three perceptions discussed above give rise to an interesting overall conclusion. If we rank the three perceptions discussed along a continuum between stability and change (see Figure 7.3), we see that the second perception – that of ongoing port migration – seems most stable. In contrast, perceptions of the environmental challenge the CityPorts project is supposed to meet seem particularly dynamic, while the challenge of economic growth and competitiveness seems to reside somewhere between the other two. If we focus on the two extremes, we discover that the perception of ongoing port migration adheres to a global 'rationale' based on a compelling amount of scientific knowledge on port evolutions, port-city relationships and waterfront development projects (see Chapter 3). In theory as well as in practice, such perceptions are clearly not easily abandoned.


Figure 7.3 Continuum of perceived port-city challenges (Rotterdam CityPorts).

On the other end of our continuum, we find that the perception of increasing the environmental quality of port and urban land uses is much less conventional, and in fact, much more experimental. Reasons for this evidently lie in the availability of land and in a growing public concern over the use of waterfront zones. While a conventional solution may have been to relocate environmentally impacting port industrial activities to locations downstream, the research reviewed in chapter three points out that such solutions have since the 1970s become increasingly wanting (e.g. Hayuth, 1982). In the Rotterdam CityPorts case, delays in the realization of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan and an unexpected increase in port business thus created a situation in which unconventional – or 'unorthodox' – thinking was regarded to be the only way forward. When State Ministries proved to be receptive of such thinking, things started to move.

What happens when actual decisions and actions observed in practice deviate from conventional theories and perceptions? According to scholars like Giddens (1984) and Mintzberg (1994), such cases imply learning. In relation to environmental issues, the practical common sense of those directly involved started to depart from what was considered rational by actors remaining at a distance. When it was announced that the relocation of port installations would stay limited, it was rational for those external to the project to assume its failure. And, finally, when shared perceptions of economic growth and competitiveness resulted in a rational land use competition 'between city and port', the practical common sense of those caught in the middle brought them to capitalize on unconventional resources and effectively change their strategy – a conclusion we will elaborate on in the next section.

Interests, Norms, and Identities

In chapter two, we introduced the principle of methodological individualism as a way of distinguishing between the role-specific interests, norms, and identities of actors in our case (Scharpf, 1997, see Figure 7.4). This principle acknowledges that while actors may be acting on behalf of a particular group or organization, their decisions and actions might in fact portray orientations that are more specific or differ from the larger whole. In chapter three, we distinguished two entities most likely to be involved in our case – the port authority and port city administration, in short: port-city actors – and defined their institutional orientations according to the literature examined. By the end of each strategic period in our case, we then inferred and discussed the 'interests' and 'norms' of these

Actor Orientations		
Perceptions	Combinations of knowledge and ignorance shared among actors in a particular situation on the basis of which action is taken.	
Preferences	*Interests*	Specific (e.g. individual or organizational) requirements for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth
	Norms	Specific expectations, conditions or restrictions in relation to particular action, or to the purposes to be achieved thereby
	Identity	Stable emphasis on certain aspects of interests and norms in order to simplify choices and reduce uncertainty towards others.

Figure 7.4 Definition of actor orientations: perceptions and preferences (based on Scharpf, 1997).

'port city actors' from their actual behavior. Here, we distinguished between particular actors and larger entities only if empirical evidence made it necessary to do so. In the following, we draw together our findings in order to evaluate to what extent strategy follows structure.

Port-City Interests and Norms

In the first period of the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy we recognized some distinct interests and norms among the two typical port-city actors identified in chapter three. During this strategic period, we witnessed that the Rotterdam port authority was in fact still a municipal department, and registered how ambitions of autonomy and growth led to a political 'package deal' – *Visie en Durf* – in which transformation opportunities for older port areas were included. This deal was focused on the realization of port expansion plan *Maasvlakte 2* and several environmental compensation measures, and would involve some of the key actors in our story: Mayor Opstelten, Port Director Scholten, and municipal planning Director De Ruiter. Later on, in the year 2003, the latter would become the director of the new semi-independent development agency. In the previous year, Port Director Scholten had found the newly appointed Port Alderman Van Sluis to be an important political partner in organizing a decision that would become known as an 'administrative triple strike'. The decision effectively formalized 1) the corporatization (*verzelfstandiging*) of the Rotterdam municipal port authority, 2) the financing of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan, and 3) the founding of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR). It is to this decision and its preceding actions that we traced back the strategy behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project.

If we look at the interests and norms of the actors we distinguished across the three strategic periods, we see that some important separations had to be made. In the first period, we discovered that the administrative triple strike described above moved against the interests and norms of the municipal departments. Their interests were focused on the execution of their core planning and development tasks, each within clearly defined port *versus* urban responsibilities and jurisdictions. The decision to found a separate, semi-independent vehicle for the development of the CityPorts area was received with a lot of skepticism. For the municipal departments of urban planning (dS+V) and development (OBR), the CityPorts area represented the next generation of waterfront development opportunities in Rotterdam after the *Kop van Zuid* project. For the newly founded Port of Rotterdam PLC, it represented a still viable port area over which it had finally been granted full and autonomous control. Obviously, this last point is crucial in relation to our case. While Port Alderman Van Sluis and Port Director Scholten supported the CityPorts initiative in light of the triple strike, land transfers had not been pulled into the deal. Later, it would be explained that land transfers had to be 'phased' due to the heavy maintenance and operation tasks the new development company would otherwise have been confronted with (see section 4.3). What followed was a process of negotiation in which port authority officials would argue in favor of the continuation of port business activities in the CityPorts area. Without the support of the municipal urban planning and development departments, OMSR would not be able to confidently state its own claim, and supply the port authority with the necessary retort. Instead of an area for port to urban residential transformation, CityPorts was labeled as a 'search area' for incremental development op-

portunities primarily fit for economic uses.

We conclude that the decisions and actions of the municipal departments and corporatized port authority portray very similar interests and norms that logically conflict in an area designated for 'a change of color' (see section 5.2). For the municipal departments, the triple strike and accompanying land transfers also signified a definite port/city separation of responsibilities and tasks. While there was still some involvement on individual levels – particularly from those assigned to the CityPorts project by OMSR commission – executive interests diminished significantly during the second strategic period of our case. To the port authority, the OMSR became a discussion platform with its own opinion about the development trajectory of the area. Alderman Van Sluis and Port Director Scholten were politically bound to keep supporting the OMSR endeavor, but became preoccupied with other concerns, especially when the latter was forced to leave office. Despite different small-scale initiatives and interventions, it was not until the interests of members of the Economic Development Board Rotterdam and housing corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers* were combined with supra-municipal support for OMSR plans that municipal department attention was regained. Here, the motive was that the realization of CityPorts plans could induce an undesirable intra-municipal competition between project initiatives and related acquisitions of regional infrastructure funds.

It was not before the Rotterdam port authority (HbR) rid itself from its statutory commitment to the CityPorts project in order to secure State financing of the Project Mainport Development Rotterdam (PMR) that it could announce a withdrawal from its OMSR participation. This decision, however, was blocked by Port Alderman Van Sluis, who was also Chair of the HbR Board of Commissioners.[3] He had just secured a deal to transform part of the terrain of the historic *Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij* (RDM) into a center for Research, Design and Manufacturing, and demanded the exploration of alternative solutions. Persistent norms around the separation of tasks and jurisdictions thus led to the proposal of the north-south deal – a separation which would still commit the port authority to the development initiatives that had emerged on the RDM terrain.

In the third period of the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy, administrative support for the CityPorts project was guaranteed by the involvement of Mayor Opstelten and the mounting government interests in the project on supra-municipal levels. Alderman Van Sluis' political party *Leefbaar Rotterdam* was forced into the opposition after the municipal elections of March 2006, after which he stepped down from politics altogether. The interests of the HbR and their new director appeared more aligned, and the formalization of the north-south deal was clearing up the financial and legal conditions involved in eventual land transfers. Now, the *Maas/Rijnhaven* area – which had in part already been under municipal control – could be added to the program, while the projects already realized or in motion could be used to present preliminary results and apply for funding on State, provincial, and regional administrative levels. While the latter was clearly the result of earlier OMSR efforts, the organization would nevertheless be dismantled and replaced by a Project Bureau that would focus on overarching tasks. Planning and development responsibilities were now performed by the appropriate municipal and port authority departments. Political and financial credit with the City Council had however been damaged. While explanations for the new north-south arrangement was being defended in the appropriate City Council committee, the shared perspective of strengthening Rotterdam's

economy and urban living conditions was combined with a clear norm: timely results. The applied time pressure quickly made the new Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau pick up on lessons learned and ideas prompted earlier by the OMSR. What was formally not judged feasible before, could now be adopted and implemented.

Identities

In chapter three, we learned that contemporary ports find themselves as nodes or hubs in global cargo transportation networks dominated by large transnational shipping companies. As such, port authorities in Europe are trying to gain control over larger parts of the 'value chain' they are a part of, and find it imperative to be able to offer space for the development of terminals dedicated to shipping companies operating the world's largest deep-sea container vessels. Such is the importance of the realization of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan in the port of Rotterdam that has been dominating the background of the CityPorts project from its very inception. Political momentum made it possible to bring Rotterdam's port expansion plan closer to realization by supporting the corporatization of its port authority in exchange for a 'dowry'. Then, that same momentum made it impossible to do all the work necessary to turn the new development company into what those involved would term a 'viable organization' (see section 4.3). That the Port of Rotterdam PLC would claim its role as the landlord of the whole port by emphasizing its newly acquired autonomy could – in light of what we discussed in chapter three – very well be expected. The propagation of this identity is also clearly what we witnessed in the Rotterdam CityPorts case. The port authority's arguments in favor of continued port uses and seemingly ongoing administrative changes subsequently pushed the CityPorts team into an extremely dependent position. Without any land use control, it needed to build up its viability through different resources.

In contrast to the strong identity portrayed by the port authority, the behavior of the 'port city administration' showed a much more divided image. In interviews, actors involved in the Rotterdam CityPorts case often aggregated and simplified things by referring to other actors as those concerned with 'the city' or 'the port' in their answers. Additional questions would then lead to distinctions between departments – i.e. 'the line' – and their superiors – whether individual directors or politicians. These distinctions are also made in the analyses of 'port city orientations' in each case chapter. Thus, we can conclude that while port authority directors and politicians were stably oriented towards the timely realization of tangible results, the departments were much more focused on their responsibilities and jurisdictions in relation to existing and planned land uses. Hence, we did not find a stable emphasis on the facilitating role suggested in the literature, except from (actors working for or on behalf of) the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company. It was only in the third strategic period of the case that we found 'the city' to stress such a role in policy documents by defining public investments in accessibility and environmental qualities as shaping the conditions for future private developments (see section 6.4). We will return to this point in the next section.

In sum, we can conclude that the civil servants directly involved in the CityPorts project did not succeed in getting their new perceptions of the economic and environmental challenges in the Rotterdam CityPorts area across to their respective organizations. The new perceptions corresponded poorly to persisting interests and norms seeking the

continuation of a strict port/city division of responsibilities, tasks, and land uses. As the people involved were separated, it can therefore be easily stated that the organizational changes after the north-south deal has threatened the search for interventions that support the economic growth and competitiveness of *both* port and city. In May 2008, where our story of the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy ends, it seemed that perceptions of a new, unprecedented challenge was still limited to the hearts and minds of the actors close to the project.

The Rotterdam CityPorts Arena

One of the most principle questions in research efforts focusing on the processes behind urban development projects are about 'who' is involved (from Dahl, 1961/2005 to Flyvbjerg, 1998b to Majoor, 2008). In chapter two, we explained that we chose to employ the descriptive tool of the 'arena'. We did this because it allows for interpretations of conflict as well as consensus, or rather, because it reflects that reality is always a shifting in-between. The actors that intend to effect (or affect) the realization of the Rotterdam City-Ports project have, while bound to it by common goals, clearly not been in agreement over development trajectories. In fact, the decisions and actions of the port authority showed that it was held inside the arena by its statutory goal to contribute, and by the dedication of several individuals to the project. Municipal departments were also involved only on a personal level, of which Port Alderman Van Sluis and – later on – Mayor Opstelten are most prominent. In the background, the case material shows that the policy advisors of the *gemeentelijke bestuursdienst* (BSD) have also played a significant role in keeping the project moving.


Figure 7.5 The Rotterdam CityPorts Arena (period March 2006-May 2008).

In daily practice, it is common to associate those involved in the realization of an urban development project's with a clear entity, i.e. a distinct 'management organization'. To most actors in our case, this organization was the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR), which would later be replaced by the Project Bureau (PbSR). Although the latter would emphatically position itself as merely the coordinator of 'overarching' tasks and issues without any formal jurisdictions, it would eventually be granted the trust of responsible politicians and executives to deliberate the completion of necessary State plans and procedures on their behalf. Nevertheless, all actors formally responsible as well as those working on specific policies, plans, projects, and procedures inside municipal, port, and other organizations (see Figure 7.5) can be seen as to portray an intent to effect (or affect) the realization of Rotterdam CityPorts – whatever its results will eventually turn out to be. While it may thus stay common and practical to point out one of these organizations as managing the Rotterdam CityPorts project, our analysis shows that the actors actually 'steering' the project closer to realization are widely dispersed. This is an important observation that cannot be overstated. Our study of the Rotterdam CityPorts case does not show the OMSR and PbSR as managing the project, especially not if managing implies direct and exclusive control over the project's outcome. All actors depicted in the three strategy arenas depicted in Appendix 2 are directly involved in shaping the future of the CityPorts area, although their relative influence on the development trajectory of the project is different and enduringly shifting. In this last regard, we acknowledge that the arena sketched out in each case chapter is unmistakably formal and reductive. What stays hidden in our arenas, for example, is the involvement of individuals belonging to one or several of the organizations, groups, or entities depicted, such as active residents or entrepreneurs in and outside of the area. Nevertheless, we hold that the arenas still do provide a useful view of the actors closely involved in our case, albeit on different aggregate levels. Further research would have to point to other tools that might be used to this end – tools that may be more in tune with the dispersed and dynamic character of the actors or 'community' actually involved in an urban development project's realization. So, we conclude that the notion of the arena, as used in this thesis, is useful as a tool to approach and visualize the social complexity of our case. However, we emphasize that this tool does not help us to understand the power relations shaping the urban development project strategy studied. These are more usefully analyzed and interpreted by employing the strategy-as-force perspective adopted throughout this thesis.

7.3 Urban Development Resources

In chapter two, we drew an analytical distinction between the urban development rules and resources that we perceive to be constitutive of the capacity to bring an urban development project towards realization. This theoretical 'dialectic' between urban development rules and resources is a specification of Giddens' (1984) dialectic of control, and is strongly related to Schapf's (1997) notion of strategic capacity and Healey's (2007) transformative force and governance capacity. In section 2.5, we introduced the concept of urban development force, and proposed that it consists of four pairs of 'urban development resources', each consisting of an inalienable and a substitutable category. In each case

chapter, we argued how and by whom these resources had been mobilized in the period described. Figure 7.6 provides an overview of these urban development resources and their elements, and groups them according to their class and the strategy-as-force relations shaped by their mobilization. Before we show the way these relations and resources explain the pattern found in the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy, we will first define and illustrate them here.

Material Relations: Property and Finance

In chapter two, we explained that allocative resources refer to the 'power to' effect the actions of others, i.e. the resources drawn upon to have others do what they might otherwise not do or choose to do differently. This implies that, in this thesis, we understand power as a relational factor existing only between actors – it is something that is exercised, not possessed. The first and most tangible resource category we distinguish within this class is *property*, the elements of which are land, water, buildings, infrastructure and public space. In the first chapter of our case, we witnessed how one of the formal motives for the designation of the CityPorts area as a new project area was the municipal procurement of the so-called '*Baristerrein*', the terrain of the former *Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij* (RDM). Moreover, most of the land in the area was under municipal control, which theoretically provided the opportunity to develop an active new land use policy for the area. However, most of the municipal land and water fell under the jurisdiction of the port authority, and its corporatization (*verzelfstandiging*) implied that the economic ownership of the docklands would be fully transferred to the new *Haven van Rotterdam NV*. Still, this did not mean that the municipality or newly founded port authority could easily mobilize this resource and induce developments. Most of the land was leased out to port companies and smaller port industrial businesses, who had built their own property like infrastructures and buildings on the terrains. Housing corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers* was the

Class	Relation	Resource	Elements
Allocative	Material	Property	land, water, buildings, infrastructure, public space
		Finance	private investments, public subsidy, gifts
	Planning	Instruments	contracts, plans, presentations, websites, press
		Time/Result	opportunity, momentum, procedure
Authoritative	Knowledge	Information	history, geography, regulations
		Expertise	access to information, skill
	Deliberative	Commitment	belief, trust, persuasiveness
		Legitimacy	accountability, ethics, acquiescence

Figure 7.6 The urban development resources and strategy-as-force relations identified in the CityPorts case, ordered by class after Giddens (1984).

owner of (most) residential units in the village *Heijplaat*, where residents had shown considerable perseverance against any relocation policies (see Box 4 in Chapter 5). A small part of the area is also privately owned, and old building structures – such as those on the *Quarantaine Terrein* – had been occupied by resident artists and the like. All this meant that, except for the procured RDM terrain in which the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) would reside, new developments could not be easily induced. A prime example of a voluntary relocation would be that of shipping company DFDS in the South-Eastern *Waalhaven*, which provided space for a private office development called DockWorks. Eventually, RDM buildings and terrain would be sub-let to the OMSR by the port authority, but no land would ever be transferred during the OMSR operation. We will return to the strategic implications of this fact in the next section.

The second resource distinguished in the CityPorts case is that of *finance*. Except for small scale interventions like the above mentioned office developments, no large-scale private investments have been registered that were aimed at realizing the port urban transformation that was originally planned and expected to occur. In fact, most financial resources mobilized during strategic periods described were those of the municipality and port authority – contributions for OMSR operations – and would later be complemented by investments from the *Hogeschool Rotterdam*, *Albeda College*, and housing corporation *Woonbron*. In addition, funding from higher government tiers occurred when, for example, the Province of South Holland subsidized a development on the *Heysehaven* on the RDM terrain.

Property can be defined as a clear non-substitutable resource, which means that it cannot be exchanged due to the geographically bounded character of an urban development project.[4] However, in the Rotterdam CityPorts case, we have witnessed two ways in which the actors involved mobilized this resource despite of its inalienable characteristic. The first was in the reclamation of land from the *Waalhaven* basin for office developments, effectively exchanging water for land uses in the area. The second was when the boundaries of the CityPorts area were redrawn, for example, to include the industrial area *New Mathenesse* inside neighboring municipality Schiedam and to add the *Rijn/Maashaven* to the CityPorts program. In sum, both property and finance imply *material relations* between actors, which we define as the strategy-as-force relations through which property and finance are added to the capacity to effect the realization of the urban development project.

Planning Relations: Instruments and Time/Result

One of the most crucial insights obtained from the Rotterdam CityPorts case is that *instruments*, whether communicative or legal, have been mobilized generatively for the realization of the project. By this we mean that almost all the plans and agreements featuring the Rotterdam CityPorts project were actually used to effect the actions of others, not to coordinate or control them authoritatively. This fact is well illustrated by plans such as the *Havenplan 2020* – see the 'map of chances' in figure 5.5 – the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Strategy, the Economic Vision 2020, the 'priorities of the *Zuidvleugel*', the *RR2020*, the 'Gateway to Europe' document, the *Stadsvisie*, and even the Unorthodox Idea Guide (see section 6.1). These plans and more were not aimed at coordinating specific land uses, but to explore and effectively induce the emergence of a market potential for the CityPorts area. Small, essentially unplanned successes were incorporated into subsequent plans, and stimulating interventions like environmental and accessibility improvements were an-

nounced. Presentations, newsletters, media statements, websites, and booklets were used as communicative instruments in order to 'put the project on the map' and bring it to life. In other words, they were used as vehicles of 'discursive seduction' in order to convince both government and market of the area's prospective (Healey, 2007).

According to Hillier (2002: 5), 'elected representatives want results and they want results immediately. Time is of the essence'. A more specific notion is uttered by Gordon (1997b), who observed how politicians in his case studies used the absence of significant waterfront developments after several years as evidence of an authority's failure. Here, we can conclude that the politicians involved in the Rotterdam CityPorts case portrayed the same behavior, particularly around the dismantling of development company OMSR and the effectuation of the north-south deal (section 6.4). In the beginning of our case, Alderman Van Sluis would also push for timely results, but this attitude changed when the existing situation in the CityPorts area became apparent. All this brings us to identify time/result as a specific allocative resource, which has to be mobilized in order to be able to 'move on'. Eventually, the OMSR would officially be in operation for less than three years when it was announced that the 'studying was over'. When the subsequent Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau was in place, time would indeed be regarded of the essence.

Because it can only be mobilized by those formally responsible for the project, *time/result* can be regarded as an essential non-substitutable resource. In fact, we saw how projects implemented in or on the boundaries of the CityPorts area by the port authority and municipal departments could only be announced by the OMSR without claiming any credit (section 6.1). Instruments, however, can be mobilized by anyone wishing to become involved in the project's realization. We witnessed this in our case when members of the Economic Development Board Rotterdam adopted the CityPorts project into their Economic Vision, and when housing corporation *Woonbron* signed a collaboration agreement with the OMSR for the 'Greater *Heijplaat*' initiatives. Finally, it should also be noted that instruments can also be used as arguments against a development initiative. The business cases demanded from the OMSR by its shareholders illustrate this point, because these would particularly be used to evidence the unfeasibility of planned interventions – interventions which would later nevertheless be picked up and implemented.

Knowledge Relations: Expertise and Information

In the first strategic period of the Rotterdam CityPorts case, we witnessed how ideas about waterfront development projects obtained from abroad – particularly Hamburg and London – shaped the content of the decision that motivated the CityPorts initiative and its organization. In the following years, the case shows that international comparisons continued to be made, but that it was also acknowledged that the precedents could not easily be found (section 5.2). Nevertheless, it was still considered important to keep studying outside experiences in order to find out what could be learned from other projects. We will return to this point in the next section.

Recruiting professionals from the port authority as well as the municipal departments responsible for the development of the city of Rotterdam can be recognized as the mobilization of an important authoritative resource: *expertise*. OMSR Director De Ruiter – who had also worked on the 'Vision and Dare' document in 2000 with port authority and environmental organization officials – was chosen to lead the CityPorts project due

to his 30-year experience in area-based projects and acquaintance with port urban assignments (OMSR, 2006). He recruited people from different municipal departments, and complemented his team with others from private organizations and Rotterdam's regional government body (section 4.3). Later on, different advisors would be invited to regularly reflect on OMSR activities (section 5.2), and intensive consultations would also incrementally mobilize the necessary knowledge. When De Ruiter was replaced, Director Beekman of the new Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR) was chosen for his mediating and motivating skills and the fact that he did not have a recent 'history' in Rotterdam's urban planning and development sector (section 6.3). OMSR staff members were offered positions within the new organizational structure erected for the continuation of the CityPorts project in order not to lose the expertise they carried with them.

Our account of the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy demonstrates that most of the work done by the CityPorts team was focused on getting to know the characteristics of the area and its (existing and potential) users. Initially, it was particularly the port authority that could mobilize such *information*. The logical place for the CityPorts team in that period was therefore the World Port Center – the home office of the port authority organization. Here, the information needed could easily be accessed, and questions about the area could quickly be answered. After their move to the RDM terrain, the CityPorts team learned about the area hands-on in order to develop practical ideas about the area's development trajectory. Additional information was provided by other municipal departments – e.g. about buildings, infrastructures, and regulatory restrictions – and by other bodies like the regional environmental protection agency and higher government tiers. Results were gathered and published in a so-called 'knowledge atlas' as well as in other documents and books. In this thesis, we distinguish all this information as an explicit resource mobilized during the operations of the CityPorts team, and continued in the subsequent PbSR stage.

From the case account, it can be concluded that much of the information and expertise mobilized during the process of strategy formation of the OMSR was initially ignored or downplayed by its shareholders. Instead of well-informed development perspectives, the OMSR Development Strategy document was regarded as an opinion – i.e. as a 'mobilization of bias' (Giddens, 1984; Healey, 2007) – without the necessary tangible focus (section 5.5). Later, this would be explained as a lack of ownership of the ideas due to the distance that had mutually been created between the organizations – a 'not invented by us' syndrome that needed some time before it was cleared up (section 6.5).

Here, we again make a distinction between the resources defined by pointing out expertise as an inalienable resource. While experts are no doubt able to provide discursive information based on their expertise, such information could never replace the practical knowledge or 'skill' mobilized in action (Giddens, 1984; Flyvbjerg, 2001a). The *knowledge relations* created during the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy can thus be defined as: the strategy-as-force relations through which information and expertise are added to the capacity to affect the realization of the urban development project.

Deliberative Relations: Commitment and Legitimacy

One of the core issues in the literature on power reviewed for this thesis (see Chapter 2) is the role of key decision makers who have the legal prerogative to coordinate the actions

of others. Their commitment to an urban development project can be crucial when arguments against the project or its projected outcome arise. Such commitment can take away important uncertainties for those who are involved in the project, or who are deliberating about the mobilization of their resources in order to bring the project towards realization. Because uncertainties incur risk, all elements that provide a perceived stability among those involved in the urban development project will make their decisions – which we defined as commitments to action – easier to make. This stability is, in our view, the only authoritative force of documents and plans like the *Stadsvisie* mentioned above. These instruments essentially promise temporary order and consistency in future planning decisions, so as to allow investors to assess, for example, whether or not to dedicate their resources to a particular project.

In the Rotterdam CityPorts case, we have witnessed the early involvement of Mayor Opstelten and Port Director Scholten in the establishment of the *Visie en Durf* agreement that would eventually lead to the 'administrative triple strike' including *Maasvlakte 2* and the CityPorts project. While Mayor Opstelten temporarily moved into the background of our story, Port Alderman Van Sluis and the port authority Director committed themselves to the project in light of the threefold agreement. When Scholten was forced to leave office due to the RDM Affair (Box 6 in Chapter 5) and several municipal directors were also replaced, Van Sluis would be the only one left to defend the CityPorts project. Mayor Opstelten would pick up his commitment to the project when supra-municipal bodies had shown their interest in tying CityPorts to their policy objectives, and a prioritization had to be made about the projects Rotterdam wanted to deliver. The case material points out that the commitment of the Mayor and Port Alderman has played a crucial role in the transition of the project around the north-south deal, which was supported by the policy advisors of the *Gemeentelijke Bestuursdienst* (BSD). In the new situation, the commitment of different municipal department directors was formalized in the Collaboration Agreement CityPorts (section 6.4). Moreover, port authority Director Smits now also regarded the endeavor of mutual interest – the commitment of the port authority would secure the development of RDM West into a cluster for Research, Design, and Manufacturing. In regard to the latter, the case shows that the support of EDBR members Boekhoud – Chair of the *Albeda College* – and Tuytel – Chair of the *Hogeschool Rotterdam* – for the RDM project has also been of crucial importance.

Next to commitment, we distinguish legitimacy as a crucial, non-substitutable urban development resource. In relation to the CityPorts project, this resource could be mobilized particularly by the Rotterdam City Council, although deliberations on provincial and State levels have also played a role in our case. In the CityPorts material collected, we have found three instances where the City Council and its Committees have played a particularly significant legitimizing role. The first were the deliberations around the motion of Van der Heijden *et al.* in November 2002, which followed shortly after the City Council Committee for Economy, Port, and Environment (EHM) conducted an international study trip. Despite some objections, the motion to found a separate development company was passed, which effectively caused a tension in the municipal departments concerned (see sections 4.3 and 7.2). The second instance was when the City Council was informed about the cancellation of a full transfer of the CityPorts docklands from the port authority to the development company by the Board of Mayor and Alderman in May 2003 (section

4.3). This cancellation was argued to be due to the heavy maintenance and operation tasks that would accompany such a transfer, and due to the obscurities that this would cause to port lessees. All the port areas would thus first be transferred to the corporatized port authority, which also made it possible to utilize the political momentum surrounding the 'triple strike' and escape prolonged negotiations and legal procedures. The third instance in which City Council members legitimized the CityPorts effort was when the responsible Council Committee refrained from demanding a Council-wide deliberation over the north-south deal. Here, time constraints – this time in relation to the acquirement of supra-municipal funds – would again play a crucial role. Because the new arrangements did not concern the continuation of the CityPorts project itself, it was argued that no substantive policy decisions were involved for which Council-wide deliberations were necessary. After Mayor Opstelten had defended the details of the north-south deal himself, the Council Committee appeared to be satisfied (section 6.2).

Urban Development Force Relations		
Allocative	*Material*	Interaction through which property and finance are added to the capacity to *effect* the realization of the urban development project.
	Planning	Interaction through which instruments and time/result are added to the capacity to *effect* the realization of the urban development project.
Authoritative	*Deliberative*	Interaction through which commitment and legitimacy are added to the capacity to *affect* the realization of the urban development project.
	Knowledge	Interaction through which information and expertise are added to the capacity to *affect* the realization of the urban development project.

Figure 7.7 Definitions of force relations identified in the Rotterdam CityPorts case.

After the deliberations of the north-south deal were over, the Rotterdam City Council formalized a way to monitor all the primary urban development projects throughout the city more closely. The PbSR would be made responsible for compiling the reports necessary for this, but also deployed a 'communication strategy' in which the responsible Council Committees would be duly informed about the project's progress. In conclusion, we interpret the mobilization of *commitment* and *legitimacy* described above as constitutive of the *deliberative relations* necessary to affect the realization of the urban development project. In figure 7.7, we propose the definitions of the urban development force relations identified in the Rotterdam CityPorts case.

7.4 Synthesis: Strategy as Force

In this thesis, we combined Mintzberg's (2007) fourfold definition of strategy with Healey's (2007) interpretations of spatial strategy-making to analyze the decisions and actions that shape our case. In each case chapter, this allowed us to define the pattern recognized in the processes of strategy formation behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project. We distinguished three shifts: from hierarchical planning to area-based learning, from area-based learning to competitive venturing, and from competitive venturing to comprehensive visioning. In

this section, we will discuss to what extent these shifts relate to the force relationships defined and illustrated above, and draw out the strategy-as-force relations that we propose to explain our case. Here, we do not propose a 'causal' relationship between strategy and force, but we propose that the strategic shifts recognized relate to a shift in the force relations between the actors involved in the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project. In other words, we thus propose that the things people decide and do in order to bring a project forward corresponds with the resources they are able to draw upon themselves and mobilize through others. This correspondence, in short, is the core proposition of this thesis.

From Strategy to Power

In the introducing chapter of this thesis, we referred to scholars who argued that urban waterfronts are magnified intersections of a number of forces, particularly the political and economic (Malone, 1996; Marshall, 2001). Needless to say, the case of Rotterdam CityPorts clearly confirms this argument. We conclude that the political forces in our case have been particularly focused on the mobilization of property and finance, that is, on the division of land uses in the CityPorts area against the background of a new port expansion plan: *Maasvlakte 2.* In our view, the founding of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) can best be understood as a compromise produced by the political forces 'between city and port' – a political status quo that lasted for more than three years in anticipation of final decision-making on the *Maasvlakte 2* plans. In the meantime, however, things changed.

In the years of the OMSR operation, we argued that the decisions and actions of all the actors involved in the Rotterdam CityPorts project can predominantly be classified as strategic learning. Without any land and little financial resources to work with, we conclude that the OMSR did what it could to interpret and reframe its assignment: focus on knowledge relations. In doing so, it effectively mobilized the expertise and information it needed. While many believed that these were acts of plan-making, our analysis shows that they were actually acts of sense-making (see Figure 7.8). This view was confirmed when those involved acknowledged that they did not

		Strategy Process	
		Deliberate Plan	**Emergent Pattern**
Strategy Content	**Tangible Positions**	*Strategic Planning* Deliberate plans about tangible positions. plan-making programming	*Strategic Venturing* Emergent patterns manifested as tangible positions. place-making discovering
	Broad Perspective	*Strategic Visioning* Deliberate plans in the form of a broad perspective. future-making imagining/designing	*Strategic Learning* Emergent patterns that result in a broad perspective. sense-making (re)framing/interpreting

Figure 7.8 Analytical distinction between four processes of strategy formation (based on Mintzberg, 2008 with additions taken from Healey, 2007).

know what they eventually started out with, and that they had to find out their assignment along the way. While the mandatory plan-making continued, we thus conclude that the decisions and actions were actually focused upon an entirely different and yet undefined outcome.

The presence of the OMSR in the CityPorts area meant that their strategic learning efforts were particularly area-based. The actors involved got to know the area and its users – like residents, artists, and entrepreneurs – and discovered different urban and port related development opportunities. Together with the knowledge institutes and 'creative' entrepreneurs they built relations with, new development trajectories for different locations in the vast and diverse CityPorts area started to take shape. In these decisions and actions, we clearly recognize strategic venturing: an emergent pattern manifested as tangible positions. Of those tangible positions, the RDM terrain would become the most prominent. The renovation of *Droogdok 17* and the initiative to transform the western part of the terrain into an area for Research, Design and Manufacturing, was an unexpected but significant result. A result that would effectively start to reframe the broad perspectives of all those involved in the CityPorts project including municipal and port authority officials. The focus on sense-making shifted towards place-making.

Figure 7.9 Model of strategy-as-force relationships.

All the work done by the OMSR and related actors had made their capacity to realize the CityPorts project grow. However, deliberative relationships needed to be added to this capacity as questions about the legitimacy of the OMSR operation mounted. Both the port authority and municipal urban planning and development departments regarded the emergent CityPorts strategy as competing with their own strategic planning for the port and the city as a whole. Hence, the competitive venturing of those involved in the CityPorts project resulted in the effectuation of the north-south deal, legitimizing lessons learned and local development trajectories discovered (see Figure 7.9 and 7.10).

7.5 Towards Effective Strategies

The model of strategy-as-force relationships proposed and substantiated in this thesis is based upon a synthesis of theoretical concepts and empirical insights. This means that it is the product of a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning in an attempt to theorize

Figure 7.10 Pattern of the Rotterdam CityPorts project strategy (November 2002-May 2008).

a situated practice. Moreover, we explicitly acknowledged the context-dependency and social character of the production of knowledge and action as a scientific point of departure in chapter two. All this makes us aware of the fact that the resources, force relations, and fourfold definition strategy reflected in the strategy-as-force model (depicted once more in Figure 7.11) are also context-dependent and value-laden. Where we have tried to be as transparent as possible about its normative grounds, we have also provided several reasons in this thesis for why we think this theoretical model can prove useful beyond the Rotterdam CityPorts context alone. We repeat these normative grounds and reasons here.


Figure 7.11 The strategy-as-force model.

Proposing 'legitimacy' as a mandatory urban development resource reflects a normative standpoint and a crucial insight supported by our case, namely that this legitimacy is not mobilized in an isolated, 'objective' sphere based on 'neutral' argumentation. It is important to acknowledge this, and recognize that all actors involved have biased orientations of the challenges an urban development project is supposed to meet, and what ought to be done in order to get there. Moreover, it needs to be understood that these endeavors often take decennia to accomplish, and require relentless efforts of a multitude of actors – including politicians – who are prone to 'change their mind' in light of new insights and circumstances. The emphasis on legitimacy is not an attempt to change these dynamics, but rather to stress that changing orientations will have important consequences for the relations between those who bring an urban development project to life. When the development trajectory of an urban development project needs to be adjusted, the argumentation behind it should be well-informed and thoroughly communicated. Our research indicates that this is what makes an urban development project strategy both effective and

legitimate: it anticipates change and involves all actors who depend on each other in making well-considered and timely decisions. For the actors involved in the Rotterdam City-Ports project, this implies continuous attention for all four types of relationships defined in this chapter, and a constant willingness to learn and to adapt.

In the first three chapters of this thesis, we argued that the Rotterdam CityPorts case can be regarded of a critical quality. If anything, the next three chapters illustrate that its complexity is enormous. Here, the forces shaping the urban development project strategy could be expected to be especially amplified, and insights obtained could thus be regarded valid for most if not all cases (see sections 1.3 and 2.7). Still, we have to acknowledge that the theoretical and empirical work this thesis is based on is drenched in western values, and that the knowledge accumulated in them is particularly based on investigations within western European practices. Therefore, we hold that the categories defined and brought together in the strategy-as-force model are prone to be useful particularly inside these practices. Hence, we recommend the model to be used as an interpretive scheme for the decisions and actions behind urban development projects, particularly because it sheds a broader light on them than has often been done hitherto. By describing the strategies behind urban development projects in terms of planning, venturing, learning, and visioning, it should be possible to explore and define different strategy 'types' depending on the order of urban development resources as they become mobilized through time. Moreover, operationalizing these strategies in terms of urban development rules and resources provides comprehensive tools for reflections with practitioners. Combining these reflections with ongoing research, the model proposed in this thesis could contribute to a productive relationship between urban development research and practice, and the (re)shaping of urban development project strategies. This is why we defined the Rotterdam CityPorts project as one that has the potential to change the emerging practice of *gebiedsontwikkeling* to which it belongs (section 2.2) – a practice that knows how to balance instrumental rationality with the core values of our society. In order to contribute to such a practice, more research obviously needs to be done in order to further develop the strategy-as-force model presented in this thesis, and to increase its usefulness in the realization of contemporary urban development projects. This means making use of the model to interpret and reflect on other cases, and finding out to what extent the model helps all those involved to understand what effective strategies for urban development projects are all about.

Notes

1. This is what Giddens (1984: 6) calls 'reflexive monitoring' within social systems.
2. One of the practitioners reviewing the Rotterdam CityPorts story commented on this point by stating that it had proven hard to get municipal civil servants involved due to the fact that the CityPorts area was literally not on their map. Within the municipal walls, the port area had a different color. Moreover, it was added that [...] 'you did not concern yourself with the other one's land. And if you did, then there would surely be a struggle'.
3. In several interviews with the municipal administration service (*gemeentelijke bestuursdienst*), it was explicitly stressed that these two tasks – Port Alderman and Chair of the HbR Board of Commissioners – were

treated with considerable prudence as political interests would not always match with the best interests of the port.

4. By this we mean that the CityPorts project cannot be 'moved' to another area – it is identified and effectively tied to its urban development project situation.

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www.cos.rotterdam.nl (general statistics Rotterdam)
www.bds.rotterdam.nl (administrative documents)
academic.lexisnexis.nl/tudelft (newspaper articles)
www.library.tudelft.nl (books and journal articles).

Relevant Knowledge Networks

Association for European Schools on Planning | Reims, France
    AESOP is a network of universities and university departments that teach and conduct research within the field of urban and regional planning.
    www.aesop-planning.com

The Waterfront Center | Washington DC, United States
    Non-profit education and urban planning organization
    www.waterfrontcenter.org

International Centre for Cities on Water | Venice, Italy
   Non-profit association developing activities connected to the water-city relationship www.citiesonwater.com
   Also: WiN | Waterfront International Network (www.waterfront-net.org)

International Association for Cities & Ports | Le Havre, France
   International network of economic and political bodies representing port cities
   www.iacp.com

Urban Land Institute | Washington DC, United States
   Non-profit research and education organization on land use and real estate development
   www.uli.org

Appendix 1 Chronology of the Case Study

The table below provides an overview of the decisions, actions, and events that have influenced the realization of the Rotterdam CityPorts project. Major decisions and events in bold.

Date/Period		Description of Action (A) Decision (D) Event (E)
2000		
	D	Visie en Durf
2002		
March 6th 2002	E	*Leefbaar Rotterdam* [Liveable Rotterdam] wins municipal elections, claiming 17 of the 45 seats in the Rotterdam City Council. A traditional Labor majority is discontinued (11 seats). A *Leefbaar*-Christian-Liberal coalition is formed. Labor party *PvdA* is forced into the opposition.
November 12th and 14th 2002	**D**	**Rotterdam Municipal Council approves the motion 'Urban Development Port Areas'.**
2003		
February 2003	E	Unofficial founding of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) inside the municipal port authority organization. Former urban planning department director Fred de Ruiter is appointed OMSR Director.
June 5th 2003	D	Rotterdam City Council approves the corporatization of the municipal port authority into the *NV Haven van Rotterdam* [Port of Rotterdam PLC].
2004		
January 1st 2004	**E**	**Official corporatization Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR) and founding of the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC (OMSR).**
January 6th 2004	A	CityPorts Expert Seminar commissioned by the OMSR (World Port Center).
January 2004	A	Port of Rotterdam publishes booklet 'Rotterdam, from CityPorts to Port City'.
June 2004	A	OMSR publishes booklet 'Atlas: *Stadshavens* in Europe'.
June 16th 2004	A*	OMSR organizes Seminar 'New economic dash in the CityPorts of Rotterdam'. Discussion between 60 representatives from business, government, and research institutes (*Hulst* Building, *Noordereiland*).
June 25th 2004	D	The Dutch State, the Province of South Holland, the Rotterdam City-Region, the Municipality of Rotterdam, and the Port of Rotterdam PLC reach a preliminary agreement on the 'Rotterdam Mainport Development Project' including the *Maasvlakte 2* port expansion plan.
August 31st 2004	**E**	**Port of Rotterdam PLC President Director Willem Scholten suspended. Board member Hans Smits appointed as Acting President Director.**
September 16th 2004	E	Presentation of the *Havenplan 2020* by the Municipality of Rotterdam.

November 18-19, 2004	A*	OMSR organizes the 'International Conference CityPorts Rotterdam' (*Droogdok 17*, RDM terrain).
End 2004	E	Smit Internationale opens its head office with 240 employees on the eastern shore of the *Waalhaven* in the CityPorts Area.
November 2004	E	Municipality of Rotterdam, Port of Rotterdam PLC, OMSR and a Project Developer sign an agreement for the development of 20,000 sqm of office space on the eastern shore of the *Waalhaven* (next to Smit International Head Office). The project is named 'DockWorks'.
2005		
January 1st 2005	E	Acting President Director Hans Smits is appointed President Director of the Port of Rotterdam PLC by the Rotterdam City Council.
January 2005	E	Economic Development Board Rotterdam publishes 'Economic Vision Rotterdam 2020' and names CityPorts as a 'hot spot'.
January 26th 2005	D	Dutch Council of State annuls State-level decisions to execute the 'Rotterdam Mainport Development Project' including the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan.
February 2005	A	OMSR publishes booklet 'Big and Beautiful: Comparing *Stadshavens* in Europe'.
Spring 2005	A	OMSR publishes 'Rotterdam CityPorts Knowledge Atlas'.
May 2005	A	Start discussions with Ministry of Spatial Planning, Housing and Environment (VROM) on possible CityPorts Key Project nomination and collaboration on environmental issues.
May-June 2005	E	Second Rotterdam Architecture Biennale 'The Flood' takes place. Biennale Curator Adriaan Geuze opens public debate on State-designated residential areas in the *Zuidplaspolder*, a polder outside of Rotterdam.
June 15th 2005	E*	The Foundation Architecture Institute Rotterdam (AIR) organizes a public discussion on the CityPorts assignment (*De Unie*).
June 2005	A	OMSR publishes the Rotterdam CityPorts Development Strategy Concept Document.
April-October 2005	A	Development Strategy consultation and information round executed by the OMSR.
July 4-15, 2005	A*	OMSR organizes the 'Architecture Summer School 2005' in collaboration with the Academy of Architecture and Urbanism, the Dutch Architecture Institute (NAi) and the *Hogeschool Rotterdam*. Housing Corporation *Woonbron Maasoevers* provides student housing.
July 2005	A	OMSR initiates 'Folly Dock' on initiative of resident artist Lowieke Duran.
September 2005	E	General Director Stam and the Director of Economy of the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR) [urban development department] fired by Alderman Pastors.
September 2nd 2005	D	The Dutch State, the Province of South Holland, the Rotterdam City-Region, the Municipality of Rotterdam, and the Port of Rotterdam PLC sign the agreement on the 'Rotterdam Mainport Development Project (PMR)'. The agreement holds the Dutch State to buy 33 percent of the Port of Rotterdam stock for a total of €500 million as of January 1st 2006.
September 2-4, 2005	E	The yearly 'World Harbor Days Rotterdam' take place.
September 2005	A	OMSR organizes design competition 'Bridge of the Future' together with the *Gemeentewerken* [municipal works] department.
September 2005	A	OMSR organizes seminar 'Creativity meets Business' on the RDM terrain.

Fall 2005	A	OMSR publishes the 'Historical Atlas CityPorts Rotterdam'.
December 1-2, 2005	A	OMSR organizes a 2-day conference with the International Association of Cities & Ports (IACP Days Rotterdam).
November 8th 2005	E	*Leefbaar Rotterdam* Alderman of Traffic, Transport, and Organization (i.e. Physical Infrastructure) Pastors is forced to leave office by the Rotterdam City Council due to controversial media statements. Mayor Ivo Opstelten takes over the Physical Infrastructure portfolio.
November 2005	A*	OMSR announces International Idea Competition 'Unorthodocks' for the (area around the) *Dokhaven* at RDM.
November 11th 2005	E	Carnegie Mellon professor Richard Florida visits Rotterdam to explain his Creative Class research in Rotterdam's New Luxor Theater.
December 2005	A*	Opening of the *Droogdok 17* OMSR office and conference building.
December 13th 2005	E	Rotterdam City Council appoints Adriaan Visser as the new Director of the municipal urban development department OBR.
2006		
January 1st 2006	D	Dutch State becomes one-third shareholder of the Port of Rotterdam PLC in return for *PMR* project financing.
February 6th 2006	**D**	**Rotterdam CityPorts 'north-south deal' established in the Shareholder Meeting under the condition of clarity about its financial consequences.**
February 28th 2006	D	The Rotterdam Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) establishes and publishes the strategic document 'Rotterdam: Gateway to Europe' featuring the CityPorts project.
March 2006	D	Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR) Director Fred de Ruiter announces his resignation and retirement as of June 2006.
March 7th 2006	E	Rotterdam municipal elections 2006. Labor party *PvdA* regains a majority vote (18 seats of total 45) over party *Leefbaar Rotteram* 11 seats). A Labor-Christian-Liberal-Green coalition is formed. *Leefbaar Rotterdam* is forced into the opposition. Port Alderman Van Sluis announces his withdrawal from politics.
May 11th 2006	E	Official visit of the Minister of Spatial Planning, Housing & Environment (VROM) Sybilla Dekker to the CityPorts Area.
May 18th 2006	E*	Final Presentations Design Competition 'Unorthodocks' for the (area around the) *Dokhaven* at RDM.
Summer 2006	E	Exposition 'Folly Dock' in the Dutch Architecture Institute (NAi).
June 8th 2006	E	OMSR Director Fred de Ruiter officially resigns into retirement. Deputy Director Wil van der Hoek is appointed Acting Director. Theo Schut is appointed Executive Advisor.
June – October 2006	E	Exhibition 'Over a Different Stern' in Rotterdam Maritime Museum featuring the CityPorts area as the latest step in the redevelopment of Rotterdam's old(er) port areas.
June 24th 2006	E	Rotterdam Architecture Day takes place in CityPorts Area.
July 10-21, 2006	A*	OMSR organizes the 'Architecture Summer School 2006'.
July, 2006	D	Municipality publishes 'Rotterdam: Gateway to Europe' brief featuring Rotterdam CityPorts after approval of the new City Council.
August 2006	E	Exhibition 'Monaco on the Muse' on former RDM site in CityPorts Area.
September 1-3, 2006	E	The yearly 'World Harbor Days Rotterdam' take place. The program includes an excursion to the historic RDM terrain and the renovated RDM office *Droogdok 17* in the CityPorts Area.

Appendix 1 Chronology of the Case Study

September 2006	D	Municipal Board Program 2006-2010 published. The program features the Rotterdam CityPorts project.
October 10th 2006	D	Dutch Lower House accepts renewed 'Rotterdam Mainport Development Project' including *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan.
October 31st 2006	E*	Official kick off of the 'CityPorts Academy Rotterdam' at RDM.
November 2006	E	Port Alderman De Boer is forced to take a leave of absence due to health problems. Mayor Opstelten decides to supervise the portfolio.
December 5th 2006	**D**	**Establishment of the 'Headline Agreement CityPorts Project' between the Municipality of Rotterdam and Port of Rotterdam PLC.**
November 22nd 2006	E	Dutch State elections. The Christian democrats (*CDA*) win the elections and receive 41 seats in the 150-seat Lower House of Parliament (*Tweede Kamer*). Labor party *PvdA* comes in second with 33 seats. Socialist party *SP* wins 25 seats, while Liberal party *VVD* is left with 22.
December 14th 2006	D	Rotterdam Board of Mayor & Alderman informs the City Council about the 'Headline Agreement CityPorts Project' between the Municipality of Rotterdam and Port of Rotterdam PLC. Mayor Opstelten personally negotiates an agreement with the responsible City Council Committee in order to avoid time-consuming Council-wide deliberations. The Council Committee raises some issues that demand formal answers.
December 15th 2006	D	Dismantling of OMSR publicly announced.
2007		
January 2007	A	Rotterdam Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) publishes a concept version of the *Stadsvisie* [City Vision] for a public consultation round.
February 7th 2007	A	Rotterdam Board of Mayor & Alderman (B&W) sends a letter to the responsible City Council Committee answering all issues raised in December 2006. Council-wide deliberations are avoided.
February 22nd 2007	D	Her Royal Highness Queen Beatrix confirms the installation of a Christian-Labor State administration consisting of the parties *CDA* (41 seats), *PvdA* (33 seats), and *Christen Unie* (6 seats).
April 7th 2007	E	Alderman Roelf de Boer (Economy, Port & Environment) is officially substituted by Liberal (*VVD*) colleague Mark Harbers due to persisting health problems.
April 11th 2007	D	Rotterdam City Council approves Environmental Effects Report and Land Use Plan of the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan.
April 24th 2007	D	The European Commission decides not to raise any objections to the contribution of the Dutch State to the Rotterdam Mainport Development Project (PMR) including the *Maasvlakte 2* expansion plan.
April 25th 2007	D	The Municipality and Port of Rotterdam publish the Rotterdam CityPorts Implementation Program 2007-2010.
May 1st 2007	D	Municipal official Hans Beekman is appointed Director of the Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau.
May 4th 2007	E	Minister of Spatial Planning, Housing, and Environment Jacqueline Cramer visits the CityPorts area during a South Holland expedition.
May 10th 2007	E	Kick Off Rotterdam Climate Initiative (RCI). The Municipality of Rotterdam, Port of Rotterdam PLC, Environmental Agency DCMR, and Deltalinqs set the goal to reduce 50% of Rotterdam's CO_2 production by the year 2025 in comparison with 1990.
May 26th 2007	E*	Opening of 'FollyDOCK EXPO' in the CityPorts Area.

May-September 2007	E	Third Rotterdam Architecture Biennale 'Power' takes place.
June 12th 2007	D	Collaboration Agreement CityPorts Project between the Rotterdam Municipality and Port of Rotterdam PLC signed. Official decision to go ahead with dismantling the OMSR.
July 9-20, 2007	E	Organization of the 'Architecture Summer School 2007'.
July 10th 2007	D	The Municipality of Rotterdam publishes the results of the *Stadsvisie* [City Vision] Rotterdam consultation round.
July 12th 2007	E	The Minister and State Secretary of Education, Culture, and Science (OCW) visit the RDM Campus and terrain.
September 7-9, 2007	E	World Harbor Days take place in CityPorts Area.
October 29th 2007	**D**	**Port Alderman Harbers and Ministers Cramer (Spatial Planning) and Eurlings (Transport and Water) sign the Brief '*Randstad Urgent*' featuring the CityPorts project.**
November 29th 2007	D	Rotterdam City Council approves the *Stadsvisie: Ruimtelijke Ontwikkelingsstrategie 2030* [City Vision: Spatial Development Strategy 2030] featuring the CityPorts project as one of thirteen Very Important Projects (VIPs).
December 2007	A	Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau publishes booklet 'CityPorts: Six Images of the Future'.
December 18th 2007	D	As primary shareholder of the *NV Haven van Rotterdam* (HbR), the Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) approves the closure of €2 billion in loans in order to finance the Project Mainport Development Rotterdam (PMR) including *Maasvlakte 2*.
December 19th 2007	A	Administrative meeting with the Ministry of Spatial Planning (VROM) about the VROM project 'Areas in Transition'.
December 27th 2007	D	Official establishment of the Foundation CityPorts Academy Rotterdam.
2008		
January 11th 2008	E*	New Year Reception with speeches by Hans Beekman (Director Project Bureau CityPorts), Minister Cramer (Spatial Planning) and Alderman Harbers.
January-February 2008	**A**	**The Municipality of Rotterdam and Port of Rotterdam PLC reach an agreement on financing the deficit in the development of the RDM terrain.**
May 2008	A	Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR) publishes booklet 'Rotterdam CityPorts: 1600ha Creating on the Edge'.
May 7th 2008	D	Intention Agreement 'Rotterdam Climate Campus' signed.
May 28th 2008	E	Kick-off educational program 'The Ideal Port', an initiative of the *Hogeschool Rotterdam* and the port authority.
May 30th 2008	A	Visit of the Board of Mayor and Alderman (B&W) to the port city of Hamburg, Germany.

* Attended by the researcher.

Appendix 2 Rotterdam CityPorts Strategy Arenas

The three arenas below depict the actors identified in the strategic periods of the Rotterdam CityPorts episode described in this thesis. Actors are complemented by a depiction of the other urban development projects that have been related to that of CityPorts. The most important documents mentioned in the chapters, which are understood as formalized decisions, are also projected. The circle represents the CityPorts strategy arena to which all those intending to realize the project belong. Consequently, some of the actors involved are (partly) depicted outside the arena. In every strategic period defined, these actors have been identified to have more distant or indefinite intentions towards the project's realization. Finally, some trends have been depicted by arrows with the names of the 'opinion leaders' that have been explicitly named during the study of our case.

The Rotterdam Port-City Arena (Period November 2002-January 2004)

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Appendix 2 Rotterdam CityPorts Strategy Arenas

The Case of Rotterdam CityPorts - Period II

Project Mainport Development (*Maasvlakte 2*)

NV Haven van Rotterdam **(HbR)**
Scholten (-Aug '04)
Smits (Aug '04-)

Priorities

Economic Development Board Rotterdam **(EDBR)**

Hogeschool Rotterdam

Albeda College

Media

Port Companies

Creative Class
Florida

Zuidvleugel Platform

Havenplan 2020

Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM)

Gateway

Economic Vision

Advisors

Rotterdam City Council

Mayor of Rotterdam
Opstelten

Alderman of EHM
Van Sluis (-Mar'06)

CityPorts
Merwe/Vierhavens
Waal/Eemhaven

Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR)

Housing Corp. *Woonbron*

Users and Local Residents

Nota Ruimte

Gemeentelijke Bestuursdienst **(BSD)**

Dev. Strategy

Province of South-Holland

Rotterdam-Rijnmond City Region

Municipality of Schiedam

Alderman of FIBS
Pastors (-Nov'05)
Opstelten (Nov '05-Mar '06)

Environmental Protection Agency Rijnmond (DCMR)

Stad van Node

Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam **(OBR)**

dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting **(dS+V)**

RR2020

New *Mathenesse*

Zuidplaspolder

Water
Geuze

Maas/Rijnhaven

The Rotterdam Port-City Arena (Period January 2004-February 2006)

The Case of Rotterdam CityPorts - Period III

Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment (VROM)

Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (V&W)

Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ)

Creative Class *Florida*

Project Mainport Development (*Maasvlakte 2*)

Zuidvleugelvisie

Pieken in de Delta

Zuidvleugel Platform

Port of Rotterdam PLC (HbR)
Scholten (-Aug '04)
Smits (Aug '04-)

Economic Development Board Rotterdam (EDBR)

Housing Corp. *Woonbron*

Hogeschool Rotterdam

Albeda College

Borough of Charlois

Borough of Delfshaven

Borough of Heijplaat

Hamburg HafenCity

London Docklands

CityPorts Academy

Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (RCPB)

Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR)

Users and Local Residents

Advisors
Rotmans/Vellinga

Deltalinqs

Province of South-Holland

Rotterdam-Rijnmond City Region

Rotterdam City Council (Committees)

Randstad Urgent

Mayor of Rotterdam
Opstelten

Alderman of Economic Infrastructure
Van Sluis (-Mar '06)
De Boer (Mar '06-Nov '06)
Opstelten (Nov '06-Apr '07)
Harbers (Apr '07-Apr '09)

CityPorts
Merwe/Vierhavens
Waal/Eemhaven
Maas/Rijnhaven

1600ha

Port Companies

Stadsvisie

Alderman of WRO
Karakus (Mar '06-)

Alderman of WSZG
Schrijer (Mar '06-)

Gemeentelijke Bestuursdienst (BSD)

Environmental Protection Agency Rijnmond (DCMR)

Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam (OBR)

dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting (dS+V)

RR2020

Municipality of Schiedam

Water *Geuze*

Sustainability
Clinton Climate Initiative

Appendix 3 List of Interviewees

No.	Date	Name	Organization	Location
1	January 5 2006	Wil van der Hoek**	Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR)	OMSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
2	January 6 2006	Jeroen van Meel	European Container Terminals (OMSR Dev. Manager 2003-2005)	ECT Home Office, Rotterdam
3	February 3 2006	Nathalie Backx	Port of Rotterdam PLC (PoR)	World Port Center, Rotterdam
4	April 18 2006	Jan van 't Verlaat	Rotterdam Development Corporation (OBR)	OBR Office, Rotterdam
5*	April 24 2006	Cor van Asch	Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR)	OMSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
6*	April 26 2006	Jaap van der Want	Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR)	OMSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
7*	April 26 2006	Monique de Knegt	Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR)	OMSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
8*	May 10 2006	Perry Boomsluiter	Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR)	OMSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
9*	June 19 2006	Kees Christiaanse	Kees Christiaanse Architect & Partners (KCAP)	Faculty of Architecture, Delft
10	March 12 2007	Ria van Oosterhout	Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company	OMSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
11	March 12 2007	Isabelle Vries	Port of Rotterdam PLC (PoR)	World Port Center, Rotterdam
12	April 25 2007	Wil van der Hoek	Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company (OMSR)	OMSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
13	June 5 2007	Hans Mani	Rotterdam Development Corporation (OBR)	OBR Office, Rotterdam
14	July 17 2007	Henk de Bruijn	Port of Rotterdam PLC (PoR)	World Port Center, Rotterdam
15	July 30 2007	Remco Neumann	Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR)	PbSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
16	February 5 2008	Valéry Hunnik**	Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR)	OBR Office, Rotterdam
17	February 14 2008	Remco Neumann	Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR)	PbSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
18	June 9 2008	Remco Neumann	Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR)	PbSR Office Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
19	October 15 2008	Remco Neumann	Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR)	PbSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
20	October 23 2008	Hans Beekman	Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau (PbSR)	PbSR Office, Rotterdam (*Heijplaat*)
21	October 24 2008	Hans Mani	Municipal Development Corporation (OBR)	OBR Office, Rotterdam

22	November 4 2008	Isabelle Vries	Port of Rotterdam PLC (PoR)	World Port Center, Rotterdam
23	November 6 2008	Suus Hubregtse	Rijnmond Environmental Protection Agency (DCMR)	DCMR Office, Schiedam
24	November 4 2008	Wio Schaap**	Municipal Administration Service (BSD)	BSD Office, Rotterdam
25	November 24 2008	Marco den Heijer	Municipal Urban Planning and Housing Service (dS+V)	dS+V Office, Rotterdam.

* Interview together with Marcel van Gils MA
** Requested to review draft of case chapter.

List of Basic Interview Questions

➢ What does a typical day look like for you? What are your activities?
➢ What is the formal role of your organization in the project? What is your personal role? Have these roles changed?
➢ What, according to you, are the main arguments for (or against) the project as it is now developing? Have these arguments changed? If so, why?
➢ How would you describe the collaboration between the main organizations/people involved in the project? In what ways has this collaboration changed?
➢ In what ways has your approach to/your organization's collaboration with others changed in relation to the project? What have you learned?
➢ What, according to you, are the crucial next steps in the project's development?

List of interviews Hamburg

No.	Date	Name	Organization	Location
1*	June 6, 2006	Hr. Günther Muncke	Günther Muncke Immobilienconsulting/ Hafencity Hamburg GmbH	HafenCity Hamburg Office
2	June 7, 2006	Hr. Freitag, Hr. Ehm, Hr. Kohns	Jones Lang Lasalle Hamburg	Jones Lang Lasalle Office, Hamburg
3*	June 8, 2006	Hr. Hurtienne, Hr. Becker	Hamburg Port Authority	HPA Office, Hamburg
4*	June 8, 2006	Dr. Schubert	Hamburg-Harburg University of Technology/HafenCity University	TUHH Campus, Harburg
5*	June 9, 2006	Hr. Märkt	Handelskammer Hamburg	Handelskammer Office, Hamburg
6*	June 9, 2006	Hr. Saadhoff	Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit.	BWA Office, Hamburg.

* Interview together with Marcel van Gils MA.

Appendix 4 Translations and Abbreviations

In this thesis, the names of most Dutch organizations and projects will not be translated. Also, Dutch abbreviations will be used in the text. Name translations into the English language will only be used if they are commonly known as such in Dutch practice.

English	Dutch	Abbreviation
(Alderman of) Economy, Port, and Environment – also: Port Alderman	*(Wethouder van) Economie, Haven en Milieu*	EHM
(Alderman of) Living and Spatial Planning	*(Wethouder van) Wonen en Ruimtelijke Ordening*	WRO
(Alderman of) Physical Infrastructure, Public Space and Sports	*(Wethouder van) Fysieke infrastructuur, Buitenruimte en Sport*	FIBS
Board of Mayor and Alderman	*College van Burgemeester en Wethouders*	B&W
CityPorts Rotterdam	*Stadshavens Rotterdam*	SR
City Council Committee	*Raadscommissie*	-
Economic Development Board Rotterdam	*Economic Development Board Rotterdam*	EDBR
(Council Committee of) Economy, Social Affairs, Port, Environment and Transport	*(Raadscommissie) Economie, Sociale Zaken, Haven, Milieu en Vervoer*	ESHMV
(Council Committee of) Physical Infrastructure, Public Space and Sports	*(Raadscommissie) Fysieke infrastructuur, Buitenruimte en Sport*	FIBS
Environmental Effects Report	*Milieu Effecten Rapportage*	MER
Fund for Economic Structure Enforcement	*Fonds Economische Structuurversterking*	FES
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment – also: Ministry of Spatial Planning	*Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer*	VROM
Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management – also: Ministry of Transport	*Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat – also: Rijkswaterstaat*	VenW
Municipal Administration Service	*gemeentelijke bestuursdienst*	BSD
Municipal Works	*Gemeentewerken*	GW
Port of Rotterdam PLC – also: port authority	*N.V. Haven van Rotterdam*	HbR
Project Mainport Development Rotterdam	*Project Mainportontwikkeling Rotterdam*	PMR
Rijnmond Environmental Protection Agency	*Dienst Centraal Milieubeheer Rijnmond*	DCMR
Rotterdam CityPorts Development Company PLC – also: development company	*Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens Rotterdam*	OMSR
Rotterdam City Council	*Rotterdamse gemeenteraad*	-
Rotterdam CityPorts Project Bureau	*Projectbureau Stadshavens Rotterdam*	PbSR
Rotterdam Municipal Development Corporation – also: urban development dept.	*Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam*	OBR
Rotterdam Municipal Port Authority – also: port authority	*Gemeentelijk havenbedrijf Rotterdam*	GHR
Urban Planning and Housing Service – also: urban planning department	*dienst Stedebouw en Volkshuisvesting*	dS+V
Societal Cost-Benefit Analysis	*Maatschappelijke kosten-baten analyse*	MKBA
Urgency Program *Randstad*	*Urgentie Programma Randstad (ook: Randstad Urgent)*	UPR

Maashaven Silo bv

Rabobank

Creative Factory

Summary

Strategy as Force
Towards Effective Strategies for Urban Development Projects:
The Case of Rotterdam CityPorts

Tom Daamen

The Dutch practice of gebiedsontwikkeling is characterized by a growing sense of inef-fectiveness in realizing its ambitions. The source of this feeling is often attributed to an excessive amount of laws and regulations, to an increasing number of well organized in-terest groups, and to ambiguous and time-consuming planning procedures. Solutions are almost automatically sought in the adjustment of existing laws and legal directives, and in the formalization of new forms of cooperation through which ambitions are seemingly pursued more effectively. When these solutions fail, explanations are often sought in a lack of social, interpersonal factors such as leadership, expertise, commitment, mutual trust, and perseverance. Thus, effective strategies for urban development projects do not only seem to consist of appropriate legal arrangements and other planning instruments. They are also composed of the ability to draw together different interests, skills and perspectives and continuously assess the feasibility of shared ambitions. In the complex and dynamic context of urban development, it is essential to understand how these strategies come about. The objective of this thesis is to propose such an understanding.

Urban Development Projects
The research presented in this thesis has taken place against the background of a much broader search for an effective planning practice in the Netherlands. And not just here. The consequences of an ongoing liberalization are felt in practices throughout Europe, as well as those of changing laws and regulations. New relationships between (semi-)govern-ment agencies, citizens, and private sectors, and a general shift from urban expansion to development projects inside existing urban areas provide unprecedented challenges. This implies a current, ongoing renewal of European urban development practices. In Dutch spatial planning, this ongoing renewal is symbolized by the emergence of *gebieds-ontwikkeling*, a term that primarily refers to collaboration between public and private par-ties in the realization of urban development projects. Given its many problems, *gebieds-ontwikkeling* cannot yet be regarded as an arrived and proven way of working. It is better understood as a practice-in-the-making.

The motive behind our research can be found in the tension between the activi-ties of those involved an urban development project and the institutional environment in which they act. It has often been argued that if Dutch spatial planning practice is to effectively realize its ambitions, many institutions are due to change. Here, the term 'insti-tutions' not only refers to legislation or (administrative) organizational structures, but also to informal rules that determine what is conventional in the way actors work and relate to

each other. Also, common perceptions that actors have of each other (e.g. 'the civil servant' or 'the project developer') or of a particular spatial area (e.g. 'the social neighborhood' or 'green heart') can be understood as being institutionalized. All this implies that it is very difficult for actors to change their perceptions of each other and the areas in which their projects are situated, even though this could open up interesting alternative planning approaches and solutions. In daily practice, acting outside institutional 'structures' often incurs resistance, and produces many conflicts and delays. The structures that sustain this rarely go through radical change – changing them takes a long time. This is why it is important to understand the nature of these structures, why they are so difficult to adapt, and how some actors sustain their inertia while others are able to get them unsettled. With this knowledge, it will possible to specify the relationship between structures and activities in the context of urban development projects, and use the results to reflexively work towards an effective and persistently legitimate practice.

Strategy as Force

We approach the relationship between institutions and actors – or in a more active sense: between structures and individual behavior – by using the work of British sociologist Anthony Giddens. In his theory of structuration, Giddens assumes a mutual influence between individuals and 'the system'. This assumption moves away from so-called structuralist arguments that roughly state that the behavior of people is unilaterally determined by the formal and informal rules of society at large. It also rejects the idea that people are completely free in their choices, even if they have the resources to do so (as is assumed in classical economics). In turn, Giddens suggests that the freedom of every individual is in many ways limited by the rules of his or her social environment. We are aware of many of these rules, and they can often be found in lawbooks and other legal documents. But other rules are much more subtle. These are the product of our upbringing, education and daily interaction with others. According to Giddens, our behavior is thus the result of a constant consideration between what we are able to do (based on resources) and what we feel is allowed (based on formal and informal rules). Hence, the ability of each individual to act freely is limited by both an understanding of personal abilities and by notions of what is possible or permitted in his or her social environment. Strategy, then, represents the capacity to act, but only in relationship to others. This means that strategy is understood as force: it is the force of actors to realize a particular goal according to their knowledge of what they can and cannot do in relation to others. In short, this has been the theoretical approach to the urban development practice central in our study.

Theory and Practice

There are three key insights behind the idea of 'strategy as force' as developed in this thesis. These insights have gradually changed our understanding of the relationship between theory and practice. The first insight is that practice, as indicated above with respect to gebiedsontwikkeling, is essentially evolving. People interact in daily practice, and they tend to learn about and reflect upon what they are doing. In academic literature, this dynamic practice is often described and decomposed on the basis of certain stable substantive characteristics. This leads, for example, to a distinction between the legal, economic, technical, or architectural features of a particular practice or project. These features are then studied

independently, after which theory-based recommendations might be made. However, the research in this thesis does not focus on specific substantive features, but rather on the way these features influence each other. That calls for a sociological approach, because it involves studying what people do when they pursue a common intention, which in our research concerns the realization of an urban development project. For that purpose, we had to find theories that describe and decompose what people actually do in order to realize such projects. These theories have been found in managerial, administrative, and spatial planning literature.

The second insight that led us to the idea of strategy as force can be found in the relationship between actors involved in the realization of an urban development project. This relationship is often unequal, which is signified in practice and research by employing the term power. For example, project developers or aldermen are widely regarded to have more power over the outcome of a project than a single resident, simply because they have the resources to influence decisions and actions of others more strongly and directly. In the Netherlands, land ownership is often identified as a primary resource in this regard, but it has to be acknowledged that this depends entirely on rules. In fact, land can only be described as a power resource when that property is protected by rights, which are in turn enforced by courts of law. In addition, one can also think of situations in which the exercise of power on the basis of land ownership seems possible and even appropriate, but that this would cause enormous damage to the reputation of the landowner. This means that the designation of land as a means of power actually implies the formal and informal rules at work in a particular practice. This, in turn, points out the context-dependency of our strategy as force concept.

Because the term power is often interpreted negatively, we have chosen to use the term force in this thesis. Indeed, the power to realize an urban development project can be experienced very differently between actors. However, it is important to acknowledge that this cannot be avoided. Unequal power relations are inherent to our society, which means that decisions and actions in favor of one actor, group, or organization tend to penalize another. However, a contemporary urban development project is not the result of the efforts of merely one actor, group, or organization, but of many. Together, these actors will all influence the direction of a project towards desired outcomes, based on a consideration of what they are able to do (resources) and what they feel is allowed (rules). In this collective game of influencing, we find the third and final insight that led us to the idea of strategy as a force: the role of values. Many studies have shown that decisions and actions in spatial planning practices are not fully informed and rational. Even though this ideal has long been pursued, it is becoming more widely acknowledged that this pursuit produces an urban development practice that is neither realistic nor desirable. In fact, human decisions and actions are based on a mix of rational and value-laden judgments – and so they should be. On the level of an entire practice, it is however crucial to consider those judgments in light of shared values like liberty, truth and equality. These common values are protected by the mechanisms of our democratic society, where powerful decisions and actions ought be publicly legitimized. Because there are always those who lose by that legitimacy, it is imperative to make decisions and actions as carefully as possible. This is why strategy as force, both in theory and practice, should be both effective and legitimate.

Resources and Strategies

In practice, urban development projects are signified by concrete material interventions in a geographically bounded urbanized area. The strategies behind these projects essentially consist of decisions and actions, which are produced by actors who intend to realize buildings, infrastructure and public space. These facts provide a breeding ground for specifying Giddens' theory of structuration. In this thesis, this has been done in two ways.

First, we introduced the concept of urban development force. Following Giddens' theory, we assumed that this force is created by mobilizing resources that consist of two types: allocative and authoritative. Allocative resources involve control over tangible products or means of production. These allow actors to persuade others to do things they would otherwise not do or choose to do differently. The four resources we propose to effect the realization of an urban development project are property, finance, instruments, and time/result. Authoritative resources are much less tangible. These enable people to determine and coordinate the decisions and actions of others. In this category, we propose information, expertise, legitimacy, and dedication as four distinct urban development resources. Together, these eight resources are proposed to create the urban development force necessary to make projects come to life.

The second way Giddens' theory has been specified is by categorizing the strategic decisions and actions by which certain resources are mobilized. We have done this by employing a four-fold definition of strategy, as devised by Canadian management scientist Henry Mintzberg. He argues that when people pursue a common intent in an organized way, four different strategic activities can be identified: planning, visioning, venturing and learning. According to Mintzberg, strategic planning and visioning covers all deliberate attempts of an organization to realize its goals, during which it also seeks to impose these goals on its environment. Venturing and learning, however, concerns emergent decisions and actions that respond to unforeseen events and circumstances. These strategic decisions and actions are also responsive to what is enforced on the organization by the environment.

The concepts of Giddens and Mintzberg represent human processes of interaction that are similar to those in the international spatial planning literature. Here, researchers show that spatial strategy formation also has its deliberate and emergent components. Thus, strategic spatial plans can be perceived temporary results of a process of deliberate plan-making, which is substantively affected by a multitude of interests, skills and perspectives. Such plans are both media of communication and devices of control: not only to they present the intentions of actors, but they also tell others what they must do in order to realize those intentions. Of course, the latter presupposes a high degree of influence over the decisions and actions of others – an assumption that rarely holds in practice, which often leads to emergent decisions and actions.

Three Research Questions

The theoretical model above should be seen as the result of an interactive process between theory and empirical data. This implies that during the research, different interpretations of the research material have been tested – a process in which usefulness has been an important criterion. By usefulness we mean that our interpretation should be able to provide a comprehensive view of the decisions and actions that constitute the strategies behind urban development projects, and that this view should provide a basis for actors involved to reflect on them and make them more effective.

In this thesis, the strategy behind an urban development project is perceived as a sequence of decisions and actions produced by actors who intend to realize the project. Decisions are conceived as commitments to action, which are often formally documented in practice. Intentions are much harder to trace. Sometimes actors are not as aware of their intentions, and pursuing them can have many unintended effects. That is the complexity of collective efforts to effect (or affect) the realization of an urban development project: the amount of actors involved is essentially unlimited because any decision and action can potentially influence a project's outcome. Based on actual decisions and actions, we have nevertheless attempted to identify the actors who portray the intention to realize an urban development project. Besides, it is hard to imagine decisions and actions without any intention, just as it is difficult to recognize strategies without any consistency in the decisions and actions observed. However, all of this does call for an in-depth investigation, because we are not only interested in what actors say about their (deliberate) strategy – we are also looking for emergent decisions and actions. Comparing these two can illuminate to what extent actors are able to unilaterally impose their plans to realize an urban development project on others, and why these plans get adjusted along the way.

Next to the way actors influence an urban development strategy based on their resources, we already stated that we are also interested to what extent the decisions and actions of these actors are structured by rules. In order to study these rules, we made use of the concept of 'actor orientations', as developed by German political scientist Scharpf. On the one hand, these actor orientations consist of perceptions, which are widely shared by the actors involved. On the other, orientations consist of interests, norms and identities that are specific to a particular actor, group, or organization. Widely shared orientations are usually broadly communicated which, according to Scharpf, also makes them accessible to the researcher. This has led us to the formulation of the following three research questions. The extent to which certain actor orientations are reflected in the sequence of

decisions and actions studied is therefore equal to the degree to which strategy follows by structure.

> **What can we expect? What is actually done? Does strategy follow structure?**

The Critical Case of Rotterdam CityPorts

In this thesis, the answers to the three research questions above are based on an in-depth, single case study. Since the objective of the research is to make general statements about the strategies behind urban development projects, the selection of this case becomes very important. Hence, we are not looking for a typical example, but for a so-called 'critical' case: a project where the interests of actors are high (political forces), where land is scarce (economic forces), and where the debate on how that land is used is fierce. According to international literature, waterfronts in port cities are areas where these forces come together most eminently. Although they clearly play a role in any urban development project, they are understood to reach critical levels on port-urban waterfronts. To understand the strategies behind urban development, it is thus logical to do an in-depth study of such a critical case. That case is CityPorts: an area of 1600 hectares within the rim of Rotterdam, accommodating more than 850 businesses and approximately twenty thousand jobs. In the next twenty to forty years, the area is set to transform into a special living and working environment with the continuation of significant port operations. Rotterdam CityPorts is thus an extremely complex operation from which many lessons can be drawn. As such, it is the laboratory of our study into the strategies behind urban development projects.

Rules between City and Port

Just like the above questions, the results of our research consist of three parts. The first concerns the orientations of port-city actors. Within the theoretical framework developed, these orientations can be interpreted as urban development rules: rules that actors appear to conform to in their decisions and actions. To what extent can we recognize such rules in the case Rotterdam CityPorts? A comparison between the case – described from November 2002 to May 2008 – and the international literature on the development of ports, of port-city relationships, and waterfront projects leads us to draw the following conclusions.

The most persistent orientation shared among the actors involved in the realization of Rotterdam CityPorts is that of a continuous migration of port functions leading to re-development opportunities. However, our study provides little evidence of such a migration process. Moreover, the story of CityPorts shows that the motive for such a migration process in Rotterdam (the realization of Maasvlakte 2 expansion plan) cannot be expected before 2012. Next to this, the migration of port operations within the CityPorts area are also still a possibility, and the departure of short-sea transhipment functions in the area is not being expected nor encouraged. Yet, the expectation that (other) port functions will eventually move out of the area has over the years been continued in various policy documents and plans featuring the Rotterdam CityPorts project. We can therefore conclude that the perceived migration process is more a deliberate plan than a series of emergent decisions and actions of port companies. Our case study shows that the perception of con-

tinuing port migration can be regarded as an urban development rule. Though historically accurate, this perception has in Rotterdam been overtaken by reality.

The second approach widely shared in the case is that of economic growth and competition. This perception appears undisputed among actors, but is less persistent than that of port migration. That is because in the CityPorts area, preferences of the port authority and port city administration particularly conflict with each other. In this area, the word 'economy' has a water-bound connotation, while actual economic features and development opportunities prove to be much more diverse. Hence, the formal separation between port and city appears to be an artificial one, which has become increasingly propagated by those involved during the period studied. The necessity of a common perspective for the economic development of the Rotterdam CityPorts area thus appears obvious. Institutionalized perceptions that separate port and city from each other – of which the reorganization of the project in 2007 has been a concrete outcome – threaten the endurance of a joint development perspective. This perspective seems to stay limited to the actors directly involved.

The orientation that is least identified as an urban development rule is that of increasing the environmental quality of port and urban land uses. Where this challenge previously led to a geographical separation of functions earlier – and thus to transformation plans – it would later on lead to the appropriation of so-called environmental strategies that would openly question regulatory (im)possibilities. These strategies draw together local experts and state officials to jointly think about the environmental issues in the Rotterdam CityPorts area, which are likely to lead to a status aparte for the project. In this light, connecting the CityPorts initiative to the sustainability agenda of Rotterdam as a whole can be interpreted as an emergent opportunity presenting itself not despite, but due to the environmental problems in the area.

Force Relationships

In this thesis, the case of Rotterdam CityPorts is analyzed on the basis of the strategy-as-force model depicted above. Thus, next to an inventory of the orientations of actors, the case material has been confronted with the theories of Giddens and Mintzberg – theories by which we have argued the way actors have been able to mobilize different resources during strategy formation process. This strategy-as-force interpretation of the Rotterdam CityPorts case has resulted in a distinction between three strategic periods. In the first period (November 2002-January 2004), the focus of the decisions and actions studied shifted from hierarchical planning to area-based learning, while in the second period (January 2004-March 2006), they moved from area-based learning to competitive venturing. In the third strategic period (March 2006-May 2008), the focus finally shifted from competitive venturing to comprehensive visioning.

The above pattern in the sequence of decisions and actions corresponds to the resources and four strategic activities that are related to each other in the strategy-as-force model. This means that, initially, actors were working to mobilize communication and (legal) planning instruments in order to provide the realization of the project with a first impulse. When contracts were being prepared, and both the corporatized port authority and the Rotterdam CityProts Development Company (OMSR) were being founded, a focus on planning efforts was abandoned for an emphasis on strategic learning activities.

Actors studying the area discovered that the CityPorts area was one in which different subareas had very diverse development trajectories. It also became clear that long-term lease contracts and a high amount of required pre-investments made a port-urban transformation financially impossible. Next to the environmental restrictions, port companies in the Rotterdam CityPorts area largely proved to function well. Initial projections of a large residential program were reduced and opportunities to locate port-related office functions in the area were picked up.

The OMSR settled its home office in the heart of the Rotterdam CityPorts area, on the terrain of the former Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij (RDM). Here, the knowledge relations of were extended by the actors involved in the project, and development opportunities in all its subareas started to be identified. Small business initiatives were stimulated, and several development prospects were communicated to the public. This made the CityPorts project more well-known in Rotterdam, but also made the OMSR become isolated from its shareholders – the Rotterdam municipality and port authority – of which particularly the latter was looking to take the development of the area in its own hands. The strategy shifted towards the establishment of material relations, especially in order to raise funds the necessary in making the broad development perspective for the RDM terrain more tangible. This happened when the directors of the Albeda College and the Hogeschool Rotterdam appeared to be interested in locating several educational courses in the old RDM hangars. In addition, different subsidies from higher government tiers were attracted to the area, and cooperation agreements were established with – among others – housing corporation Woonbron Maasoevers for the restructuring of the village Heijplaat.

While planning relationships with local authorities stayed limited to the individual level, our interpretation of the strategy behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project shows a particularly one-sided focus on knowledge and material relationships. A lack of tangible results and the threat that supra-municipal bodies would withdraw their support for the project would bring newly appointed administrators to review the organizational and geographical framework of the CityPorts project. The OMSR disappeared, but the project got a new boost because port and municipal department were now responsible for executive tasks themselves. Continued commitment to the project shown by Mayor Opstelten and Alderman Van Sluis played a crucial role in this phase, which included mobilizing the necessary legitimacy from the City Council and its committees. These deliberative relationships were extended and reinforced in the following and final strategic period, when a lot of energy was put into making deliberate plans which presented a broad perspective for the future of the Rotterdam CityPorts area. In that period, resources mobilized earlier (property, finance, information and expertise) were utilized. An effort was made to, if possible, retain the staff of the OMSR. Previously rejected subprojects were soon implemented, while previous contacts and with the State were followed upon. Hence, the Rotterdam CityPorts project was brought a step closer towards realization.

Towards Effective Strategies

In this thesis, it has been argued on the basis of one critical case that strategies for urban development do not only consist of planning. The above excerpt of the various decisions and actions that have shaped the strategy-as-force relationships behind the Rotterdam CityPorts project is very concise. We therefore invite all those interested to take note of

the full story behind this case, so that the broad interpretation of the strategy formation process presented may be taken up in their own daily practice. The above strategy-as-force model presented above can thus be used to reflect on other cases, and investigate to what extent it helps actors to recognize what strategies for urban development projects are all about. This way, the development of this theoretical model is able to contribute to the emerging practice of gebiedsontwikkeling in the Netherlands: a practice that knows how to balance rationality with the core values of its society – a practice that commonly moves towards effective strategies for urban development projects.

Samenvatting

Strategie als kracht
Naar effectieve strategieën voor stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten:
De casus Stadshavens Rotterdam.

Tom Daamen

De Nederlandse praktijk van 'gebiedsontwikkeling' wordt gekenmerkt door een groeiend gevoel van onvermogen in het realiseren van haar ambities. De oorzaak van dit gevoel wordt vaak toegewezen aan een overdaad aan wet- en regelgeving, aan het stijgende aantal goed georganiseerde belangengroepen, en aan stroperige plan- en vergunningsprocedures. Oplossingen worden vervolgens haast automatisch gezocht in de aanpassing van bestaande wet- en regelgeving en in de formalisering van nieuwe samenwerkingsvormen waardoor betrokken partijen hun ambities schijnbaar effectiever zouden kunnen nastreven. Als die oplossingen niet werken spreekt men vervolgens al snel van een gebrek aan sociale, intermenselijke factoren zoals leiderschap, deskundigheid, betrokkenheid, onderling vertrouwen en doorzettingsvermogen. Effectieve gebiedsontwikkelingsstrategieën vragen dus kennelijk niet alleen om passende contractvormen, plannen en andere instrumenten, maar vooral ook om het vermogen belangen, competenties en perspectieven constant bij elkaar te brengen om zo de haalbaarheid van gemeenschappelijke ambities voortdurend te kunnen blijven beoordelen. In de complexe en dynamische context van gebiedsontwikkeling is het essentieel om te begrijpen hoe dergelijke strategieën in de praktijk tot stand kunnen komen. Het doel van dit proefschrift is om daar een bijdrage aan te leveren.

Stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten
Het onderzoek waar dit proefschrift het resultaat van is, heeft plaatsgevonden tegen de achtergrond van een veel bredere zoektocht naar een effectievere ruimtelijke ordeningspraktijk in Nederland. En niet alleen hier. In vele Europese landen spelen de gevolgen van een doorgaande liberalisering en veranderende wet- en regelgeving deze praktijk parten. Nieuwe verhoudingen tussen (semi-)overheden, burgers en marktpartijen en de verschuiving van uitbreiding naar veelal binnenstedelijke ontwikkelingsvraagstukken zorgen overal in Europa voor ongekende uitdagingen. Dit impliceert dat er in heel Europa sprake is van een actuele, doorgaande vernieuwing van praktijken. In de Nederlandse ruimtelijke ordening wordt deze vernieuwing gesymboliseerd door de opkomst van het begrip 'gebiedsontwikkeling'; een begrip dat vooral verwijst naar een bepaalde samenwerking tussen publieke en private partijen in de totstandkoming van projecten. Gezien de vele problemen kan gebiedsontwikkeling echter nog niet worden opgevat als een bewezen manier van werken. Zij kan beter worden begrepen als een praktijk-in-wording. Daarom hebben wij het in dit proefschrift ook niet over strategieën voor gebiedsontwikkeling, maar over die voor stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten binnen een zich vernieuwende praktijk.

Aanleiding voor het onderzoek is de spanning tussen de handelingen van partijen binnen stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten en de institutionele omgeving waarin zij acteren. Het is al vaak gesteld dat als de Nederlandse ruimtelijke ordeningspraktijk haar ambities effectief wil nastreven, er vele instituties aan verandering toe zijn. Het woord instituties verwijst hierbij niet alleen naar wet- en regelgeving of (bestuurlijke) organisatiestructuren, maar ook naar informele normen die bepalen wat gangbare manieren van werken zijn en hoe actoren zich tot elkaar verhouden. Zo kunnen ook gangbare percepties die actoren hebben van elkaar (bijvoorbeeld 'de ambtenaar' of 'de ontwikkelaar') of van een bepaald ruimtelijk gebied (bijvoorbeeld 'de achterstandswijk' of 'het groene hart') geïnstitutionaliseerd zijn. Dat wil zeggen dat het heel moeilijk is om deze actoren met een andere bril naar elkaar en een gebied te laten kijken zodat alternatieve werkwijzen en oplossingen bespreekbaar worden. Kortom, wanneer mensen niet naar institutionele 'structuren' handelen, levert dat in de praktijk doorgaans veel weerstand op; met alle conflicten en vertragingen van dien. Het lastige aan die structuren is dat ze zelden een radicale wijziging doormaken. Het duurt lange tijd om ze te veranderen, terwijl de noodzaak ervan soms voor iedereen evident is. Daarom is het van belang te weten waarom deze structuren zich zo moeilijk laten aanpassen en hoe sommige actoren deze traagheid in stand houden dan wel weten te doorbreken. Met deze wetenschap kan de relatie tussen structuren en de handelingen van partijen bij stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten onderzocht en concreet gemaakt worden, en kan er met de resultaten gewerkt worden richting een effectievere en blijvend legitieme praktijk.

Strategie als kracht

De relatie tussen instituties en actoren, of (in meer actieve zin) tussen structuren en individueel gedrag, wordt in dit proefschrift grijpbaar gemaakt aan de hand van een theorie van de Britse socioloog Anthony Giddens. In zijn theory of structuration gaat Giddens uit van een wederzijdse beïnvloeding tussen het individu en 'het systeem'. Hierbij gaat hij in tegen de zogenaamde structuralisten, die grofweg stellen dat het gedrag van mensen eenzijdig door de formele en informele regels van de maatschappij wordt bepaald. Ook verwerpt hij de gedachte dat mensen volledig vrij zijn in hun keuzes, zelfs al hebben ze de middelen ervoor (zoals in klassieke economische theorieën). Giddens stelt op zijn beurt dat de vrijheid van ieder individu op vele verschillende manieren beperkt wordt door zijn of haar maatschappelijke omgeving. Van veel regels zijn we ons bewust en deze zijn vaak ook terug te vinden in wetboeken en andere documenten. Maar andere regels zijn veel subtieler; zij zijn het product van onze opvoeding, opleiding en dagelijkse contact met anderen. Ons doen en laten is volgens Giddens het resultaat van een constante afweging tussen wat kan (op basis van middelen) en wat mag (op basis van formele en informele regels). Het vermogen van ieder individu om vrij te handelen wordt dus enerzijds beperkt door een begrip van eigen kunnen en anderzijds door noties van wat mogelijk is of toegestaan wordt. Strategisch is vervolgens het ontwikkelen van dit vrije handelingsvermogen, welke bewust of onbewust dus altijd in relatie tot anderen wordt beoordeeld. Strategie wordt zodoende begrepen als kracht. Het is de kracht van actoren om een bepaald doel te bereiken binnen hun kennis van wat kan en wat mag, hetgeen constant in relatie tot andere actoren binnen de maatschappij wordt bepaald en heroverwogen. Met deze theoretische inzichten is de praktijk van stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten in het onderzoek benaderd.

Theorie en praktijk

Aan de keuze om het idee van 'strategie als kracht' verder uit te werken liggen drie belangrijke inzichten ten grondslag. Deze inzichten hebben gaandeweg ons begrip van de verhouding tussen de theorie en praktijk veranderd. Het eerste inzicht was dat de praktijk, zoals hierboven al aangegeven met betrekking tot gebiedsontwikkeling, in essentie constant aan verandering onderhevig is. Dat komt omdat mensen leren en met elkaar reflecteren op datgene waar ze mee bezig zijn. Deze dynamische praktijk wordt in de theorie vaak beschreven en ontleed op basis van een aantal vaste inhoudelijke aspecten. Hierbij wordt dan veelal onderscheid gemaakt tussen juridische, financieel-economische, (milieu)technische, architectonische en stedebouwkundige kenmerken van een bepaalde praktijk of specifiek project. Deze kenmerken kunnen dan afzonderlijk worden bestudeerd, waarna er op basis van theorie aanbevelingen kunnen worden gedaan. Het onderzoek in dit proefschrift richt zich echter niet op een specifiek inhoudelijk aspect, maar juist op de manier waarop verschillende aspecten in de praktijk met elkaar worden verbonden. Dat vraagt om een sociologische benadering, omdat het dan gaat om het bestuderen van wat mensen doen als zij een bepaalde gezamenlijke intentie nastreven, hier: het realiseren van een stedelijk ontwikkelingsproject. Daarvoor moesten theorieën gevonden worden die het doen en laten van mensen bij een dergelijk project beschrijven en ontleden. Deze theorieën zijn gevonden in de management-, bestuurlijke-, en ruimtelijke planningsliteratuur.

Het tweede inzicht dat geleid heeft tot het idee van strategie als kracht is gelegen in de relatie tussen actoren die betrokken zijn bij de realisatie van een stedelijk ontwikkelingsproject. Deze relatie is ongelijk en wordt zowel in de praktijk als de literatuur grijpbaar gemaakt aan de hand van het begrip macht. Zo hebben projectontwikkelaars of wethouders meer macht over de uitkomst van een project dan een bewoner, simpelweg omdat ze bepaalde middelen hebben om de beslissingen en acties van anderen sterker te beïnvloeden. In Nederland wordt grondeigendom daarbij vaak als belangrijkste middel aangeduid. Die valt of staat echter bij regels. Grond kan immers alleen als machtmiddel worden aangeduid als het eigendom ervan wordt beschermd door rechten die ontleend worden aan wetten, welke op hun beurt weer worden gehandhaafd door de mechanismen van de rechtstaat waarin zij gelden. Ook zijn er situaties denkbaar waarbij beïnvloeding op basis van grondposities opportuun en mogelijk lijkt, maar dat dit de reputatie van grondbezitter enorm veel schade zou berokkenen. Het aanwijzen van grond als machtsmiddel impliceert dus tevens de formele en informele regels van een bepaalde praktijk. Het idee van strategie als kracht is dus contextgebonden.

Omdat macht bij velen een negatieve connotatie heeft, gebruiken we in dit proefschrift het begrip kracht. De kracht om een stedelijk ontwikkelingsproject te (doen) realiseren kan door actoren immers verschillend worden ervaren. Het is echter belangrijk om te onderkennen dat dit niet uit te sluiten is. Ongelijke machtsrelaties zijn inherent aan onze maatschappij, wat wil zeggen dat beslissingen en acties in het voordeel van de ene actor, groep, of organisatie bedoeld of onbedoeld ten koste zullen gaan van een andere. Echter, een stedelijk ontwikkelingsproject is vandaag de dag niet het resultaat van de inspanningen van één actor, groep, of organisatie, maar van velen. Allen zullen zij elkaar, op basis van een afweging van wat kan (middelen) en wat mag (regels), beïnvloeden richting een gewenste uitkomst. In dat collectieve spel van beïnvloeding vinden we het derde en laatste inzicht dat aan het idee van strategie als kracht ten grondslag ligt: de rol van waarden.

Het blijkt namelijk dat beslissingen en acties in stedelijke ontwikkelingspraktijken niet op volledig geïnformeerde en rationele wijze worden genomen. Hoewel dit ideaal lang is nagestreefd, groeit inmiddels het inzicht dat dit geen realistische noch wenselijke stedelijke ontwikkelingspraktijk oplevert. Aan de basis van menselijke beslissingen en acties ligt nu eenmaal een mix van rationele- en waardeoordelen. Dat moet ook zo zijn, maar daarbij is het cruciaal dat in de stedelijke ontwikkelingspraktijk gemeenschappelijke waarden als vrijheid, waarheid, en gelijkheid niet uit het oog worden verloren. De controle daarvan vindt plaats binnen onze democratische samenleving, waar invloedrijke beslissingen en acties in alle openbaarheid kunnen worden gelegitimeerd. Omdat ook die legitimering zijn verliezers kent, is er veel aan gelegen om beslissingen en acties zo zorgvuldig mogelijk te laten plaatsvinden. Daarom dient strategie als kracht, zowel in theorie als praktijk, niet alleen effectief maar ook legitiem te zijn.

Middelen en strategieën

Stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten bestaan uit concrete materiële interventies in een geografisch afgebakend stedelijk gebied. Bij de strategieën achter deze projecten gaat het in essentie om beslissingen en acties met de intentie gebouwen, infrastructuur en openbare ruimte te realiseren. Dat gegeven biedt aanknopingspunten om de theorie van Giddens nader te specificeren. In dit proefschrift is dat op twee manieren gedaan.

Ten eerste hebben we het begrip stedelijke ontwikkelingskracht geïntroduceerd. In navolging van Giddens' theorie zijn wij er vanuit gegaan dat deze kracht ontstaat door bepaalde middelen te mobiliseren welke bestaan uit twee soorten: allocatieve en autoritaire. Bij allocatieve middelen gaat het om controle over tastbare producten of productiemiddelen waarmee anderen kunnen worden overgehaald om dingen te doen die ze niet of anders zouden doen. Bezittingen, financiën, instrumenten, en tijd/resultaat zijn de vier middelen die we dan bij het specificeren van stedelijke ontwikkelingskracht voorstellen. Autoritaire middelen zijn echter veel minder tastbaar. Deze stellen mensen in staat de beslissingen en acties van anderen op te leggen en te coördineren. Hierbij stellen we voor dat het gaat om de middelen informatie, expertise, legitimiteit, en toewijding. Samen zorgen deze acht middelen voor stedelijke ontwikkelingskracht.

De tweede manier waarop de theorie van Giddens is gespecificeerd, is door de strategische beslissingen en acties waardoor bepaalde middelen worden gemobiliseerd te categoriseren. Dit hebben we gedaan aan de hand van een viervoudige definitie van strategie, zoals bedacht door de Canadese bedrijfskundige Henry Mintzberg. Hij stelt dat wanneer mensen op georganiseerde wijze met elkaar een intentie nastreven, hierin vier verschillende strategische bezigheden te herkennen zijn: plannen, visievormen, ondernemen en leren. Onder plannen en visievormen vallen volgens Mintzberg alle opzettelijke pogingen van een organisatie om bepaalde doelen te bereiken, waarbij tevens getracht wordt die doelen aan de omgeving op te leggen. Bij ondernemen en leren gaat het echter om emergente beslissingen en acties die inspelen op onvoorziene ontwikkelingen en inzichten. Hierbij wordt tevens gereageerd op datgene wat de omgeving bij de organisatie tracht af te dwingen.

De concepten van Giddens en Mintzberg belichten vergelijkbare processen als die in de internationale ruimtelijke planningsliteratuur, waarin onderzoekers aantonen dat ruimtelijke strategievorming ook zijn opzettelijke en emergente onderdelen kent. Zo zijn

strategische ruimtelijke plannen het tijdelijke resultaat van een proces waarin opzettelijke plannen en toekomstbeelden inhoudelijk zijn beïnvloedt door een veelheid aan belangen, competenties en perspectieven. Dergelijke plannen zijn zowel communicatiemedia als sturingsinstrumenten: ze geven niet alleen de intenties van actoren weer, maar vertellen ook wat anderen moeten doen om deze intenties te realiseren. Dat laatste veronderstelt natuurlijk een grote mate van invloed over de beslissingen en acties van anderen; een veronderstelling die in de praktijk maar zelden gegrond blijkt en telkens tot ongeplande beslissingen en acties leidt.

Drie onderzoeksvragen

Het theoretisch model hierboven moet worden gezien als het resultaat van een proces waarin theorie en empirie constant op elkaar worden betrokken. Dat wil zeggen dat er verschillende interpretaties van het onderzoeksmateriaal zijn uitgeprobeerd, waarbij bruikbaarheid een belangrijk criterium is geweest. Met bruikbaarheid bedoelen we dat we uiteindelijk concepten en interpretaties hebben gekozen die een ruimere, meer realistische kijk geven op de strategieën achter stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten dan anderen. Dit helpt actoren op deze strategieën te reflecteren en ze effectiever te maken.

In dit proefschrift wordt de strategie achter een stedelijk ontwikkelingsproject gezien als een reeks beslissingen en acties van actoren die de intentie hebben het project te realiseren. Beslissingen worden daarbij opgevat als verplichtingen tot actie, welke in de praktijk vaak formeel zijn vastgelegd. Intenties zijn echter veel lastiger te achterhalen. Soms zijn actoren zich niet zo bewust van hun intenties, of heeft het nastreven ervan vele onbedoelde effecten. Dat is het complexe aan collectieve inspanningen als het (doen) realiseren van stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten: het aantal betrokkenen is in essentie onbegrensd omdat de beslissingen en acties van iedereen in potentie de uitkomst van het project beïnvloedt. Toch doen we een poging om op basis van daadwerkelijke beslissingen en acties actoren in kaart te brengen die de intentie hebben een stedelijk ontwikkelingsproject te (doen) realiseren. Beslissingen en acties zonder enige intentie zijn immers moeilijk

voor te stellen, net als strategieën zonder enige consistentie in die beslissingen en acties. Een en ander vraagt echter wel om diepgaande studie, omdat we niet alleen zoeken naar wat actoren zelf zeggen dat hun (opzettelijke) strategie is; we zoeken ook naar emergente beslissingen en acties. Uit de vergelijking tussen beide blijkt dan in hoeverre actoren eenzijdig in staat zijn het stedelijke ontwikkelingsproject te (doen) realiseren, en in hoeverre ze gedurende het proces zijn gaan afwijken van eerder gemaakte plannen.

Naast de manier waarop actoren door de tijd heen de stedelijke ontwikkelingsstrategie vorm geven op basis van hun middelen, zijn we zoals gezegd ook geïnteresseerd in hoeverre bepaalde structuren de beslissingen en acties van actoren beïnvloeden. Om dit onderzoekbaar te maken hebben we gebruik gemaakt van het concept 'actor oriëntaties' van de Duite politicoloog Scharpf. Deze actor oriëntaties bestaan enerzijds uit percepties (die worden gedeeld door alle actoren) en anderzijds uit voorkeuren: belangen, normen, en identiteiten die door een specifieke actor, groep, of organisatie worden uitgedragen. Oriëntaties die ruim gedeeld en alom uitgedragen worden zijn volgens Scharpf om dezelfde reden voor een onderzoeker gemakkelijk te achterhalen. Dat heeft geleid tot de formulering van de volgende drie hoofdvragen. De mate waarin bepaalde actor oriëntaties doorklinken in de reeks bestudeerde beslissingen en acties staat daarbij gelijk aan de mate waarin strategie wordt gevolgd door structuur.

> **Wat kunnen we verwachten? Wat is er daadwerkelijk gedaan? Volgt strategie structuur?**

Stadshavens Rotterdam als kritieke casus

De drie hoofdvragen hierboven worden in dit proefschrift beantwoord aan de hand van een diepgaande, enkele case studie. Aangezien het onderzoek is gericht op het doen van generieke uitspraken over de strategieën achter stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten, is de selectie van de casus van groot belang. We zijn namelijk niet op zoek naar een doorsnee voorbeeld, maar naar een zogenaamde 'kritieke' casus: een project waar de belangen van vele actoren samenkomen (politiek), waar ruimte schaars is (economie) en waar dus het debat over de wijze waarop die ruimte gebruikt moet worden het hoogst oploopt. Volgens internationale literatuur zijn waterfrontgebieden in havensteden bij uitstek gebieden waarin deze krachten samenkomen. Zij spelen weliswaar in ieder stedelijk ontwikkelingsproject een doorslaggevende rol, maar in waterfrontgebieden bereiken zij een kritiek niveau. Voor het begrijpen van de strategieën achter stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten moet een diepgaande studie worden gedaan naar een dergelijk kritiek geval. Dat geval is Stadshavens: een gebied van 1600 hectare binnen de ruit van Rotterdam waar meer dan 850 bedrijven zijn gevestigd en circa twintig duizend mensen hun beroep uitoefenen. De komende twintig tot veertig jaar moet het gebied veranderen in een bijzondere omgeving waarin gewoond en gewerkt kan worden met behoud van belangrijke havenactiviteiten. Stadshavens Rotterdam is daarmee een uiterst complexe opgave waar veel van te leren valt. Zij is het laboratorium van onze studie naar strategieën achter stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten.

Regels tussen haven en stad

De resultaten van het promotieonderzoek bestaan, conform het aantal hoofdvragen, uit drie delen. Het eerste deel betreft de oriëntaties van havenstedelijke actoren, welke binnen

het gehanteerde theoretisch kader geïnterpreteerd kunnen worden als stedelijke ontwik-
kelingsregels: regels waaraan betrokken actoren zich in hun beslissingen en acties blijken
te conformeren. In hoeverre kunnen we dergelijke regels in de casus Stadshavens Rot-
terdam herkennen? Uit een vergelijking tussen de casus (die is beschreven van november
2002 tot mei 2008) en internationale literatuur over de ontwikkeling van havens, haven-
stad relaties, en havenstedelijke waterfronten blijkt het volgende.

De hardnekkigste oriëntatie die gedeeld wordt onder de actoren die betrokken zijn
bij het (doen) realiseren van Stadshavens Rotterdam is die van een doorgaande migratie
van havenfuncties, welke vervolgens kansen voor herontwikkeling oplevert. Het onder-
zoek biedt echter weinig bewijsmateriaal voor een dergelijk migratieproces. Sterker nog,
uit het verhaal van Stadshavens blijkt dat de aanleiding tot dat migratieproces in Rotter-
dam (de aanleg van de Tweede Maasvlakte) op zijn vroegst in 2012 en door vertragingen
pas later gereed zal komen. Daarnaast blijkt de migratie van havenactiviteiten ook bin-
nen het stadshavengebied nog tot de mogelijkheden te behoren en wordt het vertrek van
short-sea overslagfuncties in het gebied niet verwacht noch gestimuleerd. Toch wordt de
verwachting van de migratie van (andere) havenfuncties in allerlei beleidsdocumenten en
plannen rondom Stadshavens Rotterdam door de jaren heen volgehouden. We kunnen
dus concluderen dat het hier meer gaat om een opzettelijk plan dan een reeks emergente
beslissingen en acties van overslagbedrijven. De doorgaande migratie van havenfuncties
blijkt in onze casus dus een echte havenstedelijke ontwikkelingsregel die historisch gezien
weliswaar klopt, maar in Rotterdam door de realiteit wordt achterhaald.

De tweede oriëntatie die breed uitgedragen wordt in de casus is die van econo-
mische groei en concurrentie. Deze perceptie blijkt onder betrokken actoren onbetwist,
maar is minder hardnekkig dan die van havenmigratie. Dat komt omdat in het stads-
havengebied de voorkeuren van de havenautoriteit en het havenstedelijke bestuur bij
uitstek met elkaar in conflict komen. Het woord 'economie' heeft in dat gebied een wa-
tergebonden connotatie, terwijl de economische functies en ontwikkelingskansen hier
in realiteit veel meer divers zijn. De formele scheiding tussen haven enerzijds en stad
anderzijds blijkt in dit gebied dus een kunstmatige, hetgeen gedurende de onderzochte
periode steeds meer door betrokkenen is uitgedragen. De noodzaak van een gezamen-
lijk perspectief voor de economische ontwikkeling van het stadshavengebied blijkt dus
evident. Gangbare instituties die haven en stad van elkaar scheiden (waarvan de reorga-
nisatie van het project in 2007 een concreet resultaat is) bedreigen het beklijven van een
gezamenlijk ontwikkelingsperspectief. Dit perspectief lijkt nu beperkt te blijven tot direct
betrokken actoren.

De oriëntatie die het minste als stedelijke ontwikkelingsregel kan worden aange-
duid is die van het vergroten van de milieukwaliteit van haven en stedelijk grondgebruik.
Waar deze uitdaging eerder leidde tot een geografische scheiding van functies en dus
tot het maken van transformatieplannen, wordt er later in het proces gewerkt aan zoge-
noemde milieustrategieën die de regeltechnische (on)mogelijkheden openlijk aan de kaak
stellen. Hierbij zijn lokale experts en rijksambtenaren betrokken die meedenken over de
milieuproblematiek in het stadshavengebied, wat wellicht gaat leiden tot een status aparte
voor het project. Het aanhaken op de gebiedsoverstijgende duurzame ontwikkelingsagen-
da in Rotterdam is in dat licht een strategische kans die zich dus niet ondanks, maar juist
door de milieuproblematiek binnen Stadshavens heeft aangediend.

Krachtsrelaties

In dit proefschrift is de casus Stadshavens Rotterdam aan de hand van het bovenstaande strategie-als-kracht model geanalyseerd. Naast een inventarisatie van de oriëntaties van actoren is het onderzoeksmateriaal dus geconfronteerd met theorieën van Giddens en Mintzberg, waarbij is beargumenteerd hoe de voorgestelde middelen door betrokken actoren in het proces van strategievorming zijn gemobiliseerd. Deze strategie-als-kracht interpretatie van Stadshavens Rotterdam heeft drie strategische periodes opgeleverd. Waar in de eerste periode (november 2002-januari 2004) de focus van de bestudeerde beslissingen en acties verschoof van hiërarchisch plannen naar gebiedsgericht leren, is deze in de tweede periode (januari 2004-maart 2006) verschoven van gebiedsgericht leren naar competitief ondernemen. In de derde periode (maart 2006-mei 2008) is het accent ten slotte van competitief ondernemen op omvattende visievorming gaan liggen.

Het patroon in de reeks beslissingen en acties van betrokken actoren corresponderen met de middelen die er in het strategie-als-kracht model aan zijn gekoppeld. Dat betekent dat er in eerste instantie vooral gewerkt is aan het mobiliseren van communicatieve en juridische (plan)instrumenten om zo de realisatie van het project een eerste impuls te geven. Toen overeenkomsten in voorbereiding waren en zowel het verzelfstandigde havenbedrijf als de Ontwikkelingsmaatschappij Stadshavens Rotterdam (OMSR) in oprichting waren, werd het plannen langzamerhand verlaten voor leren. Men bestudeerde het gebied en ontdekte dat het ging om een gebied waarbinnen de deelgebieden verschillende ontwikkelingsrichtingen hebben. Ook werd duidelijk dat het door langlopende contracten en benodigde voorinvesteringen financieel onmogelijk was om het gebied te transformeren. Naast alle milieuproblematiek bleek de havenbedrijvigheid in het stadshavensgebied goed te functioneren. Initiële woningbouwprojecties werden teruggeschroefd en mogelijkheden tot het vestigen van havengerelateerde kantoorfuncties werden opgepakt.

De OMSR vestigde zich in het hart van het stadshavensgebied, op het terrein van de Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij (RDM) waar het zijn kennisrelaties uitbreidde en ontwikkelingskansen in alle deelgebieden in kaart begon te brengen. Initiatieven van kleine ondernemers werden gestimuleerd en verschillende ontwikkelingsperspectieven werden gecommuniceerd. Dat maakte Stadshavens Rotterdam als project bekender, maar bracht de OMSR in een isolement ten opzichte van haar aandeelhouders (de gemeente en het havenbedrijf van Rotterdam) waarvan vooral de laatste de ontwikkeling van het gebied zelf ter hand wilde nemen. De strategie verschoof richting het leggen van materiële relaties, waarbij vooral naar financiële middelen is gezocht om het brede ontwikkelingsperspectief voor het RDM terrein tastbaar te maken. Dat gebeurde toen bestuurders van het Albeda College en de Hogeschool Rotterdam geïnteresseerd bleken in het vestigen van diverse opleidingen in de oude loodsen van de RDM. Ook kwamen subsidies van hogere overheden los en kwam er een samenwerking tot stand met onder andere woningcorporatie Woonbron Maasoevers voor de herstructurering van het dorpje Heijplaat.

De strategie achter Stadshavens Rotterdam bleek zich echter te eenzijdig te richten op kennis- en materiële relaties, terwijl planningsrelaties met gemeentelijke diensten beperkt bleef tot die tussen enkele individuen. Het gebrek aan tastbare resultaten en de dreiging dat steun van hogere overheden voor het project zou worden misgelopen bracht veelal nieuwe bestuurders ertoe de organisatorische en geografische kaders van het stadshavensproject te herzien. De OMSR verdween maar het project kreeg een nieuwe impuls

doordat havenbedrijf en gemeentelijke diensten nu zelf voor uitvoerende taken verantwoordelijk werden. De aanhoudende toewijding van bestuurders als burgemeester Opstelten en wethouder Van Sluis speelden in deze fase een cruciale rol, waaronder in het verkrijgen van de nodige legitimiteit bij de gemeenteraad en haar commissies. Die deliberatieve relaties werden uitgebreid en versterkt in de navolgende en laatste strategische periode, waarin werd gewerkt aan opzettelijke plannen in de vorm van een breed perspectief voor de toekomst van het stadshavensgebied. Hierin is op vele manieren gebruik gemaakt van de middelen (bezittingen, financiën, informatie en expertise) die in de voorgaande periodes gemobiliseerd waren. Het personeel van de OMSR werd waar mogelijk vastgehouden, eerder verworpen deelprojecten werden uitgevoerd, en de contacten met de rijksoverheid werden aangehaald. De realisatie van Stadshavens Rotterdam was zodoende een stap dichterbij gebracht.

Naar effectieve strategieën

In dit proefschrift is aan de hand van een kritieke casus beargumenteerd dat strategieën voor stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten niet alleen bestaan uit het maken van plannen. Het zojuist geschetste overzicht van de verschillende beslissingen en acties die vorm hebben gegeven aan de strategie-als-krachtsrelaties achter het project Stadshavens Rotterdam is zeer beknopt. We nodigen een ieder dan ook uit om van het volledige verhaal van deze casus kennis te nemen, om zo de brede interpretatie van het strategievormingsproces die wij voorstaan te kunnen meenemen in hun eigen dagelijkse werkzaamheden. Zo kan het hierboven gepresenteerde strategie-als-kracht model gebruikt worden om te reflecteren op andere cases, en kan er worden onderzocht in hoeverre het betrokkenen helpt te herkennen wat er bij een strategie allemaal komt kijken. De ontwikkeling en aanscherping van dit theoretisch model kan op deze manier een bijdrage leveren aan de opkomende praktijk van gebiedsontwikkeling: een praktijk die rationaliteit en gemeenschappelijke waarden met elkaar in balans weet te brengen. Een praktijk waarin gezamenlijk wordt gezocht naar effectieve strategieën voor stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten.

Curriculum Vitae

Tom Daamen was born in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, in 1977. Before he started his studies at Delft University of Technology, Tom obtained a BSc degree in construction engineering (*bouwkunde*) at the *Hogeschool van Amsterdam* in the year 2000. After finishing his MSc-thesis at the Faculty of Architecture in the summer of 2003, he continued his research on public-private partnerships in the context of three urban development projects in The Hague. Results were presented in the book *De kost gaat voor de baat uit* [Costs precede benefits], published by *SUN Uitgeverij* in the spring of 2005. By then, Tom had already started his PhD research on the strategies behind waterfront development projects. Next to Rotterdam, this research project has included some fieldwork in the European port cities of Antwerp and (particularly) in Hamburg. This has led to the publication of several conference proceedings and a contribution to a yearly international educational course named 'The Investing City' organized for the Netherlands School of Public Administration. Next to his primary research efforts, Tom has also performed several coordinating activities within the framework of a research collaboration agreement between the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR) and the Faculty of Architecture since March 2004. In 2009, Tom has become more closely involved in the educational program of the post-initial course Master City Developer (MCD), which has been initiated by the department Real Estate & Housing of the Delft Faculty of Architecture, the *Ontwikkelingsbedrijf Rotterdam* (OBR), and the Faculty of Economics of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. He is involved in co-supervising the academic content of the MCD program and performs several management and educational tasks (see www.mastercitydeveloper.nl).

In European urban development practices throughout Europe, there is a recurring need for new perspectives that provide insight into the complexity involved in the realization of projects. This need exists particularly around prestigious projects, where the tension between planning ambitions on the one hand, and the reality of conflicting interests and tight budgets on the other reaches its highest point. In the Netherlands, it is also likely that this tension will not decrease in the coming years. Reason enough for an investigation into strategies for urban development projects.

This thesis combines several existing scientific insights around the phenomenon 'strategy'. Here, strategy is recognized as force. The term force emphasizes that a strategy, as opposed to a plan, provides those involved with the capacity to respond to the continuously changing reality of an urban development project. Thus, an effective strategy not only consists of making plans, but also includes three other strategic activities: venturing, learning, and visioning. These insights are then specified on the basis of the remarkable case of Rotterdam CityPorts – a project between city and port in which political and economic forces are especially amplified. This leads the thesis to develop a comprehensible theoretical model that reflects the complexity occurring in the realization of contemporary urban development projects. This strategy-as-force model is useful for both scientists and practitioners.